Agent-based simulations and human-subject experiments explore the emergence of respect for property in a specialization and exchange economy with costless theft. Software agents, driven by reciprocity and hill-climbing heuristics and parameterized to replicate humans when property is exogenously protected, are employed to predict human behavior when property can be freely appropriated. Agents do not predict human behavior in a new set of experiments because subjects innovate, constructing a property convention of “mutual taking” in 5 out of the 6 experimental sessions that allows exchange to crowd out theft. When the same convention is made available to agents, they adopt it and again replicate human behavior. Property emerges as a social convention that exploits the capacity for reciprocity to sustain trade.

We propose a model of international oligopoly with two countries, two vertically-differentiated goods, and heterogeneous consumers in terms of their willingness to pay for quality. Various sources of pollution are taken into account: consumption, production and the transportation of goods between the two countries. Green persuaded consumers display consumption home bias: they derive additional satisfaction when consuming a domestic good because buying locally abates transportation pollution. We investigate whether consumption home bias effectively curbs global emissions. Finally, we uncover the environmental role played by the globalization of markets.

This paper examines the impact of trade-related technology diffusion from G7 countries to Latin America and East Asia on total factor productivity controlling for education, governance, and distance. We build on the trade and distance-focused strands of the technology diffusion literature and find that (i) total factor productivity (TFP) increases with education, trade, and governance (ETG) and declines with distance to the G7 countries; (ii) increasing Latin America's ETG to East Asia's level would double TFP, accounting for about 75% of the TFP gap between the two country groups; and (iii) South America's greater remoteness relative to Mexico's from the US and Canada significantly reduces its TFP and similarly for Singapore's greater remoteness from Japan relative to Hong Kong.

The rapid liberalisation of trade policies since the 1990s has brought additional attention to the role of trade as an engine of economic growth. Although an abundant literature addresses the relationship between openness and economic growth, the real effect of trade liberalisation is still ambiguous and undetermined. Most previous studies have ignored the selection effects of strict labour regulations on international trade. The main objective of this study is to measure the role of labour regulations in moderating the contribution of trade to economic growth among 30 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries for the period 2006–2013. In doing so, we employ a one-step Generalised Method of Moments system estimation method. Our results reveal that openness to trade does not have a robust and significant effect on growth. However, the interaction of openness with strict labour regulations enhances the contributions of trade to growth.

Brexit has both increased the momentum towards Scottish independence and complicated what it could mean in practice, especially if Scotland rejoins the European Union (EU). EU accession would re-open the flow of goods, people, services and capital between Scotland and other EU member-states; a corollary of this, however, would be new restrictions on movement between Scotland and its non-EU neighbours. Effective border management entails a variety of ‘at the border’ and ‘behind the border’ processes. As much as these would require dedicated infrastructure and trained personnel, they would ultimately depend upon reliable data/information and good communication among myriad agencies, including on the other side of the border. Fundamentally, the nature and form of the border controls would be determined largely by the relationship that an independent Scotland had with the remainder of the UK—and, principally, on the relationship that the UK develops with the EU.

The tariff preferences in FTAs do not apply automatically to all imports. Instead, importers can request to use the tariff preferences, but must then show that the imported goods fulfil the formal requirements (e.g. rules of origin) of the FTA. This is costly, which is a likely reason why tariff preferences are not always used. This research note examines preference utilization under the FTA between the EU and South Korea, which was formally ratified in 2015 (but had been provisionally applied from 2011). We use firm and transaction level data for Swedish imports from South Korea during November 2016 to answer the question ‘Who uses the EU's FTAs?’ With information on firm size, product category, import mode (direct imports or customs warehousing), preference margin, potential duty savings, and transaction size, we provide a detailed picture of when firms choose to utilize the tariff preferences. The results suggest that the differences across importers are not primarily related to firm size, as is sometimes suggested in extant literature. We also find that it is the size of the import transaction rather than the size of the preference margin that determines preference utilization.

Several existing studies have documented a negative relationship between firm financial constraint and export activities but do not attempt to examine factors that could attenuate this relationship in Africa. In this paper, we examine the effect of financial constraint on exports in Africa and explore how the level of trust in countries where firms are located shapes this relationship. We combine the World Bank Enterprise Surveys with different measures of country-level personal and interpersonal trust computed from the Afrobarometer surveys of 19 African countries. Our results show that financial constraints negatively affect export activities. However, this negative effect is attenuated for firms that are located in trust-intensive societies. These findings are robust to different specifications. Interestingly, we find that small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa are more likely to be affected by financial constraints but also more likely to benefit from a higher level of both personal and interpersonal trust, while for larger firms only interpersonal trust matters.

The article considers crises of globalization: the 1840s, the 1870s, the Great War, the Great Depression, the Great Inflation (1970s), the Global Financial Crisis (2008) and the Great Lockdown (2020). Each led to a reshaping of the institutions that supervised or regulated economic development globally but also nationally. In each case, a series of questions are answered: what were the origins of the crisis, what were the monetary and fiscal policy responses, how did the crisis affect the drivers of globalization, trade, migration and capital flows? And how did these different challenges affect governance and views of politics? The article concludes that supply shocks are most easily dealt with by inflationary mechanisms, allowing groups to gain some apparent compensation for their losses through the supply shock. But the resulting mobilization into groups also strains social cohesion.

The article analyses the development of the coffee export business of the British company Edward Johnston & Co. in the years 1840-1880. Established in 1842 in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the firm's senior partner was the English merchant Edward Johnston. The departure of partners and the crisis of 1847 made Edward Johnston reorganise the firm in Brazil. In the 1850s, the company established itself as a family business based in Liverpool and then in London in the 1860s. The expansion of the coffee market in the United States made Edward Johnston create a network of firms which consolidated the company as a major exporter of Brazilian coffee by the late 1870s.

This article presents, for the first time, a continuous series of value of Honduran exports and imports for the period 1880-1930, extending the series previously available from Notten (2012). The new series were constructed based on the official statistics of the main trading partners of Honduras (United States, Great Britain, Germany and France) corrected from Honduran and complementary sources. The correction criteria applied are based on the results of a previous reliability validation exercise. The data obtained allow to delimit a new chronology of the foreign trade of Honduras where the “export age” began before the banana export boom that took place between 1903 and 1930.

The value of exports to the domestic UK economy does not equal gross export flows, as some of the value-added within UK exports may have been generated abroad. For key business and financial service industries we present new and initial estimates giving a lower bound for the value-added component of exports generated directly by the domestic exporting sector, called the direct domestic value-added component of exports. Our initial estimates suggest that at least 38 per cent of UK monetary financial institutions (MFIs) exports in 2016 was direct domestic value-added amounting to £14.6bn, of which £5.0bn came from exports to the EU. These initial estimates suggest that approximately 80 per cent of accountancy and legal services exports in 2014 were direct domestic value-added amounting to £1.7bn and £5.2bn respectively, of which £500mn and £1.7bn came from exports to the EU respectively.

Results indicate that, when comparing the unconditional derived-demand elasticities to the unconditional consumer demand elasticities, significant differences emerge due to the differences in the first-stage estimation procedure between the differential production approach and the Rotterdam model. In comparing the consumer demand price/cross-price elasticities to the derived-demand price/cross-price elasticities, it is clear that use of the Rotterdam model when a production approach should be used can lead to overestimation, underestimation, and incorrect signs in deriving unconditional price effects.

This paper examines the effect of the U.S.-Mexico trade agreement under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The results suggest that U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico have been responsive to tariff rate reductions applied to Mexican products. A one percentage point decrease in tariff rates is associated with an increase in U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico by 5.31% in the first 6 years of NAFTA and by 2.62% in the last 6 years of NAFTA. U.S. imports from Mexico have also been attributable to the pre-NAFTA tariff rates. Overall, the results indicate that the U.S-Mexico trade agreement under NAFTA has been trade creating rather than trade diverting.

In order to estimate demand elasticities of source differentiated beef in South Korea, this study used the quantity of an endogenous demand system derived through maximizing the economic welfare of market participants including local beef consumers and local and foreign beef suppliers. The demand system is then weighted with respect to quality adjustment parameters to identify the effects of quality differences in source differentiated beef on market demand. As implied by the high relative price of locally produced “Hanwoo” beef, substitutability between local and imported beef is shown to be very weak and the own price elasticity of South Korean beef is shown to be inelastic. Related to quality differences between source differentiated beef, South Korean beef consumers show a preference for Australian beef relative to U.S. and Canadian beef, perhaps due to BSE concerns.

This paper focuses on the analysis of weak states in the international trading system during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic crises, especially on Portugal's trade relations with the United States. We argue that the previous studies of the trade flows during these conflicts have not paid enough attention on smaller actors. Even though the Peninsular War caused severe disruption of agricultural production in Portugal, the United States, despite its strained relations with an ally of Portugal, Great Britain, became a key supplier for the Portuguese market. Clearly, the threatened position of the peninsula, and the need to supply the troops, awarded the Portuguese some room to manoeuvre in the international markets. Total war was not a constraint for all states — economic necessities trumped political and diplomatic concerns during the era of the first real-world wars. This situation was a temporary one, only to change after the conflict.