Mediation ends in three distinct ways: achievement of the mandate, for instance in the form of a peace agreement; termination by the mediator, by the term limits given by the mandator, or by the warring parties themselves, in effect undermining the third party; or due to external events such as changes in conflict dynamics or concerns about the mediator’s security (threats or assassination). These possible endings are explored using concrete cases.

Following NATO’s military intervention and a very wide-ranging UN peacekeeping mission, Kosovo is today the site of the largest civilian mission of the European Union. In the aftermath of the armed conflict of 1998–9 which was fought along ethnic lines and led to mass atrocities and to the destruction of more than half of the available housing stock, the UN set up a quasi-judicial, administrative mechanism to “resolve” property issues, which was called the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA). Staffed predominantly by Kosovo Albanian national legal professionals and a few international jurists, the KPA was entrusted to deal with war-related property claims submitted overwhelmingly by Kosovo Serbs. Relatively powerless and underfunded, the KPA is a paradigmatic example of a contemporary transitional justice mechanism that is understood as a short-term, bridging, technical-legal project rather than a national process of righting past wrongs. Under the increasing neoliberal managerialism of rule of law as a tool of good governance, the KPA was organized as a mass claims procedure. To “streamline” the process and allow for the “quick” and “efficient” resolution of claims, it used data-processing technologies, and decisions were issued in batches of claims of similar legal scenarios. This chapter conceptualizes the work of the KPA as “law-washing” within the post-cold war juristocratic phase of international intervention and international law more generally. The chapter understands juristocracy in a broad sense, as a diffuse and transhistorical moment in which law is used in often fetishistic, instrumental ways to tackle a range of social and political issues previously not conceived as legal issues. Engaging with law’s “dialectics of reckoning” means analytically making sense of moments (that we may choose to call “juristocratic”) of simultaneous hope in law’s potential to propel the currents of social justice and cynicism and disenchantment about law’s incapacity to “solve” issues beyond law (if at all).

This chapter focuses on the urban and rural landscapes of the Balkans in Late Antiquity, covering modern-day Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia . It examines how cities and countryside areas evolved between the third and seventh centuries, with a particular emphasis on the material traces of early Christianity. The chapter draws on archaeological evidence, historical texts and urban planning studies to highlight the transformation of key cities such as Thessaloniki, Nicopolis ad Istrum and Serdica (modern Sofia). This contribution argues that the Balkans served as a cultural and political bridge between Asia and Europe, influencing the spread of Christianity and shaping imperial policies. It also explores how urban centres adapted to economic shifts and military threats, with some cities reinforcing their fortifications while others declined. Thessaloniki, for instance, maintained its urban layout and economic role, even as certain Roman public buildings fell out of use. Religious change also played a crucial role in shaping the Balkan landscape. Christian basilicas replaced pagan temples, while monasteries and bishopric centres became focal points for local governance and cultural life. The chapter further addresses the challenges of dating archaeological sites, emphasising the need for more precise chronological frameworks.

This chapter analyzes the norm impasses over the status of Kosovo after its declaration of independence in February 2008 and over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following the 2008 August war. Both cases happened within quick succession, revolved around the same well-established norms in the United Nations (UN) Charter – the rights to territorial integrity vs. self-determination – and showed an interesting reversal of sides: While the United States (US) and European states recognized Kosovo’s statehood and rejected Russia’s emphasis on Serbian territorial integrity, the US and European states rejected Russia’s support of South Ossetia’s statehood and emphasized Georgian territorial integrity. These norm impasses became protracted because each side received social support from key audiences, or at least only muted criticism, for their interpretations, lowering the cost of disagreement. These disputes show both the power and limits of international law: The US’s sui generis frame and Russia’s quasi-legal argumentation indicate that there is a strong collective expectation regarding using international law to justify claims. Yet these cases also indicate that protracted norm impasses weaken individual norms: Unclear norm meaning gives leeway for interpretation, which can be used to craft interpretations that appeal to important audiences and thereby reduce pressure to abandon contested norm interpretations.

Chapter 5 examines the evolving legal context and the practical effectiveness of CoE interactions with the central case study, Kosovo. Kosovo is a sui generis case, distinct from all others, but it is an appropriate case study as it has faced and, in several cases, overcome similar engagement challenges. Over more than two decades, the CoE has innovated and adapted its relationship with Kosovo, and so this chapter seeks to illustrate the pragmatism and creativity which can be employed when the political will to do so is in place. The chapter elaborates the principle of engagement on the basis of ‘functional capacity’ and the practice of monitoring substitution.

In Chapter 2 I propose reconceptualising the ‘CoE system’ from one traditionally seen as a hierarchy of autonomous institutions towards an understanding of a matrix of mutually reinforcing judicial and non-judicial components for which Member States have collective responsibility. I argue that a whole-of-system approach is especially important when faced with systemic problems of such complexity. I then offer a high-level snapshot of current examples which exist in Eastern Europe (Transnistria and currently occupied parts of Ukraine), the South Caucasus (the Karabakh region/Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and the Eastern Mediterranean (Northern Cyprus).

The presence of foreign judges on the Constitutional Courts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo is due to the existence of ethnic conflicts and societal divisions which resulted in the internationalisation of their constitutions and centralised constitutional courts. This chapter examines whether and to what extent the presence of foreign judges on these constitutional courts has met the rationale of helping to end or pacify the ethnic conflicts. It compares the influence of foreign judges on adjudication and constitutional law, and their contribution to the legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of the public and political actors. Differences between the working conditions of each court, degree of judicial activism, and the distribution of legitimacy between the court itself and the foreign judges, arise in each context, but the analysis ultimately suggests that the appointment of foreign judges to resolve ethnic conflicts is a ‘mission impossible’.

This chapter examines how the double historical experience with imperialism is incorporated into the collective memory of Ottoman and Post-Ottoman societies and to what end. While collective memory – sociocultural narratives and practices of collectively remembering (and forgetting) specific aspects of the past – and its cultivation reflects to the past it is a product of the respecting present. Using the example of the Battle of Kosovo and the Status of Jerusalem and focussing on the linkages between memory cultures and national identities this chapter highlights how different actors at different points in time have made use of the Ottoman past to shape the Post-Ottoman present according to their respective agenda.

A federalised Serbia was formed after the war, as part of a communist-governed Yugoslav federation. Tito and the Party leadership restored Yugoslavia following four years of occupation and civil war, including a brutal conflict between pro-communist and pro-monarchy Serbs. In the post-war period, Serbia, like the rest of Yugoslavia, experienced modernization and industrialization and it was home to a vibrant arts and cultural scene. Serbia was the only Yugoslav republic that itself was federalized, with the establishment of the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. In the late 1970s, Serbian political leadership and intellectuals objected, from their different positions, to Serbias status in Yugoslavia. In the second half of the 1980s, the Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milošević adopted a nationalist platform which alienated many non-Serbs, undermined pro-democracy forces in Serbia, and destabilized Yugoslavia. Under the guise of the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution, Milošević pushed his agenda in 1988-1989 to restore Serbia’s sovereignty over the provinces, and to extend his influence in Montenegro, where pro-Serb sentiments were strong.

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, after more than thirty years of political limbo, constitutional ambiguity and tension that culminated in the Kosovo War of 1998–1999. The following years witnessed a series of internationally sponsored peace talks, culminating in a Comprehensive Proposal for the Status Settlement in 2007, which Kosovo accepted but Serbia rejected. The Status Settlement proposal served as the basis for Kosovo’s Independence Constitution, which in terms of process, reflects a dynamic interplay between formally internationally-led negotiations on the political status and an informal internationally-supported constitution-making process. In terms of content, it reflects a combination of locally driven choices within internationally imposed guidelines. Therefore, the Kosovo case contributes to the scholarly debate on the legality and legitimacy of internationalized constituting-making processes. While criticism dominates this debate, Kosovo’s experience sheds light on the advantages of such a process in post-conflict contexts. It shows that the internationally influenced constitutional design constraints can also be “enabling” and that the role of external actors can help balance the motivational factors affecting a constitutional design. Furthermore, it reflects how an effectively coordinated partnership between local and external forces can lead to an outcome, which is compatible with the “will of the people”.

Chapter 6 presents the second of the three case studies: Protecting the Individual Human Being from Mass Atrocities. The case study offers a critical discussion of the literature and the development of R2P. The chapter then analyses the discourse on Libya and Syria concerning actions to protect civilians and the potential use of force to do so. The analysis focuses mainly on UN Security Council deliberations. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the individual human being appears in the discourse on protection as innocent civilians or guilty perpetrators or terrorists. As will be demonstrated, this matters for enabling a politics of protection. By analysing the debate on the intervention in Libya in 2011 and dealing with the conflict in Syria, mainly focusing on the years 2011 to 2015, respectively, I demonstrate how these politics of protection play out