The paper advances a novel theoretical perspective on the agency of international organizations (IOs). It argues that existing accounts–whether focused on intraorganizational actors such as bureaucracies or on member-dominated IOs–overlook the fact that IO agency is inseparable from their personification through the ascription, in decision-making and official documents, of various intentions, beliefs, and emotions. To address this gap, the paper draws on Margaret Gilbert’s concept of plural subjects, i.e., collective agents formed through the joint commitment of their members to act as aunified body. Using the UN Security Council as an illustrative case, the paper contends that IOs function as such plural subjects. In doing so, the paper departs from the longstanding criterion in International Relations that IOs must act independently of state interests and preferences to qualify as agents in their own right. It further argues, also contra dominant theories, that IO agency is not transient, but a stable and enduring feature. The paper concludes by outlining the theoretical and empirical implications of this perspective, particularly for understanding institutional moral agency and IO authority.

With formal international organizations (IOs) facing gridlock and informal IOs proliferating, cooperation in the twenty-first century looks different than it did in previous eras. Global governance institutions today also face additional challenges, including a fragmented information environment where publics are increasingly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation. What do these trends portend for international politics? One way to answer this question is to return to a core ingredient of a well-functioning IO—information provision—and ask how such changes affect efficiency. Viewed through this lens, we see decline in some arenas and adaptation in others. Formal IOs are struggling to retain relevance as their weak policy responses and ambiguous rules create space for competing signals. The proliferation of informal institutions, on the other hand, may represent global governance evolution, as these technocratic bodies are often well-insulated from many political challenges. Yet even if global governance retains functionality, the legitimacy implications of such trends are troubling. IO legitimacy depends in part on process, and from this standpoint, the informational gains of informal governance must be weighed against losses of accountability and transparency. Ultimately, evaluating the normative implications of these trends requires making judgments about the preferred legitimizing principles for global governance.

Recent times have been hard for global governance, not least for formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs). Given changing conditions and their inability to adapt, many observers argue that FIGOs are drifting and losing ground to low-cost institutions (LCIs). We argue that this widespread perception is incomplete and that it dismisses too quickly the durability of FIGOs. We begin by pointing out that not all FIGOs are drifting and that some may even thrive amid transnational crises and power shifts. We then highlight the possibility that in a densely institutionalized global environment, states can substitute one FIGO for another. Thus, even as one FIGO is drifting, other FIGOs, rather than or alongside LCIs, can take the mantle. We identify and exemplify three key motivations for FIGO substitution: overcoming gridlock, enhancing ideological alignment, and policy laundering. During crises and power shifts, some members might paralyze a FIGO, leading to gridlock and prompting other members to cooperate in another FIGO. Power shifts and crises can also motivate dissatisfied FIGO members to pursue parallel activities in a FIGO that better fits their ideological outlook. Policy laundering occurs when members use one FIGO over another to signal political intent. We conclude by exploring the normative implications of FIGO substitution.

In the introduction to this roundtable, we argue that global governance currently faces hard times because it is affected by a set of significant developments revolving around the changing distribution of state power, the rise of nationalist populism, and the frequent occurrence of transnational crises, while seeking to facilitate collective action on complex cooperation problems. Against this backdrop, the essay identifies two major institutional dynamics of global governance in hard times: first, the drift of formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) that is caused by them being gridlocked in a period of significant changes in their social, (geo)political, economic, and technological environment. Second, the proliferation of various types of low-cost institutions. To help us think systematically about how these two interrelated institutional dynamics affect global governance, the essay develops the innovation thesis and the decline thesis. The “innovation thesis” suggests that by transitioning from a rather exclusive and hierarchical system revolving around FIGOs into a more inclusive and heterarchical system revolving around institutional diversity, global governance is currently being adapted to its new environment. The “decline thesis,” by contrast, argues that the two institutional dynamics undermine rules-based multilateralism and may lead to a shift back toward traditional (great) power politics that does not respect institutional constraints.

This article examines the Philippines’ engagement with international law and institutions under Duterte’s populist presidency. While populism is often associated with hostility toward multilateralism, this case study reveals a more nuanced dynamic. The article argues that state engagement under populist administrations is more complex than assumed, and populist rhetoric does not uniformly dictate international behaviour. Using a novel conceptual framework and empirical data, it analyzes the Philippines’ multilateral interactions in human rights, trade, and health. Duterte’s government displayed ritualistic engagement with the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), constructive engagement with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Health Organization (WHO), and destructive disengagement from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Key themes include the divergence between rhetoric and action, instrumental use of institutions for domestic priorities, and the critical filtering role of domestic institutions. These findings offer broader insights as to how populist states balance domestic imperatives with international commitments, offering broader insights into the interplay between populism, foreign policy, and multilateralism.

This Article analyzes the role played by international actors, indigenous peoples, and independent lawyers as guardians of democracy in a context where democratic backsliding, abusive judicial review, and institutional takeover has taken place. Using the Guatemalan 2023 electoral process as a case study, this Article sheds new light on authoritarian constitutional practices, evidenced through the judgments of the Guatemalan Constitutional Court and activities of its Criminal Prosecutor’s Office. This Article also considers how foreign governments, international organizations, indigenous peoples, and independent lawyers came to play a guardianship role in the face of the decline of core institutions of constitutional democracy. Techniques such as transnational sanctions, judicial challenges, diplomatic “shaming,” and protest movements were successful in upholding constitutional democracy by discouraging attempts by the courts and government officials to derail the transition of power and annul the electoral results. This Article analyzes how and why these techniques had an impact in the Guatemalan context and extracts lessons and insights, both positive and negative, for dealing with abusive constitutional practices in theory and in practice.

When is science politicized in the international climate change regime? Does greater scientific certainty protect it from becoming politically contentious? I study these questions in the context of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the organization responsible for communicating the global scientific consensus on climate change. Using newly digitized data from inter-state negotiations at the IPCC, I show that states attempt to influence the IPCC’s assessment of scientific consensus in line with their bargaining positions in climate change negotiations. Estimating an ideal-point model, I find that the predominant cleavage over climate science is distributional—between new and old industrializers with broader ideological disagreements, rather than between large polluters and vulnerable countries. Next, I show that this cleavage is mediated by scientific uncertainty. Large polluters are more likely to agree with each other on interpretations of relatively uncertain science, which allows them to jointly weaken the scientific basis for strong climate agreements. Conversely, these countries are less likely to agree on relatively certain science, which heightens conflict over the distribution of the burden of mitigation. Thus greater scientific certainty may change the nature of politicization rather than reducing it.

On 16 March 2022, Russia became the first state to be expelled from the Council of Europe (CoE). The reshaping of power dynamics between international law actors is providing a favourable space to international organizations to use membership as a strategic tool. In order to understand under what circumstances the CoE decides to end membership, the article elucidates the substantive and symbolic grounds of Russia’s expulsion. Substantive grounds are defined as non-compliance with the membership criteria of the CoE and its founding principles as regulated in Article 3 of its Statute. Symbolic grounds are what motivates the CoE in its positioning within the international legal order as indicated in the preamble of its Statute. The analysis of the substantive grounds will reveal that the violation of the CoE Statute and the prohibition on the use of force because of the invasion of Ukraine are not enough to explain Russia’s expulsion. This article argues that Russia’s expulsion relies on symbolic grounds that allowed the CoE to preserve its position as the guardian of European imperialism. The clash of the two actors’ irreconcilable imperial policies proved for the CoE that Russia would no longer be at the receiving end of its demands. The Ukraine invasion signals a breaking point, escalating the inter-imperial rivalry to a level where the CoE believes Russia will no longer submit itself to the European international legal order as shaped by the Western European founders of the Organization.

As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international organizations (IOs) are undergoing significant digital transformation and operate in an increasingly digitalized environment, questions as to how they can continue to ensure their information security are becoming more acute. Legal tools to protect IOs from harm in the digital age are central in this regard, alongside technical and organizational measures. This article focuses on one specific legal tool that can be used to foster IOs’ information security, namely legal interpretations of the concept of inviolability. Specifically, the article explores how the Agreement on the ICRC’s privileges and immunities in Luxembourg interprets the scope of the concept of inviolability, and the obligations arising under it.

How does China use development finance to gain influence in international organizations? Leveraging the exogenous rotation of ASEAN and African Union Chairmanship, I estimate the effect of regional leadership on Chinese commitments. Results suggest that Chinese projects are politically motivated only when the lending and recipient entities are linked to the Chinese and host governments. Governments that assume the Chair received seven times more commitments from Chinese government agencies relative to non-Chair years, a $90 million increase for the average project. By contrast, there is no evidence to suggest that Chinese banks act as agents of Beijing. Moreover, I find a consistent null relationship between temporary UN Security Council status and Chinese finance, unlike established findings about Western donors, suggesting that China is deliberately seeking regional influence. These results underscore the importance of considering the specific actors involved in China’s economic statecraft.