This chapter explores the impact of the 1707 Union between England and Scotland on the public law of both nations, specifically the extent to which the Acts of Union can be seen to have unified the public law of the newly created Kingdom of Great Britain by extending English law to Scotland. In so doing, this chapter presents a new and original hypothesis of the Acts of Union which provides a more coherent understanding of the post-Union constitution and the role of English and Scots public law therein. It shows that the Acts of Union, by necessary implication of the creation of Britain-wide institutions, unified public law throughout England and Scotland in relation to those institutions, thus creating a new but partial body of British common law. In other areas of public law, variation between England and Scotland remains possible.

This chapter lays out the book’s central thesis that Supreme Court decisions changing previously prevailing interpretations of a mostly unaltered written Constitution represent the historical norm, not an exception. The chapter begins by discussing the death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February 2016 and the changes in constitutional doctrine that Scalia, who had pioneered the interpretive methodologies of originalism and textualism, had helped to bring about. The chapter also highlights changes that Scalia had urged but could not persuade a majority of his colleagues to adopt. It describes the political machinations by a Republican Senate majority in the aftermath of Scalia’s death and the similarly partisan maneuvers that resulted in the swift confirmation of a successor to the iconic liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 2020. Together, these developments helped produce the Court’s current supermajority of six conservative justices (out of nine), including three appointed by Donald Trump, and inaugurated a new era in constitutional history. After sketching this background, the chapter preliminarily sketches some of the book’s most important themes, including that the Supreme Court is a lawmaking institution but one that is constrained by widely shared understandings of the judicial role in ways that legislative lawmakers are not.

This chapter points out the significant challenges in holding foundation model developers and deployers clearly responsible for the uses and outputs of their creations under US law. Scienter requirements, and difficulties in creating proof, make it challenging to establish liability under many statutes with civil penalties and torts. Constitutional protections for speech may shield model-generated outputs, or the models themselves, from some forms of regulation—though legal scholars are divided over the extent of these protections. And legal challenges to agencies’ authority over AI systems could hamstring regulators’ ability to proactively address foundation models’ risks. All is not lost, though. Each of these doctrines do have potential pathways to liability and recourse. However, in all cases there will likely be protracted battles over liability involving the issues described in this chapter.

The text of the First Amendment explicitly protects two foundational social institutions: religion and the press. Since 2021, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly granted one of these two institutions – religion – a status of heightened constitutional privilege. In contrast, current law treats the other First Amendment institution – the press – as wholly unexceptional. However, the press is defined – from newspapers to television and bloggers in pajamas to professional journalists – it receives no greater constitutional protections than any other speaker. The Court has essentially read the Press Clause out of the Constitution, voiding its specific textual commitment, despite the absence of any countervailing constitutional provision parallel to the Establishment Clause. Until religion law’s recent exceptional turn, the law’s treatment of religion and the press were in some sense parallel. Recently, they have diverged, as press law has not kept pace with changes in religion law. In this chapter, I argue that the press should be treated at least as constitutionally exceptional as religion, and I explore what such press exceptionalism might mean in practice.

If the press can claim rights different from those guaranteed to every speaker, it must be because we understand the Press Clause to serve constitutional values different from the freedom of speech clause and because these values require distinct forms of rights for their protection. In this short chapter, I explore four distinct constitutional values that at various times have been claimed to be uniquely served by the press: 1) the value of public discourse, 2) the Meiklejohnian value of distributing information, 3) the checking value, and 4) the value of the public sphere. Each of these values yields a different constitutional definition of the “press,” and each might imply a different array of rights that ought to accrue to the press. Although these values are distinct, the press may simultaneously serve one or more of them.

Social media and the internet are the most important changes in communication since the development of the printing press. They democratize the ability to reach a mass audience, but they can also quickly spread harmful information and threaten the viability of traditional media that are essential for newsgathering. Courts have thus far largely approached these media by applying existing doctrines of freedom of the press and freedom of speech. But these doctrines are often, though not always, inadequate to deal with the issues posed by social media and the internet. It is important to identify those areas where traditional doctrines are inadequate and to begin to develop new First Amendment and statutory approaches.

In this chapter we ask if people have rights to their social identities – in particular, their gender identities. We cash out what such gender identity rights entail by discussing the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to apply to laws that target transgender people.

This chapter considers the status of a constitutional “right to grow old” under the US Constitution. Understood as a “positive” right – ensuring a certain minimum quality of life to people as they face the challenges of aging – such a right may seem unavailing given the austerity in respect to such rights that many lawyers associate with the US constitutional tradition. This chapter shows this view to be premature, at least. Unlike the kinds of positive rights overtly rejected in prior cases, such as rights to certain forms of social welfare or to racial equality, a right to grow old contemplates social support for all of us, and not simply for a politically disfavored class. Moreover, many of the conventional objections to positive rights, grounded in the difficulty of disciplining them, can be overcome or mitigated through strategies that have proven effective in many courts around the world: proportionality review, polycentric constitutionalism, a “minimum core” approach, progressive realization, and remedial flexibility.

At some point, the necessary interpretation of vague, abstract, and nonspecific provisions in constitutions, including the United States Constitution, places appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court, in a jurisprudential position very similar to the one they occupy when engaged in traditional common law analysis and lawmaking. Working out the specific doctrinal meaning of constitutional phrases such as “free speech,” “establishment of religion,” and “equal protection” is a jurisprudential task not unlike working out the specific doctrinal meaning of “duty,” “breach,” or “causation” in the common law of negligence.

This means that as a practical judicial matter, the development of constitutional law is often very similar in nature to traditional common law lawmaking. Thus, a court such as the United States Supreme Court can accurately be thought of as often operating like a common law court, despite the relative paucity of federal common law.

This chapter takes advantage of this insight to apply the nature of the paradigm shift from formalism to instrumentalism, and its many consequences, to the area of constitutional law. More specifically, it offers an example of instrumentalist common law analysis applied to the constitutional law free speech doctrine of prior restraint.

Federalism is a distinctive form of constitutional rule but one that has largely been neglected by both political and constitutional theory. Existing accounts of federalism tend to focus almost exclusively upon its institutional manifestation. What is lacking is an account of the common conceptual underpinnings that unite these various institutional forms within the genus of one constitutional idea. In this chapter Stephen Tierney argues that the core idea of federalism can only be arrived at by way of constitutional theory. Constitutional theory explains both how and why law is used to manage political power. Federal constitutions manage and transform political power for a discrete purpose that is fundamentally distinguishable from other constitutional forms. This chapter contends that federalism must be addressed as a specific genus of constitutional government for the modern state which, in the act of constitutional union, gives foundational recognition and accommodation to the state’s constituent territorial pluralism. The purpose of the federal constitution is to maintain the foundational relationship between pluralism and union through the creation and reconciliation of different orders of government. This marks a significant fork in the road between federal and unitary constitutionalism, not just in institutional terms but at the most fundamental level of constitutional identity and legitimacy.

Personalized pricing is a form of pricing where different customers are charged different prices for the same product depending on their ability to pay, based on the information that the trader holds of a potential customer. Pricing plays a relevant role in the decision-making process by the consumers, and a firm’s performance can be determined by the ability of the business entities to execute a pricing strategy accordingly. Further, pricing also determines the quality, value, and willingness to buy. Usually the willingness of a consumer depends on transparency and fairness.

Technological developments have enabled online sellers to personalize prices of the goods and services.

While statelessness remains a global phenomenon, it is a global issue with an Asian epicentre. This chapter situates the book within the context and multi-disciplinary scholarship on statelessness in Asia by reviewing the causes, conditions and/or challenges of statelessness. It recognizes statelessness in this region as a phenomenon beyond forced migration and highlights the arbitrary and discriminatory use of state power in producing and sustaining statelessness. The chapter reviews the ‘state of statelessness’ in Asia, including applicable international, regional and national legal frameworks. It also maps some of the core themes that emerge from the contributors’ examination of the causes and conditions of statelessness in Asia. These include: the relationship between ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic diversity and statelessness; the legacies of colonialism; contemporary politics surrounding nation-building, border regimes and mobilities; as well as intersecting vulnerabilities. The chapter concludes with some preliminary thoughts on frameworks of analysis and future research agendas, including challenges and prospects for reform.