Chapter 3 focuses on Hegel’s critique of liberalism. It starts by discussing the preface to the Philosophy of Right in order to challenge the widespread assumption that Hegel is averse to robust social criticism. Afterwards, the chapter considers two main causes for the limited recognition of his work’s critical dimension. The first is the tendency to read Hegel’s book as a horizontal progression, fuelled by the accumulation of different aspects or layers of freedom. This kind of approach misrepresents the qualitative transformation that is at stake in the transition from civil society to the state, which only a vertical reading can adequately convey. Second, the Philosophy of Right’s critical import has also been obfuscated by some of Hegel’s own philosophical positions. Despite his intended sublation of the stage of civil society, his account of the state remains wedded, in important ways, to the former’s underlying logic. As the chapter seeks to show, if we accept Hegel’s claim that a rational state must synthesize the particular and the universal dimensions of human freedom, we must reject some of his political options as partly or wholly un-Hegelian.

Chapter 4 reassesses Hegel’s views on property and its role within a rational state. In the Philosophy of Right’s initial stage, devoted to ‘abstract right’, each person is defined as an independent legal agent, with the right to own and exchange property. From this standpoint, the political sphere is but a prolongation of the legal sphere and the state is reduced to an external authority, charged with regulating existing property relations. As the progression unfolds, however, this legalistic framework is called into question: it turns out that individual rights are not the true foundation of the state, but a part thereof, subordinated to a wider commitment to the common good. Yet while this commitment is clearly affirmed by Hegel, it is at odds with the priority he accords to private property, in the progression’s later stages, over other forms of ownership. Taking a different path, the chapter argues that a Hegelian theory of property entails a critical revision of Hegel’s actual treatment of property rights. If the state is to bring together the citizens’ particular interests and the common good, the ownership of society’s productive resources must be shared by all of its members.

The concept of post-Kantian perfectionism clarifies the mutual polemics in the Hegelain School, contrasting Feuerbach’s naturalism, which combines pre- and post-Kantian motifs, with the more exigent Kantianism of Bruno Bauer; and it elucidates sharp disagreements with anti-perfectionists like Max Stirner. The concrete historical situation comes under scrutiny of post-Kantian perfectionist thinking. French Revolutionary factions and the contending parties in the German Vormärz express distinct views of freedom and follow different developmental trajectories. Civil society too reveals its inner dynamics. Rejecting Leibniz’s pre-established harmony and Wolffian mutuality, but also markedly differing from Kant and Schiller, the non-compossibility of interests in civil society is the theoretical innovation here. The irreconcilable opposition of interests, central to Marx, is not a view original with him. In Bauer, autonomy means divesting oneself of particular interests to the extent that they inhibit institutional transformation.

History for German idealism is the expression of practical reason, the process of gradually bringing about the accord of subject and object. In Hegel’s conception of the history of freedom, different configurations of ethical life embody changing assessments of the self and the world, and contain essential contradictions whose resolution is the key to progress towards new and more complex forms. The dialectic of the will in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is an exposition of the idea of spontaneity, endowing itself with concrete content as it moves through its dimensions of universality, particularity, and singularity. Hegel demonstrates that modern institutions are not mere limitations, but legitimate conditions for the exercise of freedom. The rationality of the real, however, does not preclude a critical engagement. Close examination of current relations and institutions as exemplifying ideas of freedom reveals nodal points where practical interventions are likely to be fruitful in effecting change. An implicit, historicised ‘ought’ in Hegel, arising from his reworking of the logical categories, marks his place within post-Kantian perfectionism.

The chapter explores the impact of new technologies on liberal democracy, highlighting both positive and negative dimensions. E-governance, facilitated by information and communication technologies, improves efficiency, transparency, and accountability, reducing the need for physical government visits. AI-supported online voting enhances participation and prevents fraud, while social media and online communities can foster social capital. However, challenges arise as well. Social media algorithms can manipulate information, affecting public opinion, and tech giants’ dominance may influence democratic participation. Increased reliance on digital systems exposes governments to cybersecurity threats, undermining public confidence. Inequality in internet access disenfranchises those without it, leading to voter suppression and declining trust. Algorithms contribute to polarization and filter bubbles, with deepfakes impacting political discourse. In totalitarian contexts, technology aids activism against authoritarian regimes through anonymous communication and encryption. The chapter concludes by advocating strategies for maximizing benefits and minimizing harm, emphasizing digital literacy, citizen education, data privacy regulations, responsible technology use, community empowerment, activism, awareness, and accountability for ethical use by governments and tech companies. Recognizing the importance of both physical and digital connections is crucial for thriving liberal democracies.

Chapter 13 examines the evolution of regionally administered totalitarianism (RADT) in post-Mao China. The reforms were implemented to safeguard totalitarianism within the boundaries of its core principles. Economic reforms, particularly those implemented in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, inadvertently strengthened the private sector and civil society under RADT, which ultimately saved the regime. Yet this development also unintentionally created a new liberal type of institutional genes and steered China in the direction of regionally decentralized authoritarianism (RDA). The chapter explores the tug-of-war between the old institutional genes of the RADT/RDA system and the new institutional genes, with the authoritarian system exerting force to suppress the nascent traits, followed by a subsequent shift back to rigid totalitarian control. Finally, the chapter assesses the economic constraints imposed by the totalitarian structure, the changes in the party-state incentives, the precarious position of the private sector, and the overarching influence of communist totalitarianism on China’s economic progress.

The case of The Bahamas highlights the institutionally disruptive impacts of climate change. Despite pioneering efforts in national adaptation legislation in the mid 2000s, the chapter finds that The Bahamas has largely focused on relatively conservative programs concerned with climate change mitigation rather than adaptation or loss and damage. Yet drawing on semi-structured interviews and an analysis of relevant policy documents, the chapter also suggests that climate change has impacted the configuration of relevant institutional bodies in The Bahamas. As the analysis demonstrates, the loss and damage associated with several extreme weather events in the late 2010s led to the establishment of the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness, Management and Reconstruction; the strengthening of the legal framework for environmental protection; and the growing resonance among civil society organizations of the implications of climate change for their humanitarian and nature preservation work. The chapter argues that while much of The Bahamas’ loss and damage policy agenda is focused on developing the knowledge, resources, skills, and governance frameworks to grapple with the impacts of climate change, it is also worth paying attention to how climate change impacts are reshaping political institutions and defining the possible contours of knowledge generation.

This chapter focuses on how Bangladesh, a country with extensive experience of climate-related disasters, has dealt with loss and damage in its national policymaking. In response to its high vulnerability, Bangladesh is – among the countries studied in this book – a role model in disaster reduction and preparedness. However, the government’s efforts do not meet the scope of needs connected to climate impacts on the ground. Drawing on a review of relevant policy documents and semi-structured interviews with key public and civil society actors, the chapter analyzes national-level engagement with loss and damage from climate change in Bangladesh. It demonstrates that while fundamentally all ministries in Bangladesh are involved in averting, minimizing, or addressing loss and damage, the concept is yet to be fully integrated in national policy. The chapter also finds that existing policies tend to focus on addressing economic losses and overlook the significant noneconomic losses from climate change. It is argued that integrating loss and damage into national policies, establishing a fair national mechanism, and creating a comprehensive database of loss and damage data would strengthen Bangladesh’s role as both an advocate for loss and damage governance and a leader in climate response.

The durability of democracy among modern political systems is based on its ability to provide for its own self-enforcement without recourse to outside compulsion (North, Summerhill, and Weingast 2000; Przeworski 1991). Recourse to outside enforcement is always dangerous because loss of self-restraint by that authority raises the dilemma of “who guards the guardians” (Hurwicz 2008), and holds out the possibility of dictatorship.

Whether old or new, democracies are fragile. There are no guarantees that they will last. Why? Part of the answer is that democracy is an inherently unfinished project. There is always more political work to do. The institutions that define democratic life, such as a robust civil society, political parties that structure public opinion and voting behavior, and free, fair, and competitive elections, moreover, are just as available to authoritarians, as to democrats. Finally, democracies operate in an international system that supports the spread of dictatorship, as well as democracy.

This chapter explores the possibilities and dilemmas that civil society actors face in resisting and reversing democratic backsliding through examples from around the world. It examines the conditions that shape civil society activism under backsliding and the roles it has played in containing or reversing autocratization. As it shows, in a number of cases civil society resistance has been critical in restraining and reversing backsliding. But it has been better able to counter backsliding when popular support for the backsliding leader has eroded and the opposition is able to work through institutions rather than having to work against them. As backsliding proceeds, institutional channels for influence deteriorate. As a result, there is a critical window during which civil society resistance stands a better chance of containing backsliding: before electoral processes and institutional constraints on executives are fully captured. Once capture occurs, civil society resistance moves to the much more dangerous and difficult task of confronting rather than preventing dictatorship.

This chapter argues that advisory proceedings have the procedural flexibility to enable individuals’ participation, despite the Court’s reluctance to bring such participation to fruition. It first dispels the myth that witnesses are limited to the confines of contentious proceedings. It then discusses the Court’s sparse engagement with amici curiae. Finally, it explores the potential of the analogous extension of Article 66(2) of the Court’s Statute, authorising the furnishing of information by entities beyond states and international organisations.

This chapter discusses the political and diplomatic control of the implementation of international decisions by quasi-judicial bodies. It covers the follow-up procedures of the Human Rights Committee, the African Commission, and the Inter-American Commission, highlighting the challenges and effectiveness of these mechanisms. The chapter examines the role of states, international organizations, and civil society in ensuring compliance with international human rights decisions, the strategies for overcoming obstacles to implementation, and the impact of political and diplomatic efforts on the protection of human rights. It also discusses the need for enhanced cooperation and coordination among various actors to improve the effectiveness of these follow-up procedures.