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The 1991 Madrid Conference marked a turning point in US-Israel relations and the broader Middle East peace process. After the Gulf War, the Bush administration, led by Secretary of State James Baker, pushed for direct talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Co-sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union, the conference aimed to establish a peace framework based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, emphasizing land for peace. Tensions emerged between the US and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, especially over Israeli settlement policy and the makeup of the Palestinian delegation. The Bush administration linked US loan guarantees for absorbing Soviet Jewish immigrants to a freeze on settlement expansion, increasing pressure on Israel. The conference also exposed divisions within the American Jewish community over US policy and its implications for Israel’s future. This chapter explores the diplomatic maneuvering before Madrid, the negotiations over participation, and the conference’s impact on US-Israel relations. It places Madrid within the broader realignment of US Middle East policy under Bush and assesses its long-term legacy.
When George H. W. Bush ascended to the American presidency in 1989, one of the more urgent relationships that he was faced with building was that with Israel's Yitzhak Shamir. Drawing on newly declassified materials, from American and Israeli state and non-state archives, this book reveals the complexities of a relationship defined by both deep cooperation and sharp tensions. From the peace process to loan guarantees, from military aid to emotional diplomacy, The Strained Alliance uncovers the debates, conflicts, and strategic decisions that shaped this critical period between 1989–1992. In doing so, David Tal challenges the traditional perception that US-Israel relations were dominated by policy disagreements, highlighting instead the broader foundation of collaboration that endured behind the scenes. Tal provides fresh insights into the intricate dynamics of diplomacy, ideology, and leadership, offering a balanced perspective on one of the most pivotal chapters in US-Israel history.
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