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This chapter conveys the origins, course, impact, and consequences of Kristallnacht, locating the events of November 1938 in the longer-term trajectory of Nazi domestic and foreign policy; explores the extent and forms of popular participation in the violence and popular responses to the destruction; pursues the shorter- and longer-term impact of Kristallnacht for the victims (though emigration will be dealt with in Volume III); examines the shifts in Nazi policy in the wake of Kristallnacht, and the shifts of institutional power that accompanied it, and again considers the relationship between antisemitism and foreign policy.
This chapter shows how foreign observers sometimes condemned and sometimes endorsed the Nazi regime’s anti-Jewish policies in the years before the Second World War, and in turn how the Third Reich responded to global opinion. The Nazis encountered international outrage in the face of their anti-Jewish policies. But they also found imitators and supporters around the world, including in the USA, who applauded Hitler’s efforts to solve the “Jewish question.” As the 1930s proceeded, global condemnation of Hitler’s antisemitism grew, but the Nazi regime rightly came to see expressions of outrage as largely toothless, as the international community appeared either unwilling or incapable of organizing collective action to save Europe’s Jews.
Key questions for a foreign diplomat in Washington DC were how to have his government’s concerns heard by the administration which was taken up with economic revival and implementing the New Deal and also would Roosevelt move from isolationism to internationalism? The chapter unravels how Ireland’s interests featured in official America’s foreign and domestic policies. It argues that the two Irish ministers, Michael MacWhite and Robert Brennan had contrasting abilities and personalities which affected how each fulfilled de Valera’s unrealistic instructions to secure Roosevelt and the State Department’s attention. Trade negotiations between the US and Ireland never formally commenced, despite MacWhite and Brennan’s efforts and throughout the period Roosevelt restated his opposition to intervention in partition. However, both diplomats prevented a diplomatic crisis when the US government protested to the Irish government about the illegal dissemination and sale of Irish Hospitals Sweepstake tickets in the US. By 1939, de Valera and Roosevelt accepted that international co-operation through the League of Nations had failed.
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