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The essay examines the lessons from the international intervention in Afghanistan, highlighting the failures of externally imposed state building, including neglect of local governance structures and prioritizing donor interests over Afghan ownership. The international peace- and state-building intervention in Afghanistan, which spanned two decades, culminated in the abrupt withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2021, leading to the Taliban’s swift resurgence. This event has sparked a critical examination of the strategies employed by NATO and allied nations during their engagement in Afghanistan. This essay aims to distill seven key lessons from this intervention, emphasizing the need for future peacebuilders to adapt their approaches to better align with local contexts and realities. The analysis highlights the failures of liberal peacebuilding, the importance of local ownership, the necessity of effective and legitimate institutions, and the detrimental impact of corruption. Furthermore, it underscores the significance of coherence among international actors and the need for a nuanced understanding of regional dynamics. By reflecting on these lessons, the essay seeks to provide actionable insights for future international interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states.
The subject of insurgency explores how and why armed groups confront the state, their political and ideological claims, their links to society – including the support they have and their recruitment practices – and their political and military tactics. Rebel governance explores the behavior of non-state armed insurgencies in the territories they control – or partially control – and their attempts to provide public services, gain the support of the population, recruit members, manage economic policy, and gain legitimacy. Counterinsurgency involves efforts by state actors – sometimes with international assistance – to challenge and defeat rebel groups by military and political means and reassert the authority of the state in areas where rebel groups have influence. This chapter explores the relationship between insurgency and civil war, and the main theories of why insurgencies emerge and grow, their endurance, and their impact. As a part of this, it considers the provision of “governance” by some rebel groups in the territories in which they have some control, the services they attempt to provide, and the objectives that motivate this on the part of rebel leaders. Based on this, the chapter then explores the lessons of “rebel governance” for counterinsurgency campaigns and for peacebuilding after conflict.
This chapter uses three declassified case studies to examine the varying and complex mobilisation processes that led to each of Australia’s major Afghanistan commitments throughout 2005–6. It examines how the Department of Defence implemented its decisions – what it did to organise for operations – up until the point that military forces deployed overseas. Questions of manpower, supply and logistics, force preparation, combined planning with coalition partners, force insertion and policy development were different for each of these deployments. What worked, and what did not? What was done, and what was left undone? And what impact did any of this have on subsequent operations?
This chapter considers the concurrency pressures faced by the Australian Army, particularly in the middle years of this century’s first decade. As the 2020s portend not just localised regional crises or disasters but also a greater range of environmental challenges coupled with a surge in governance challenges and great power contestation, the Army needs to reflect on concurrency pressures of the recent past to prepare for what the future holds. In contemplating contingencies the Army can expect to face in coming years in Australia’s region, reflecting on the experience from 2003 to 2010 is a good place to start.
This paper traces how geological surveys and prospecting across two centuries shaped Afghanistan’s enduring characterization as a mineral-rich “El Dorado.” By investigating the shift in survey methods from comprehensive terrestrial to aerial reconnaissance, I show how geological knowledge production served purposes far beyond imperial resource identification and extraction. Drawing from historical and ethnographic research, including insights from a current emerald mine operator, I uncover how precious stones’ physical properties and circulating narratives about hidden riches propelled—and continue to propel—a vast network of individuals into mining enterprises: from state authorities and local powerbrokers to foreign geologists, mineral collectors, and international aid organizations. The result is the creation of new narratives about extractable wealth that interweave scientific practices and global market dynamics to transcend conventional periodization such as pre-Soviet, Soviet, and United States. These narratives have emerged from and reinforced asymmetrical relationships in both labor and expertise, ultimately positioning Afghan participants precariously within global mineral markets, made riskier still in times of conflict.
Since its first codification in the early twentieth century, Iranian family law has followed the Shiʿi (Jaʿfarī) school of jurisprudence. In other parts of the Shiʿi world, the question of codifying Shiʿi family law has emerged more recently. This chapter argues that codification enhances the formal rule of law. In the past, family law codification was considered to conflict with a fundamental element of Shiʿi legal thought and religious practice, namely ijtihād, independent legal reasoning by qualified scholars, which makes for a living law. Based on a comparative analysis of Iranian family law and recent Shiʿi (draft) laws put forward in Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Iraq, this chapter discusses where modern Shiʿi family law is located between the “opposite” poles of the formal rule of law (where law is general, prospective, clear, and certain) and ijtihād. The findings indicate that, today, the two are not viewed as contradicting each other. Yet, while Iranian family law only serves as a limited model for other parts of the Shiʿi world, the comparison shows that Iran subjects Shiʿi family law to the formal rule of law more comprehensively than is the case in the other three analyzed countries.
This chapter examines the nonviolent projects of ‘Pride of the Afghans’ Indian independence activist Bacha Khan. It engages both with his personal and institutional praxis within their Pashtun cultural context and with the historiographical challenges posed both by his suppression by the state and his proximity to Mahatma Gandhi.
Reflecting on the Islamic law–secular law balance in past Afghan constitutional regimes and contemporary Taliban rule, this paper contextualizes Afghan constitutionalism in a broad spectrum of constitutional traditions present in other Islamic law states (ILS). Though the Taliban are reticent about their plans for a constitutionally-anchored society, similar to processes elsewhere, the organization’s previous drafters relied upon the country’s previous constitutional regimes and on other countries’ constitutions. Though necessarily aspirational, we argue that taking lessons from the Taliban’s history, Afghanistan’s own rich constitutional tradition, and contemporary ILS’ approaches—combined with international cooperation—there may be a way forward for a Taliban-led Afghanistan: one grounded in a stable constitutional order that protects the dignity of Afghan people. But since the Taliban regained control of the country, its people have endured extreme social and economic hardship. The ongoing crisis cannot be ignored. This paper does not seek to disregard or minimize Taliban-induced atrocities; rather, by exploring the history of Afghan constitutionalism through a different lens, it looks to provide a building block for a future, more stable solution. While the existing scholarship focuses mainly on the current Taliban practices, we examine past Afghan constitutions and propose the potential for specific legal solutions in the context of the country’s robust constitutional tradition. We rely on qualitative and quantitative data in analyzing the nexus between secular law and Islam-based constitutional language, highlighting certain trends and patterns. In an important way, therefore, our research places the Taliban efforts at constructing a legal system as part of an evolving—however jolted by the Taliban—constitutional process.
The Taliban’s forceful control of Kabul resulted in severe criticism by the world community and has consequently raised a pertinent question about its recognition in international law. Though a few countries publicly denied recognition to the Taliban government, many countries have (re)-started engaging with it by concluding bilateral treaties and (re)-opening embassies without recognition. Besides, countries have put several “conditions”, such as respect for human rights and a promise to form an “inclusive government”, before they will recognize the Taliban government. This note maps out these “conditions”, along with different proposals states have proposed concerning recognizing the Taliban government. It identifies the possible legal consequences of these “proposals” for the institution of recognition of government in international law. The note finally argues that though a recognition decision is largely political, it should nevertheless be regulated by international law to the extent that it would help avoid adverse international legal consequences.
Does the situation in Afghanistan amount to persecution due to the accumulation of repressive measures enacted against women and is it sufficient that women are affected by such measures merely on the basis of their gender? While these two questions remain in front of the Court of Justice of the EU, several EU member states have moved to grant asylum to women and girls from Afghanistan on general risks of gender-based persecution. This dynamism in asylum regulations across the EU has occurred alongside renewed discussions around gender-based persecution and gender apartheid in international criminal law in light of the ongoing process for a Crimes Against Humanity Treaty. In this article, I put these developments into conversation through case study method and legal-institutional analysis, and argue that the historical link between international refugee law and international criminal law provides a space to envision an integrated system of protection around gender-related claims. To this end, I offer three outlooks for establishing general risks of gender-based persecution in international refugee law and the relationship between gender apartheid and asylum.
This article explores the geographical imagination of diasporic activists from Afghanistan. It examines the significance of the historic-geographic region of Khorasan for their attempts to re-imagine Afghanistan and its place in the region and wider world. The article documents ethnographically the forms of intellectual exchange in which these intellectual-activists participate, and their modes of materializing the geographical imagination of Khorasan in everyday life. Rather than analyzing their geographical imagination solely through the lens of ethnicity, it treats it as reflecting the activists’ underlying yearning for sovereign agency and as an attempt to forge politically recognizable subjects capable of action.
This position paper highlights the dire impacts of environmental and household air pollution, which were responsible for 6.7 million deaths globally in 2019. These deaths occurred predominantly in low- and middle-income countries, with Afghanistan reporting the highest age-adjusted mortality rate. The situation worsens during large-scale disasters like earthquakes, which release more pollutants into the air, exacerbating health risks and leading to severe conditions such as pulmonary diseases. Because political factors may hinder foreign NGOs and similar organizations from providing direct support, the frequent occurrence of earthquakes in Afghanistan underscores the critical need for emergency response training for local residents. Consequently, it is essential to provide ERT training, including the proper use of protective equipment, to local populations as well as disseminating risk communication through online technologies and other appropriate means.
In parts of southern and western Asia, as elsewhere, the cannon once served as one of the most dramatic tools in the inventories of state executioners. The practice of ‘blowing from a gun’, by which the condemned was bound to the front of a cannon and quite literally blown to pieces, was most infamously employed in British India and the Princely States, and the vast majority of English-language scholarship focuses on these regions. However, blowing from guns was commonplace in several other contemporary states, and the British use of the practice has rarely been situated in this context. The tactic was considered especially useful in Persia and Afghanistan, where weak governance, rebellion, and rampant banditry all threatened the legitimacy of the nascent state in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This article presents a history of the practice of execution by cannon in southern and western Asia, positioning it within the existing literature on public executions in the context of military and civilian justice. In doing so, the article seeks to situate the British use of the tactic within a broader regional practice, arguing that, whilst the British—following the Mughal tradition—used execution by cannon primarily in maintaining military discipline, states such as Persia and Afghanistan instead employed the practice largely in the civilian context. This article also provides a brief technical review of the practice, drawing upon numerous primary sources to examine execution by cannon within the Mughal empire, British India, Persia, and Afghanistan.
The dramatic impact of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington sharply intensified relations between Australia and the USA. The bilateral relationship was reconfirmed as the two states joined in war against an elusive, and unexpected, enemy. As the war on terrorism broadened, Australia enthusiastically joined the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, sending troops to fight in Afghanistan and, more controversially, deploying forces alongside the USA in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. From late 2001 commentary in Australia invariably accepted that ‘relations with the United States dominated Australian foreign affairs’ or more subtly observed that ‘the central dynamics of Australian foreign policy revolved around the issue of relations with the superpower, and the implications of this relationship’ for the broader exercise of Australian foreign policy.
As 2001 began, Australia’s relationship with West Asia could be characterised as one between perfect strangers. Despite regular military forays into the region, largely in support of the USA, and a burgeoning commercial relationship, the region had never been considered part of Australia’s primary area of strategic interest nor had political relations between the Australian Government and its regional counterparts ever really moved beyond occasional visits and diplomatic courtesies. Meanwhile, to the extent that Australia entered the consciousness of regional elites and the broader population, it was mainly as a supplier of primary products, such as sheep and wheat, and as a steadfast, if somewhat lower-profile, ally of the USA. In effect, there was a degree of mutual, if largely happy, ambivalence between Australia and the region.
In the early 1990s, scholars talked about Australia’s neglect of South Asia, in particular Australia’s failure to understand the rising importance of India. We spoke of indifference, blind spots, missed opportunities, general indifference and even ideological differences between the two countries that began with Jawaharlal Nehru and Sir Robert Menzies. During the last ten years, Australia’s engagement with South Asia has changed dramatically – Australia has been involved in a counterinsurgency war against the Taliban in Afghanistan intermittently since 2002, and India has emerged as Australia’s fourth largest export market. The paradox that this chapter addresses is the way in which Australia’s strategic engagement with South Asia was dominated by Afghanistan while Australian commercial national interests lay with India. These two relationships have overwhelmingly defined Australia’s connection with South Asia. The focus is on Kevin Rudd’s period as prime minister of Australia (2007–10) and his subsequent role as foreign minister (from 2010), because the Rudd years capture the essence of Australia’s new relationship with this part of the world where some two billion people live.
Examining the history and institutions of the legal systems in Afghanistan, we contend that there is an under-examined set of plural legal systems – those where different legal traditions remain in continual contention. Unlike mixed legal systems, these plural legal systems are not composed of mixed, blended, or accommodated models, but of conflicting legal influences that fail to create a well-functioning legal order, contributing to social and political conflicts. In this chapter, we first discuss the different characteristics of divided legal systems. Next, we explain why Afghanistan has failed to overcome the problem of a divided legal system.
In 2019, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II decided not to open an investigation into potential Taliban and US crimes in Afghanistan on the grounds that it would not be in the ‘interests of justice’. In arriving at this conclusion, the judges relied upon management concerns about organisational sustainability and the proposed use of resources to justify their position. While heavily criticised by scholars at the time, the judges’ reasoning alludes to the pervasiveness of management ideas and reasoning throughout the court, even in the realm of legal argumentation. This chapter takes the Afghanistan decision as the starting point for a discussion on management’s relationship to core argumentative dilemmas comprising the ICC legal field. Whether in framing case selection as a matter of court capacity or fashioning past obstacles to victim participation as ‘lessons learnt’, management ideas and practices enact a flight from the dilemmas and complexities of ICC-style justice by experts, deferring critique and sustaining the institutional project of global justice.
This chapter documents the constellation of films and literary works extending outward from the Eastern international in the late- and post-Soviet years when socialist internationalism pivoted from an east–west to a north–south axis and then dissipated (1960s–1990s). It affirms the enduring coherence of the Persianate literary space, now bound together by Soviet models of literary representation. The chapter samples the occasional poetry produced by Eastern literary representatives involved in Soviet–Third-World cultural diplomacy at Cold War literary congresses, especially through the Afro-Asian Writers’ Association. However, it also shows how artists gripped by classical Persianate forms continued to find and respond to each other after Soviet-backed literary institutions lost international legitimacy. The chapter discusses several Persian and Uzbek texts from the Soviet–Afghan War, including a leading Afghan communist literary bureaucrat’s mystical love poem to an Islamist insurgent, written continuously from 1980–2020. Its other central case study is the impact of the Soviet Armenian filmmaker Sergei Parajanov’s film The Color of Pomegranates as a model for Persianate poetics on film, including in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including in the art films of Muhsin Makhmalbaf. The chapter tempers the elegiac impulse of the post-Persianate left with an affirmation of the tradition’s continued vitality.
The conclusion reviews the arguments developed throughout the book. This summary is framed by a consideration of the changing meanings of the poetic figures of the rose and nightingale in the Persianate twentieth century. Accordingly, each chapter is elucidated through a reading of that chapter’s classical Persian or Turkic epigraph.
While women's political inclusion is central to international conflict resolution efforts, public attitudes in conflict states towards women's political inclusion remain understudied. We expect insecurity to depress support for female political leadership in conflicts where women's political inclusion is violently contested. Citizens wanting security through force prefer male leaders because of stereotypes privileging men's military prowess. However, citizens wanting security through reconciliation also favour men for fear that female leadership would provoke more violence. We assess these expectations with experimental and observational data from the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In the survey experiment, priming respondents to think about insecurity decreases support for female leadership, but only among women. In observational data, insecurity correlates with more polarized attitudes towards women's political representation in some regions and greater support for female leaders in others. Insecurity's impact on public support for female leadership in conflict states may be highly heterogeneous.