The chapter outlines Dayan’s transition from commanding the Southern Command to becoming the Chief of Staff, emphasizing his strategic vision and operational command. The document delves into Dayan’s approach to military training, his participation in advanced command courses, and the unique leadership style he exhibited during his command of the Northern Command. Additionally, it sheds light on Dayan’s role in shaping Israel’s security doctrine, particularly through the implementation of reprisal actions to address ongoing security threats. The content elucidates Dayan’s belief in the importance of readiness for both routine security challenges and high-intensity conflict, as well as his deep-seated conviction in the necessity of an reprisal operations for maintaining Israel’s deterrence posture that is necessary for Israel’s survival. Furthermore, it provides insights into Dayan’s perception of the conflict through his famous eulogy for a fallen officer, which underscores his complex sentiments towards peaceful coexistence and the harsh realities of conflicts in the region. Overall, the chapter highlights Dayan’s multifaceted leadership, military strategy, and the evolving nature of Israel’s security challenges during his tenure.

The chapter provides a detailed account of the second part of Yom Kippur War, starting with the turning point in the war on October 12. It highlights the existential danger that Israel’s leaders believed they faced before the turning point and how Israel’s leaders strategized and made a bold move to cross the canal and encircle Egypt’s Third Army, a move that changed the course of the war. It also discusses the differences in approach between Dayan and Elazar in achieving a ceasefire and how Israel’s leaders used a ruse or move to force one of their enemies to lay down their arms. It also sheds light on the difficult decisions that leaders must make during times of crisis, such as Dayan’s decision to give the order to prevent more losses that could weaken the new defense line. The chapter also discusses the aftermath of the war, including the establishment of a National Commission of Inquiry, the Agranat Commission, to examine the war’s prelude and conduct until October 8. It held the military echelon responsible for the catastrophe, a decision which escalated antigovernment protests and calls for Dayan’s and Meir’s resignations.

After the close of the Cold War, a delegation of Israelis met with a delegation of Palestinians in Oslo, Norway, and hammered out a plan to bring peace between the two national communities. The result –– the Oslo Accords –– consisted of two parts: recognition of Israel by the Palestinians and recognition of a Palestinian nation by the Israelis; and a roadmap for step-by-step negotiations between the two sides for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and a final settlement of issues that had been outstanding since 1948 and 1967. Peace, however, was not to be for a variety of reasons: spoilers on both sides; publics that grew disenchanted with waiting or with only half a loaf; politicians who never rose to the occasion by becoming statesmen; the imbalance in power and negotiating positions; the passing of a singular window of opportunity that, over time, diminished to a vanishing point. The “era of Oslo” came to an end in 2020, when Donald Trump offered a “peace plan” that, in fact, gave the Israelis everything and the Palestinians nothing.