In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled not only that Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territory systematically violated international law, but also that Israel’s ‘continued presence’ (i.e. occupation) as such had become illegal, so that Israel was required to withdraw from the Occupied Palestinian Territories as rapidly as possible. The ICJ’s finding that Israel engaged in a sustained abuse of its position as an occupying power, through annexation of territory and frustration of Palestinian self-determination, was central to its reasoning, as was its holding that the legality of the occupation was to be judged against the jus ad bellum. This article unpacks the concept of an illegal occupation. It argues that, as matter of the jus ad bellum, it is only the right to self-defence that could, in theory, justify Israel’s continued occupation. Curiously, however, the Opinion does not mention self-defence, although it preoccupied many of the judges writing separately. The article argues that two approaches to the occupation’s ad bellum illegality are most persuasive: first, that the occupation could not meet the necessity and proportionality criteria of lawful self-defence; and, second, that even a valid self-defence claim can be vitiated by a predominant ulterior purpose.

This article examines recent developments relating to the use of third-party findings of fact at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A proliferation of fact-finding mechanisms creates more opportunities for litigants to ask the ICJ to rely on third-party facts. This demands renewed attention to how the ICJ responds to this type of evidence, especially given the rise of public interest litigation that may depend especially heavily on such materials. The analysis focuses on the ICJ’s approach in recent requests for the indication of provisional measures and asks whether the Court’s approach to third-party evidence differs depending on the phase of litigation, using the 2024 judgment in Ukraine v. Russia as a case study. Ultimately, recent decisions suggest that the ICJ’s efforts to distinguish evidence generated through an adversarial, court-like process from findings of fact based on investigation and fieldwork are often blurred in practice. Moreover, while the Court’s liberal approach to third-party evidence at the provisional measures phase may be justifiable, the quest for coherence in how the Court approaches third-party evidence, especially on the merits, remains a work in progress. To that end, the article suggests ways in which the Court could engage more closely with third-party fact-finding reports in the fulfillment of its adjudicatory function.

Which international obligations are characterised as obligations owed erga omnes or erga omnes partes is today a crucial question for the enforcement of international law, particularly through adjudication before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ, however, has not given sufficiently clear indication as to how it understands and identifies obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes. This lack of clarity and consistency permits varied approaches to the articulation of such obligations, ultimately leaving uncertain the enforceability, through adjudication and otherwise, of a wide variety of obligations.

This article argues that, in provisional measures cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) now examines jurisdiction by assessing not only an applicant’s arguments for jurisdiction, but also a respondent’s arguments against it. This more granular examination is different from the ICJ’s traditional prima facie test. The change in approach was demonstrated in the 2008 provisional measures order in Georgia v Russian Federation. This article suggests two likely explanations for the development of a more detailed test. The first is the ICJ’s reluctance to limit State sovereignty by imposing provisional measures since it held, in the 2001 LaGrand judgment, that they are binding. The second is the political sensitivity of the particular dispute. However, the more detailed approach to the question of jurisdiction in provisional measures has generated inconsistency in the ICJ’s jurisprudence: first, the malleability of this approach risks like cases being treated differently; second, this approach overlaps with the plausibility test, which concerns a separate requirement for provisional measures; and, third, this approach overlaps with the Oil Platforms test, which the Court uses to determine definitively whether it has jurisdiction ratione materiae. The new approach also promotes a dispute-settlement conception of the Court’s judicial function, rather than acknowledging its role in developing international law or maintaining public order.

This case note examines the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2022 reparations judgment in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, analyzing the Court’s legal reasoning, its evidentiary approach, and the implications for future reparations cases. The 2022 judgment follows the ICJ’s 2005 ruling that found Uganda responsible for violations of international law during its military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Given the failure of negotiations between the parties, the ICJ determined the amount of reparations owed, awarding a global sum of $325 million – substantially lower than the DRC’s claim. The case addresses complex legal and evidentiary questions, including the causal link between Uganda’s wrongful acts and the damages claimed, the standard and burden of proof for reparations, and categorizing harm. The Court examined four heads of damage, which were damage to persons, damage to property, damage to natural resources and macroeconomic damage, dismissing the latter due to insufficient proof of causation. A key aspect of the judgment was the ICJ’s adoption of a global sum approach – an uncommon approach in the Court’s practice. This case note assesses the lack of clear reasoning and methodology for determining the exact amount awarded for each head of damage.

Additionally, the ICJ’s over-reliance on United Nations reports and its application of standards of proof raise concerns about consistency and clarity in reparations proceedings. This case sets a precedent for State responsibility in mass violations of international law but highlights challenges in quantifying harm and ensuring equitable reparations. The Court’s reasoning and methods in the case may influence future cases involving State responsibility, armed conflicts, and reparative justice under international law.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), often referred to as the “World Court,” plays a central role in the field of international law. Despite the significance of this court, socio-legal scholarship has not examined the ICJ’s inner workings due to limited access. Drawing from field theory and organizational theory, this study addresses this gap by using various data sources including interviews, organizational documents, and publicly available texts from insiders. Based on this data, this article explores how the ICJ’s institutional context shapes its organization and the experiences of its actors. We argue that the ICJ provides a space that tightly connects institutional myths, organizational practices, and individual action. This tight coupling effectively mediates and manages differences among ICJ actors, fostering a stable practice of international law within a field otherwise marked by conflict. This enables the ICJ to produce and sustain a specific way of doing international law which has stabilizing effects in this field. By linking the macro level of the field – an area emphasized in prior scholarship – with a microlevel organizational perspective, this article offers a nuanced understanding of the conflicts and organizational practices influencing the ICJ’s operations and development of international law.

International Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction ratione materiae — Whether Bank Markazi a company under Article III(1) of Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, 1955 — Whether Bank Markazi’s activities commercial — Purpose of Bank Markazi’s activities — Link between Bank Markazi’s activities and its sovereign functions — Admissibility — Whether Iranian entities exhausting local remedies in the United States — Whether remedies in United States’ legal system effective — Defences on the merits — “Clean hands” doctrine — Whether sufficient connection between wrongful acts imputed to Iran and Iran’s claims — Abuse of rights — Whether Iran invoking rights for purpose other than that for which rights created — Article XX(1)(c) and (d) of 1955 Treaty — Whether United States’ measures seeking to regulate production or traffic in arms — Whether United States’ measures necessary to protect essential security interests

Treaties — Interpretation — Application — Alleged violations of Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, 1955 — Article III(1) of 1955 Treaty — Article IV(1) of 1955 Treaty — Link between provisions — Scope of duty to recognize juridical status of entities under Article III(1) — Whether question being existence of company rather than company’s separateness — Meaning of “fair and equitable treatment” — Denial of justice — Whether provisions removing separateness of companies amounting to denial of justice — Whether United States’ measures “unreasonable” or “discriminatory” — Whether measures manifestly excessive — Article III(2) of 1955 Treaty — Whether Article III(2) conferring procedural and substantive rights or merely access to courts — Whether Iranian companies’ access to United States’ courts limited — Article IV(2) of 1955 Treaty — Whether United States’ measures expropriatory — Illegality — Whether “most constant protection and security” protecting against both physical and legal harm — Article V(1) of 1955 Treaty — Whether Article V(1) applying to cases of expropriation — Article VII(1) of 1955 Treaty — Meaning of “restrictions” — Whether Iran’s claims relating to exchange restrictions — Article X(1) of 1955 Treaty — Whether financial transactions falling within meaning of “commerce” — Whether commerce taking place between the territories of United States and Iran — Whether United States’ measures actual impediments to commerce — Remedies — Cessation — Compensation — Satisfaction