The present chapter presents a recent historical description of the implementation of cross-cultural competence (3C) training programs throughout the United States (US) military. Training for 3C in the military aims at increasing foreign cultural understanding and providing behavioral strategies necessary to improve interactions in a foreign operational environment or with people of different national backgrounds. The importance of 3C was highlighted through a DoD Strategic Plan and an active body of basic and applied research throughout the DoD from 2007 to 2014. However, by 2018, its strategic value waned, except for a few activities within the Marines and US Air Force. Some of the challenges 3C training programs experienced were: (1) limited funding to conduct training evaluations, (2) balancing a need for culture-specific training for immediate deployment vs. culture-general training for having a military force at the ready for "any-time" deployment, and (3) inconsistent language to operationalize “culture” across the forces. After a review of US military 3C training programs from mid 2000s, this chapter concludes with propositions for stimulating a demand signal and furthering valid evaluation research on the effectiveness of 3C training.

This chapter describes how the world’s first independent air force, led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, reacted to the threats to its existence by maximizing the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) operational utility and financial efficiency, while simultaneously contriving a credible narrative about its future strategic potential. In pursuing these twin narratives, the RAF developed a unique culture of beliefs and taken-for-granted attitudes that thrived because of the conceptually incurious nature of the men it selected to become officers. Few of these technically able "practical men" were willing to challenge their superiors’ intuitive and speculative belief that the morale of civilian populations was especially vulnerable to bombing. Instead, like their leaders, they became consciously complicit in acceding to the societal prophecies, articulated in books, films, and newspapers, that bombing would have apocalyptic effects, and that civil societies subjected to its effects would wish to sue for peace. The chapter concludes by analyzing how this culture impeded the realization that the anticipated outcomes were not being achieved and explains how this stymied options to pursue alternative strategies.

Two kinds of war have characterized the development of US Air Force culture. The first has involved struggles for air supremacy and decisive impact against a series of opponents, from Germany to Japan to Vietnam to Iraq. The second has involved bureaucratic fights against the US Army and the US Navy in the halls of Congress and the Pentagon. Combined, these fights have led to emphasis on recurring elements across the history of Air Force culture, including information precision, technological dominance, and decisive effect. These concentrations have structured how the US Air Force has fought its opponents, foreign and domestic, from before organizational independence in 1947 to the present day.