The conclusion of historical and normative parts of the study is that the extension of human rights to companies in the A1P1 ECHR was not necessitated by a sui genesis European liberal conception of human rights. Rather it was the result of a political compromise manifested in a text that obscured the breadth of the legal, proprietary rights protected and the inclusion of private companies as subjects of the rights. The subsequent review of the Court’s jurisprudence on IPRs shows that, regrettably, the Court did not correct the text’s hidden deviation from the moral ideal of universal human rights which the ECHR sought to enforce. The conclusion canvasses three possible scenarios for the futureandoutlines how the Court could develop its jurisprudence to recalibrate the balance of protection of companies IPRs in line with international human rights.

The introductory chapter establishes the central questions, the rationale and structure of the monograph noting that it is concerned with the impact of unresolved conflict and contestation on the effectiveness of Europe’s human rights protection architecture within the framework of the Council of Europe. It also highlights several limits, such as the European focus and the deliberate decision not to seek to advance any reform proposals for the European Court of Human Rights Article 1 jurisprudence. It also engages, and dismisses, the potential critique of human rights imperialism.

The book concludes with a reflection on the challenge of grey zones as being one of first principles, which represents a risk to the integrity and long-term future of the organisation. It emphasises that the populations in areas of conflict and contestation are the most vulnerable rights holders in Europe, yet the most isolated. The Council of Europe must address this systematic problem as a matter of urgency and with the decisive attention of Member States and both statutory and non-statutory actors.

Police use of facial recognition technologies is on the rise across Europe and beyond. Public authorities state that these powerful algorithmic systems could play a major role in assisting to prevent terrorism, reduce crime, and to safeguard vulnerable persons. There is also an international consensus that these systems pose serious risks to the rule of law and several human rights, including the right to private life, as guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The world’s first case examining the legality of a facial recognition system deployed by police, Bridges v South Wales Police, thus remains an important precedent for policymakers, courts, and scholars worldwide. This chapter focusses on the role and influence of the right to private life, as enshrined in Article 8 ECHR, and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in the ‘lawfulness’ assessment of the police use of live facial recognition in Bridges. A framework that the Court of Appeal for England and Wales held was ‘not in accordance with the law’ and therefore in breach of Article 8 ECHR. The analysis also considers the emerging policy discourse prompted by Bridges in the United Kingdom surrounding the need for new legislation, a significant shift away from the current AI governance approach of combining new ethical standards with existing law.

This chapter argues that enforceable decisions by treaty bodies are central to ensuring that international human rights laws are respected domestically. Taking the UK as an example, this chapter compares the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The chapter demonstrates that the ECHR has been used increasingly by the UK’s courts to protect individuals’ rights, and that the courts have often engaged directly with European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions. By contrast, although the courts sometimes make limited use of the ICCPR, their approach and its outcome are inconsistent. A similar pattern is observed when the UK’s compliance with both instruments is assessed. Although this may stem from a range of factors, the importance of binding judgments of the ECtHR should not be underestimated: they allow domestic courts to engage directly with a treaty body, and also create a pressure to act. Looking beyond the UK, the chapter concludes that enforceable decisions by treaty bodies have a vital role in ensuring that international human rights laws are respected, and individuals’ rights are protected.

The introduction sets out the context, aims and approach of this book. It explains that over the past thirty years, the number of cases before the ECtHR concerning freedom of thought, conscience and religion has increased significantly and interest in this right in the literature has grown exponentially. It notes that ECtHR jurisprudence relating to ECHR Article 9 has been heavily criticised by commentators but there has been very little interrogation of the core premises that underpin doctrinal analyses of Article 9 in recent years. In particular, the fundamental question—what is the law in relation to freedom of religion or belief?—has not been fully explored. The introduction explains that this book aims to address this important question in relation to ECHR Article 9 and, in doing so, it challenges the classic approach to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the literature and offers an alternative interpretation of ECHR Article 9 and the related ECtHR jurisprudence. The detailed overview of the structure of this book in the introduction details the approach which will be taken, and sets out the the materials which form the basis for the analysis.

Chapter 2 focuses on the text of ECHR Article 9 and other international provisions protecting the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion including Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 1 of the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief (1981 Declaration). It also explores the drafting history of these Articles through an examination of the relevant travaux préparatoires. By analysing this material, and drawing upon a recent, deeply valuable contribution to the understanding of ICCPR Article 18, Chapter 2 seeks to demonstrate that it is more faithful to these text of the ECHR Article 9 and the relevant travaux préparatoires to understand the forum internum and forum externum aspects of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in terms of a relationship rather than in terms of a binary and hierarchical distinction.

European Criminal Law has developed into a complex, jagged subject matter, which at the same time has become increasingly important for everyday criminal law practice. On the one hand, this work aims to do comprehensive justice to the complexity of the matter without sacrificing readability. In order to achieve this, the book’s structure enables legal scholars and experienced practitioners to access the information relevant to them in a targeted manner and, at the same time, enables less-oriented readers to gain access to European Criminal Law. Thus, the volume both answers basic questions and offers discussion in more specialised areas. Written by experts in the field, the book offers discussions that are both of the highest academic standards and accessibly readable.

The essence of a human right is that it is afforded immediate protection, even if this protection is not absolute. Rights are ‘fundamental’ because their existence is not open to dispute, negotiation or compromise, although their substance is subject to interpretation. Rights are anchored in law and they underwrite legal as well as political action. Despite their interaction, human rights should not be equated with human rights law. This chapter will explore the appearance and evolution of human rights in EU law, paying particular attention to five themes: the history and systematisation of human rights in EU law; their initial appearance in EU law via adjudication rather than political deliberation; the relationship between general principles, fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights in EU law; the use of fundamental rights in EU law, in particular the scope of judicial review by the CJEU; and accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.

The chapter highlights the main legal arguments under the European Convention on Human Rights and in the jurisprudence in the European Court of Human Rights which resulted in the Menarini judgment declaring Italian competition law to be quasi-criminal and thereby enabling the effective protection of Article 6 of the ECHR. Both EU and Hungarian competition law are quasi-criminal – mainly – due to the increased level of fines imposed by the relevant competition authorities. Article 6 requires effective judicial review in the form of full review, which however is a question that is still not answered satisfactorily in both Hungarian and EU law. This chapter only focuses on the review of fines, where the practical judicial oversight is compatible with the de facto full review requirement of the Menarini judgment.