This chapter examines the transformative measures implemented by policymakers and regulators to improve security and transparency in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets following the 2009 G20 Pittsburgh Summit. Notably, these measures included mandating the central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives, which were previously traded without the involvement of clearing houses. The chapter argues that these regulatory efforts significantly increased the “infrastructural authority” of central clearing counterparties (CCPs). This concept refers to the ability of CCPs, as private organizations, to influence derivatives trading through their clearing and settlement operations. Traditionally, CCPs held infrastructural authority over exchange-traded derivatives, a smaller segment of global derivatives markets. As policymakers and regulators pushed for the central clearing of OTC derivatives, CCPs expanded their influence, encompassing the majority of global derivatives trading. While this process enhanced the transparency and safety of derivatives markets, it also transformed CCPs into potential factors of financial instability, due to risk concentration and the impact of clearing margins on market liquidity. Both dimensions have the potential to make the infrastructural authority of CCPs more visible to the wider financial system and economy, potentially resulting in state actors reining in their authority.

This chapter argues that by the latter half of the nineteenth century, priests, bishops, and other religious had immense latitude within the diffuse structures of the Church not only to raise money by different means but also to act as the central financial administrator and expert within their own parishes, dioceses, and religious houses, and that this power gave them an influential role in shaping the wider economic culture of Catholic Ireland in the period under review. It first explores levels of accounting and financial management knowledge among clergy and then situates their economic activity, including managing of debt and investments, within a wider transactional framework with wealthy and professional lay Catholics. It finally analyses how clergy were frequently afforded a significant role as arbiters of financial disputes and stewards of financial resources by the laity.

The market of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) is rapidly growing and their potential uses and applications are still being discovered. The rapid growth of this market, coupled with the unique nature of NFTs, which do not fit squarely within the existing regulatory frameworks, creates a regulatory gap between existing and effective regulation of NFTs. This gap, in turn, creates a policy-making dilemma: on the one hand, regulating NFTs too quickly could prevent efficient uses and applications from being discovered and deployed, thus stifling innovation. On the other, leaving NFTs unregulated could leave investors unprotected from the risks posed by this innovation. With this dilemma in mind, this chapter argues that regulation of NFTs should occur sparingly, and to the extent that it does occur, regulatory experimentation and competition emerges as the most promising approach. In the US, one place where regulatory competition exists is between and among the states. State regulation in the areas of securities and virtual currency and money transmission can be used to address some of the prominent present concerns posed by NFTs, such as frauds and money laundering, and states have the opportunity to experiment as NFTs evolve and are refined.

Addressing the contribution of EU financial markets to unsustainable business practices is vital to realising the EU’s commitments on sustainability. In this chapter, we assess recent EU legislative progress in this field. We argue that legislative and regulatory mechanisms in the field of financial regulation are progressing too slowly to meet the EU’s self-imposed targets for sustainability. We argue that, on current trajectories, a fundamental recalibration of reform efforts is required in relation to financial system participants if a reduction in the funding of activities that cause damage to the environment and to the social foundation of humanity is to be achieved. To this end, we provide a menu of rapid and meaningful policy interventions.

Speculation has been mounting that the digital yuan will be used to displace the US dollar and circumvent sanctions. In retaliation, financial institutions can be targeted whereby US dollar payment or financial system access can be sanctioned. If the United States weaponizes the dollar, the digital yuan will not provide sanction protection beyond the status quo. The digital yuan’s true innovation is the ability to manage capital controls and facilitate financial liberalization. Being a programmable currency, the digital yuan enables Mainland China to open its economy more expeditiously than would normally be possible, while providing the regulatory levers to manage monetary and financial stability. Mainland technology companies are instrumental in the circulation of the digital yuan through electronic payment platforms. These same technology companies have recently established virtual banks and stored value facility payment platforms in Hong Kong. This chapter argues that technology is introducing new risks into Hong Kong’s banking system which pose a material risk to financial stability. To manage these risks, financial data supervision and infrastructure is required which currently does not exist. With the recent growth surge and volatility in cryptocurrency markets, the current approach of neglecting financial stability supervision is erroneous and reckless.

During the 2008–9 global financial crisis, credit default swaps created conduits in the financial system which facilitated the transmission of systemic risk. In response, the Financial Stability Board recommended over-the-counter derivative clearing through a central clearing counterparty. Although the Securities and Futures Commission is the designated supervisor and resolution authority for Hong Kong’s central clearing counterparty, OTC Clear, its supervisory ambit, capacity, and powers are insufficient to mitigate systemic risk and manage financial stability. This chapter argues that a securities supervisor is not the optimal supervisor or resolution authority for OTC Clear. Central clearing counterparties require credit and liquidity risk management which aligns more with banking supervision and central banking. This is supported by the dominance of foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives being traded in Hong Kong. The optimal resolution authority for OTC Clear is the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, being the resolution authority for systemically important banks, having monetary authority expertise that aligns with foreign exchange and interest rate risks, experience in mitigating credit and liquidity risks, and being designed to manage financial stability.

In the wake of the 2008–9 global financial crisis, the G20 devised a framework for a sustainable recovery based on international cooperation. An agreement was reached to ensure that inter alia macro-prudential and regulatory policies would support sustainable economies by preventing credit and asset price cycles from becoming forces for financial destabilization. The G20 recognized the importance of striking a balance between micro- and macro-prudential regulation to control risks, and to develop tools to monitor the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system. This chapter argues that the design of the supervisory structure is instrumental in striking the appropriate balance between these regulatory disciplines. Clear mandates and supervisory judgement are necessary to control this interdependent relationship. Regulatory underlap, gaps, and arbitrage can surface when the supervisory structure does not harmonize with legal infrastructure. To mitigate these regulatory flaws causing financial instability and producing unsustainable economies, supervisors must have sufficient capacity, expertise, awareness, and discretion. Attaining financial stability and a sustainable economy requires the supervisory structure or model, and the supervisor’s capacity and expertise to be harmonized with the legal infrastructure.

Banks fail when an illiquidity event depletes capital reserves. Liquidity is sourced from assets that can readily be transformed into cash or from wholesale funding markets and central banks. Basel III strengthens bank balance sheets by allowing supervisors to release capital and liquidity reserves during times of market liquidity stress. This chapter analyzes the implementation of the Basel III capital and liquidity reforms in Hong Kong, banking sector stability during the 2008–9 global financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, and systemic supervision. Hong Kong is a unique international financial centre because it is overwhelmingly populated by domestic systemically important banks. Universal banking and Basel III compel banking sector supervision of Hong Kong’s securities and insurance sectors, despite falling outside the supervisory design of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. This chapter argues that different supervisory structures and models affect the regulation and supervision of financial stability in Hong Kong’s banking sector. Insurance and wealth management products in the banking industry can produce systemic risks that might be overlooked by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Supervisory bias towards the banking sector in conjunction with cross-sectoral underlap could cause financial instability and a systemic banking crisis in Hong Kong.

This chapter provides a brief financial history of Hong Kong’s financial regulation and financial crises between 1841 and 1997. In the beginning, financial markets were subject to market-based regulation and the British colonial legal influence. Hong Kong took a long time to embrace financial regulation. The chapter argues that Hong Kong’s financial markets and the origins of financial regulation have developed, evolved, and shaped in response to a series of financial crises. Hong Kong underwent extensive market and regulatory change when the first modern banking crisis and stock market crash battered the economy between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. The deposit-taking company and banking crises of the 1980s provided the impetus to develop the current regulatory and supervisory architecture. By 1997, subsequent regulatory reforms had shaped this architecture to resemble other developed financial centres, with the banking, securities, and insurance sectors having a designated supervisor and ordinance.

Managing banking sector liquidity in financial crises has historically depended on deposit protection and the lender of last resort. Deposit protection assuages market panics by guaranteeing that depositors will be paid if a bank fails. The lender of last resort is a capital injection to preclude a failure when an illiquid yet solvent bank has exhausted all other funding sources. This chapter analyzes deposit protection, the lender of last resort, and how different supervisory structures influence the implementation of these bank stabilization tools. Moreover, certain structures can adversely affect supervisors from fulfilling their financial stability mandates. Hong Kong is susceptible to a supervisory coordination failure from a statutory friction that prioritizes monetary over banking stability. A tension is created within the Hong Kong Monetary Authority which could compel the Financial Secretary to usurp control during a financial crisis. This tension exposes the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to macro-prudential underlap which could undermine its financial stability mandate. Despite these flaws, the statutory mandates of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority complement Hong Kong’s deposit protection and lender-of-last-resort policies, which have performed faultlessly over the past 20 years. However, neither approach has been sufficiently tested during this period.

Since the 1997 handover to Mainland China, Hong Kong has endured pandemics, recessions, and financial crises. Hong Kong’s financial supervisory architecture performed relatively well following the speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar and the Hang Seng Index during the 1997–8 Asian Financial Crisis, the liquidity crunch in the 2008–9 global financial crisis, and the economic shutdown from the Covid-19 pandemic. There have been no major supervisory failures or financial instability despite several international financial assessments and reviews recommending structural reforms. This chapter argues that these recent crises call for Hong Kong’s financial supervisory architecture to reflect on the financial system, rather than wait for a market failure to incentivize a redesign. The ongoing financial system integration with Mainland China is placing more reliance on supervisory coordination and cooperation to manage financial stability. Hong Kong is critical to Mainland China’s financial market liberalization and internationalization which will be a key driver of financial market growth in the future. As an international financial centre, Hong Kong is actively involved in market and regulatory developments. Hong Kong has taken a leading role to ensure its financial markets evolve and are fertile to embrace prevailing market trends.