The question to what extent EU law is constitutive of European society as articulated in Article 2 TEU is, at its core, a question about the nature, scope and limits of EU law. This article suggests certain clear limits to EU law’s ability to make the European society visible in law, or legible for law – let alone composable through law. The article is entitled ‘Is this Europe?’ as a direct challenge to the widely held belief that EU law is somehow constitute of European integration; that EU law contains all that European integration is, can and will be. Sure, the Europe that we see when analysing cases, treaties and legislation matters. But the ‘real’ Europe – the one that is felt, experienced, lived – resides in what happens due to, in spite, or irrespective of those cases, treaties and legislation. For EU law to remain sensitive to its society, then, EU law needs to reformulate the expectations it has of itself and create an analytical framework that allows it to transcend its immanent nature. This requires three changes to the way we ‘do’ EU law. First, more sensitivity to the material and relational context in which EU law operates. Second, creating space for forms of lay knowledge that are rooted in social praxis. Third, more ambition and playfulness in the way we – as scholars – ‘speak’ EU law.

This article critiques the case-law of the CJEU on when Member States are ‘implementing’ EU law under Article 51 of the Charter, and tables a proposal for amending Article 51 to enhance the effectiveness of EU fundamental rights protection. It also suggests modifying and updating the explanations. Given that Member State judges have alternative routes available to them to resolve fundamental rights disputes, namely via Member State rules and the ECHR, and which do not require consideration of a complex threshold question before the pertinent substantive laws can apply, it suggests that review of Article 51 of the Charter might be timely.

The concept of constitutional identity has recently been invoked to impose limits on fundamental rights. In this article, I explore the relation between constitutional identity and fundamental rights and argue that constitutional identity – when properly understood – does not stand in tension but rather presupposes respect for fundamental rights. In the first part of the article, I develop a conception of constitutional identity as a set of normative commitments of a community that reflects its shared experience of establishing, and being subject to, a constitutional form of authority. In the second part, I argue that, while different constitutional identities can be idiosyncratic, they must incorporate respect for fundamental rights if their claim to reflect such common experience is to be credible. The upshot of the argument is that fundamental rights should not be understood as external constraints that limit the scope of constitutional identity, but as internal requirements inherent to the concept of constitutional identity. Although this understanding does not eliminate the difficulties which arise from different interpretations of fundamental rights, it does allow for a more productive engagement with constitutional identity claims, and for analysing them in light of fundamental rights standards they must already accept.

This article establishes a foundation for the development of Marxist approaches to European Union (EU) law. While Marxist scholarship has engaged with European integration throughout its history, it has largely overlooked the legal architecture of the EU. Conversely, EU legal studies have remained largely insulated from Marxist thought, even as critical approaches have begun to gain traction. Bridging this mutual neglect, the article argues that EU law must be understood not as a neutral or technocratic system, but as a central element of capitalist social relations both in Europe, and in terms of Europe’s wider integration in the global market. In this way, EU law is bound up with processes of accumulation, imperialism, and racialised social reproduction. Drawing on key currents within Marxist theory, the article situates EU law within the historical dynamics of capitalist development, demonstrating how a materialist legal analysis can deepen and enrich existing critiques of European integration.

This paper examines in what way providers of specialized Large Language Models (LLM) pre-trained and/or fine-tuned on medical data, conduct risk management, define, estimate, mitigate and monitor safety risks under the EU Medical Device Regulation (MDR). Using the example of an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based medical device for lung cancer detection, we review the current risk management process in the MDR entailing a “forward-walking” approach for providers articulating the medical device’s clear intended use, and moving on sequentially along the definition, mitigation, and monitoring of risks. We note that the forward-walking approach clashes with the MDR requirement for articulating an intended use, as well as circumvents providers reasoning around the risks of specialised LLMs. The forward-walking approach inadvertently introduces different intended users, new hazards for risk control and use cases, producing unclear and incomplete risk management for the safety of LLMs. Our contribution is that the MDR risk management framework requires a backward-walking logic. This concept, similar to the notion of “backward-reasoning” in computer science, entails sub-goals for providers to examine a system’s intended user(s), risks of new hazards and different use cases and then reason around the task-specific options, inherent risks at scale and trade-offs for risk management.

Almost 10 years ago, the Ordonnance of 10 February 2016 reforming the French Civil Code (CC) removed the cause from the conditions for validity of the obligation. Thus, it broke with the tradition of the Code Napoléon, and a large number of civil codifications followed. Since 2016, French scholars have argued that, notwithstanding its conceptual implications, the disappearance of the formula of the cause has resulted in semantic rather than substantial changes. Whereas, in one opinion, the cause is still found underlying ‘contenu litice et certain’ (Article 1128), its various forms and functions today appear in several CC provisions.

The numerous scandals that have marred the world of football suggest that reform is badly needed. As governing bodies like FIFA and UEFA fail to make meaningful improvements, calls for public regulation are gaining ground. This article explores what the European Union (EU) could do to effect change. Although long hailed as a powerful sports regulator, there is a widespread feeling that the EU’s regulatory potential remains unfulfilled. The article argues that the Union is in a unique position to leave a positive mark on football governance if it decides to regulate the sport more extensively. Three options are outlined: increasing the intensity of scrutiny exercised under the internal market rules, changing the approach towards cooperation with football stakeholders, or enacting a European Sports Act. After examining the benefits and drawbacks of each route, it will be claimed that, on balance, the most promising avenue is EU legislation which sets out minimum governance standards as well as substantive requirements, including on human rights, gender equality, and athlete welfare. The conclusion will offer some reflections on what would need to happen for the proposal to materialize, discussing the role of advocacy coalitions and crises in bringing about regulatory change.

Energy has been a fundamental precondition for human survival, economic development, and preserving dignity throughout history. At the same time, the increasing digitalisation of energy systems, especially in the EU’s energy transition, creates new challenges, especially concerning rights such as data protection and privacy. Although European Law restricts the right to energy as a consumer right, it expressly recognises data protection and privacy as fundamental rights. This article outlines the theoretical, historical and legal foundations of the right to energy and analyses the implications of digitalisation for its realisation while also addressing emerging concerns about data protection and privacy rights. Furthermore, it identifies the tension points between the Recast Electricity Directive (RED) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and provides recommendations for a legal framework that harmonises the abovementioned rights.

This paper discusses how epistemic and ontological commitments shape different understandings of European Union (EU) law and why it matters. Many key debates on EU law—and some of the fiercest disagreements in European legal scholarship—go back to divergent epistemic and ontological commitments. While these philosophical commitments usually operate in the background, this paper foregrounds them. A core aim of the paper is to denaturalise the epistemic and ontological groundings of mainstream approaches to EU law and, thus, to demarginalise approaches more peripheral to the centres of power in EU law-making and in EU legal academia.

This article considers the application of the precautionary principle as understood in EU law to EU decision-making on geoengineering, in particular solar geoengineering. It finds that the situation is riddled with more complexities than first appears; (i) the principle is used to argue against research, even though more research is usually itself seen as precautionary response; (ii) the risks of research are claimed to lie in its political impact, whereas the principle is traditionally applied to direct physical risks; (iii) while there are legitimate precautionary arguments against geoengineering, it is itself put forward as a precautionary measure and there are precautionary arguments in favour too. Drawing on case law and scholarship we conclude that the precautionary principle can nevertheless be applied and will lead to a procedural requirement to do comprehensive reviews of relevant scientific knowledge before decision-making. This leaves wide – but not unbounded – discretion but may still be valuable in providing a frame for reasoned public debate. We also apply our findings to the recent expert reports on Solar Radiation Modification and show that they have failed to apply precaution correctly.

As the EU is positioned, and positions itself, as a global leader in digital regulation, it is more important than ever to challenge narratives that flatten disparities within the bloc. In this paper, I seek to problematise the perception of the European Union as the homogenous bloc sometimes alluded to, and even outwardly projected, in discussions about a ‘Brussels Effect’ in digital regulation. Using the EU Digital Services Act as a prism, I draw attention to the legal, political, social, and cultural variation within the EU and, crucially, the inter-state power dynamics and disparities that shape the development and implementation of EU digital regulation. Building on scholarship related to core-periphery dependencies within the EU and extending burgeoning critical methods in EU legal studies, leaning on decolonial approaches, I offer a foundational analysis of the DSA’s preliminary stages of the implementation of the EU Digital Services Act.

Calling for different comparative counterpoints to those routinely used in EU legal studies and digital regulation, this article presents a rare insight into the process from the perspective of the EU’s smallest member state, Malta, a former British colony considered part of the EU’s southern periphery that acceded in 2004. In this paper, I argue that, within the EU’s borders, the belief that we are moving toward increased harmonisation and standardisation in the realm of digital rights is, in practice, questionable. I underline that any meaningful assessment of the Digital Services Act’s overall success must pay close attention to the regulation’s tangible impacts (and shortcomings) from the perspective of ‘peripheral’ EU states.