8.1 Reflection: The Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Introduction
This chapter introduces the ICC decisionsFootnote 1 concerning the Lubanga and Ntaganda cases delivered in the context of the situation in the DRC, and the reparations order of the Lubanga case.Footnote 2 It summarises the key facts and outcomes of each of these decisions and then considers how the authors of subsequent contributions have reimagined these ICC decisions from a feminist perspective. How the reimagined judgments depart from the original ICC decisions will be analysed and what makes them ‘feminist’ will be assessed. Finally, this contribution will conclude by critiquing the importance of the reimagined judgments in the context of ‘gender-sensitive’ ICC decision-making.
Background to the Conflict
The Lubanga case in which Thomas Lubanga was charged with crimes related to child soldiers served as an ICC landmark for more reasons than one, chief among them being that it was the first case ever before the ICC. It was hoped by many survivors of the DRC conflict and civil society advocates that the case would serve as a reminder that this ‘new’ system of international criminal justice would hold perpetrators of international crimes to account. The eventual guilty verdict and sentencing only managed to partially satisfy the wishes of the international community, especially those interested in gender justice.Footnote 3
Prior to discussing the details of the cases before the ICC, it is important to set the factual scene against which the conflict associated with the ICC trials in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), including that of Mr Ntaganda, took place. The multi-ethnic Ituri region of the DRC is known for its abundant natural resources, which include coltan, diamonds, gold, and petroleum.Footnote 4 However, from 1999 onwards, these resources became a root cause of inter-ethnic tensions in the region.Footnote 5 By 2002, Ituri was ‘plunged into conflict over land distribution and the ownership of natural resources’.Footnote 6
Prior to 2002, the dominant Hema ethnic group in Ituri coexisted peacefully with other ethnic groups, until DRC politicians whose primary aim was to (illegally) trade in Ituri’s abundant natural resources became involved.Footnote 7 One of these politicians was Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (hereinafter Mr Lubanga), who formed the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC). He also established and became head of a non-state armed group, the UPC’s military wing, the Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC).Footnote 8 As the head of FLPC, between July 2002 and December 2003, Mr Lubanga, with other members, ‘undertook the large-scale enlistment of children under the age of fifteen years who were trained in the FPLC training camps … and who subsequently participated actively in hostilities’.Footnote 9 Mr Bosco Ntaganda (hereinafter Mr Ntaganda), was also involved as the Deputy Chief of Staff and commander of the FPLC.Footnote 10
It is important to the context of these cases to also note that the DRC has been recognised as a country with one of the highest rates of sexual violence in the world. There are reports stating that during the conflict, girl soldiers were regularly raped, and boy soldiers were forced to rape and were also raped themselves.Footnote 11 Sexual violence was used as a tool to demonstrate control over the child soldiers by the UPC and conscription of the children by the UPC was clearly not gender-neutral. In the Lubanga case, the UN Under-Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy, provided testimony as an expert witness.Footnote 12 In her testimony, she specifically described the roles girl soldiers are forced to play in conflict situations, including that of cooks, porters, nurses, and translators, together with being sexually exploited.Footnote 13 However, while the ICC analysed the child soldiers issue in the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute crimes of sexual violence and the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defence stirred controversy among DRC survivors and civil society groups.Footnote 14 Further, when the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision to modify the legal characterisation of the facts to include the crimes of ‘inhuman treatment’ and ‘sexual slavery’, there was significant dissent. Many in the international criminal law community felt that the charges brought against Mr Lubanga were too narrow and did not accurately represent the full breadth of the crimes allegedly committed by him.
Situation in the DRC
In 2003, when the ICC commenced its work in earnest, it was announced by the then Prosecutor, Mr Luis Moreno Ocampo, that the DRC would be selected as the most urgent situation for investigation. In 2004, President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, referred the situation to the ICC for all crimes occurring after 1 July 2002.
In June 2004, Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo announced that he found reasonable basis to commence an investigation. Mr Lubanga was accused as a co-perpetrator of the war crime of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities. An ICC arrest warrant was issued for Lubanga on 10 February 2006 and the charges were confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber I on 29 January 2007. On 26 January 2009, the Lubanga trial opened before Trial Chamber I.
Mr Ntaganda was charged with thirteen counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity committed in 2002–2003 in the Ituri district of the DRC. The trial of Ntaganda opened on 2 September 2015 with closing statements from 28 to 30 August 2018. The ICC Prosecutor was Mr Karim A. A. Khan.
Background to the Relevant ICC Cases
Lubanga
As stated above, Mr Lubanga was charged and later convicted by the ICCFootnote 15 along with his co-perpetrators for agreeing to, and participating in, a common plan to build an army, whose purpose was to establish and maintain control over the Ituri region. Owing to this common plan, children under the age of fifteen were conscripted into the UPC and FPLC between 1 September 2002 and 13 August 2003. The role Lubanga played in the UPC and FPLC, how aware he was of his specific role, his exercise of authority and implementation of UPC/FPLC plans, which included the recruitment of children under the age of fifteen and, most importantly, making them participate in hostilities, led to his charges and subsequent conviction by the ICC. Mr Lubanga was found guilty of the war crime of ‘enlisting and conscription of children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities’ on 14 March 2012 and was sentenced on 10 July 2012 to fourteen years’ imprisonment. This verdict and sentence was confirmed by the Appeals ChamberFootnote 16 of the ICC in December 2014.
In their judgment, the Chamber also found that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) should not have delegated its investigative responsibilities to intermediaries. This led to the submission of unreliable evidence and consequently contributed to a delay in the proceedings.Footnote 17 The Lubanga case spanned six years from arrest to conviction, largely due to two successive suspensions of proceedings. The length of ICC proceedings has been criticised due to its impact on the rights of the accused, as well as costs. The OTP did not make potentially exculpatory evidence available to the defence in the first instance.Footnote 18 Furthermore, in the second instance, the question of impossibility of a fair trial arose when it was found that the defence of the identity of an intermediary (whose veracity had been called into question) was not disclosed by the OTP, in spite of being ordered to do so by the Court.Footnote 19 The Appeals Chamber reversed both suspensions in October 2010, citing that sanctions should have been made instead.Footnote 20
Ntaganda
In the Ntaganda case, on 15 June 2017, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC handed down the verdict after the defence challenged the jurisdiction of the Court over the war crimes of sexual violence.Footnote 21 The scope of the appeal boiled down to whether the Rome Statute’s jurisdictional reach extends to members of the same armed forces for the war crime of rape and sexual slavery listed in Article 8(2)(b) in a non-international armed conflict. In 2017, the Trial Chamber ruled that sexual violence crimes where the victims and perpetrators are members of the same fighting force (intra-party war crimes) can amount to war crimes under the ICC Statute.Footnote 22 That finding was subsequently upheld on appeal.Footnote 23 On 8 July 2019, Trial Chamber VI of the ICC found Ntaganda guilty of five counts of crimes against humanity and thirteen counts of war crimes.Footnote 24 On 7 November 2019, Mr Ntaganda was sentenced to a total of thirty years’ imprisonment.Footnote 25
On 30 March 2021, the ICC Appeals Chamber confirmed the conviction and the sentence in this case.Footnote 26 On 8 March 2021, Trial Chamber VI delivered its Order on Reparations to victims against Ntaganda.Footnote 27 On 12 September 2022, the Appeals Chamber issued its judgment outlining its reasoning in this case.Footnote 28
Critical Reflection of the Reimagined Cases
The following section introduces the relevant original ICC decisions in the Lubanga and Ntaganda cases, while critiquing the reimagined decisions written by Judges Marie Wilmet (Lubanga), Priya Gopalan and Olga Jurasz (Ntaganda); and Isabel Maravall-Buckwater (Ntaganda).
Judge Marie Wilmet: Reimagining the ‘Reparations for Child Soldiers’
In 2015, the Appeals Chamber issued its decision regarding the reparations order in the case against Mr Lubanga.Footnote 29 The Appeals Chamber ruled that Mr Lubanga was not liable for reparations for child soldiers who were alleged victims of sexual violence committed by members of the armed forces under his control. Referring to the sentencing decision, the Appeals Chamber noted that the failure of the Trial Chamber to include sexual violence as an aggravating factor meant that it did not ‘establish harm from sexual and gender-based violence resulted from the crime for which Mr Lubanga was convicted’.Footnote 30
At trial, the standard of proof is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, and at the reparations stage it is a less exacting standard of a ‘balance of probabilities’.Footnote 31 Judge Marie Wilmet, in her reimagined decision, reconsiders the trial evidence, applying what she determines is the correct standard of ‘balance of probabilities’ rather than the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard originally applied, and determines that, but for the crimes Mr Lubanga was convicted of, the child soldiers would not have experienced the relevant sexual and gender-based harm. With this conclusion, Wilmet allows those victims to qualify for reparations.
Judge Wilmet reimagines the recruitment of child soldier crimes in the Lubanga judgmentFootnote 32 by using Article 21(3) as an interpretative tool. She demonstrates that, while the evidence presented by witnesses was limited to gender-based violence committed against girl soldiers, it is erroneous that boy soldiers be automatically excluded from reparations, since they did suffer from sexual and gender-based violence as a result of their conscription, enlistment, and use in the armed conflict. Wilmet’s view that ‘anyone – male or female – demonstrating that they suffered from sexual and gender-based violence as a result of the crimes committed by Mr Lubanga is eligible to benefit from reparations’ is, in our opinion, a strong case. We found this to be particularly respectful and inclusive, while not losing sight of the factual particularities of the case, and situating it against the backdrop of the DRC’s socio-economic conditions. What Judge Wilmet does not do is go beyond this brief reference to boy soldiers’ experiences of sexual violence, which she might have chosen to do to better highlight the extent of these experiences. However, girl soldiers, deservingly so in our view, given the extent of the crimes against them, get an in-depth analysis of the harms suffered at the hands of the perpetrators. By doing so, in reimagining the case Judge Wilmet has applied Article 21(3) in a manner that ensures that intersectional and gender-sensitive injuries are at the fore.
As ICC Judge Odio Benito stated in her dissenting Trial Chamber opinion in Lubanga, the Chamber did in fact receive ample evidence of the conditions, including sexual violence, in which boys and girls were recruited, enlisted, and used in the hostilities and reminded us ‘to keep in mind the differential gender effects and damages that these crimes have upon their victims, depending on whether they are boys or girls’.Footnote 33 Judge Wilmet shows the value in Odio Benito’s feminist lens, and in her reimagining rigorously narrates how the original decision failed to consider women’s unique circumstances and the existence of power relationships. In her rewritten decision, Judge Wilmet discusses how the seemingly gender-neutral war crime of conscription of children to actively participate in an armed conflict differently impact on girl and boy soldiers.
Critiques of the Lubanga case have focused on the constraints surrounding the ‘recognition of harms experienced by girl child soldiers and whether gendered experiences and roles were sufficiently reflected’.Footnote 34 The route the Trial Chamber took in the original decision was viewed as suppressing the complexity of harms suffered by girls and established a hierarchy of harms; some were for substantive offences while others were categorised as being relevant for sentencing or reparations.Footnote 35 In a remarkably succinct paragraph, Judge Wilmet moves away from this approach and highlights the forms of ‘physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or substantial impairment of his or her fundamental rights’ applicable to this case. This exposition of how each of these forms of injury was suffered by the child soldier victims who were conscripted by the UPC also aids in understanding the gendered experiences of these child soldier victims, especially those to whom the original decision was blind.
Finally, Judge Wilmet, when holding that the child soldier victims qualify for reparations, clarifies that sexual and gender-based violence are also criminal acts which should be prosecuted as such. In doing so, Judge Wilmet’s rewritten judgment strongly criticises the former Prosecutor Mr Ocampo’s omission of sexual and gender-based crimes in the original charges.
Judges Priya Gopalan and Olga Jurasz: Reimagining ‘War Crimes within an Armed Group’
In 2017, Trial Chamber VI issued its decision regarding the challenge from the defence to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect to Counts 6 and 9 against Mr Ntaganda.Footnote 36 The Trial Chamber confirmed the charges of rape and sexual slavery of child soldiers as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, crimes allegedly committed as intra-party crimes. In this rewritten decision, Judges Priya Gopalan and Olga Jurasz confirm this decision. In doing so, they depart from the methods used by the original Chamber, instead, as explained below, situating their analysis in international humanitarian law (IHL) and treaty interpretation while simultaneously questioning the application of bodies of law created in historical contexts. Judges Gopalan and Jurasz also work to amplify the voices of victims, highlighting how nuances in gender relations influenced the commission of these crimes, particularly against female child soldiers.
More particularly, Gopalan and Jurasz’s rewritten decision overlays a feminist lens onto the factual circumstances of the crimes. To begin with, they engage in feminist judging when ‘asking the woman question’,Footnote 37 pointing out how the apparently gender-neutral war crime of using children to participate actively in hostilities impacts differently on girl soldiers. Another important feature of feminist judging is the fact-telling process – that is, the contextualisation of women’s experiences in the judgments’ narrative. Judges Gopalan and Jurasz recognise the reality of girl soldiers’ lives by pointing out a flaw in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s legal grasp of sexual violence. In the rewritten decision, they bring the previously marginalised experience of girl soldiers to the fore and place the legal issues in a wider social context, taking into account the specificities of women’s lives.Footnote 38 Finally, Judges Gopalan and Jurasz included specific and explicit references to ‘girl soldiers’ in their rewritten judgment, which gives a more realistic reading of the circumstances of the case. Yet, at the same time, one could highlight that these references make boy soldiers who suffered from rape invisible in the narrative of the judgment.
In concrete terms, they make a point of capturing the complexity of real-life experiences of girl soldiers, who are victims of the acts of sexual violence and threats thereof in armed conflicts. In doing so, they are drawing attention to the continuing nature of this crime. They concur with the Pre-Trial Chamber that girl soldiers were not contemporaneously taking part in hostilities during the time of the commission of the sexual violence and were therefore protected under IHL. They refute the Pre-Trial Chamber’s basis for this conclusion, and in particular its focus on the specific and distinct time of the rape. In this context, they opine that the prevalence and frequency of acts of sexual violence experienced by girl soldiers as part of their daily lives and the long-standing impact of rape in both public and private spheres needed to be taken into account.Footnote 39
While paying attention to the continuum of violence experienced by girl soldiers in and outside conflict settings, Judges Gopalan and Jurasz have shown concern for indirect victims such as the relatives of girl soldiers and the transgenerational transmission of trauma. It is telling that, in the Reparations Order in the same case, the ICC Chamber concluded that children who have been born out of rape and sexual slavery may qualify as direct victims, and are therefore entitled to reparations.Footnote 40 Judges Gopalan and Jurasz also argue that sexual violence is employed as a tactic of war to assert control over both the civilian population and the members of the same armed group, and that the sexual slavery and the participation in hostilities do not necessarily occur at distinct and different times. They highlight the perpetrators’ powers of ownership that are continuously exercised across conflict and non-conflict settings. Furthermore, in their reimagining, these judges shed light on the socio-cultural tenets of the crime of sexual violence, identifying the need to take into account the patriarchal power structures in which sexual slavery is perpetrated in the DRC.
Judges Gopalan and Jurasz draw upon the Statute’s reference to the ‘established framework of international law’ in order to permit recourse to IHL as a source of interpretation. In this context, they point to the evolutionary nature of the relevant treaties, including the Statute, the Geneva Conventions, and their Additional Protocols, in order to reflect the realities of child soldiering, and the protection of child soldiers, who shift regularly between different roles. Then, using Rome Statute Article 21(3) as an interpretive tool to reach their conclusion, they contextualise the gendered aspects of child soldiering and the use of girls for sexual purposes. They apply and interpret Article 21 in a manner that ‘surfaces’ gendered and intersectional harms. In their rewritten version, they include the experience of girl soldiers in the construction of legal rules and the rules of interpretation in particular.
In their rewritten judgment, Judges Gopalan and Jurasz make the gender issues visible within their feminist retelling of the facts; the complexity and continuity of the sexual violence in armed conflict is clearly underlined. One point that we felt was missing in their judgment was addressing the corrosive political and socio-economic effects of the sexual violence to cover the full spectrum of the temporal analysis of the crime.Footnote 41
Judge Isabel Maravall-Buckwater: Reimagining ‘Consent’
In 2019, Trial Chamber VI issued the judgment in the case against Bosco Ntaganda. Convicted of eighteen counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the volume of sexual violence, especially against women and girls, was a particular feature of this case.Footnote 42 In Judge Isabel Maravall-Buckwater’s rewrite, the tension between age-related incapacity and consent is explored. She considers a global interpretation of consent while wanting to acknowledge the sexual agency of individuals, and in doing so uses the voices of victims to recount how the coercive environment within an armed conflict effectively eradicates consent. Through this approach, the reimagined judgment finds that multiple incidents of rape must be confirmed against Mr Ntaganda.
In international criminal law, it is unclear at what age, and in what circumstances, a child is legally capable of consenting to sexual acts. This issue has arisen in multiple cases concerning alleged sexual crimes against female children, including female child soldiers in the Ntaganda case. In her rewritten version of the 2019 Ntaganda trial judgment, Judge Maravall-Buckwater examines the law regarding age-related incapacity to consent. Age-related incapacity constitutes one of the circumstances which render consent immaterial to the crime of rape. As ‘age-related incapacity’ remains undefined in both the Statute and Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Elements of Crime, Maravall-Buckwater considers it appropriate to flesh out details on this point. She holds that, under Article 21(3), the absence of age of consent defined in the law is incompatible with international human rights standards. She has further used Article 21 to incorporate findings/reports of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to ascertain what should be considered as the minimum age for consent. Using these international standards, she reaches the conclusion that sixteen is an appropriate age of consent.
In her rewritten judgment, Judge Maravall-Buckwater includes distinctive feminist features. First, her feminist judging provides reasoning with reference to the actual lived experience of individuals and gives social context to issues.Footnote 43 Maravall-Buckwater also provides contextual facts related to the age of the victims of sexual violence, thus enhancing the individual lived experiences of victims. Secondly, her reimagined decision is inclusive in nature. Even though girls are more affected, she does not focus solely on the implications for women; by considering the question of the age of consent, she incorporates the experiences of all victims of sexual violence. On another note, one point that we felt was missing in her reimagined exposition of facts was giving a name to the unnamed girl soldiers who suffer rape.Footnote 44 Giving a name is considered important to personify a victim, and to demonstrate empathy with the experience of litigants.
As Cronin has indicated in the New Zealand feminist judgments project, this methodology carves out spaces to ‘see cases in ways that we have been blind to and may be continuing to be blind to. In that sense, the feminist project has larger implications, showing us how to engage with facts in a different way, by letting those facts inform the law, rather than disregarding or ignoring them’.Footnote 45
8.2 Child Soldiers in Lubanga Reparations Order
In 2015, the Appeals Chamber issued its decision regarding the reparations order in the case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.Footnote 46 The Appeals Chamber ruled that Mr Lubanga was not liable for reparations for child soldiers who were alleged victims of sexual violence committed by members of the armed forces under the control of Mr Lubanga. Referring to the Sentencing Decision,Footnote 47 the Appeals Chamber noted that the failure of the Trial Chamber to include sexual violence as an aggravating factor meant that the Trial Chamber did not ‘establish harm from sexual and gender-based violence resulted from the crime for which Mr Lubanga was convicted’.Footnote 48
In this reimagining of the appeal decision, Marie Wilmet begins by highlighting the ‘gender injustice cascade’ characteristic of the Lubanga case at the ICC.Footnote 49 Recalling the procedural background of the case, the author provides for judicial recognition from the ICC’s highest Chamber of the Prosecutor’s failure to include sexual and gender-based crimes within the charges and of Judge Odio Benito’s gender-just interventions in dissenting opinions. Wilmet reconsiders the trial evidence, applying the correct standard of ‘balance of probabilities’ rather than the misused ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard originally applied, and determines that but for the crimes Mr Lubanga was convicted of, the child soldiers would not have experienced harms from sexual and gender-based violence. With this conclusion, Wilmet allows those victims to qualify for reparations.
On the appeals against the Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations of 7 August 2012 No. ICC-01/04-01/06 A A 2 A 3
Date: 3 March 2015
Original: English
THE APPEALS CHAMBER(B)
Before: Judge Marie WILMET
SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. THOMAS LUBANGA DYILO
Fourth Element: The Order for Reparations Must Define the Harm Caused to Direct and Indirect Victims as a Result of the Crimes for Which the Person Was Convicted, as well as Identify the Appropriate Modalities of Reparations Based on the Circumstances of the Case
Assessing the Harm Suffered by the Victims of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
Background and Relevant Portion of the Impugned Decision
192. In their victims’ applications, 129 victims claim that they have suffered harm as a result of the enlistment or conscription of children under the age of fifteen, or their use to participate actively in the hostilities.Footnote 50 Of these victims, eighteen females and twelve males have referred to acts of sexual violence which they suffered or witnessed as part of the enlistment, conscription, or use of children under the age of fifteen by the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC)/Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC).Footnote 51
193. On 28 August 2006, the Prosecutor charged Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Mr Lubanga) with enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities within the meaning of Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 25(iii)(a) of the Statute.Footnote 52 He did not charge Mr Lubanga with sexual and gender-based crimes.Footnote 53
194. In the 29 January 2007 Decision on the confirmation of charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I found that there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Mr Lubanga was responsible for the charges of conscription, enlistment, and use of children under the age of fifteen into the UPC/FPLC.Footnote 54
195. On 22 May 2009, the legal representatives of the victims filed a joint application pursuant to Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.Footnote 55 They requested the Trial Chamber consider a legal re-characterisation of the facts in view of the large number of witnesses who referred to numerous cases of inhuman and cruel treatment as well as sexual violence before the Chamber.Footnote 56
196. In its 14 July 2009 Decision, Trial Chamber I explained that it appeared ‘to the majority of the Chamber that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to change’ in accordance with Regulation 55(2), Judge Fulford dissenting.Footnote 57 The majority of the Chamber stated that the defence, the prosecution, and the victims’ legal representatives would be given an opportunity to make submissions on the requalification at a later stage of the proceedings.Footnote 58 On 8 December 2009, the Appeals Chamber reversed the decision on the grounds that the Trial Chamber erred in law ‘when finding that Regulation 55 contained two separate procedures and that it was permissible under Regulation 55 (2) and (3) to include additional facts and circumstances that are not described in the charges’.Footnote 59
197. On 14 March 2012, Trial Chamber I issued its Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute and convicted Mr Lubanga of the war crimes of enlisting, conscripting, and using children under the age of fifteen to participate in hostilities. The Chamber recognised it heard evidence from witnesses that girl soldiers were subjected to sexual violence and rape by UPC/FPLC commanders.Footnote 60 The majority, however, disagreed with the Prosecutor’s argument that the recruitment of girls for sexual purposes and forced marriage was an integral part of the ‘active participation in hostilities’ of child soldiers,Footnote 61 and that sexual abuse was systematic in the training camps.Footnote 62 Considering ‘the prosecution’s failure to include allegations of sexual violence in the charges’,Footnote 63 the Chamber did not make ‘any findings of fact on the issue, particularly as to whether responsibility [was] to be attributed to the accused’.Footnote 64 As the relevant facts were not included in the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, the majority found that ‘it would be impermissible for the Chamber to base its Decision … on the evidence introduced during the trial’.Footnote 65 Judge Odio Benito dissented from the majority, stating that ‘[a]lthough the Majority of the Chamber recognises that sexual violence has been referred to in this case, it seems to confuse the factual allegations of this case with the legal concept of the crime, which are independent’.Footnote 66 The dissenting judge argued that sexual violence was an intrinsic part of using children to participate actively in the hostilities and could be subsumed under Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute.Footnote 67
198. In its Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute of 10 July 2012, the Trial Chamber examined whether rape and other forms of sexual violence could be a relevant factor in the determination of the sentence under Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.Footnote 68 The majority found that it could not consider sexual violence as a relevant factor for sentencing, stating:
On the basis of the totality of the evidence introduced during the trial on this issue, the Majority is unable to conclude that sexual violence against the children who were recruited was sufficiently widespread that it could be characterised as occurring in the ordinary course of the implementation of the common plan for which Mr Lubanga is responsible. Moreover, nothing suggests that Mr Lubanga ordered or encouraged sexual violence, that he was aware of it or that it could otherwise be attributed to him in a way that reflects his culpability.Footnote 69
199. Judge Odio Benito dissented from the majority considering that the Chamber received ample evidence during trial of the conditions, including sexual violence, in which boys and girls were recruited, enlisted, and used in the hostilities.Footnote 70 She insisted on the importance ‘to keep in mind the differential gender effects and damages that these crimes have upon their victims, depending on whether they are boys or girls’.Footnote 71
200. In the Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations of 7 August 2012 (Impugned Decision), the Trial Chamber identified victims of sexual and gender-based violence as beneficiaries of reparations.Footnote 72 It found that ‘the Court should formulate and implement reparations awards that are appropriate for the victims of sexual and gender-based violence’.Footnote 73 The Trial Chamber stated that pursuant to Articles 21(3) and 68 of the Statute as well as Rule 86 of the Rules, reparations should be granted to victims without adverse distinction on the grounds of, inter alia, gender and take into account the needs of sexual and gender-based violence victims.Footnote 74
Submissions of the Parties and Participants
201. Mr Lubanga submits that the Trial Chamber erred in law by finding that victims of sexual violence could benefit from reparations, contradicting the principle according to which the convicted person can only repair harms resulting from crimes he has been convicted of.Footnote 75 He argues that the Prosecutor limited the scope of the case to the crimes of recruiting, enlisting, and using children in hostilities, and that the Trial Chamber dismissed the contention that the commission of these crimes would necessarily lead to the perpetration of sexual violence, including at the sentencing stage.Footnote 76 Additionally, Mr Lubanga argues that Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute, the corresponding elements of crimes, and international law do not link the commission of these crimes to sexual violence.Footnote 77
202. The Office of Public Counsel for Victims and the legal representatives of victims V02 submit that ‘the recruitment of girls into armed forces is generally recognised as having as primarily aim [sic] their use as sex slaves’, justifying the participation of victims of these crimes in the reparations proceedings.Footnote 78 They argue that the key consideration is not the nature of the crimes for which the person was convicted, but rather the harm produced as a result of such crimes which must be evaluated following the ‘proximate cause’ test.Footnote 79 In their view, harms of a sexual nature normally result from the crimes of which Mr Lubanga was convicted, thus warranting reparation before the Court.Footnote 80 The legal representatives of victims V01 argue that the key issue is the causal link between the crime committed and the harm suffered.Footnote 81 They contradict the defence’s suggestion that a harm is necessarily an element of a crime and argue that the fact that sexual violence was not sufficiently widespread to be a relevant factor at sentencing does not prevent the harms being considered at the reparations stage.Footnote 82
203. ‘The Trust Fund notes that a distinction must be made between the legal qualification of the facts [– meaning the crimes for which Mr Lubanga was convicted] … – [and] the harm … that resulted from these crimes’.Footnote 83 It submits that ‘[t]he standard test is, whether during the course of those facts that are the basis of the charges … acts of sexualised violence were committed that are directly linked to, and are a component of, the acts and facts underlying the charges’.Footnote 84 The Trust Fund subsequently argues that sexualised violence is inherently connected to the enlistment, conscription, and use of child soldiers,Footnote 85 and that therefore victims are entitled to reparations addressing this specific harm.Footnote 86
Determination of the Chamber
204. As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Chamber notes that pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Statute, the application and interpretation of the Court’s legal framework ‘must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in Article 7, paragraph 3’. Article 7(3) defines gender as ‘the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society’. The Appeals Chamber also notes that pursuant to Rule 86 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, a Chamber ‘in making any direction or order … shall take into account the need of all victims and witnesses in accordance with Article 68, in particular … victims of sexual or gender violence’.
205. The prosecution’s failure to charge Mr Lubanga with rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence as separate crimes is not determinative of the question of whether the underlying acts are a relevant factor in the determination of the reparations for which the accused is responsible. The Chamber is entitled to consider sexual violence under the fourth principle, according to which ‘the order for reparations must define the harm caused to direct and indirect victims as a result of the crimes for which the person was convicted’, established pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute and Rule 85(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
206. As indicated by the Trial Chamber, the Court’s legal framework determines only in general terms the required causal link between the harm and the crime for which the person was convicted for the purpose of reparations.Footnote 87 The Appeals Chamber recalls its earlier finding that, pursuant to Rule 85(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ‘[r]eparation is to be awarded based on the harm suffered as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’Footnote 88 and the ‘causal link between the crime and the harm for the purpose of reparations is to be determined in light of the specificities of a case’.Footnote 89 The Appeals Chamber must therefore decide whether harm from sexual and gender-based violence resulted from the crimes for which Mr Lubanga has been convicted. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber considers that it can.
207. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber has correctly applied the ‘but/for’ standard of causation to the relationship between the harm suffered and the crime for which the person was convicted for the purpose of reparations.Footnote 90 The crimes must be the ‘proximate cause’ of the harm for which the reparations are sought, meaning that the liability of the person is limited to the causes that are closely connected to the result of the act they were convicted of.Footnote 91 The Appeals Chamber emphasises that the causal nexus must be ‘determined in light of the particular circumstances’ of this case.Footnote 92
208. In line with the previous jurisprudence, the Chamber adopts the standard of proof of a ‘balance of probabilities’ as appropriate for the reparations proceedings.Footnote 93 The applicant must therefore show that it is more probable than not that the harm suffered is a consequence of the crimes of which Mr Lubanga was convicted.
209. The Appeals Chamber will now analyse the significance of Trial Chamber I’s sentencing decision for the present determination. The Trial Chamber considered whether the evidence of sexual violence presented at trial could constitute a factor relevant to sentencing under Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules as part of ‘(i) the harm suffered by the victims; (ii) the nature of the unlawful behaviour; and (iii) the circumstances of manner in which the crime was committed’.Footnote 94 On the basis of the evidence introduced during the trial, the majority found that because the link between Mr Lubanga and the sexual violence against the children who were recruited had not been established beyond reasonable doubt, this factor could not be taken into account for the purpose of sentencing.Footnote 95
210. Concurring with Judge Odio Benito’s Dissenting Opinion, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber disregarded the harm suffered by the victims and considered ‘as relevant factors only: (a) the large-scale and widespread nature of the crimes committed; (b) the degree of participation and intent of the convicted person; and (c) the individual circumstances of the convicted person’.Footnote 96 As such, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that the Trial Chamber’s considerations on sentence limit its assessment of the causal relationship between sexual violence and the crimes of which Mr Lubanga was convicted.
211. Additionally, the Appeals Chamber confirms the Trial Chamber’s finding that reparation proceedings are fundamentally different from proceedings at trial.Footnote 97 While the standard of proof at trial is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’,Footnote 98 at the reparations stage the standard is a ‘balance of probabilities’. In the sentencing decision, the Trial Chamber considered the evidence introduced at trial in light of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard.Footnote 99 As the standard is less exacting at the reparations stage, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that it must now reconsider the trial evidence. It will determine whether, on a balance of probabilities, but for the crimes of which Mr Lubanga was convicted, the child soldiers in the particular circumstances of this case would have suffered from sexual violence.
212. In their victims’ applications, thirty victims have referred to acts of sexual violence which they have suffered or witnessed as part of their enlistment, conscription, or use by the UPC/FPLC.Footnote 100 Eight witnesses have provided evidence on the treatment of girl soldiers by commanders in training camps.Footnote 101 According to P-0046 and P-0031, sexual violence against young girls was prevalent and systematic in the training camps.Footnote 102 P-0046 explained that ‘all the young girls stated they had been sexually abused by their commanders most often, or by – by soldiers’, including girls as young as twelve.Footnote 103 Several witnesses testified that this conduct took place once they were stationed with commanders as bodyguards.Footnote 104 P-0016 explained that girl soldiers were used as domestic servants by their commanders, forced to perform domestic chores, and to have sexual relations.Footnote 105 The sexual violence was committed during an extended period as the commanders took the girls as ‘wives’ or ‘concubines’.Footnote 106 P-0089, for example, testified that commanders in the Mandro training centre would take girl soldiers ‘as women [and] [t]hey would get them pregnant’,Footnote 107 including girls who were under fifteen years old.Footnote 108
213. The sexual violence had significant effects on the lives of girl soldiers. P-0031 and P-0046 testified that many girls suffered physical consequences from the sexual violence, including in the form of sexually transmitted diseases.Footnote 109 As a result of the sexual violence, several experienced early childbearing, and the obligation to raise children born of rape.Footnote 110 Others had to undergo abortions (voluntary or forced) to end the pregnancy.Footnote 111 Additionally, P-0046 referred to the mental difficulties experienced by the girl soldiers as a result of the sexual violence.Footnote 112 Expert witness Dr Elisabeth Schauer testified that the child soldier victims of rape had higher exposure to traumatic stressors, leading to a higher likeliness to develop post-traumatic stress disorder.Footnote 113 Additionally, Dr Schauer noted the increased risk to develop psychiatric disorder due to the proximity between the perpetrator of rape and the child solder.Footnote 114 The reintegration of the girls into their original communities was very difficult as they were stigmatised, especially in the event they had children.Footnote 115
214. The Appeals Chamber recalls that following the Court’s jurisprudence, harm denotes ‘hurt, injury and damage’,Footnote 116 in the form of ‘physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of his or her fundamental rights’.Footnote 117 Child soldiers who were victims of sexual and gender-based crimes during their conscription, enlistment, and use in the hostilities suffered physical, mental, social, and sui generis harms. They have suffered physical harm from the act of rape, sexually transmitted diseases, forced pregnancy, and forced abortions. Moreover, they have suffered mental harm through the development of psychiatric disorders and, amongst other, post-traumatic stress disorder. By forcing them to perform domestic chores, the victims have suffered social harms by being reduced to their social identities as defined by the perpetrators.Footnote 118 Due to their difficult reintegration in their original communities and the need to care for children born as a result of the sexual violence, the child soldiers have also suffered sui generis harms. These harms include the loss of socio-economic opportunities, of standard of living, but also of their familial development that would have been possible under normal circumstances.
215. Finally, the Appeals Chamber finds that the child soldiers suffered a substantial impairment to their fundamental rights to physical and mental integrity as well as sexual and reproductive autonomy, in the case of forced pregnancy and forced abortion.Footnote 119
216. Mr Lubanga was found guilty as a co-perpetrator of committing the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen into the FPLC as well as using them to participate in hostilities.Footnote 120 The Trial Chamber held that, as part of the enlistment and conscription, children were sent to training camps where they endured a harsh training regime and were subjected to a variety of severe punishments.Footnote 121 It considered that using children under the age of fifteen as bodyguards, a common practice among commanders of the UPC/FPLC – including Mr Lubanga himself – fell within the scope of Article 8(2)(e)(vii).Footnote 122 The Chamber also found that in addition to the other tasks they carried out as UPC/FPLC soldiers, such as acting as bodyguards, ‘a significant number of girls under the age of fifteen were used for domestic work’.Footnote 123 According to the Trial Chamber, as President of the UPC/FPLC, Mr Lubanga was inter alia closely involved in making decisions on recruitment policy and ‘personally used children below the age of fifteen amongst his bodyguards and he regularly saw guards of other UPC/FPLC members of staff who were below the age of fifteen’.Footnote 124
217. The Chamber recalls the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that due to their vulnerability, children need to be afforded particular protection, as recognised in various international treaties.Footnote 125 It concurs that ‘[t]his includes not only protection from violence and fatal or non-fatal injuries during fighting, but also the potentially serious trauma that can accompany recruitment, including … exposing them to an environment of violence and fear’.Footnote 126
218. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds that in the particular circumstances of this case from the evidence presented at trial, the presence of child soldiers at training camp exposed them to an environment of violence and fear which made them vulnerable to sexual violence. Their close contact with commanders during an extended period of time exposed child soldiers, and especially girl soldiers, to danger by becoming potential targets of sexual violence. Indeed, this prolonged exposure in the homes of the commanders, and their assignation to domestic chores, made them defenceless and susceptible of being taken as ‘wives’ by their superiors.
219. The Appeals Chamber considers it is clear from the evidence presented at trial that, had they not been enlisted, conscripted, or used by the UPC/FPLC, particularly as bodyguards to commanders, the girl soldiers would not have suffered the sexual violence harms described above.Footnote 127 As required by the ‘proximate cause’ standard, the sexual and gender-based violence is closely connected to the crimes of conscription, enlistment, and use of children in hostilities.
220. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that it is more probable than not that the sexual and gender-based violence suffered by child soldiers resulted from the crimes of which Mr Lubanga was convicted, satisfying the standard of proof of a balance of probabilities applicable to the reparations stage.
221. The evidence presented by witnesses at trial focused on the sexual and gender-based violence committed against girl soldiers. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber considers that this fact does not in any way exclude boy soldiers who suffered from sexual and gender-based violence as a result of their conscription, enlistment and use, from receiving reparations. The Chamber recalls that under Article 21(3) of the Statute the application and interpretation of the Statute must ‘be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender’. As such, the Appeals Chamber finds that anyone – male or female – demonstrating that they suffered from sexual and gender-based violence as a result of the crimes committed by Mr Lubanga is eligible to benefit from reparations.
222. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber considers that harm from sexual and gender-based violence resulted from the crimes for which Mr Lubanga was convicted. Child soldier victims of sexual and gender-based violence can therefore benefit from reparations. The Appeals Chamber clarifies that this conclusion should not be interpreted to mean that sexual and gender-based violence do not constitute criminal acts which should be prosecuted as such. The Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber and ‘strongly deprecates the attitude of the former Prosecutor in relation to the issue of sexual violence’ and his omission of sexual and gender-based crimes in the original charges.Footnote 128
Judge Marie Wilmet
8.3 War Crimes within an Armed Group in Ntaganda Jurisdiction Order
In 2017, Trial Chamber VI issued its decision regarding the challenge from the defence to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect to Counts 6 and 9 against Mr Bosco Ntaganda.Footnote 129 The Trial Chamber confirmed the charges of rape and sexual slavery of child soldiers as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, crimes allegedly committed as intra-party crimes.
In this reimagining, Priya Gopalan and Olga Jurasz confirm this decision. In doing so, they depart from the methods used by the original Chamber, instead situating their analysis in international humanitarian law and treaty interpretation while simultaneously questioning the application of bodies of law created in historical contexts. Gopalan and Jurasz also work to amplify the voices of victims, highlighting the particular nuances of gender that influenced the committal of these crimes, particularly against female child soldiers.
Second decision on the defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9. No.: ICC-01/04-02/06
Date: 4 January 2017
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER VI(B)
Before: Judge Priya GOPALAN
Judge Olga JURASZ
SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. BOSCO NTAGANDA
Trial Chamber VI (Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (Court), in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, having regard to Articles 8 and 19 of the Rome Statute (Statute) and Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules), issues this Second decision on the defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9.
Counts 6 and 9 were based on evidence that:
UPC/FPLC commanders and soldiers raped and sexually enslaved their soldiers without regard to age, including child soldiers under the age of 15 … UPC/FPLC [Union des Patriotes Congolais/Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo] commanders and soldiers referred to child soldiers (and other girls and women in the UPC/FPLC above the age of 15) as guduria, a large cooking pot, to mean that they could be used for sex whenever the soldiers wanted them for that purpose.Footnote 130
The crimes underlying Counts 6 and 9 are found in Article 8(2)(e)(vi) for non-international armed conflicts. The provision reads in relevant parts:
Applicable Law
Article 8 War Crimes
1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: …
e. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: …
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in Article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilisation, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.
Analysis of the Merits of the Challenge
Submissions on the Merits of the Challenge to Jurisdiction over Counts 6 and 9
2. The defence submits that Counts 6 and 9 do not fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court because:Footnote 131
(i) Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute is subject to the established requirements of international law;Footnote 132
(ii) according to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Common Article 3), war crimes may not be committed by members of an armed force against fellow members of the same armed force;Footnote 133
(iii) the prosecution has defined the victims of Counts 6 and 9 as being ‘members’ of the same armed force as the perpetrators;Footnote 134
(iv) the notion of ‘membership’ of an armed force is not compatible with ‘taking no active part in hostilities’;Footnote 135 and
(v) international humanitarian law does not recognise any exception for child soldiers.Footnote 136
Chamber’s Analysis of the Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Respect to Counts 6 and 9
Applicable Law
Status Requirements under Article 8 of the Statute
3. Common Article 3 refers to ‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities’. Additional Protocol II, which applies in non-international armed conflicts, states that children ‘shall be provided with the care and aid they require’.Footnote 137
4. The Pre-Trial Chamber held that individuals only lose their protection for such time as they are actively participating in hostilities, and that those who were raped and subjected to sexual violence were clearly not participating in hostilities at that time.Footnote 138 It found that children lose their protection when they take direct part in hostilities, for the duration of their participation in the hostilities.Footnote 139
5. On this basis, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that sexual violence committed against child soldiers constituted war crimes under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute because children were protected by international humanitarian law (IHL) during the commission of the sexual violence.Footnote 140 The Pre-Trial Chamber determined that whether the girl soldiers in question assumed the role of combatants in the same armed group as the perpetrator was irrelevant to this finding.Footnote 141
6. This Chamber concurs with the conclusion of the Pre-Trial Chamber that child soldiers are protected under IHL but respectfully disagrees with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s basis for this conclusion, namely that the girl soldiers in question could not logically have been taking a direct/active part in hostilities at the precise time sexual violence was being perpetrated against them.Footnote 142
7. The Chamber observes that this interpretation does not represent the full spectrum of the lived experiences of girl soldiers in conflict. The focus on the specific time of the rape to find that a victim could not have been taking a direct or active part in hostilities while being raped appears to presume that rape occurred infrequently and in limited circumstances. The Chamber finds this to be a rigid and unrealistic assessment of the nature, frequency, and consequences of sexual violence experienced by girl soldiers. It is also an approach that marginalises the lived experiences of girl soldiers. The trial record contains substantial evidence of the widespread and systematic perpetration of rape and other forms of sexual violence against child soldiers, particularly girls, by adult UPC/FPLC commanders.Footnote 143 Given the prevalence and frequency of sexual violence in this case, a temporal analysis that focuses on single acts does not reflect the multiplicity of acts of sexual violence experienced by girl soldiers as part of their daily lives as well as multiple and intertwined types of abuse perpetrated against them.
8. In addition, the Chamber notes that a narrow focus on the act or acts of rape precludes any considerations of the long-standing impact of rape – in particular, the psychological trauma resulting from rape, which is a defining feature of this crime and other forms of sexual violence: sexual and gender-based violence causes grave and long-lasting physical, psychological and social effects at multiple levels. Individuals, families and communities are affected whether before, during or after the conflict in the DRC, both in public and private spheres’.Footnote 144 Finally, this approach does not recognise the strategic function wielded by sexual violence.
9. Considering the strategic purpose of sexual violence, the Chamber notes the dual manner in which violence, sexual violence, and threats thereof can be used to obtain military advantage. Firstly, this is externally facing and directed at terrorising and instilling fear in the civilian population, as recognised by and captured in the jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.Footnote 145 Secondly, it is internally directed against members of the same armed group in order to exercise power and control over members of that armed group. This is not uncommon practice, especially in the context of recruiting and using children to participate in hostilities – an international crime that has been examined at length and prosecuted by this Court.Footnote 146 The Chamber finds that rape and sexual slavery committed against members of the same armed force or group – specifically children who were recruited and used to participate in hostilities – in this case are examples of the latter. The deployment of sexual violence in this context is a tool of exercising power and control over the victims and, as noted by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘in conflict situations, acts of sexual and gender-based crimes rarely occur in isolation from other crimes’.Footnote 147 The Chamber recalls terminology such as ‘strategic rape’ or ‘rape as a weapon of war’ which has been used to describe the strategic purpose for which sexual violence is deployed in conflict.Footnote 148
10. Turning to the crime of sexual slavery, the Chamber observes that a defining feature of the crime of sexual slavery is that the perpetrator exercises rights of ownership over the victim or imposes on the victim a similar deprivation of liberty, and forces the victim to engage in sexual acts.Footnote 149 In the context of girl soldiers, a common-sense interpretation of this crime is that sexual slavery continues so long as the perpetrator exercises rights of ownership over the victim or similarly deprives the victim of her liberty, and on at least one occasion forces the victim to engage in a sexual act. Within this interpretation, the crime continues even while the victim is actively or directly participating in hostilities, cooking, engaging as a porter, laying mines, spying, and/or manning checkpoints. The presumption underlying the Pre-Trial Chamber’s finding appears to be that that the sexual slavery and the participation in hostilities occur at distinct and different times.Footnote 150
11. The Chamber finds additional support for the continuing nature of this crime in the socio-cultural tenets underpinned by the systemic gender inequalities of patriarchal power structures in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Chamber observes that it was in this context that sexual slavery was perpetrated. Up to 52 per cent of women in DRC are survivors of domestic violence and 39 per cent report having been threatened or injured. Reports indicate that 27 per cent of women in DRC are victims of harmful traditional practices. In 2007 early marriages affected 39 per cent of women in their early twenties who were married or in a union before the age of eighteen.Footnote 151
12. The Chamber recalls that according to the Paris Principles, ‘[g]ender inequalities, discrimination and violence are frequently exacerbated in times of armed conflict’.Footnote 152 Sexual and gender-based violence has been a hallmark of the conflict in the DRC, with Margot Wallström, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, declaring that the DRC was the ‘rape capital of the world’ in 2010.Footnote 153 Decades of armed conflict have led to the deaths of over 2 million civilians and estimates suggest over 1 million women have been raped.Footnote 154
13. The Chamber observes that in this context, once a girl becomes associated with an armed group and is used sexually, she becomes identified socially as a ‘military wife’.Footnote 155 If a girl has sexual contact with a man – whether voluntarily, by rape, or by assumption due to being taken by an armed group – outside of marriage and dowry, she is considered to ‘no longer have any value’ in society.Footnote 156 In certain communities in the DRC, a traditional justice approach to cases of rape or sexual relations outside of marriage is to force the perpetrator to pay a dowry/compensation to the family and marry the girl.Footnote 157
14. As such, there is a strong socio-cultural conception that a girl has to remain with a sexual partner, whether that relationship originated with or without her consent, including where this may be rape, thus entrenching the continuous nature of this violation.Footnote 158 Many girls simply do not see leaving their ‘military husband’ or ‘enslaver’ as a choice, which reinforces the continuing nature of the crime of sexual slavery.Footnote 159
15. The Chamber will now analyse whether the ‘established framework of international law’ applicable in non-international armed conflicts protects members of the same armed force from crimes committed by other members of the same armed force, with the result that the acts of sexual violence constituted war crimes under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute.
The ‘Established Framework of International Law’ Applicable in International and Non-international Armed Conflicts
16. Article 8(2)(e) refers to ‘other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in non-international armed conflicts, within the established framework of international law’. Similarly, the ‘Introduction’ to the Elements of Crimes for Article 8 provides that the war crimes under paragraph 2 ‘shall be interpreted within the established framework of the international law of armed conflict’ as expressed in IHL.
17. The question of whether acts of rape and sexual slavery committed against members of an armed force or group by members of the same armed force or group must be considered not only in the context of the principles of IHL and international criminal law (ICL) (specifically, the Statute), but also positioned within the broader principles of international law.
Principles of International Law: Treaty Interpretation
18. This issue goes to the heart of the object and purpose of treaties – here, the Statute, the Geneva Conventions, and their Additional Protocols – as well as a matter of treaty interpretation. The body of IHL was created in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth century, with Additional Protocol II being adopted over forty years ago. Since then, the nature, typology, and duration of armed conflicts has changed dramatically and so has the international community’s knowledge about the lived experiences of modern armed conflicts. This includes the growing ICL jurisprudence on sexual and gender-based crimes which has advanced (i) the knowledge of international courts on how sexual violence is used in conflict and (ii) practice in successful prosecutions of such crimes. Furthermore, whilst children’s participation in armed conflicts is not a novel issue in the realm of IHL, the past two decades have been instrumental in conceptualising and advancing the understanding of child soldiering in contemporary armed conflicts.Footnote 160 Therefore, the Chamber considers that an evolutionary approach to treaty interpretationFootnote 161 (which treats them as ‘living instruments’) is required in light of the above developments as well as the rapidly changing nature of violations of IHL and ICL, that better reflect the realities of child soldiering.
19. The Chamber observes that in the context of the changing nature of conflict around the world, including in African countries such as the DRC, and the increasingly asymmetrical nature of such conflicts, the bright-line rule that was drawn in traditional or formal armed forces between those on the front line and those playing supportive roles in rear bases is no longer clear or tenable. This opacity is evident when it comes to the protection of child soldiers who shift regularly between different roles, whether as active fighters, guards, porters, cooks, bush wives, or sex slaves.
20. The Chamber recalls that the object and purpose of Article 8 of the Statute is to punish criminal acts committed ‘in the context of and associated with’ an armed conflict of either international or non-international character.Footnote 162 This criterion ultimately differentiates war crimes from other crimes. The Chamber views acts referred to in Counts 6 and 9 as satisfying this criterion and notes that members of an armed force or group are not categorically excluded from protection against the war crimes of rape and sexual slavery under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute when these acts are committed by members of the same armed force or group.
21. Furthermore, the Chamber notes that the non-exhaustive nature of the protections provided under IHL is recognised in the Preamble to the Additional Protocol II. Echoing the Martens clause,Footnote 163 the Preamble states that ‘in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience’.Footnote 164 Whilst Additional Protocol II, at the time of drafting, has not explicitly captured victimisation, exploitation, and violence directed by members of an armed force or group against members of the same armed force or group as a war crime, it has not explicitly excluded it either.
22. The Chamber notes that the scope of Article 8 of the Statute, whilst drawing upon the principles of IHL, is not a verbatim reproduction of the relevant IHL provisions. In fact, Article 8 differs in scope and phraseology from IHL provisions. Considering the substance of the defence’s challenge, specifically with regard to status requirements, the Chamber emphasises that crimes listed under paragraphs 2(b)(xxii) and (e)(vi) do not identify a requirement for a particular victim status. This is in contrast with paragraphs 2(a) and (c) which stipulate specific victim status criteria.
23. The Chamber additionally observes that, whilst Additional Protocol II extends protection to those not taking or no longer taking part in hostilities, it remains silent on the issue of which side of the conflict these persons belong to. Additionally, the Chamber notes that ICL (including the jurisprudence of this CourtFootnote 165) and IHL both recognise the act of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen to participate in hostilities as a war crime.Footnote 166 This crime has not only been recognised as one of a continuous natureFootnote 167 for purposes of international criminal law but – in essence – constitutes a crime committed against members of the same armed group. Critically, these war crimes can only be perpetrated by members of a military force against victims who are from the same military force.
24. The Chamber observes that although in general IHL regulates conduct directed towards those external to a military force rather than to those internal to a military force, this general proposition does not constitute an irrebuttable presumption.
25. IHL accepts that the parties’ objective to overcome the opposing side will result in certain suffering, damage, and harm, but specifically determines that such consequences ought only to follow from actions that are militarily necessary or that will result in a definite military advantage.Footnote 168 Yet sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery, is increasingly being deployed by armed groups in an attempt to gain political and/or military advantage. In this regard, the Chamber notes the jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which established that sexual violence can be, and was, deployed by armed groups with the specific intent to terrorise the civilian population and – therefore – commit acts of terrorFootnote 169 contrary to Articles 4(2)(d) and 13(2) of Additional Protocol II.
26. This Chamber considers that acts of sexual violence, especially rape and enslavement, including sexual slavery, cannot under any circumstances be considered as legitimate acts in pursuance of military necessity or military advantage. Raping and sexually enslaving children under the age of fifteen,Footnote 170 or indeed any persons, would never bring any accepted military advantage, nor can there ever be a necessity to engage in such conduct. To do so would not only be in violation of the principle of legality but also in violation of customary international humanitarian law and the principle of jus cogens.
27. While most of the express prohibitions of rape and sexual slavery under IHL appear in contexts protecting civilians and persons hors de combat in the power of a party to the conflict, the Chamber does not consider those explicit protections to exhaustively define, or indeed limit, the scope of the protection against such conduct. The Chamber finds that rape and other forms of sexual violence have long been prohibited by IHL. The prohibition against rape and sexual slavery is a peremptory norm and such conduct is prohibited at all times, both in times of peace and during armed conflicts and against all persons irrespective of any legal status.Footnote 171
Article 21(3) as an Interpretive Tool
28. In concluding sexual violence committed against child soldiers constituted war crimes under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute because the children were protected by IHL during the commission of the sexual violence, the Chamber also relies on Article 21(3) of the Statute, which compels it to interpret and apply the law in accordance with internationally recognised human rights,Footnote 172 without adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender and age. In order to apply and interpret the law in this manner, this Chamber seeks to surface the gendered aspects of child soldiering as an intentional process of legal reasoning that is grounded in the realities of the conflict and lived experiences of child soldiers.
29. The Chamber recalls the UN Guidelines for the Demobilisation of Child Soldiers which emphasise that ‘children, and girls in particular, perform numerous combat and non-combat functions that are essential to the functioning of the armed force or group’.Footnote 173 In her report, Dr Schauer highlights that girls’ participation is central to sustaining a force because of their productive and reproductive labour.Footnote 174 The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children in Armed Conflict has stressed that ‘during war, the use of children in particular includes sexual violence’.Footnote 175 The Chamber recalls that the Cape Town Principles include ‘girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage’ in the definition of child soldiersFootnote 176 and that the Paris Principles reinforce this approach, acknowledging that ‘girls are frequently used for sexual purposes’.Footnote 177
30. The Chamber also recognises in this context the extensive scholarly critiqueFootnote 178 concerning the language of IHL, specifically where it concerns sexual violence, as well as the scope of protection afforded to women and girls. Although the use of girls for sexual purposes is well documented, the Chamber recalls that neither IHL nor ICL clearly regulate this conduct. As noted by Judge Odio-Benito in Lubanga, ‘invisibility of sexual violence is the legal concept that leads to discrimination against victims of enlistment, conscription and use who systematically suffer this crime as an intrinsic part of the involvement with the armed group’.Footnote 179 Therefore, in light of the nature of the crimes in Counts 6 and 9, as well as the identities of the victims, a gender-competent and intersectional interpretation of the law is a positive obligation imposed on the Chamber under Article 21(3).
31. Article 21 calls for the law to be applied and interpreted in a manner that surfaces gendered and intersectional harms. Understanding the range of harms including sexual violence leads to a non-discriminatory analysis of sexual crimes, which in this context predominantly affected girl soldiers.Footnote 180 The Chamber observes the continuous nature of the violation of being recruited or enlisted as a child soldier, and the significance of contextualising these violations within societal norms, values, and attitudes to fully ventilate the harms arising from their multiple roles, including experiencing sexual violence committed by their own side. Accordingly, this Chamber makes plain the link between the jus cogens nature of the prohibition against rape and sexual slavery and its application to the girl soldiers.
32. Although the foregoing analysis centres on the experiences of girl soldiers, the Chamber notes that a gender-competent intersectional interpretative approach towards the law and offences pursuant to Article 21(3) is also the standard to be applied to the experiences of boy soldiers. Such an approach enables the recognition and unpacking of the experiences of child soldiering and permits a shift away from essentialist narratives that further the binary of the female victim and male perpetrator. Girl soldiers and boy soldiers experience conflict differently due to the gendered elements that underlie the perpetration of the crime of child soldiering. Article 21(3) permits the surfacing of these gendered and intersecting violations without adverse distinction.
The Special Protection Afforded to Children
33. The Chamber observes that the prohibition on conscripting or enlisting child soldiers or allowing children to directly participate in hostilities is an exception to the general proposition precisely in order to provide non-derogable protections for children as a particularly vulnerable group. The notion of vulnerability – traditionally determined through one’s non-combatant status, be it civilian or hors de combat – underpins IHL provisions affording protection to selected persons/groups deemed specifically vulnerable.Footnote 181 Rape and sexual slavery committed against child soldiers by members of the same armed force or group heightens their vulnerability – first, resulting from recruitment and, second, as victims of sexual violence. This induced vulnerability is exploited by armed groups as an effective method of controlling child soldiers and is used to manipulate and subjugate the victims. The essence and motivations behind the acts underpinning crimes of rape and sexual slavery stand not only against the principles of customary international law, IHL, and ICL but also against key principles of humanity.
34. The Chamber recalls the legal basis for Counts 6 and 9, as explained in the document containing the charges, which stated that the rape and sexual enslavement of child soldiers by the UPC/FPLC commanders and soldiers constitute war crimes.Footnote 182 Child soldiers are afforded general protections against sexual violence under the fundamental guarantees afforded to persons affected by non-international armed conflicts under Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.Footnote 183 They also have special protections because of their vulnerability as children under Article 4(3) of the Additional Protocol II.Footnote 184 The Chamber thus finds that the protection offered by these provisions supports the recognition of child soldiers as victims of sexual violence for the purposes of charges under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute.Footnote 185
35. The Chamber thus concludes that sexual violence is used strategically in contemporary armed conflicts to exert power, influence, and control, irrespective of the status of its victims. [However, this is not accepted within the confines of the principles of military necessity and military advantage under IHL.] Having found that the protection against sexual violence under IHL is not limited to members of the opposing armed forces, who are hors de combat, or civilians not directly participating in hostilities, the Chamber does not need to address whether or not the persons alleged to have been ‘child soldiers’ in the facts and circumstances underlying Counts 6 and 9, or any persons alleged to have been held in sexual slavery by the UPC/FPLC, are to be considered as ‘members’ of this armed force at the relevant time.
Conclusion
36. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Chamber finds that members of the same armed force are not per se excluded as potential victims of the war crimes of rape and sexual slavery, as listed in Article 8(2)(e)(vi), based on the principles of treaty interpretation, the framework of international law including the jus cogens prohibition on sexual violence and the special protection afforded to children under IHL. Without prejudice to whether such acts have taken place, the Chamber therefore finds that it has jurisdiction over the conduct charged pursuant to Counts 6 and 9.
Judge Priya Gopalan and Judge Olga Jurasz
8.4 Consent and Sexual Crimes in the Ntaganda Judgment
In 2019, Trial Chamber VI issued the judgment in the case against Mr Bosco Ntaganda.Footnote 186 Convicted of eighteen counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the volume of sexual violence, especially against women and girls, was a particular feature of this case.
In Isabel Maravall-Buckwalter’s rewrite,Footnote 187 age-related incapacity, as a circumstance defining the crime of rape, is explored. In Ntaganda, age was only considered as a circumstance sufficient to find rape in the case of a nine-year-old girl called Nadège. In the case of victims over the age of nine, additional circumstances were necessary for a finding of rape. Without diminishing the sexual agency of victims, the rewritten judgment argues against this standard and, by providing an interpretation in accordance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, raises the age of consent to the acceptable standard in international law.
with public Annexes A, B, and C Judgment No.: ICC-01/04-01/06
Date: 8 July 2010
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER VI(B)
Before: Judge Isabel MARAVALL-BUCKWALTER
SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. BOSCO NTAGANDA
This case relates to events alleged to have occurred from on or about 6 August 2002 to on or about 31 December 2003, in Ituri, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Mr Bosco Ntaganda is charged with thirteen counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity, of which specifically rape as a crime against humanity and as a war crime (Counts 4, 5, and 6) pursuant to Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute (the Statute).
Factual Findings
Sexual Violence against Female Recruits and Soldiers
1. The Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC)/Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC) extensively recruited individuals of all ages, from June 2002.Footnote 188 Female members of the UPC/FPLC were regularly raped and subjected to sexual violence at the camps by male UPC/FPLC soldiers.Footnote 189 Sexual violence was committed against girls of all ages, including girls under the age of fifteen.Footnote 190 A number of these female members of the UPC/FPLC became pregnant during their time in the UPC/FPLC.Footnote 191 The Chamber has heard relevant evidence of sexual violence committed against girls over the age of fifteen, however it does not fall within the scope of the charges.Footnote 192
2. P-0883 was under fifteen years old at the relevant time.Footnote 193 During her time at Bule camp she was raped by ‘many soldiers’.Footnote 194 She was not able to state how often she was raped, and indicated that ‘whether you were sitting down or sleeping, anyone who wanted to do so could rape you’.Footnote 195 Soldiers would come and take her and other girls ‘whenever they wanted’, whether they were inside or at the place of work of the soldier, sometimes saying that they would shoot them if they did not agree.Footnote 196 Later, after having been injured during a battle, P-0883 was sent to Camp Baudouin for treatment, where she found out that she was pregnant, without knowing ‘who was responsible for that pregnancy’.Footnote 197
3. A girl named Nadège, who was around nine years old at the time, and who was taken to training at Lingo camp, was raped; P-0758 explained that there was pus coming out of Nadège’s vagina and that, as a result, she died.Footnote 198
4. A girl by the name Mave, who was under fifteen years of age, was raped by many different soldiers on a regular basis. P-0887 testified that many soldiers ‘slept with’ Mave, ‘treated her as a … soldier’s woman’, had sexual relations with her. The witness said she knew this because soldiers were talking about it amongst themselves, and she also spoke to Mave.Footnote 199 P-0907 testified as well that it was ‘common knowledge’ that Mave had been raped several times by soldiers and she began to suffer from fistula, and that he was present when Kisembo gave a speech to a gathering of soldiers in March 2003, where he told the soldiers that Mave had a fistula and prohibited the further rape of Mave.Footnote 200
The Operations Involving the UPC/FPLC
5. During and in the immediate aftermath of the assault on Mongbwalu, UPC/FPLC soldiers forced women and girls to have sexual intercourse with them. P-0892, thirteen years old at the time, was taken to a house by UPC/FPLC soldiers.Footnote 201 Upon arrival, a UPC/FPLC commander named Saidi ordered the soldiers to undress the girl; the soldiers then violently ripped off her skirt and underwear and threw her onto the bed.Footnote 202 Saidi then penetrated the girl with his fingers, saying that she was a minor who had not ‘known a man’, after which he got on top of her and penetrated her vagina with his penis.Footnote 203 The girl started screaming, after which Saidi put a cloth over her mouth and continued.Footnote 204 After he finished, he said that she now was a ‘woman’, after which one of UPC/FPLC soldiers got on top of the girl and also penetrated her.Footnote 205
6. P-0892 and P-0912 testifiedFootnote 206 that other women and girls were also taken away by UPC/FPLC soldiers and raped. One girl, who was approximately fourteen years old at the time, told her that she was forced to enter a bedroom, asked to lie down, and as she refused, the soldiers started hitting her. Subsequently, two people ‘raped’ her;Footnote 207 P-0912 testified that she overheard that the fourteen-year-old girl had been taken from the same house by soldiers who mentioned that they were taking girls to prepare food at the military camp. This girl later told P-0912 that she had been ‘raped’ and injured.Footnote 208 P-0887 testified that the UPC/FPLC soldiers committed ‘rapes’ and abductions of girls in Mongwalu and referred to one particular instance in which he saw a girl from the neighbourhood being chased and pushed by a UPC/FPLC soldier with a gun, and who then spent a night with the soldier.Footnote 209 P-0888 also testified that he personally saw soldiers and commanders who raped ‘little girls’, although he could not provide their names.Footnote 210
7. While in Kobu, UPC/FPLC soldiers detained several women and girls, in some instances for hours, in others over the course of several days; during these periods, UPC/FPLC soldiers raped them and otherwise subjected them to sexual violence on one or more occasion.Footnote 211 This included an eleven-year-old captured by Commander Simba during a mop-up operation in Kobu whom he brought with him to Bunia where she stayed until the Bunia operation and forced her to sleep with him; according to P-0017, she was forced to have ‘sexual relationships’ with Simba to save her life.Footnote 212
Applicable Law
8. The crime against humanity of rape is laid down in Article 7(1)(g) of the Statute. The war crime of rape is laid down in Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute.Footnote 213
9. The legal elements of the crime against humanity of rape as defined in Article 7(1)(g)1 of the Elements of Crimes:
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
10. The legal elements of the war crime of rape are as defined in Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)1 of the Elements of Crimes:
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.
11. As to the second element of the crime of rape as a crime against humanity and as a war crime, the fourth possible circumstance to be considered under the Statute is that an invasion of the body of the victim or the perpetrator may also constitute rape when committed ‘against a person incapable of giving genuine consent’. The Elements of Crimes specifies that ‘[i]t is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced, or age-related incapacity’.Footnote 214 Neither the Elements of Crimes nor the Statute establishes when a person is of age-related incapacity. Regarding this requirement, the Court’s jurisprudence has stated that it is necessary that ‘the Prosecution will only have to prove that the victim’s capacity to give genuine consent was affected by natural, induced, or age-related incapacity’.Footnote 215 In 2014, in the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga the ICC’s Trial Chamber noted that, ‘save the very specific situation of a person whose “incapacity” was “tak[en] advantage of”, the Elements of Crimes do not refer to the victim’s lack of consent, and therefore this need not be proven’.Footnote 216
12. According to the Court’s jurisprudence, ‘at least one of the coercive circumstances or conditions set out in the second element is therefore sufficient alone for penetration to amount to rape’.Footnote 217
13. Considering that age-related incapacity constitutes one of the circumstances which render consent immaterial to the crime of rape, the Chamber considers pertinent to give content to this circumstance, as it has been left undefined in the Statute and in the Elements of Crimes.
14. Article 21 of the Statute provides judges with the tools to interpret when the Court’s primary sources, the Statute or the Elements of Crimes, fail to resolve an issue and there is a remaining lacuna in the law. First, according to Article 21.1(b), by resorting to the applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict. Second, Article 21.1(c) establishes that if these also fail to resolve the issue, the Court may apply general principles of law derived from the national laws of the states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided they are consistent with international law. Article 21(2) allows the Court to apply principles and rules of law interpreted in its previous decisions and provides in Article 21(3) that the application and interpretation of law is consistent with international human rights law.
15. Judges must therefore ensure according to Article 21(3) of the Statute that the interpretation and application of the law is consistent with internationally recognised human rights. This obligation means that the law must not only be interpreted, but also applied in accordance with internationally recognised human rights law.Footnote 218 This requires that interpretation, resulting from Article 21(1) or Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties will always have to produce a result which is compatible with international human rights law.Footnote 219
16. Not having an age of consent defined in the law or adopting a threshold which is too low is not compatible with international human rights law standards. The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has noted, in General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Health of Adolescents, that ‘States parties need to ensure that specific legal provisions are guaranteed under domestic law, including with regard to setting a minimum age for sexual consent’,Footnote 220 and in General Comment No. 20 on the implementation of the rights of the child during adolescence that ‘States parties should take into account the need to balance protection and evolving capacities, and define an acceptable minimum age when determining the legal age for sexual consent. States should avoid criminalizing adolescents of similar ages for factually consensual and non-exploitative sexual activity’.Footnote 221 The CRC has also disapproved states’ lack of clarity in setting a legal minimum age of sexual consent or its absence from legislation in its concluding observations to state parties.Footnote 222
17. Both the CRC and the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against women (CEDAW) have stressed in their concluding observations that when the age of sexual consent is undefined or set too low, it fails to protect the child from sexual exploitation and health-related risks. In order to protect children from such risks, both the CRC and the CEDAW have signalled the ages of twelve and thirteen as being too low.Footnote 223 The CRC has also shown concern ‘at the rather low age for sexual consent (14 years), which may not provide adequate protection for children older than 14 years against sexual exploitation’Footnote 224 and has welcomed the adoption of legislative measures by states in raising the age of sexual consent to sixteen years.Footnote 225
18. The recognition of sixteen as an acceptable age of consent is consistent with the CEDAW’s and the CRC’s Joint General Recommendation 31 which has highlighted in relation to child marriage that, ‘as a matter of respecting the child’s evolving capacities and autonomy in making decisions that affect her or his life, a marriage of a mature, capable child below 18 years of age may be allowed in exceptional circumstances, provided that the child is at least 16 years of age … without deference to culture or tradition’.Footnote 226
19. These recommendations are in line with research showing that early sexual activity is correlated with negative psychosocial consequences for the child.Footnote 227 These range from unintended pregnancies, sexually transmitted infections, mental health risks, substance abuse, weaker attachments to conventional institutions, lower academic achievement and aspirations, and poorer mental health.Footnote 228 Researchers have asserted that these negative psychosocial consequences ‘tend to be concentrated among early initiators – those less than age 16 at sexual debut – or among girls’.Footnote 229 The maternal health consequences associated with early child marriage corroborate these findings in non-Western countries, where early sexual relations as a consequence of early child marriage entail a greater risk for maternal morbidity and mortality.Footnote 230
20. This Chamber observes that the suggested age of sixteen is also compatible with the subsidiary sources embedded in Article 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Statute. Firstly, international humanitarian law prohibits in absolute terms the infliction of sexual violence against children. The special protection afforded children from any form of sexual violence can be found in Article 77(1) of Additional Protocol I,Footnote 231 which recognises the obligation of state parties to award children special respect and to protect them against any form of indecent assault,Footnote 232 and Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II,Footnote 233 which prohibits at any time and any place whatsoever outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault.Footnote 234 This prohibition is recognised in customary international law.Footnote 235 This protection against any form of sexual violenceFootnote 236 covers all children, even those children who have not attained the age of fifteen years and take a direct part in hostilities or fall into the power of an adverse party.Footnote 237 This legal framework ‘is continuous and not diminished by the fighter status or the civilian status of the child, even while in the hands of their own party’.Footnote 238 Articles 77(3) and 4(3)(d) do not set a higher age threshold for the provision of this privileged treatment; they only require that parties continue to protect children, including those under the age of fifteen, when they take up arms or are detained.Footnote 239
21. Secondly, having satisfied Article 21(1)(b), it is not required that the Chamber apply 21(1)(c), which, in any case, were there to exist a recognised general principle on this subject matter, would still have to be consistent with the Statute and with international law and internationally recognised norms and standards, according to Article 21(1)(c). These, as mentioned earlier, agree on setting the age of consent at sixteen.
22. This Chamber therefore concludes that, considering the undefined age of capacity in the Statute and Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Elements of Crimes, an application of Article 21 of the Statute allows this Chamber to conclude that an interpretation which is compatible with the sources therein recognises the age of sixteen as the acceptable age of consent.
Findings of the Chamber
23. Turning to the second legal element of the crime of rape, the Chamber notes that, in many instances, the perpetrators used force and threats of force and took advantage of a coercive environment to have sexual intercourse with girls or women.
24. The Chamber also considers that at the camps, UPC/FPLC soldiers repeatedly raped P-0883, a girl under fifteen years of age, at Camp Bule,Footnote 240 a girl named Nadège, approximately nine years old, at the Lingo training camp,Footnote 241 and a girl named Mave, who was under the age of fifteen.Footnote 242 Additionally, the Chamber notes that during the immediate aftermath of the assault on Mongbwalu, Witness P-0892 was thirteen years old at the time when she was rapedFootnote 243 and witness P-0892 and P-0912 testified that another girl was fourteen years old.Footnote 244 In Kobu, UPC/FPLC soldiers detained several women and girls for hours, even days, and raped them during this time.Footnote 245 One of the girls was eleven years old.Footnote 246 The Chamber therefore is satisfied that perpetrators invaded the bodies of victims who were under the age of sixteen, and therefore under the acceptable age of consent.
25. Accordingly, the Chamber concludes that at least one, often more, of the coercive circumstances or conditions set out in the second legal element of the crime against humanity and of the war crime of rape is proven for all incidents listed.
Judge Isabel Maravall-Buckwalter
9.1 Reflection: The Situation in Uganda
Introduction
This reflection addresses the feminist judgments concerning the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Uganda. It provides a background to the conflict in Uganda, before delivering an overview of the ICC in Uganda. A brief background of the Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen case (Ongwen case) is given, which is the only current ICC case in Uganda.Footnote 1
A reflection is then provided of each of the three rewritings of the Ongwen case in this collection, explaining first the relevant findings from the original decision, before outlining how each of the rewritings differs from the original decision and reflecting on how the judges have incorporated a feminist perspective into their judgments. Finally, a reflection is given on how gender justice could be delivered beyond the existing rules and structure of the ICC.
Background to the Conflict
Uganda was a British colony, declaring independence in 1962. The postcolonial period has been dominated by violence and armed conflict, starting in 1964 with violent protests against the consolidation of power by the country’s first prime minister, Milton Obote.Footnote 2 In 1971, General Idi Amin Dada carried out a coup. His eight-year regime was characterised by violence, as he tortured and murdered anyone affiliated with the opposition, those perceived as supporting Obote, particularly Acholi and Langi peoples. ‘It is estimated that between 300,000 and 500,000 Ugandans were killed during this period, which earned Amin the nickname “the butcher”.’Footnote 3
After the defeat of Amin’s forces in 1979, Obote eventually returned to power in 1980 and retaliated against Amin’s supporters, starting his own campaign of ‘rape, torture, looting and destruction of property’, during which another 300,000–500,000 people were killed.Footnote 4 Obote was once again ousted by the military in July 1985, although it too was then overthrown. In January 1986, Yoweri Museveni seized power and has been President of Uganda ever since, as he abolished all political parties except his own (National Resistance Movement), and continues to perpetuate violence against any opposition.
Uganda has fifty-six ethnic groups, and this has led to opposition, armed insurgencies, and resistance against the government, which continue today. After Museveni took power, conflict began in northern (and parts of eastern) Uganda and continued between government authorities and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. The LRA has abducted children to use as child soldiers, forced wives, and sexual slaves. It has also perpetrated atrocities against civilians, such as torture and murder.
To date, the only examples of accountability for LRA members are the conviction of Dominic Ongwen at the ICC and one ongoing Ugandan domestic trial against LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo.Footnote 5 It has been reported that some LRA soldiers ‘were integrated into the Ugandan military without investigation into crimes they may have committed in the LRA’, although others remain ‘in the bush’, waging conflict.Footnote 6 A temporary ceasefire agreement was signed by LRA negotiators in 2008 (extending previous ceasefire agreements originally signed between November 2006 to 29 February 2008), and then a Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) agreement and an implementation protocol on 29 February 2008. Kony himself did not participate in negotiations, and ultimately the negotiations for a full peace agreement fell apart due to his erratic behaviour.Footnote 7 Kony vowed never to sign a full peace agreement until ICC arrest warrants were withdrawn. Despite a high-profile campaign to find him in 2012, his whereabouts remain unknown.Footnote 8
The ICC in Uganda
In January 2004, the government of Uganda referred its own situation to the ICC, and investigations were opened in July 2004. The ICC’s focus is on crimes committed in the armed conflict between the LRA and the government authorities. Alleged crimes are war crimes (including murder, cruel treatment of civilians, pillaging, rape, enlistment and use of child soldiers) and crimes against humanity (including murder, enslavement, sexual enslavement, rape, and other inhumane acts).
In 2005, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for LRA leaders Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, and Dominic Ongwen. Kony and Otti remain at large; Lukwiya and Odhiambo are deceased (proceedings terminated). Ongwen surrendered himself to the ICC in January 2015, and, to this day, remains the only defendant to face trial at the ICC over crimes committed in Uganda. No crimes committed by Ugandan government authorities are being investigated by the ICC.
Background to the Ongwen Case
After surrendering himself to the ICC, Ongwen’s trial began in December 2016, closing in March 2020. At the time of his surrender and arrest, Ongwen was the commander of the LRA’s Sinia Brigade, with the rank of brigadier from 2004 onwards. Ongwen’s history is complex. He was himself abducted by the LRA as a child, somewhere between the ages of eight and fourteen, although his exact age at abduction in the late 1980s is difficult to confirm. Ongwen was a particularly brutal leader, and was charged with over seventy counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.Footnote 9 These included crimes of murder, attacking civilians, torture, enslavement, pillaging, other inhumane acts, persecution, destruction of property, rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, outrages upon personal dignity, conscription of children into an armed group, and use of children in hostilities. These charges related to specific attacks on internally displaced persons (civilian) camps, and also to long-term and ongoing crimes (in particular, sexual and gender-based offences).
Ongwen was convicted by the ICC’s Trial Chamber IX on 4 February 2021,Footnote 10 found guilty of sixty-one crimes (war crimes and crimes against humanity), and sentenced in May 2021 to twenty-five years in prison.Footnote 11 His conviction and sentencing were affirmed in the Appeal Judgment and Sentencing Appeal Judgment of 15 December 2022.Footnote 12
Reflecting on the Feminist Judgments
All of the authors have reimagined aspects of the Ongwen Trial Judgment or Sentencing Decision, as the Appeal Judgment was released too late in this project (December 2022). Judges Kirabira, Ringin, and Grey rewrite the sentencing decision in relation to the crime of forced pregnancy; Judge Kyojiika writes a separate sentencing decision to incorporate the aggravating factor of the impact on children who were born as a result of Ongwen’s sexual and gender-based crimes; and Judge Rigney looks at the defence of duress while applying the concept of abolitionism.
Sentencing for Crimes of Forced Pregnancy
Ongwen was convicted of forced pregnancy as a war crime and a crime against humanity, and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment for each count. The forced pregnancy took place in the context of forced marriages, a systematic element of the LRA, in which girls and young women were abducted and ‘given’ to LRA soldiers as ‘wives’. The ‘wives’ were regularly raped as part of their role as ‘wife’. Ongwen had a number of ‘wives’, and the Trial Chamber found that he repeatedly raped his ‘wives’. The Chamber found that two of his seven ‘wives’ became pregnant (P-0101 and P-0214); one birthed separately a girl and a boy, the other a girl. The Chamber found that the ‘wives’ were unable to escape, under threat of death, including the two pregnant ‘wives’, and that they were held in violent circumstances, including beatings and rape.
The Trial Chamber discussed the background to the Rome Statute definition of forced pregnancy. It then went on to detail the definition, namely when the perpetrator ‘confine[s] one or more women forcibly made pregnant’, with the two components of ‘unlawful confinement’ and ‘forcibly made pregnant’, and with the intent to ‘affect the ethnic composition of any population or carry out other grave violations of international law’.Footnote 13 The trial judgment and sentencing judgment noted that the ‘crime of forced pregnancy is grounded in the woman’s right to personal and reproductive autonomy and the right to family’, where forced pregnancy deprives a woman of reproductive autonomy. The sentencing judgment found the crime to be of a very high gravity, due to the forced pregnancy itself but also because the pregnancy resulted from rape. The defencelessness and multiplicity of victims was acknowledged as an aggravating factor, as was the discriminatory nature of the crime.
Judges Kirabira, Ringin, and Grey’s sentencing judgment (Joint Judgment) differs from the original sentencing judgment in that it delves into the harm caused by forced pregnancy in significant detail, which the original sentencing judgment did not. The Joint Judgment explores four categories of harms. Firstly, the harms of violation of personal and reproductive autonomy, which the judges note is a ‘key aspect of human dignity’.
Next, they outline the physical harms stemming from rape, lack of medical assistance and perinatal care, birth complications, physically demanding domestic duties, and physical punishments. Here, the judges point out that insufficient evidence was collected of the physical harms experienced by the victims, which should be addressed in future cases.
Thirdly, the judges address psychological and emotional harm caused by fear and intimidation (threats of physical abuse). It was noted that the victims were still afraid of Dominic Ongwen, which diminished their willingness to fully cooperate with ICC investigators. Again, the judges noted a lack of evidence of the specific psychological harms to P-0101 and P-0214, although these could have included depression, anxiety, PTSD, shame, and more.
Finally, the Joint Judgment examines economic harms, including the ‘significant economic burden’ that can be placed on the victim from childcare responsibilities and the limited earning capacity due to parental responsibilities, while acknowledging that Ongwen’s indigence left him unable to contribute to the welfare of the children he fathered. The judges also pointed out that the victims’ education ceased once they were abducted, affecting their future earning capacity, and encouraged future Trial Chambers to pursue more detailed evidence of the socio-economic harms resulting from these crimes. A particularly feminist step in an international criminal court judgment taken here is to ‘consider the provision of childcare in [the] reparations order in this case to address the financial burden’.
The judges include the same three aggravating factors that the original sentencing judgment included; however they also discuss social harms, namely the stigma attached to the victims in Uganda, which detrimentally affected their reintegration into society. As there was no evidence of this raised with regard to P-0101 and P-0214 specifically, the judges could not apply this aggravating circumstance but, again, urged this to be considered in future sentencing decisions. The judges do take cultural harms into consideration, such as the forced disconnection from cultural practices, including inheritance and land rights, as well as pregnancy rituals.
A strong feminist aspect of the Joint Judgment is to make obvious the lacunae in the evidence that results in the sentencing judges not being able to take some feminist-centred issues into account in their sentencing decision. This is an important commentary, making a critique of the trial process, which did not adequately explore how the women in this case were affected by the crimes they experienced.
A feminist approach to judging is to ‘do no harm’, and this is evident in the Joint Judgment. The judges are critical of the Trial Chamber for not seeking further testimony from P-0101 and P-0214 but decline to recall the witnesses so as to minimise the re-traumatisation caused by court appearances.
The judges ultimately conclude by pronouncing a sentence of life imprisonment each for the war crime and the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy, which they reduce to thirty years due to the mitigating circumstances of Ongwen’s experiences as a child soldier. This is a longer sentence than that actually awarded to Ongwen (including on appeal), which ultimately better reflects the aggravating circumstances, thereby better taking the victims’ experiences into account.
Considering Children Born of Sexual Offences
Rather than rewrite an existing part of either the trial or sentencing judgments, Judge Kyobiika has added to the sentencing judgment. Judge Kyobiika considers a wide range of the sexual and gender-based crimes against girls and women that Ongwen was convicted of (Counts 50–68): forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’; torture; rape; sexual slavery; enslavement; forced pregnancy; and outrages upon personal dignity. Judge Kyobiika’s focus, however, is on ‘children born as a result of these sexual and gender-based crimes’. She treats the children as both a group of victims entitled to their own reparations and an aggravating factor in sentencing; this has not been considered by international courts. She discusses the context of the LRA’s systematic abduction of girls and young women to take as forced ‘wives’, who were regularly raped by their ‘husbands’ and many of whom subsequently gave birth to children born from this rape.
Judge Kyobiika discusses the relevance of children’s human rights, including to children’s right to special care and assistance, and recognition that ‘family is a fundamental group of society’. Children’s growth, well-being, and development are all influenced by their experiences and environment. Obviously, being born of rape and growing up in an armed conflict environment, while not a definite predetermination of a child’s ultimate life journey, is not in the best interests of a child. Such circumstances lead to significant obstacles to that child’s enjoyment of human rights, such as the right to family and the right to education. Judge Kyobiika observes ‘that some of the children born as a result of war have been treated with disdain and continue to face untold suffering, rejection, discrimination, and stigmatisation in the communities’; that patriarchal societal structures contribute to ‘children’s contested identities’; and that children born of war have a high risk of experiencing domestic and family violence. The forced ‘wives’ and the children born of rape in the LRA were also exposed to conflict, witnessing and experiencing horrific violence that may lead to serious mental health concerns from trauma, such as depression.
Ultimately, the radical nature of Judge Kyobiika’s judgment is the inclusion of children born of sexual offences in the sentencing. By doing so, she is not merely acknowledging them as an aggravating factor, but actually considering these children and their needs as another category of victims. Judge Kyobiika finds that ‘Ongwen denied some of his children the fundamental right of being born and raised in the security of a family’, with resulting ‘mental, economic, social, ethical, religious effects’. Thus, in addition to terms of imprisonment, Judge Kyobiika orders reparations for children who were members of Ongwen’s homestead; children that were born as a result of forced pregnancy; children that witnessed some of the crimes; and children who were members of LRA soldiers’ households.
Judge Kyobiika’s judgment fills a significant gap in international criminal law jurisprudence. While ‘women and children’ is an oft-seen victim category, and in some cases rightly criticised for grouping these two types of people into one category, it is also the case that the plight of children is often directly connected to the plight of women, and thus it is appropriate to consider children in a sentencing decision. In particular, the children that Judge Kyobiika considers to have been very specifically impacted by the actions of Ongwen and the rest of the LRA, with their lives starting at a disadvantage. It is crucial that defendants are ordered to provide reparations to such victims, not just because they are in fact the children of Ongwen himself (which would lend itself to the traditional concept of child support) but because he brought these children into a world of violence and disadvantage, through an act of violence. The ICC has a reparations regime,Footnote 14 and it is surprising that this was not considered in the original Ongwen sentencing.
In relation to this reimagined judgment, I would like to see more detail about the reparations ordered. Certainly, financial reparations are appropriate, to assist with the rehabilitation of children, physical and mental health needs, education, living expenses, and more. What kind of reparations are appropriate for children born of war rape? Moffett discusses the need to shift ‘the moral value system’ of those responsible for atrocity crimes as part of reparations, which should be not just about money for victims (particularly if payments are merely symbolic) but also ensuring victims’ rights.Footnote 15 Reparations for children, who have their lives ahead of them, are certainly challenging. Moffett notes that ‘assessing the impact or measurable outcomes [of reparations] is complicated by the unpredictability of what will happen when societies move away from war. These issues reflect the disconnect between the idealism of rights and the reality of implementing remedies’.Footnote 16 Reparations must be feasible and secure ‘adequate measures and processes to remedy victims’ harm with responsible actors taking ownership to redress that harm, while at the same time not bankrupting a country, reinforcing inequalities, or humiliating responsible actors’.Footnote 17 It is a huge undertaking for a bench of judges to decide on appropriate remedies that achieve all of these, but it is necessary, as a general order for reparations may not address any of the harms suffered by children. Of course, a separate, more detailed reparations order may be made (see Articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute), and the lacunae in Article 75 ‘provide judges with the flexibility to determine the scope and extent of reparations’.Footnote 18 Ultimately, reparations for the children born of rape are necessary to remedy the victims’ harm, and Judge Kyobiika’s inclusion of these in her feminist judgment highlights a significant void in the original judgment.
Duress and Abolitionism
Part of Ongwen’s defence was a claim for the defence of duress, and scholars have analysed the defence of duress in the Ongwen case.Footnote 19 The defence argued that Kony’s control of LRA soldiers was ‘allegedly maintained through a combination of strict disciplinary rules which severely punished non-compliance with orders, the tight supervision of commanders, and successful assertion of spiritual powers’.Footnote 20 The Trial Judgment considered multiple elements when analysing the duress defence: Ongwen’s status in the LRA hierarchy and the applicability of the LRA disciplinary regime to him; executions of senior LRA commanders on Kony’s orders; the possibility of escaping from or leaving the LRA; Kony’s alleged spiritual powers; Ongwen’s personal loyalty to Kony and his career advancement; and crimes committed in private.
It is outside the scope of this reflection to go through all of these elements; however, as an example, I will detail one of these elements: escape. The Trial Chamber noted that, if Ongwen engaged in the charged criminal conduct ‘when escaping or leaving was possible is a strong indication that he acted on his own accord’.Footnote 21 The Chamber notes that evidence was given of other LRA soldiers, including of a high rank, who escaped, and that Ongwen was more afraid of being held accountable for the crimes he committed than of Kony. The Chamber held that Ongwen’s ‘high rank and position placed him in a relatively better position to escape, as compared to lower-ranking LRA members’.Footnote 22 Based on the evidence given, the Trial Chamber concluded ‘that escaping from or otherwise leaving the LRA was a realistic option available to Dominic Ongwen … as it was for many others who successfully escaped’.Footnote 23
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber found ‘no basis in the evidence to hold that Dominic Ongwen was subjected to a threat of imminent death or imminent or continuing serious bodily harm to himself or another person at the time of his conduct underlying the charged crimes’. The Trial Chamber determined that, quite the opposite, Ongwen ‘frequently acted independently and even contested orders received from Kony’.
Judge Rigney concurs with the majority opinion in finding that the defence of duress is not open to Ongwen, but then goes on to discuss the limits of the defence of duress. Judge Rigney ponders the agency of the accused, why they made decisions, and what structural conditions influenced their actions. Drawing from this, she asks whether international criminal law can address ‘the interconnectedness between personal and political violence’, and, in doing so, questions whether there are alternatives to the international criminal justice system.
The feminist aspect of Judge Rigney’s piece, which goes further than others in this collection, is that it questions the entire structure of international criminal law. As other feminist judgment projects have shown, some judgments are directed towards working within the system while others seek to disrupt the legal project entirely, and it is the latter that Rigney is seeking here. She questions the act of assigning individual criminal responsibility for collective wrongdoing when it is larger political, economic, or legal structures that have created the conditions for individual criminality. As Rigney points out, international criminal legal discourse largely does not engage with these structures and the conditions they create, resulting in the de-contextualisation of a defendant’s actions from the conditions that led to them.
Judge Rigney then moves on to discuss the concept of abolition, a philosophy that ‘ultimately aims to eliminate [the need for] imprisonment, policing and surveillance’ (connecting this system to racism, capitalism, and slavery), introducing alternatives to punishment and imprisonment. Abolitionism has a strong feminist grounding, particularly in Black feminism, and looks at the root causes of harm and violence.
Judge Rigney’s piece raised many questions for me. I would have liked to see in this judgment specific suggestions for future trials. Specifically, what does Judge Rigney think that judges (and/or lawyers) in future trials should implement to adopt an abolitionist perspective in their decisions? How does an abolitionist perspective fit with international criminal law generally? How does abolitionism in the context of a discussion about international criminal law (as opposed to domestic criminal law) differ from or overlap with atrocity prevention literature and strategies, which already focus on a societal structure that seeks to address risk factors, such as a human rights-focused society?Footnote 24 How can abolitionism engage with atrocity prevention theories and practice? How could international criminal law be adjusted to adapt transformative justice responses to address the social causes of violence and move away from incarceration? How could the court have addressed these concerns in this particular case, of Dominic Ongwen’s experience as a child and adult soldier living in an environment of long-term armed conflict? While these questions remain unanswered, Judge Rigney’s reimagining opens new paths for thinking about the value of feminist engagement with international law and for looking to alternatives to achieve justice for all.
Imagining Gender Justice beyond the Existing Rules
One theme that emerges from the rewritten judgments of Judges Kirabira, Ringin, and Grey, and of Kyojiika is the need in sentencing to take into greater account any aggravating circumstances related to the impact of crimes on women and children. Ongwen’s sentence of twenty-five years is something that I have struggled with. The details of the experiences and harms of the girls and women who were victims of the LRA are horrific and long-term: they did not cease when the women managed to escape. Crimes such as forced marriage and forced pregnancy have a lifelong impact. I had hoped that the sentence would be increased on appeal, and was disappointed it was not. I understand that the final sentence given to Ongwen was reduced because of the mitigating factor of his background as a child soldier. However, I found it difficult to balance the length of this sentence given the evidence which detailed the enthusiasm, violence, and cruelty with which Ongwen carried out his crimes. Ongwen may have been abducted as a child, but he was quick to engage with the LRA’s way of life and to rise up through the ranks as he perpetrated atrocities in a way that other child soldiers did not. In addition, as the court noted in its rejection of the duress defence, Ongwen also had opportunities to leave the LRA, but did not do so.
This is perhaps why I find the idea of abolitionism advanced in the reimaged decision by Judge Rigney so challenging. As a scholar, I am open to the idea and can comprehend the arguments such as the need to address the root causes of violence: I agree prevention is better than punishment, if we can avoid the violence. However, when violence does take place, I cannot fathom not having a system of punishment. This is no doubt due to my ingrained education and subsequent work in criminal law. However, it is also due to my extensive empirical research with atrocity survivors. I have interviewed (often mostly women) survivors in Australia, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Israel. I have delved in depth into survivor testimonies (oral and written) and memoirs, as well as accessing other sources of atrocity evidence such as photographs and film, and explored atrocity sites, memorials, and museums around the world. I have interviewed women who survived rape (including in rape camps) and forced marriage (some of which produced children). I have watched an elderly Holocaust survivor deliver her regular talk about her experience, and still struggle to talk about the loss of her mother over seventy years ago. The lifelong trauma that survivors carry is an incredibly heavy burden that never leaves them. The concept of punishment for crimes has always existed, although it is true that incarceration is historically a relatively new form of punishment, with its roots in racist and capitalist societies.Footnote 25 However, the idea that perpetrators of such horrific, deeply affecting atrocity crimes have the opportunity to ‘rehabilitate’ and live a free life is one I genuinely struggle with, particularly in the context of the crimes that women (and children) have experienced, and in the lifelong trauma and life disruption experienced by victims of genocide and other atrocities.Footnote 26 Thus, I want to see a stronger argument from abolitionists as to how abolitionism fits with atrocity crimes; how it would balance with the desire for justice that victims seek. To me, a gender-just outcome is one that honours the victims’ wishes: what is the justice that they seek, and how can the international criminal justice system deliver that?
It would also be interesting to see how the judges in this collection would implement the amicus curiae contributions that were solicited by the ICC as part of the Ongwen appeal process, if these feminist judgments were at the appeal stage.Footnote 27 Some of the amicus briefs and oral presentations submitted to the court delivered perspectives on issues addressed here, including feminist-influenced arguments: duress, forced pregnancy, forced marriage, and, although not expressly using the word ‘abolitionism’, some relating to arguments about the context of violence in which Ongwen existed.Footnote 28 How would the judges in this collection have considered these amicus submissions? Would these submissions have contributed to or even strengthened the judges’ findings? An interesting future project, perhaps.
The three Ongwen judgments in this book have two starkly competing feminist perspectives: one that works from inside the legal system and seeks to take the perspectives and experiences of children into account; and one that seeks to disrupt the legal system and urges it to take the context of atrocity violence into account to create new solutions. Yet all the judgments are grounded in a human rights perspective and language, always seeking to enhance and uphold the human rights of victims. Hence, this Uganda/Ongwen section of this book of feminist judgments is a microcosm of feminism, which comes in many forms and with many theories, although ultimately seeking equality, participation, non-violence, peace, and justice. Which, after all, is also what international criminal justice systems should deliver.
9.2 Mental Incapacitation and Duress in the Ongwen Judgment
In 2021, Trial Chamber IX convicted Mr Dominic Ongwen of sixty-one counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.Footnote 29 In this rewritten decision, Sophie Rigney interrogates the defence of duress to place Mr Ongwen firmly in the position of perpetrator and victim, eradicating the false dichotomy between the two. Rigney considers the constraints within which Mr Ongwen was operating and links these to broader questions of culpability. Rigney links these questions to carceral abolition movements.
Ultimately, Rigney confirms the finding of the original Trial Chamber and convicts Mr Ongwen of sixty-one counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Redacted Trial Judgment – Separate and Concurring Opinion of Judge Sophie Rigney No.: ICC-02/04-01/15
Date: 4 February 2021
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER IX(B)
Before: Judge Sophie RIGNEY
SITUATION IN UGANDA
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. DOMINIC ONGWEN
Overview
1. The man on trial was born Dominic Okumu Savio.Footnote 30 He was born into a Uganda that already knew significant political turmoil and conflict. When he was ten years old, or perhaps slightly younger, he was taken from the side of the road, abducted, and forced to become a soldier for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This was a common occurrence, and there is evidence that his family had prepared him for such a possibility, including teaching him to provide a different name to his captors. This he did, telling them that his name was Dominic Ongwen.Footnote 31 Ongwen is now the name that he is known by, and is charged by in this trial. As he grew up within the LRA, Dominic also became adept at the various methods employed by the LRA, and was promoted through the ranks to eventually become a battalion and brigade commander. During this time, he turned eighteen, and thus became of age to be criminally responsible within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for his actions. He is now charged with seventy counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the majority judgment finds him guilty of sixty-one of those counts.Footnote 32
2. Ongwen is the first person to come before this Court charged with crimes that we also know he was a victim of himself. Moreover, unlike many other cases in international criminal law, Ongwen was not a high-level commander or a president, issuing orders from behind a desk or hidden away behind palace doors. This is not to deny his position of power – as a commander, he held considerable authority in the LRA. But he was located within a hierarchy of power, rather than leading the hierarchical structure; and this relative position, as well as his victimhood, makes this case an unusual one.
3. There is a powerful narrative in popular discourse that portrays those charged with international crimes as monsters. However, the case of Ongwen has starkly shown the complexity of victimhood and perpetration, and how lines between these categories are ‘porous’,Footnote 33 with individuals often being both victim and perpetrator.
4. Perhaps more so than many other cases, this case sets out the devastation and depravity of war as experienced by its soldiers and commanders – and how this leads to conditions that allow, or even encourage, criminality. There are complex interactions that can be witnessed, between individual, local, and global conditions. These include questions of childhood and trauma, mental illness, and poverty; the role of international interventions in conflict and in criminal law; and the role of global capitalism which enables the market in arms and military spending. This case shows how these intersecting conditions can both structure individual decisions and agency, and simultaneously define what behaviour is criminalised and who is held accountable for it.
5. Acknowledging these factors does not take away from the devastation and depravity experienced by other victims too, including crimes perpetrated by soldiers and commanders. The evidence in this case is overwhelming, particularly with regard to the use of sexual violence against young women and girls.Footnote 34 In the situation in Uganda, it was common that children were victims, and perpetrators, and victim-perpetrators.
6. All of this is particularly relevant to the defence of duress, which the defence has raised in this case. For reasons I will expand upon below, applying the law compels me to concur with the majority in this case, and find that the defence of duress is not open to Mr Ongwen. Nonetheless, I want to offer some comments on the defence of duress generally. It is my opinion that, even though it was not established on the evidence in this case, the defence of duress still permits us to examine the structure of international criminal law, alternative possibilities to this carceral system, and ultimately whether we can build an abolitionist movement for international criminal law. This separate and concurring opinion, then, shows the limits of the defence of duress as defined under the Rome Statute, but also shows what the defence of duress might allow us to understand about the structure and system of international criminal law.
Opinion
The Defence of Duress
7. Article 31 of the Rome Statute permits an accused a defence against their criminal responsibility for their conduct in situations where there was a ‘threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person’.Footnote 35
8. I agree with the majority’s statements on the elements of the defence of duress. As they have set out, duress has three elements.Footnote 36 The first is the existence of a particular type of threat: there is a requirement that the conduct which is alleged to constitute the crime must have been caused by duress which resulted from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm, against the accused or another person.Footnote 37 The threat may be made by other persons, or may be constituted by other circumstances beyond the accused’s control, but it is to be assessed at the time of the conduct in question which is alleged to constitute the crime. The requirement of imminence relates to the nature of the threatened harm (rather than the threat itself).Footnote 38 Hence, the threatened harm must be to be killed immediately, or to have serious bodily harm inflicted immediately or in an ongoing way.Footnote 39 Duress is not an available defence if this requirement of immediacy is not met; and an elevated probability of harm or an abstract danger will not be sufficient.Footnote 40
9. The second element of the defence of duress is that the accused acted necessarily and reasonably to avoid the threat.Footnote 41 They are not required to take all conceivable action to avoid the threat. A determination of what ‘necessarily and reasonably’ would mean under the circumstances is a decision for the Trial Chamber, and should be assessed in relation to the totality of the circumstances in which the accused found themselves. The third element is that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. This is a subjective element and relates to the intention of the individual, not whether or not they actually avoided the greater harm.Footnote 42
10. The defence argues that Ongwen was ‘under a continuing threat of imminent death and serious bodily harm from [Joseph] Kony and his controlling, military apparatus’.Footnote 43 They contend that Kony maintained control over the LRA through strict rules and severe punishment for non-compliance; supervision of commanders; and assertion of spiritual powers.Footnote 44 In total, the defence have led substantial evidence about the environment of the LRA and the horrors to which LRA members were subjected.Footnote 45
11. The defence have also led significant evidence about Ongwen’s mental state, and defence expert evidence suggested that ‘the coercive and violent LRA, controlled by Kony (and the Spirits), with its “do or die” rules and regulations, disrupted [Ongwen’s] development of any moral values and of the Acholi culture, leaving Mr Ongwen with no free will. Every activity that Mr Ongwen participated in while in the LRA was under duress’.Footnote 46 The defence argues that Mr Ongwen’s mental state ‘destroyed his capacity to “act reasonably and necessarily” in his situation to avoid the LRA’s threats, and made it not possible for him to formulate any intent not to cause a greater harm’.Footnote 47
12. The prosecution argues that the defence of duress is not applicable in this case. While the prosecution acknowledges that the LRA ‘sometimes inflicted severe punishment on its members for breaking the armed group’s rules, the Chamber has heard no evidence that Mr Ongwen’s conduct was caused by a threat of imminent death or imminent or continuing serious bodily harm against him or another person’.Footnote 48
13. In this case, the majority have concluded that the accused was not ‘subjected to a threat of imminent death or imminent or continuing serious bodily harm to himself or another person at the time of his conduct underlying the charged crimes’.Footnote 49 In particular, they focus on evidence that during the period of the charges, Mr Ongwen did not face any prospective punishment by death or serious bodily harm when he disobeyed orders. Moreover, although Mr Ongwen had a realistic possibility of leaving the LRA, he chose not to do so and instead ascended through the ranks and attained greater power. Indeed, Mr Ongwen occasionally contested orders, and frequently acted independently.Footnote 50 This evidence is compelling, and I agree with the view of the majority that there has not been evidence brought to satisfy the particular elements of the defence of duress, particularly the requirement of immediate threat. In this case, then, the defence of duress has not been established and cannot excuse Mr Ongwen’s conduct.
14. Nonetheless, due to the contestation of the defence of duress, significant evidence was brought which cast light on the conditions under which Mr Ongwen operated. Indeed, while duress has not been made out in this case, the defence itself – and the evidence that has been adduced by virtue of raising the defence – invites consideration of particular issues of morality, responsibility, power, and violence. Duress is fundamentally concerned with choice, and the structures that constrain or motivate that choice. What decision did the accused make about their actions, and why was that decision chosen? What drives the accused’s agency? What structural conditions influenced their actions?
15. In raising such questions, the defence of duress allows us to consider the structure of international criminal law, its conditions of possibility, and whether it can address the interconnectedness between personal and political violence. In so doing, we are invited to consider whether there are other alternatives to this criminal justice system. These are the issues I want to address in my remaining comments.
International Criminal Law’s Structural Features and Conditions
16. As a system of law, international criminal law has emerged relatively recently: the 1990s saw a huge momentum towards building institutions, substantive laws, and procedural laws. It is no coincidence that the growth of international criminal law occurred at the same time as post-Cold War expansion of neoliberalism, with its attendant greater recourse to criminal law.Footnote 51 Neoliberalism ‘often called for a strong punitive state’, and ‘criminal law played an important role in economic restructuring and rule of law projects throughout the world’.Footnote 52 Moreover, international criminal law’s focus on individual responsibility mirrors the individualist ideologies of neoliberalism.Footnote 53
17. Many argue that international criminal law is vulnerable: it is reliant on states for funding and logistics; it has no independent police force; and its jurisdiction is limited in many ways. Yet the suggestion that international criminal law is inherently vulnerable obscures the fact that it has some significant structural strengths. In particular, it is the powerful states and individuals that can either enforce or ignore international criminal law. Just as in domestic criminal systems, some are more criminalised than others. Far from being a flaw, the ways in which some powerful parties can flaunt international criminal law while others are captured by it is part of the design of the system.
18. There are various ways in which international criminal law structures criminality. Its relationships to global capitalism, race, and imperialism all determine who and what is criminalised.Footnote 54 International criminal law’s focus on particular core crimes disregards other types of harm.Footnote 55 Its jurisdictional limitations mean that certain states and people are often concentrated on, and others escape examination. All of this means that race, nationality, class, and gender are powerful determinants of who will be brought before the Court – even more so than commission of a crime.Footnote 56
19. International criminal law is galvanised by two powerful narratives, or aims of the system of law: ‘ending impunity’ and providing ‘justice to victims’.Footnote 57 The first of these, ‘ending impunity’, is undertaken through criminal trials of individuals, and holding individuals criminally responsible for collective wrongdoing and for crimes perpetrated by others (through extended modes of liability and superior responsibility).Footnote 58 But in assigning individual criminal responsibility to particular people for acts that are often collective, international criminal trials ‘exonerate[e] … those larger (political, economic, even legal) structures within which the conditions for individual criminality have been created’.Footnote 59 Those structures, and the conditions they create – including ‘poverty, discrimination, marginalization, and social exclusion’ – are ‘lost from sight’ in international criminal legal discourse.Footnote 60 Thus, international criminal trials often decontextualise the actions of the accused, and refuse to examine these actions within the conditions that give rise to them.
20. A further structural feature of international criminal law is how this legal system addresses victimhood and perpetration. As mentioned, ‘justice for victims’ is a pre-eminent aim of international criminal law. Victims are seen as the ones in whose name criminal justice is dispensed. Yet they are also frequently ‘feminized, infantilized and racialized’Footnote 61 in the process, and are made into a ‘deity-like abstraction’ rather than a real person with their own needs and opinions.Footnote 62 Perpetrators (and alleged perpetrators) are similarly reduced. Ultimately, victimhood and perpetration are separated in international criminal law – presented as a dichotomy.Footnote 63
21. Alongside this general dichotomy of victim and perpetrator, there is a more particular ‘legal fiction’ that paints child soldiers as ‘faultless passive victim(s)’.Footnote 64 The reality is ‘not so simple’, with child soldiers often exercising agency and sometimes perpetrating crimes.Footnote 65 Indeed, Ongwen has become a personification of these issues: a small boy, vulnerable and victimised, who grew up to be a man accused of committing heinous crimes; accused himself of victimising others.
22. To summarise, we see that international criminal law, as a system of law, has particular structural features. These features are a consequence of its ideological underpinnings, which are linked to neoliberalism, as well as the relationships between international criminal law and race, global capital, and imperialism. The structural features include substantive and procedural laws that criminalise some and exonerate others. As a result, some wars (or ‘situations’), and therefore some individuals, are brought into the realm of ‘international criminal justice’ while others are not. Even further, within these situations some are labelled as criminals and others are labelled as victims – and these binaries have an additional gloss when we consider the example of child soldiers, as in the current case. I now want to consider these structural features of international criminal law against the arguments of abolitionist movements.
Abolition
23. Abolition, as it refers to more modern understandings of the carceral system, is defined ‘as a tradition, a philosophy, and a theory of change, [which] moves away from a myopic focus on the distinct institution of the prison toward a more expansive vision of the social, political, and economic processes that defined the context within which imprisonment came to be viewed as the legitimate hand of justice’.Footnote 66 Abolition ultimately aims to eliminate imprisonment, policing, and surveillance, and to create ‘lasting alternatives to punishment and imprisonment’.Footnote 67
24. Abolitionist movements are guided by a philosophy which typically holds three central tenets:Footnote 68
1. That the modern carceral punishment system has its origins in ‘slavery and the racial capitalist regime it relied on and sustained’;
2. That the carceral system ‘functions to oppress black people and other politically marginalized groups in order to maintain a racial capitalist regime’; and
3. That ‘we can imagine and build a more humane and democratic society that no longer relies on caging people to meet human needs and solve social problems’.Footnote 69
25. Thus, abolitionist philosophy and movements aim to understand what is (in particular, the links between carceral systems and racial capitalism), and envisage what might be (imagining and building a better approach to complex social problems).
26. Abolition has been grounded in feminism, particularly the work of Black feminists and feminists that oppose racial capitalism. Indeed, it has been said that ‘abolition is unimaginable without feminism … feminism is unimaginable without abolition, and … this dialogue is imperative’.Footnote 70
27. In recent years, we have seen an uprising in domestic police and prison abolition movements in domestic jurisdictions. Increasingly, people are coming to better understand the causes of deviance and the links between capitalism, race, imperialism, and criminal ‘justice’. While not seeking to detract from the experience of racialised carceral systems experienced in the United States of America, we can, I would argue, apply abolitionist theory and praxis to international criminal law. We can do so as follows.
28. First, we can understand the origins of international criminal law. As I have outlined above, these are linked to neoliberalism, capitalism, racism, and imperialism. Second, we can examine how these origins work to structure criminality. As I have also outlined above, international criminal law, by design, criminalises some – disproportionately those who are Black, and from the Global South – more than others. This, together with its steadfast refusal to engage with the causes of criminality, has meant that international criminal law has not shown itself to be capable of addressing the causes of mass violence.
29. This brings us to our final consideration: can we ‘imagine and build a more humane (international) society that no longer relies on caging people to meet human needs and solve social problems’?Footnote 71 I believe we can, and I will return to this point in the conclusions. However, I first want to draw out why the defence of duress is particularly helpful for building an abolitionist movement.
The Defence of Duress and an Abolitionist Movement for International Criminal Law?
30. The defence of duress provides an important opportunity to understand several issues that are at the heart of abolitionist movements. These are (1) the factors that led to criminality; (2) the complexity of being both victim and perpetrator; and, relatedly, (3) the interconnectedness between personal and political violence, or between individual and state violence.
31. First, the defence of duress, as we have already seen, allows a conversation about why an individual acted in a particular way. What caused this person’s criminality? In Mr Ongwen’s case, the defence has emphasised the abduction of young Dominic and the crimes suffered by him, as well as the LRA’s practices of harm and threat against its own soldiers. This may not be sufficient to excuse the criminal conduct alleged; the facts of the case may not satisfy the requirements of duress, particularly the need for ‘imminence’ of the threat.Footnote 72 Nonetheless, raising the defence of duress allows us to situate the accused and the reasons for his conduct. We can, and should, also look more broadly – to the political, legal, and economic causes of the situation of conflict (which includes considering who is benefiting financially from the war – arms manufacturers, particular individuals, and certain states and companies).
32. This broader examination is also at the heart of the abolitionist movement. Abolitionists ‘address the root causes of harm by investing in people’s basic needs and addressing the causes of interpersonal violence’.Footnote 73 In seeking to understand what causes criminality – those political, legal, and economic systems that lead to poverty, racism, and systems that criminalise some more than others – abolition also attempts to build solutions to those root causes. It is ‘about presence, not absence. It’s about building life-affirming initiatives’.Footnote 74
33. Secondly, the defence of duress permits us a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of victimhood and perpetration. The current case of Mr Ongwen has particularly highlighted the challenges for international criminal law accounting for ‘victims who victimise’,Footnote 75 or individuals who are both victim and perpetrator. As we have seen, international criminal law is structurally inept at understanding such victim-perpetrators. But when an individual raises a defence of duress, we often hear evidence about their own victimhood. While they may even admit to the commission of the crime, they also explain how they were victims of the actions of another person and, perhaps, of particular systems and structures.Footnote 76 In Ongwen’s case, and in other cases where duress is raised, perpetration and victimhood are entangled.
34. This interconnection between victimhood and perpetration might be difficult for international criminal law to accept, but in contrast, an abolitionist movement is concerned with contradictions ‘which are often the spark for change’.Footnote 77 Contradictions – such as ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ – are instead held onto as ‘both/and’.Footnote 78 This allows the abolitionist movement to recognise ‘the relationality of state and individual violence and thus frame our resistance accordingly: supporting survivors and holding perpetrators accountable … sometimes messy and risky, these collective practices of creativity and reflection shape new visions of safety’.Footnote 79
35. This brings us to the third area in which duress permits an understanding, which is also important to abolitionist movements – this interconnectivity between personal and political violences. An easy – yet false – critique of abolitionist movements would be that victims are forgotten; not provided with ‘justice’. If we do not have a carceral system designed for retribution, what will happen to the victims?
36. It is worth recalling the crimes and victims in this particular case. Mr Ongwen is charged with committing acts of murder, attempted murder, torture, enslavement, outrages upon personal dignity, pillaging, destruction of property, persecution; the recruitment of child soldiers; and sexual and gender-based crimes including forced marriage, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enslavement, forced pregnancy, and outrages upon personal dignity. These acts and crimes all have victims.
37. It is not that abolitionists just want the end of the carceral system: they want the end of the need for the carceral system. Abolition feminists remember that ‘to render prisons and policing obsolete we must also build movements demanding that society be reshaped with the goal of eliminating gender and sexual violence and their enabling of racist and heteropatriarchal structures’.Footnote 80 Moreover, abolition feminists point out that ‘while it is critical to hold those who use violence accountable, advocating for greater involvement by the criminal legal system is counterproductive at best, and can actually further endanger some survivors’.Footnote 81
38. Indeed, we see some of these problems in international criminal law. While it is a system that is galvanised by victims, there are significant issues with how victims are treated in international criminal law. At this Court, victim participation in trials has meant that some victims of crimes are granted participation status while other victims are not. This has the effect of creating a hierarchy of victimisation, and narrowing types of victimhood.Footnote 82 This system, then, can be challenging for victims.
39. In contrast, abolition practices ask, ‘what does it mean … to fight violence against women while simultaneously addressing the structural violence faced by the larger community?’Footnote 83 Or, put another way, ‘how to acknowledge the structural character of gender violence alongside its intersections with violences generated by racism and capitalism’.Footnote 84 Thus, abolition of carceral justice attempts to prioritise victims by building a world where crimes do not occur in the first place.
Imagining a Different World
40. What would it have meant if Dominic Savio was born in a safe place? What if he was able to walk by the road without being kidnapped? What if he – and all other children in his community – had been able to go to school, had full bellies, safe beds, and high-quality universal healthcare? What if all children had been free from fear of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence?
41. It is my belief that we need to turn our attention from the ‘ending impunity’ rhetoric of international criminal law (which is already partial and skewed towards impunity for some and criminalisation of others), to instead focus on ending atrocities and the conditions that give rise to them.
42. Abolitionists work towards ‘community-based transformative justice responses that address the social causes of violence and hold people accountable without exposing them to police violence and state incarceration’.Footnote 85 These practices might include community-building, properly funded education, robust healthcare, and rehabilitation. In a similar way, international criminal law needs to consider more deeply what a world could look like without any need for international criminal law, and what strategies might be used to achieve this alternative world.
43. In this case, I concur with the majority, and find that the defence of duress is not satisfied. I feel some regret at this conclusion, because it is likely – subject to the separate sentencing judgment – that Dominic Ongwen will be imprisoned. However, we remain operating within the penal system of international criminal law, with its defences set out under the Rome Statute. In the case of duress, the defence is strictly defined, and limited to instances where the elements are satisfied. In this case, it has not been met.
44. But nevertheless, at a more abstract level, duress permits us to understand the limitations of international criminal law, its structural features, and what else might be possible. I hope we can work together to envisage this alternative reality where we have a safer, better, world for all – and then to form a movement to undertake the work to bring this world into being.
Judge Sophie Rigney
9.3 Violation of Reproductive Autonomy in the Ongwen Sentence
In 2021, an ICC Trial Chamber convicted Dominic Ongwen, one of the top commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), of sixty-one counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in northern Uganda.Footnote 86 This was the first ICC case to result in a conviction for the crime of ‘forced pregnancy’ as a war crime and crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.Footnote 87 The Trial Chamber sentenced Ongwen to terms of imprisonment ranging from eight to twenty years for each count, including twenty years for forced pregnancy as a war crime and twenty years for forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity, resulting in a total joint sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment, taking into account mitigating circumstances concerning his abduction by the LRA as a child. In 2022, that sentence was confirmed on appeal.
The Trial Chamber’s original sentencing decision provided only a fleeting analysis of the harms caused by forced pregnancy in this case. In their reimagining of that decision, Judges Kirabira, Ringin, and Grey revisit the available evidence to make detailed findings on these harms, including the violation of reproductive autonomy, and the physical, psychological, economic, and social harms suffered by the two survivors of forced pregnancy in this case.
Redacted Sentencing Decision No.: ICC-02/04-01/15
Date: 6 May 2021
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER IX(B)
Before: Judge Tonny KIRABIRA, Presiding Judge (Uganda)
Judge Adrienne RINGIN (Australia)
Judge Rosemary GREY (Australia)Footnote 88
SITUATION IN UGANDA
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. DOMINIC ONGWEN
Procedural History
1. On 4 February 2021, Trial Chamber IX delivered its judgment in Mr Dominic Ongwen’s case. It convicted him on sixty-one counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Uganda between 1 July 2002 and 31 December 2005, during an armed conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan armed forces.
2. The conviction encompassed war crimes (intentionally attacking the civilian population; rape; sexual slavery; forced pregnancy; murder and attempted murder; torture; pillage; outrages on personal dignity; conscripting children under the age of fifteen into an armed group and using them to participate actively in hostilities; pillage; and destruction of property) and crimes against humanity (rape; sexual slavery; forced pregnancy; murder and attempted murder; torture; enslavement; persecution on political grounds; and inhumane acts including forced marriage).
3. Following conviction by Trial Chamber IX, the sentencing proceedings were assigned to this Chamber, Trial Chamber IX(B).
Sentencing Rationales
4. As in previous ICC sentencing decisions, the Chamber will offer observations on the rationales for sentencing. In this Chamber’s view, the strongest rationale for imposing penal sanctions on individuals who have been convicted of one or more crimes under the Rome Statute (the Statute) is to express the international community’s condemnation of these crimes. Rather than a means of exacting revenge, penal sanctions recognise the specific ways in which the perpetrator wronged the victims, their families, and their communities.Footnote 89 In this way, the sentence provides access to truth and justice as well as a unified international denunciation of such crimes.Footnote 90 The process of calculating the sentence must therefore include recognising the specific harms that resulted from each of the perpetrator’s crimes.Footnote 91
5. As recognised in the Statute’s preamble, the prosecution and sentencing of individuals may also contribute to the prevention of crimes. At the specific level, the sentence may discourage the convicted person from recidivism. Access to rehabilitative services such as education and healthcare, particularly if such services have been inaccessible to the individual prior to ICC custody, may assist in decreasing the likelihood of recidivism. At the general level, sentencing aims to dissuade prospective perpetrators from committing similar crimes.Footnote 92
6. The Chamber acknowledges that prosecuting and sentencing individual actors does not ameliorate the structural factors that contribute to the commission of crimes, including economic inequalities, postcolonial legacies, and entrenched beliefs about the inferiority of ‘others’ along ethnic, racialised and gendered lines. Sentencing is therefore not an effective deterrent in isolation; the structural causes of violence must also be addressed.
Sentencing Principles
7. In determining an appropriate penalty, the Chamber is directed by Articles 76–78 of the Statute and Rules 145–148 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the Rules).Footnote 93 These provisions direct the Chamber to examine the gravity of a crime and the personal circumstances of the accused,Footnote 94 and then any mitigating and/or aggravating factors present.Footnote 95 The Chamber notes that factors used to determine the gravity of the crime will not be ‘double counted’ as aggravating factors.Footnote 96 Discretion is granted to the Chamber in determining the scope and weight of the relevant factors.Footnote 97
8. The available penalties include imprisonment for a maximum of thirty years, or for life ‘when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person’.Footnote 98 Capital or corporal punishment are impermissible under the Statute.
9. In the present decision, the Chamber will first summarise the parties’ submissions, and then analyse each specific crime of which Mr Ongwen was convicted, before turning to those aggravating and mitigating circumstances that apply to the totality of his crimes.
The Parties’ Submissions
10. Trial Chamber IX granted 4,095 victims standing to participate in Mr Ongwen’s trial. Their legal representatives jointly argued that the crimes attributed to Mr Ongwen are ‘extremely grave’ and warrant a sentence of life imprisonment.Footnote 99 In relation to sexual and gender-based crimes, the victims’ legal representatives submit that the ‘particularly repugnant circumstances in which acts of rape; sexual slavery; torture, outrages upon personal dignity and enslavement considered under the ambit of sexual violence; forced marriage; and forced pregnancy … carry a specific high threshold of gravity’.Footnote 100
11. In particular, some victims were ‘satisfied and relieved’ that forced pregnancy and forced marriage – neither of which had previously been prosecuted in the ICC – were recognised in this case.Footnote 101 In their view, forced pregnancy and forced marriage are ‘very serious crimes worthy of life imprisonment in light of the tremendous harm suffered by the victims, especially the harm suffered through the children born out of rape’.Footnote 102 The victims emphasise the ‘immensely challenging’ situation of these children, as well as ‘the difficult situation their mothers are confronted with, facing rejection from their families and communities’, many of whom ‘now live on the margins of the society with all the associated psychological, material and financial difficulties’.Footnote 103
12. The prosecution submits that the crimes committed by Mr Ongwen would ordinarily warrant a sentence at the ‘highest range available’ under the Statute.Footnote 104 For sexual and gender-based crimes, the prosecution proposes a sentence of thirty years for each crime (to be served concurrently).Footnote 105 This proposal stems from the ‘inherent gravity’ and ‘long-lasting’ effect of the crimes perpetrated against Mr Ongwen’s so-called wives as well as the indirect victims within his brigade.Footnote 106 However, considering the defendant’s personal circumstances, particularly his status as both a victim and a perpetrator,Footnote 107 it recommends a one-third reduction in the total joint sentence, resulting in twenty years’ imprisonment.Footnote 108
13. The defence submits that Mr Ongwen’s ‘unique’ circumstances warrant a sentence of no longer than ten years (if, indeed, their client is not acquitted on appeal).Footnote 109 These circumstances, according to the defence, include Mr Ongwen’s mental defect, the harms suffered by him as an abducted child soldier, his willingness to undergo traditional justice mechanisms in Uganda, his family situation, and good deeds with the LRA.Footnote 110 The defence asks the Chamber to consider rehabilitation and reconciliation above retribution, arguing that deterrence should not be considered in this case.Footnote 111
14. Informed by these submissions, the Chamber will now analyse the gravity and relevant circumstances of each specific crime.
Specific Crimes
[Author note: Here, the judgment would consider each crime of which Mr Ongwen was convicted, but for the purposes of this reimagined judgment, only the analysis of the crime of forced pregnancy is shown.]
Forced Pregnancy
Evidentiary Considerations
15. Article 7(2)(f) of the Statute defines ‘forced pregnancy’ as the unlawful confinement of a victim who has been made forcibly pregnant with one of two specific intents: to affect the ethnic composition of any population, or to carry out other grave violations of international law. We note that this article refers to the victim of forced pregnancy as a ‘woman’. However, the Statute’s drafting history reveals no intention to exclude other victims who are capable of pregnancy, including girls of any age, or non-binary, intersex, or trans people. Moreover, Article 21(3) requires that the Statute must be applied and interpreted in accordance with ‘internationally recognised human rights’ and without any adverse distinction founded on grounds including age, gender identity, or intersex status. For these reasons, the Chamber will describe a person subjected to forced pregnancy using the gender-neutral term ‘victim’.
16. The Chamber recalls that Mr Ongwen was convicted of forced pregnancy based on evidence that he impregnated and unlawfully confined two women who had been assigned to him as ‘wives’. To protect their privacy, these two women are identified as P-0101 and P-0214 in the Court records.
17. Neither witness testified at trial, as would ordinarily happen for key witnesses in the ICC. Rather, Trial Chamber IX viewed a video-recording of the testimony that Mr Ongwen’s forced ‘wives’ (including P-0101 and P-0214) had provided during the pre-trial proceedings. This measure was taken at the request of Prosecutor, in order to preserve the evidence and to limit the risk of re-traumatising the witnesses by reducing the number of times they had to testify.Footnote 112
18. This is the first conviction of forced pregnancy by an international court. This Chamber recognises the value in a careful analysis of the many harms that can and did occur as a result of this crime. The copious evidence of harms proffered throughout the case records, including the testimony of P-0101 and P-0214, greatly enables this endeavour.
19. Notwithstanding this wealth of evidence, certain questions about P-0101 and P-0214’s experiences of forced pregnancy remain unanswered. To fill that information gap, it would have been apt to seek further testimony from these two witnesses earlier in the proceedings.Footnote 113 However, mindful of our duty to protect the well-being of victims and witnesses,Footnote 114 and noting that calling P-0101 and P-0214 back to answer further questions about sexual violence might cause them distress,Footnote 115 this Chamber decided not to recall these witnesses to give further evidence at the sentencing phase. Instead, we will respond to the gaps in the evidence by raising questions that merit further consideration in subsequent cases where the crime of forced pregnancy is charged.
The Forced Pregnancies in This Case
20. Mr Ongwen was convicted of forced pregnancy as both a war crime and a crime against humanity on the basis that between July 2002 and December 2005 he confined P-0101 and P-0214, both whom he had impregnated, with the intent of continuing to subject them to grave violations of international law (forced marriage, torture, rape, and sexual slavery).Footnote 116 The charges of forced pregnancy were limited to three pregnancies within the temporal scope of the charges: P-0101’s two pregnancies between 2002 and 2004, which resulted in the birth of a daughter and a son, and P-0214’s pregnancy in 2002, which resulted in the birth of a daughter.Footnote 117
21. Both women endured extreme violence in connection to their pregnancies. P-0101 was abducted in August 1996 by Mr Ongwen when she was aged fifteen.Footnote 118 He immediately claimed her as his ‘wife’ and raped her that night.Footnote 119 This initial rape is illustrative of the circumstances by which P-0101 later became forcibly pregnant. In her words, ‘immediately the escorts held my hands and they forced me … He [Mr Ongwen] held me forcefully and he slept with me’Footnote 120 and ‘He told me if I’m still resisting, can’t I see the – what is there beside me, the gun?’Footnote 121
22. P-0101 remained with Mr Ongwen for eight years.Footnote 122 Her duties as Mr Ongwen’s ‘wife’ included cooking as well as enduring his repeated sexual assaults. P-0101 was under threat of death if she tried to escape. She explained: ‘if you’re caught when you’re trying to escape, if you are not properly prepared for your escape, you would be killed without mercy, and for these reasons I was scared. People who tried to escape and were killed, I saw this’.Footnote 123
23. During her eight years in Mr Ongwen’s household, P-0101 conceived three children as a result of sexual assault by him: a daughter in 1999, another daughter between 2002 and 2004, and a son in 2004, shortly after her return from the bush when her second daughter was shot and taken during an assault from government armed forces.Footnote 124
24. P-0214 was abducted by LRA forces in June 2000 when she was aged seventeen.Footnote 125 She was assigned as a ‘wife’ to Mr Ongwen by LRA leader Joseph Kony.Footnote 126 Thereafter, P-0214 endured repeated sexual assaults by Mr Ongwen under threat of physical force. In her words, this sexual activity ‘wasn’t my choice’.Footnote 127 Escape was virtually impossible. P-2014 explained: ‘I could not escape as his [Mr Ongwen’s] security guards guarded me well. They were all armed. And even if you escaped from the LRA, the Dinka and the Lutugu [other groups] in Sudan would kill you. I heard that they had killed people who fled the LRA.’Footnote 128 P-0214’s chance at freedom eventually came in 2010, when she escaped with another of Mr Ongwen’s ‘wives’.Footnote 129
25. During her ten years in Mr Ongwen’s household, P-0214 conceived four times: in 2005 she delivered a child (sex unspecified); in 2007 she delivered a daughter, who died after a month; in 2007 her third pregnancy ended by miscarriage; and in 2009 she gave birth to a son.Footnote 130
Harms Caused by the Crimes
26. The Chamber is cognisant that for some people, it is difficult to conceive of a pregnancy that results in a new life as a source of harm, even if that pregnancy was forced. Yet as the following analysis shows, forced pregnancy can result in serious and extensive harms. As well as being a grave violation of the victim’s dignity and autonomy, this crime can cause serious physical, psychological, social, cultural, economic, and legal harms. The fact that it can also result in a new life – a life which is inherently valuable – does not erase those harms. Nor does it relieve this Court of its responsibility to punish the perpetrator. The fact that a victim of forced pregnancy may love the resultant child in no way dilutes the wrongdoing by the perpetrator.
The Harm of Violation of Personal and Reproductive Autonomy
27. Trial Chamber IX observed that the crime of forced pregnancy is grounded in the right to ‘personal and reproductive autonomy’.Footnote 131 This statement is correct. The criminalisation of forced pregnancy protects the right of every individual to exercise agency over their body, their fertility, and their sexuality. The protection of reproductive autonomy was the rationale for the inclusion of the crime in the Statute. The recognition of this crime in the Statute and other international instruments,Footnote 132 and the ratification of the Statute by numerous states including Uganda, signals the importance placed on rights to reproductive autonomy by the international community.
28. Reproductive autonomy is a key aspect of human dignity. Rights pertaining to reproductive health and reproductive autonomy are protected in a range of international and regional human rights instruments,Footnote 133 and are the birthright of every individual regardless of their sex, gender, nationality, or culture. The distinctive violation of reproductive autonomy is reflected in the articulation of the crime of forced pregnancy as a crime in and of itself; it is not subsumed by rape or ‘any other form of sexual violence’.Footnote 134 This violation has extensive and intergenerational implications. By subjecting P-0101 and P-0214 to forced pregnancy, Mr Ongwen violated their rights to personal and reproductive autonomy. As P-0101 explained, ‘When I became pregnant with my three children to Ongwen, I did not think I had a choice as to whether I would become pregnant or not’.Footnote 135
29. The state of pregnancy was used as a control mechanism by Mr Ongwen.Footnote 136 It was ‘understood that pregnancy made it more difficult for women to escape’.Footnote 137 Whilst pregnant, P-0101 and P-0214 were physically confined and monitored.Footnote 138 They were ‘placed under heavy guard’ and were unable to leave, and they were ‘told or came to understand that if they tried to escaped they would be killed’.Footnote 139 There was no access to family planning or contraceptives and abortive attempts and successes were severely punished.Footnote 140
Physical Harms
30. P-0101 and P-0214 endured severe and prolonged physical harm as a result of forced pregnancy. The relevant pregnancies were achieved through sexual assault.Footnote 141 During and after these pregnancies, critical medical assistance and perinatal care was limited. P-0214 experienced pre-birth complications close to her due date and had to endure these in the bush with only the support of the other ‘wives’ and Mr Ongwen.Footnote 142 During the delivery, P-0214 stated that ‘on that day that I had my baby there was no doctor, I was only with the girls in his household’.Footnote 143
31. While pregnant, P-0101 and P-0214 were subjected to physically demanding domestic dutiesFootnote 144 as well as the constant threat and use of physical punishments for perceived failures.Footnote 145 P-0214 was beaten with a machete while pregnant for being ‘too slow to bring’ the bathing water.Footnote 146 While P-0214 was pregnant, Mr Ongwen continued to ‘rape her, torture her, sexually enslave her, and enslave her for domestic purposes’.Footnote 147
32. The available evidence does not divulge whether P-0101 or P-0214 experienced other pregnancy-related health issues disclosed by other victims, including birth-related complications, infertility, painful intercourse, and chronic pain,Footnote 148 although we are aware that P-0214 endured a miscarriage outside the charged period.Footnote 149 In future cases, we urge the parties and the Chamber to ask victims of forced pregnancy further questions about physical harms, so that these harms can be addressed in the sentencing decision.
Psychological and Emotional Harm
33. Testimony provided by P-0101 and P-0214 reveals that they experienced serious psychological and emotional harm during their captivity, including during their pregnancies. Fear and intimidation were employed to keep them compliant.Footnote 150 P-0214 described being threatened when she refused to have sexual intercourse with Mr Ongwen: ‘He told his security guards to get the sticks. The security guards scared me with the sticks so I went to Ongwen’s place.’Footnote 151 This threatening environment was described by P-0101 as extending even when Mr Dominic Ongwen was physically injured: ‘even if he was still weak physically, he could still use his mouth to give instructions or orders because if a superior gives instructions, you have to go and follow what he says’.Footnote 152
34. The continuation of psychological trauma once the victim is released is evidenced by P-0101’s concern about speaking with ICC investigators. She stated: ‘During the last interview the reason that I did not want to answer questions about Ongwen is because I fear him and thought he might kill me if he came to learn what I was saying.’Footnote 153
35. We note that the psychological burden on the victims of forced pregnancy can extend ‘beyond the obvious physical effects of pregnancy and childbearing’.Footnote 154 The continual use of the word ‘wife’ to denote P-0101, P-0214, and the other women who were assigned to Mr Ongwen further perpetuates the continuing bond between the defendant and victims.Footnote 155 The situation can be even more complex in cases of forced pregnancy, when the perpetrator is the father of the resultant child and continues to be present in the victims’ lives, as is the case with P-0101 and P-0214.Footnote 156 For example, the Chamber is aware that Mr Ongwen attempted to make financial payments to P-0214,Footnote 157 and the defence, prosecution, registry, and victims’ legal representative have facilitated contact between Mr Ongwen and his children, with the consent of their mothers.Footnote 158 The victim may even express a degree of affection for the perpetrator, as P-0214 did at points in her testimony.Footnote 159
36. Expert testimony in the case further indicated that victims of sexual and gender-based crimes perpetrated by the LRA often experienced ‘PTSD, depression, anxiety and dissociation, loss of perceived control, shame, increased sexual risk/vulnerability’Footnote 160 and that ‘When an individual does not perceive that she or he is safe, basic daily activities such as feeding, sleeping, and self-care are undermined and dysregulated … higher level pursuits such as taking care of others, gaining employment, and pursuing an education are also threated and rendered more challenging, if not impossible’.Footnote 161 The available evidence does not confirm whether P-0101 or P-0214 experienced these specific harms. In future cases, further evidence on the psychological impact of forced pregnancy on the victims would assist in sentencing.
37. There was also extensive evidence in this trial about the experience of cen, which in Acholi culture is a ‘malevolent emanation that comes from those who have experienced or perpetrated violent acts’.Footnote 162 The Chamber did not receive evidence that P-0101 and P-0214 experienced this psychological harm. We suggest that in future cases there is a fuller examination of psychological harms resulting from forced pregnancy, including harms that are experienced in the victims’ particular spiritual context.
Economic Harms
38. Where forced pregnancy results in a child, and therefore caring responsibilities, a significant economic burden can be placed on the victim. Not only do parental responsibilities limit the victims’ earning capacity, they also generate additional costs.
39. For example, according to the defence, almost all of Mr Dominic Ongwen’s children are of school-going age or are quickly approaching this age.Footnote 163 Ugandan primary school costs are on average around Ugandan shillings (UGX) 100,000 per school quarter (€25.27) and this cost increases as the children advance through the school system.Footnote 164 UGX 100,00 in education costs is relatively expensive for the average household in the Acholi region of Uganda.
40. The Chamber is aware that in March 2016, while in ICC custody, Mr Ongwen attempted to contribute financially to some of his ‘wives’.Footnote 165 However, any such future contribution will be limited. At the commencement of ICC proceedings he was indigent.Footnote 166 His current income in detention stands at €25 per week.Footnote 167 In this context, the Chamber is concerned that the financial burden of raising and educating the children that resulted from forced pregnancy may fall primarily on P-0101 and P-0214. The Chamber will further consider the provision of childcare in its reparations order in this case to address this financial burden and to assist in removing further barriers to employment in the immediate future.
41. When assessing the economic consequences of forced pregnancy, it is also relevant to consider how this crime affected the victims’ education. In Uganda, educational attainment is associated with economic success, better health, and employment opportunities. P-0101 and P-0214 did not have these privileges. As this Chamber is aware, formal education commences for children in Uganda between the ages of six and eight, with seven years of primary school and six years of secondary school.Footnote 168 P-0101 was abducted when she was in primary 4,Footnote 169 and P-0214 in primary 7.Footnote 170
42. The Chamber did not hear evidence as to how P-0101 and P-0214’s lost educational opportunities affected their economic status, aside from the fact that P-0214 has been able to ‘find work and survive, but not thrive’.Footnote 171 However, we were presented with evidence that, in general, time spent ‘in the bush’ placed victims in a worse economic position than their peers who were not abducted, and were therefore able to finish their education and gain employment without mental and physical trauma.Footnote 172 Regardless, the abduction and confinement of P-0101 and P-0214 immediately severed their educational opportunities. In future cases, we suggest that evidence is led on the impact of forced pregnancy on the victims’ education, and subsequent earning capacity, noting that in some countries, education is legally and/or practically inaccessible during and after pregnancy.Footnote 173
43. As a final note in respect to the gravity of the crimes, the Chamber would like to make some recommendations regarding future forced pregnancy cases. There needs to be more detailed examination and specific evidence regarding physical, socio-economic, cultural, and psychological harms that are experienced by the victims of forced pregnancy.
Degree of Participation by Mr Ongwen
44. Mr Ongwen was convicted as the direct perpetrator of forced pregnancy. He personally confined the victims, with the intent of continuing to subject them to sexual and gender-based crimes. He was also the person responsible for forcibly impregnating the victims.Footnote 174. As such, his direct involvement in the crime points in favour of a high sentence.
Aggravating Circumstances
45. The Chamber considers three aggravating factors in respect to Mr Ongwen’s conviction of forced pregnancy, under Rule 145(2)(b).
Commission of a Crime Where the Victim Is Particularly Defenceless
46. The Chamber heard evidence that within the LRA, young girls were targeted for rape and other sexual crimes because they were believed to be ‘free from HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases’.Footnote 175 Mr Ongwen himself was frequently involved in the sexual assault of young girls.Footnote 176 These observations apply to P-0101 and P-0214, as detailed above. The victims’ youth and gender, and the fact that they faced the threat of punishment or execution for escape, made them ‘particularly defenceless’.Footnote 177
Commission of a Crime with Particular Cruelty or with Multiple Victims
47. Three pregnancies were imposed on two separate victims, utilising physical and psychological methods. The multiplicity of victims and the inherently cruel methods (use of force and threat of force, including death threats) used to perform the crime leads this to be a highly significant aggravating factor.Footnote 178
48. We note that while Mr Ongwen’s conviction of forced pregnancy is restricted to three incidents that occurred between 1 July 2002 and 31 December 2005, DNA evidence links Mr Ongwen to nine additional children delivered by his forced ‘wives’.Footnote 179 These nine additional pregnancies were not charged, and therefore do not affect the sentence, but are recognised here as part of the Court’s truth-telling role.
Commission of the Crime with Discriminatory Motives
49. The systemic abduction of girls and women by Mr Ongwen, coupled with the forced pregnancy and other sexual crimes, illustrates a discriminatory motive, on the grounds of gender. This discriminatory motive constitutes another aggravating factor.
Additional Aggravating Circumstances
50. Cognisant of the non-exclusive list of aggravating factors under Rule 145(2)(b), the Chamber uses its discretion to consider additional aggravating circumstances,Footnote 180 in order to capture the full extent of damage caused by the crime of forced pregnancy.Footnote 181
51. The first element worth considering relates to the social harms. Forced pregnancy results in a particular social stigma in Uganda.Footnote 182 Like others who returned from captivity with the LRA, victims of forced pregnancy were referred to as ‘dwog cen paco’ (a derogatory term for ‘somebody who has come back home’).Footnote 183 Reintegration was detrimentally affected due to the violations inflicted upon them.
52. The Chamber does not have evidence that these social harms were experienced by P-0101 or P-0214. We urge these potential social consequences of forced pregnancy to be considered as additional aggravating circumstances in future sentencing decisions.
53. The second aspect worth considering relates to the resultant cultural harms to the victims. As many other victims of the LRA, P-0101 and P-0214 were unable to practise Acholi pregnancy rituals such as observing role changes and the preparation and consumption of specific food.Footnote 184 During labour, a traditional midwife called the lacele was not present to supervise and guide them through processes such as breastfeeding, nor was there a communal birthing ceremony.Footnote 185
54. Expert evidence from Professor Musisi explained the consequences of the disconnection from cultural practices. Due to the Acholi culture being patrilineal, the mothers and children are unlikely to receive familial claims such as inheritance and fractal rights, which secure the land for Acholi women to work and provide for their family on.Footnote 186
55. In its discretion, the Chamber considers the aggravating factor of cultural harms as relevant within the context of this case. This consideration does not amount to ‘double counting’ as social and cultural circumstances have not been considered for gravity purposes.
Sentencing Determination for Forced Pregnancy
56. As the above analysis shows, forced pregnancy is a crime of the most serious gravity. It violates a person’s dignity, their body, and their reproductive autonomy. The impacts can reverberate through every facet of the victim’s life.
57. In addition, the crime can result in a child, which even if welcomed, can place a heavy economic burden and caring responsibility on the victim. Forced pregnancy, therefore, resonates well after the pregnancy itself. It is a crime whose effects can endure for the duration of the victim’s life, as well as there being intergenerational impacts felt by the child. [Editors’ note: see below, Winfred Naigaga Kyobiika’s reimagined judgment in this collection on the impact on children born of sexual violence (Chapter 9.4).]
58. Taking into account the damage caused by the crime, the direct role of Mr Ongwen, and the other aggravating factors noted above, and in keeping with previous sentences by this Court for analogous crimes,Footnote 187 it is appropriate to sentence Mr Ongwen to life imprisonment for the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy (Count 58) and the war crime of forced pregnancy (Count 59), to be served concurrently with his sentence for other crimes.
59. However, this sentence is to be reduced to thirty years taking into account the impact of Mr Ongwen’s childhood experiences in the LRA on his moral and psychological development (see next section).
Mitigating Factors
[Editors’ note: save for the reference to mitigation in paragraph 59, the analysis of mitigating factors is omitted for the purpose of this reimaged judgment on forced pregnancy.]
Disposition
The Chamber pronounces the following sentences for each of the crimes committed by Dominic Ongwen:
For the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy (Count 58): life imprisonment;
For the war crime of forced pregnancy (Count 59): life imprisonment;
Mr Ongwen’s total joint sentence would ordinarily be for life. However considering his mitigating circumstances, a reduced sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment is justified in this case. Time spent in ICC custody will be deducted from this thirty-year sentence.
Judge Tonny Raymond Kirabira, Judge Adrienne Ringin, and Judge Rosemary Grey
9.4 Children Born of Rape in the Ongwen Sentence
In 2021, Trial Chamber IX convicted Mr Dominic Ongwen of sixty-one counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.Footnote 188 In determining an appropriate sentence, the Chamber canvassed a number of aggravating and mitigating factors.Footnote 189
In this rewritten sentencing decision, W. Naigaga Kyobiika inserts an additional aggravating circumstance, namely children born of war. In including this additional factor, Naigaga focuses in particular on the social and cultural experiences of these children, both during and after the war, noting the continuing nature of their harm due to the circumstances of their birth. Naigaga utilises the evidence provided at trial by experts to reframe the sentencing decision away from the perpetrator to the victims themselves, highlighting their voices and providing an avenue for closure denied in the original decision.
Redacted Sentencing Decision Separate and Concurring Opinion of Judge Winifred Naigaga Kyobiika No.: ICC-02/04-01/15
Date: 6 May 2021
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER IX(B)
Before: Judge Winifred Naigaga KYOBIIKA
SITUATION IN UGANDA
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. DOMINIC ONGWEN
1. I agree with the final decision of the Trial Chamber as regards the individual criminal responsibility of Mr Dominic Ongwen. However, I respectfully wish to add to the conclusions of the majority of the Chamber as regards as an aggravating factor: the impact on children who were born as a result of the sexual and gender-based crimes for which Mr Ongwen has been convicted.
2. While sentencing Mr Ongwen for the crime of sexual and gender-based crimes directly and not directly perpetuated by Dominic Ongwen (Counts 50–68), the majority of the Trial Chamber states, and I agree, that there was a presence of aggravating circumstances of: a multiplicity of victims; victims being particularly defenceless; and a discriminatory motive as regards gender within the meaning of Rule 145(2)(b) of the Rules.
3. However, I wish to add another element: the concept of ‘children born as a result of these sexual and gender-based crimes’ as an aggravating factor. This element may be read into those circumstances covered by Rule 145(2)(b)(VI), which, although not enumerated in the Rules, is by its nature similar to the aggravating factors mentioned. Consequently, I consider it necessary to evaluate this factor.
4. It is important to note that the Rome Statute’s provisions are applied and interpreted concerning specific charges brought against individuals. However, the Chamber must not disregard or shy away from discussing issues or interests that may arise while adjudicating a case. In the present case, it is an agreed fact that children were born as a result of sexual and gender-based crimes for which Mr Ongwen was convicted. It is therefore permissible for the Chamber to give a wide interpretation of the victims of crime to include those victims that arose as a result of far-reaching effects of charges with which Mr Ongwen was charged. Such an interpretation nurtures growth in the jurisprudence of the court and marks a step forward in the progressive development of international law in the area of a victim-centred approach.
5. I find that the majority of the Chamber addresses the purpose of the ICC trial proceedings: to decide on the guilt or innocence of an accused person. However, having regard to Article 75 of the Rome Statute, Rule 97 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Court, ICC trial proceedings through victim participation also attend to the effects embedded in the crimes of which one is charged that may become relevant during the determination of reparations. In our case, we have evidence of the existence of children born of war, some of whom may be indirect victims of the crime of which Dominic Ongwen is charged.
6. To analyse this additional aggravating factor, it is important to (a) discuss the legal framework that governs children in international law; and (b) expound on the complexity of children born as a result of the crimes Mr Ongwen has been convicted of.
7. The concept of ‘children born as a result of war’ is a relatively emerging area of law that has not previously been dealt with by this court or by any other international court in our present times. While hearing and deciding cases, the Chamber is compelled to use applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law; national laws of legal systems of the world; and principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.Footnote 190
8. International law on children, especially the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, its Optional Protocols, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, recognises that due to their physical and mental immaturity, children require special safeguards and care. The provisions for the special protection are guided by four general principles: non-discrimination; the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival, and development; and the right to express one’s views and have them considered.Footnote 191 The protections include that a child has a right to: know and be cared for by his/her parents;Footnote 192 an identity including family relations;Footnote 193 be protected from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment, or exploitation;Footnote 194 highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of healthFootnote 195 and education;Footnote 196 and protection against child abuse and torture;Footnote 197 among others. These safeguards seek to protect children from the multiple and different risks as they develop into adulthood, including in any context such as that of armed conflict
9. It is universally recognised that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance. The Chamber recognises that a family is a fundamental group in society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members particularly include children. It also notes that children have a right to be afforded the necessary protection and assistance in a family so that they can be prepared to fully assume their responsibilities within the community in adulthood. For the full and harmonious development of a child, that child should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love, and understanding. In the Inter-American Court’s decision, in the case of Gelman v. Uruguay,Footnote 198 it was stated, in regard to enforced disappearance, that it is a violation of both the mental and psychological rights of a child if the mental state is a direct consequence of the enforced disappearance of the mother. The Court stated that this link was drawn because the enforced disappearance of one’s mother meant a denial of identity and protection of a family, a right to a name and to a nationality. This further was a denial of the right to self-determination and a choice of one’s preferred existence. The court emphasised that the denial of all these rights could be a result of the denial of protection to the mother.
10. I will now move to expound on the complexity surrounding children born of war. Mr Ongwen has been convicted of sexual and gender-based violence offences directly committed by him: forced marriage as another inhumane act and as a crime against humanity (Count 50); torture as a crime against humanity and as a war crime (Counts 51–52); rape as a crime against humanity and as a war crime (Counts 53–54); sexual slavery as a crime against humanity and as a war crime (Counts 55–56); enslavement as a crime against humanity (Count 57); forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity and as a war crime (Counts 58–59); and outrages upon personal dignity (Count 60).
11. Mr Ongwen has also been convicted of eight sexual and gender-based crimes not directly perpetrated by Dominic Ongwen which he committed – within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute – in the context of a coordinated and methodical effort in Sinia Brigade during the relevant period: forced marriage as an inhumane act and as a crime against humanity (Count 61); torture as a crime against humanity and as a war crime (Counts 62–63); rape as a crime against humanity and as a war crime (Counts 64–65); sexual slavery as a crime against humanity and as a war crime (Counts 66–67); and enslavement as a crime against humanity (Count 68).
12. This was a complex situation that went beyond the individual acts of Ongwen but, further, those perpetrated on his command. I take judicial notice of the proposals that the Lord’s Resistance Army had a political agenda. Reports such as that of the Justice and Reconciliation projectFootnote 199 have argued that there was a systematic plan to abduct young girls in part to develop a ‘new moral order’, a forceful purification of the old, and the birth of a ‘new Acholi’. Forced marriage was a political project in which Acholi men and women, boys and girls were forced to ‘marry’ and bear children as ‘families’ in an effort to expand this new Acholi population.Footnote 200
13. As a result of the forced marriages, some of the victims were mothers to children fathered by Mr Ongwen and his soldiers in the Sinia Brigade. To be precise, though Mr Ongwen had thirteen children at the time of the trial, ten of the thirteen children were fathered by him outside the period relevant to the charges. The three children who were fathered by Mr Ongwen during the period relevant to the charges were born to P-0101 and P-0214. Mr Ongwen also played a vital role in coordinating the Sinia Brigade to commit the offence of forced marriage which led to the fathering of many children. While precise findings as to the number of children were not possible, the Chamber found in the Trial Judgment that at any time between 1 July 2002 and 31 December 2005 many children were conceived and born as a result of the rampant sexual abuse that took place during this time
14. Studies on children born of war, such as Brigitte Rohwerder’s 2019 study,Footnote 201 generally observe that children born of wartime rape, and their mothers, are often stigmatised by their own communities due to their associations with political, ethnic, or religious enemies. She added that their identity and sense of belonging are contested, which creates dangers for their physical security and emotional well-being. She found that children born of wartime rape are at risk of violence, abuse, abandonment, discrimination, and marginalisation, at the hands of both families and communities. They often have less access to community resources, family protection, and education or livelihood activities, and are likely to grow up in poverty. They can face challenges in registering their birth and their right to citizenship. The experiences of children born of wartime rape can result in a lifetime of detrimental consequences, and the stigmatisation they experience continues long into the post-war period.
15. It is important to remind ourselves that being born as a result of war does not predetermine how a child will experience life’s journey. Children’s capacities and vulnerabilities do change according to time and contexts such as gender, perceived ethnicity, social and economic status, as well as structural gender discrimination, especially in patriarchal and patrilineal societies. Diane AmannFootnote 202 writes that ‘children as persons with individual rights, as members of families and as constituents of multigenerational communities, may be impacted differently by crimes based on their sex, gender, or other status or identities’. She states that age and birth may give rise to multiple forms of discrimination and social inequalities, either alone or as they intersect with other factors, such as race, ability, or disability; religion or belief; political or another opinion; national, ethnic, or social origin; gender, sex, or other status or identity.
16. Indeed, the listing of child rights in the international human rights regime does not presume that all children always are vulnerable but instead requires attention to be paid to the evolving capacities of the child.
17. The discussion of experiences of children born as a result of rapes during war does not in any way suggest that I am lumping together the realities of children born as a result of war. I am aware that different children had different experiences. After the war, some relocated with their mothers from their ancestral villages to towns, where there was greater anonymity and people were less likely to know about their experiences in captivity, which contributed to reduced stigmatisation; others had a privileged social class and families that paid for their therapy and education in cities including Kampala; while others were welcomed back in their ancestral home and went on to have a loving family experience. However, I focus on those unfortunate children who were stripped of the protections of family life due to their status of being born because of rape.
18. It is a fact that forced marriages produce complex emotional and psychological effects on the victims and their children beyond the obvious physical effects of pregnancy and child-bearing. For example, I observe that some of the children born as a result of war have been treated with disdain and continue to face untold suffering, rejection, discrimination, and stigmatisation in the communities. On the maternal side, a majority of the children face discrimination because they were born outside the norms since their father never paid the dowry when he forcefully married their mothers. This fact in a way disrupted the social fabric – the belief in and sanctity of marriage. It should be noted that in northern Uganda having children out of wedlock is a practice that is generally frowned upon among the communities.Footnote 203 Secondly, some of these children and their mothersFootnote 204 have come to be identified as perpetrators or enablers of the conflict since the evidence in the Trial Chamber shows that they served as wives, cleaners, cooks, and actively took part in the conflict, among others.Footnote 205
19. Joanne NeenanFootnote 206 and Mahlet WoldetsadikFootnote 207 report that the influence of patriarchy in Acholi communities contributes to children’s contested identities, as paternal clan membership determines access to identity and belonging, social status, land and resources. They propose that contested clan membership reduces one’s access to inherited family land and resources, leading to potential poverty, homelessness, and reduced prospects for marriage. They conclude that this is especially problematic for young men as, without a way to provide for spouses and families, they will experience greater social rejection than young women. It should be noted that some of these children face far more complex difficulties that are not comparable to those of other children born out of unsanctioned unions. For example, a situation where children are born as a result of elopement in peaceful times can be corrected with paying of dowry but the situation at hand cannot be corrected in the same way. Since the children of P-0099, P-0101, P-0214, and P-0227 fathered by Mr Ongwen were born out of an unsanctioned union, the chances that some of them may experience the rejections described above should not be disregarded.
20. Living outside the protection of family means that some of these children continue to be denied not only a sense of identity and belonging which correlates with inheritance and possession of land but also the provision of basic needs that are necessary to the full development of the child. It is important to note that the four witnesses mentioned above were aged between approximately nineteen and twenty-one at the time relevant to the crimes committed against them of which Dominic Ongwen has been found guilty. In a normal setting, these witnesses would have acquired skills at school during those formative years. The effect of the wasted years can be seen from the evidence of P-0236. When she was asked by the Trial Chamber to compare herself to her schoolmates now that she had returned home, she responded as follows:
There is no comparison because right now they are much better off than I am. I’m back home. I’ve got – I have injuries. I’m weak. Maybe if I had not been abducted I would have not been shot at, I would have not been injured, I would have not had any – I would not be suffering. Most of the people that – my peers are okay. They are not injured. They’re working. Some of them have finished their education. So they’re in a much better off position than I am.Footnote 208
21. Without skills, the victims are not a great fit for the labour market and unless supported may continue to be disadvantaged in giving their children the best chances in life.
22. If children born of war have been accepted with their mothers to live in their maternal home, in some extreme cases they stand a high chance of being victims of abuse in these maternal homes. Joanne NeenanFootnote 209 writes that such children are ‘generally perceived as proxy members of the LRA, symbols of misfortune, and stereotyped as violent, unproductive, unequal members of society’ and, as a result, they are discriminated against in everyday life. For example, some children shared that they were not allowed to share bedding with other children, and others were denied an opportunity to attend school and instead turned into casual labourers, among others. This is further exacerbated by the patrilineal culture where their mothers have no right to land, meaning the children have nothing to inherit apart from the segregation that their mothers suffer.Footnote 210
23. I now turn to discuss the effect of the offences of torture, rape, sexual slavery, enslavement, forced pregnancy, and outrages upon personal dignity on the children born of war.
24. Mr Ongwen’s children and those of his soldiers in the Sinia Brigade were conceived, born, and raised in difficult circumstances. For example, P-0099 testified that in September 2002, while she was sick, she went to collect food with her three-month-old child. She successfully escaped and was taken to the government barracks where her baby started being fed on formula until she recovered. P-0101 testified that her group came under fire from two government gunships in July 2004. She stated that she was injured and her one-year-old daughter was shot and taken by government soldiers. P-0372 testified that abducted women and girls could occasionally be released after giving birth if they could not move with the group because of having to take care of the baby. The mothers and their children lacked proper medical attention, adequate food, accommodation, clothes, clean water, and education.
25. The evidence from the Trial Chamber also shows that as a result of the rape during the relevant period, P-0101 and P-0214 gave birth to children fathered by Dominic Ongwen, and other women who experienced sexual violence from the soldiers of the Sinia Brigade also gave birth. These children were born and conceived in violent circumstances and they grew up witnessing the rape of their mothers and other women by Mr Ongwen and his soldiers over a protracted period. It is important to note that other older children in Mr Ongwen’s homestead and those who lived in the homestead of other members of the Sinia Brigade also witnessed this protracted violence perpetrated on their mothers.
26. Additionally, some of the children born of war witnessed and experienced violent events. The record of the Trial Chamber shows that Mr Ongwen and his soldiers often used violent acts such as beatings, rape, sexual slavery, and executions to discipline his army in his homestead. For example, P-0101 told the court about her first sexual encounter with Mr Ongwen. She stated that he threatened her with a gun before forcefully having sex with her while his escorts held her hands. She stated that she was fifteen years old at the time and in her own words she felt ‘he violated my rights, I was young and there was absolutely nothing that I could say about it’. P-0099 testified that she and another woman refused to cook for Mr Ongwen or go to the garden. Mr Ongwen called his escorts and instructed them to beat them. P-0101 confirmed to the trial chamber that she was beaten by Mr Ongwen multiple times for refusing to have sex with him. P-0235 recalls an incident in Uganda when P-0214 was beaten when two months pregnant. Given that P-0214’s evidence indicates that she was only in Uganda while pregnant for the first time, while all her other pregnancies occurred outside Uganda, the Trial Chamber concluded that the incident described by P-0235 took place during P-0214’s first pregnancy in 2005, a time that falls within the period of the charges. P-0227 testified that at one time, when Mr Ongwen thought she was cunning and intended to escape, he ordered his soldiers to beat her. She stated that the beating continued for a long time until her body was swollen and it was difficult for her to walk. P-0352 described being forced, on Dominic Ongwen’s orders, to take part in the killing of another girl who had been accused of witchcraft, while P-0351 similarly stated that she was forced to kick to death a boy who had tried to escape but was caught.
27. From the above, I find that some of Mr Ongwen’s children were conceived because of rape and were raised in a largely violent homestead. Professor Weierstall-Pust explained to the Court that when someone is exposed to traumatic events, it may lead to a trauma spectrum disorder. Professor Mezey’s report gave the Trial Chamber a comprehensive description of the effect of a traumatic event on a person’s mental health. It stated that victims of trauma may experience severe depressive illness, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and dissociative disorder (including depersonalisation and multiple identity disorder) as well as severe suicidal ideation and high risk of committing suicide, and from dissociative amnesia and symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder.
28. In his report, Professor Mezey described that a depressive disorder is characterised by a persistent severe lowering of mood, feelings of sadness, hopelessness, despair, often associated with an inability to see any future or to feel hopeless about the future. He added that this disorder is often associated with a high risk of suicidal tendencies. He stated that the more severe conditions will be associated with disruptions in the individual’s physical health and functioning and will include symptoms such as a reduction of appetite, loss of weight, disruption to sleep, particularly inability to get to sleep, and waking early in the morning. Professor Mezey stated that the condition can result in an individual becoming socially withdrawn and disruption of the individual’s cognitions so that they are unable to concentrate well. He stated that people who have undergone traumatic experiences may become retarded, so that the person’s speech and their movements are slowed down; they may lack spontaneity in terms of expressing themselves, but also in terms of their facial expressions or ability to verbalise or vocalise. He also stated that they often express unreasonable feelings of worthlessness, low self-esteem, and guilt, sometimes to an extreme extent, so that they feel guilty about the war and things they cannot possibly be held responsible for.
29. Professor Mezey also noted in his report that PTSD is significant clinical distress associated with symptoms that are so severe and so intrusive that they stop the individual from being able to carry on with their normal day-to-day functioning. For example, children may fail to study, help with household chores, or interact with friends.
30. Concerning dissociative identity disorder, Professor Mezey explained that dissociation is a disruption to the person’s identity, their sense of self, and their sense of agency. He stated that this disorder is characterised by two or more distinct personalities operating, essentially, side by side and neither personality knows of the other person’s existence. He added that this is an enduring condition that does not remit or relapse in the way that other illnesses might do.
31. The Chamber also called Ms Elisabeth Schauer as an expert witness on the topic of children with trauma, particularly post-traumatic stress disorder. During her testimony, Ms Schauer stated that the trauma suffered by child soldiers has intellectual and cognitive consequences for the children. Children who have suffered trauma have problems with their memory and may have learning difficulties, particularly as regards reading and writing comprehension. She also affirmed that this trauma never goes away. The expert further stated that although persons with PTSD may recall events that occurred in the past, their ability to answer and remember these events will depend on the way questions are asked, and if they are asked chronologically. She stated, ‘you probably have a hard time just wanting to know – jumping and wanting to know little details here and there’.
32. I find the evidence of these medical experts entirely convincing and do believe that some of Mr Ongwen’s children and some of the other children born to his soldiers in the Sinia Brigade stand a high risk of suffering from the mental disorders discussed by the medical experts.
33. I find that Mr Ongwen denied some of his children the fundamental right of being born and raised in the security of a family. The central element and underlying act for children born of war is the imposition of this status on the victim. Such a status, as seen above, has mental economic, social, ethical, and religious effects, among others.
34. I recall that Dominic Ongwen himself had in the past been a victim of war, having been abducted as a child and integrated as a fighter into the LRA ranks. He described the great suffering of the children abducted by the LRA when providing an account of his own experience. It cannot go unnoticed that Dominic Ongwen, despite being well aware of such suffering, which he had been subjected to several years earlier and fully appreciating its wrongfulness, did nothing to spare similar experiences to other children after him, but, on the contrary, wilfully sustained and contributed to perpetuating the systemic, methodical, and widespread fathering of children for the LRA.
35. From the foregoing, I thus sentence as follows:
For the crime against humanity of forced marriage as another inhumane act of P-0099, P-0101, P-0214, P-0226, and P-0227 (Count 50) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of torture of P-0101, P-0214, P-0226, and P0227 (Count 51) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the war crime of torture of P-0101, P-0214, P-0226, and P-0227 (Count 52) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of rape of P-0101, P-0214, P-0226, and P-0227 (Count 53) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the war crime of rape of P-0101, P-0214, P-0226, and P-0227 (Count 54) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of sexual slavery of P-0101, P-0214, P-0226, and P-0227 (Count 55) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the war crime of sexual slavery of P-0101, P-0214, P-0226, and P-0227 (Count 56) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of enslavement of P-0099, P-0235, and P-0236 (Count 57) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy of P-0101 and P-0214 (Count 58) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for the children that were born as a result of this offence.
For the war crime of forced pregnancy of P-0101 and P-0214 (Count 59) a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of Mr Ongwen’s homestead during the period relevant to this offence.
For the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity of P-0226 and P-0235 (Count 60) a term of fourteen years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that witnessed this crime while it was happening.
For the crime against humanity of forced marriage as another inhumane act, from at least 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2005 (Count 61), a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of the Sania Brigade soldiers’ homesteads during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of torture, from at least 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2005 (Count 62), a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of the soldiers’ homesteads during the period relevant to this offence.
For the war crime of torture, from at least 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2005 (Count 63), a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of the soldiers’ homesteads during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of rape, from at least 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2005 (Count 64), a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of the soldiers’ homesteads during the period relevant to this offence.
For the war crime of rape, from at least 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2005 (Count 65), a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of the soldiers’ homesteads during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of sexual slavery, from at least 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2005 (Count 66), a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of the soldiers’ homesteads during the period relevant to this offence.
For the war crime of sexual slavery, from at least 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2005 (Count 67), a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of the soldiers’ homesteads during the period relevant to this offence.
For the crime against humanity of enslavement, from at least 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2005 (Count 68), a term of twenty years of imprisonment; and in addition, I order reparations for any of the children that were members of the soldiers’ homesteads during the period relevant to this offence.
Judge W. Naigaga Kyobiika
10.1 Reflection: The Situation in Sudan
Context
In February 2003, violence erupted in Sudan’s western Darfur region and quickly evolved into a civil war between the Government of Sudan and several organised armed groups, in particular the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).Footnote 1 Following the 25 April 2003 SLM/A attack on an airport in northern Darfur, the Government of Sudan, led by then-President Omar Al Bashir, issued a general call for the mobilisation of the Janjaweed militia in response.Footnote 2 Sudanese government forces – including the Sudanese armed forces and their allied Janjaweed militia – launched a counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur, a core component of which were unlawful attacks on the civilian population, largely belonging to the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa communities, who were perceived to be aligned with one or more of the various armed groups.Footnote 3
Within a year of the campaign’s start, the United Nations estimated that more than 750,000 people were displaced in Darfur and upwards of 110,000 had fled across the border into Chad.Footnote 4 The refugees and internally displaced came bearing accounts of horrific violence against the civilian population.Footnote 5 By December 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan voiced alarm at the ‘reports of widespread abuses against civilians, including killings, rape and the burning and looting of entire villages’.Footnote 6
On 18 September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1564 requesting that the Secretary-General ‘rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable’.Footnote 7 The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, chaired by Antonio Cassese, began its work in late October 2004. It submitted a full report on its findings to the Secretary-General on 25 January 2005, and found that,
Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity. The extensive destruction and displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of survival for countless women, men, and children. In addition to the large-scale attacks, many people have been arrested and detained, and many have been held incommunicado for prolonged periods and tortured. The vast majority of the victims of all of these violations have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel, Aranga and other so-called ‘African’ tribes.Footnote 8
The Report’s findings that the Sudanese government forces and militias had committed acts that may have amounted to multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes were overshadowed in media reports by the fact that the Commission did not make a finding of genocide due to insufficient information on the specific intent required for the crime.Footnote 9
The Darfur Cases
On 31 March 2005, the Security Council, through its Resolution 1593 and acting under its Chapter VII powers, referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC and required Sudan to give its full cooperation.Footnote 10 This marked the first time that the Security Council had successfully referred a situation to the ICC. It would also be the first ICC investigation on the territory of a non-state party to the Rome Statute.
The Office of the Prosecutor, then under Luis Ocampo, opened its investigation on 1 June 2005,Footnote 11 focusing on allegations of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur, Sudan, since 1 July 2002. Since April 2007, the ICC has issued summons to appear and/or warrants for arrest for seven men alleged to bear responsibility for various crimes committed in Darfur: Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir; Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman; Ahmad Harun;Footnote 12 Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein;Footnote 13 Bahr Idriss Abu Garda;Footnote 14 Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain;Footnote 15 and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Janus.Footnote 16
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir
In its 2009 Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest (First Decision), Pre-Trial Chamber I determined there were reasonable grounds to believe that around April 2003, along with other top political and military leaders of the Sudanese government, Mr Al Bashir – then President of the Republic of Sudan and the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese armed forces – established a common plan to carry out a counter-insurgency campaign against armed groups opposing the government, and that a core component of the campaign was the unlawful attack on that part of the civilian population of Darfur belonging largely to the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups; and he used the ‘apparatus’ of the Sudanese state to direct hundreds of attacks against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa civilian population taking no direct part in hostilities.Footnote 17 In issuing the warrant, the Chamber held that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Al Bashir was criminally responsible for the war crimes of attacking civilians and pillage, arising from various attacks taking place between August 2003 and May 2008 on specified localities,Footnote 18 and the crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, forcible transfer, and rape arising from attacks on named localities in West and South Darfur in various periods between August/September 2003 and May 2008.
In its second decision regarding the warrant of arrest (Second Decision), issued on 12 July 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Al Bashir was criminally responsible for the commission of the three counts of genocide against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups.Footnote 19 Following his overthrow in the 2019 coup d’état, Al Bashir was arrested by local authorities and is currently in Sudanese custody. As he has not been transferred to the seat of the Court, his case remains at the pre-trial stage.
Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb)
Mr Abd-Al-Rahman is alleged to be a senior leader in the Janjaweed militia in Wadi Salih area of West Darfur, a member of the Popular Defence Forces, and commander of thousands of militia/Janjaweed from August 2003 to March 2004.Footnote 20 On 27 April 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I granted the Prosecutor’s application under Article 58(7) of the StatuteFootnote 21 and decidedFootnote 22 to issue a warrant of arrest against Mr Abd-Al-Rahman for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in the localities of Kodoom, Bindisi, Mukjar, Arawala, and their surrounding areas in Darfur, Sudan, between August 2003 and March 2004.Footnote 23 On 16 January 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the Prosecutor’s application to amend the first warrant,Footnote 24 issuing a second warrant of arrest for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in the locality of Deleig and surrounding areas in Darfur, Sudan, on or about 5–7 March 2004.Footnote 25
Mr Abd-Al-Rahman is charged with thirty-one counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity – including murder, rape, forcible transfer, torture, persecution, pillage, cruel treatment, intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, destruction of property, and outrages upon personal dignity – committed in 2003 and 2004 in four villages in West Darfur. He is charged with directing attacks, and also mobilising, recruiting, arming, and providing supplies to Janjaweed militia under his command.
On 9 June 2020, Mr Abd-Al-Rahman voluntarily surrendered himself in the Central African Republic and was transferred into ICC custody. In June 2020, as ordered by the Chamber,Footnote 26 Mr Abd-Al-Rahman made his first appearance before the single judge,Footnote 27 during which his case was severed from his co-defendant Mr Harun’s case. Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed all thirty-one charges on 9 July 2021. Mr Abd-Al-Rahman’s trial commenced on 5 April 2022 and is ongoing at the time of writing.
Feminist Reimaginings of Select Judgments and Decisions
Our authors have engaged in the feminist reimagining of four judgments: two from the Al Bashir case and two from the Abd-Al-Rahman case.
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Second Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest
Judge Akila Radhakrishnan and Judge Grant Shubin deliver their reimagining of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s Second Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, issued in 2010 against Sudan’s then president in respect of his responsibility for the alleged genocide in Darfur against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples.
While the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Second Decision explored the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of the material elements of each of the alleged counts of genocide being met, their examination’s approach to the victims was gender-blind and ageless, often referring to victims as ‘people’ or ‘civilians’Footnote 28 – apart from sexual violence, where only women were highlighted as victims.Footnote 29 The original Second Decision, in the absence of an intersectional approach, did not grapple with how the gendered and age-disaggregated commission of genocide, by design, was more likely to specifically target and/or impact on victims who are routinely less visible in documentation and jurisprudence, such as children and women, as well as deepening the annihilative impact of the crime.
Judges Radhakrishnan and Shubin’s reimagined decision takes as its starting point the Pre-Trial Chamber’s exploration of the specific material elements of each of the three counts of genocide. It illuminates how gendered understandings are woven into the Sudanese government’s planning and commission of coordinated acts that make up the continuum of genocidal violence, and how through these gendered annihilative acts the perpetrators maximised the crime’s destructive impact on the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups.
Alighting first on the count of genocide by killing, the judges delve into the gendered manner of the killings, emphasising that civilians were targeted in specific ways by reason not only of their ethnicity but also of their perceived gender. The Chamber makes the significant choice – given the paucity of information as to the gender and age of the victims within the evidence presented by the prosecution – to include testimony from the UN Darfur Commission report, which charts the targeted killing of men and boys from the three ethnic groups, including the seeking out and killing of young boys being hidden by their families.Footnote 30 Radhakrishnan and Shubin also highlight how the crime of murder was committed in different ways against victims of different genders, a facet that is obscured in the original decision’s use of the gender-blind term ‘civilians’. In one example, the judges, in their reimagining, direct focus to the gendered nature of killing, juxtapositioning the killings of men and boys through gunshot at the onset of an attack, and an attack where the women suffered far slower deaths, having been abducted, transferred to a military garrison, paraded naked, and raped continuously for several days, in the course of which three were killed.Footnote 31
In the second count of genocide by causing serious bodily and mental harm, Judges Radhakrishnan and Shubin explore the legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Akayesu case, in discussing rape and sexual violence as constitutive acts of genocide. While both the prosecution and Chamber refer to the rape of ‘thousands of women’, the reimagined decision renders visible the experience of girls, highlighting sections of the prosecution’s application stating that ‘girls as young as five … were raped’.Footnote 32 Also discussed are the particular gender-specific impact on women and girls in society, with the gendered impact layered atop the harm done as a result of pre-existing structural inequalities and practices. In Darfur, that includes not only the physical and psychological damage, but particularly physical damage – including increased risk of fistula – in those who had previously been subjected to female genital mutilation.
As well as exploring the gendering of the third count of genocide, Judges Radhakrishnan and Shubin centre the gendered dimensions of evidencing genocidal intent, unexplored in the original decision. They note that judicial and non-judicial determinations of genocide have largely focused on intent to physically destroy as evidenced through mass killing. They posit that, considering the gendered underpinnings of the acts in question, equally relevant is the intent to biologically destroy, which aims at the target group’s regenerative capacity and its ability to ensure long-term survival – and which has specific consequences for women and girls, who are perceived to be the main reproductive agents of the group, in the gendered role of bearers of life.Footnote 33
While limited by the gender-blindness of the underpinning evidence, Judges Radhakrishnan and Shubin’s reimagined decision underscores that female and male members of targeted groups, by the perpetrators’ own design, experience genocide in distinct ways by reason of their gender. In particular, they successfully illuminate how genocidal violence directed at women and girls is fed by existing misogynistic attitudes in society, and the traumatic impacts are magnified by the financial, social, and cultural inequalities to which women and girls are subjected.
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral of the Al Bashir Appeal
Judges Saumya Uma and Ramya Jawahar Kudekallu have handed down their reimagining of the Appeals Chamber’s May 2019 judgment in the Jordan referral of the Al Bashir appeal.Footnote 34
The original judgment addressed the question about the extent to which states are legally obligated to cooperate with the Court, in which the Appeals Chamber decided that Jordan, as a state party to the Rome Statute, had an obligation to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir, despite Sudan not being a state party to the Statute and despite Mr Al Bashir then holding the post of President of Sudan. The reimagined judgment focuses on the question of whether Jordan had failed to comply with its Rome Statute obligations, examining the issue of state cooperation and accountability from a feminist analytical perspective.
The original and the reimagined judgments share commonalities. Both confirm the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, finding that Jordan had failed to comply with its obligations under the Statute by not executing the Court’s request for the arrest of Mr Al Bashir and his surrender to the Court while he was on Jordanian territory on 29 March 2017.Footnote 35 In the underlying reasoning, both judgments concur that there is no customary law recognising head-of-state immunity before an international court, and such immunity cannot be claimed under Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute.Footnote 36
Further, both judgments agree that parties to the Rome Statute are under an obligation to cooperate fully with the Court in accordance with the Statute, and that this obligation must be ‘understood in the context of the Statute as a whole and bearing in mind its object and purpose’.Footnote 37 In this, the original judgment notes that the ICC was established to exercise jurisdiction ‘over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern’ and its state parties express their determination to ‘put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes’.Footnote 38 The original judgment states: ‘The obligation to cooperate with the Court reinforces the obligation erga omnes to prevent, investigate and punish crimes that shock the conscience of humanity, including in particular those under the jurisdiction of the Court and it is this erga omnes character that makes the obligation of States Parties to cooperate with the Court so fundamental.’Footnote 39
Nevertheless, Judges Uma and Kudekallu’s reimagined judgment explores, with greater sensitivity and nuance, both how state cooperation impacts on victim communities, and specifically victims from marginalised communities including women, girls, and those belonging to sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) minorities. With great clarity, they emphasise how Jordan’s breach of its obligation to cooperate with the Court in failing to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir also fails the victims of the alleged crimes, which include multiple war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as the crime of genocide – ‘an undesirable outcome that is diametrically opposed to the objectives for which this Court was established’.Footnote 40
In further contrast to the original judgment, Judges Uma and Kudekallu’s reimagining explores the intrinsic interconnections between state cooperation with the ICC in arresting and surrendering a suspect to the Court, and ending impunity for ICC crimes, especially crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. As they note, a failure of states to cooperate opens up ‘chasms in access to justice for victims’, while assisting the accused to take refuge in other jurisdictions. The reimagined judgment further observes that Jordan has also fallen foul of its duty to discharge its state obligations under other conventions that it has ratified, including (but not limited to) the Genocide Convention and/or Torture Convention.
In contrast with the original judgment, Judges Uma and Kudekallu’s feminist reimagining confronts the international legal community with the reality that a failure of a state party, here Jordan, to live up to its obligations to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir has profound implications for victims’ access to justice.
Prosecutor v. Abd-Al-Rahman, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges
In this rewritten decision, Judges Lisa Davis and Marina Kumskova consider whether the Chamber had the evidence before it to request, under Article 61(7) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor to present evidence on the crime of gender persecution.
In the original Rahman Confirmation of Charges Decision, the Chamber found that the contextual elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity had been proven to the requisite standard.Footnote 41 Following an examination of the evidence put forward by the prosecution, and taking into account the submissions by the defence, Office for the Public Counsel for Victims, and legal representatives of victims, the Chamber confirmed the multiple counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including persecution as a crime against humanity.Footnote 42
The charge of persecution concerned targeted attacks on persons in Kodoom, Bindi, and surrounding areas, the population of which were predominantly Fur and who were perceived as belonging to, or being associated with, or supporting the rebel armed groups. The prosecution asserted that Mr Abd-Al-Rahman targeted these persons on political and ethnic grounds, severely depriving them of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, bodily integrity, private property, freedom of movement and residence, and not to be subjected to rape, torture, or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.
In their reimagined decision on confirmation of charges in the Abd-Al-Rahman case, Judges Davis and Kumskova engage with the question of whether to confirm the charge of persecution on the ground of gender, under Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute. More specifically, they look at the question of whether, drawing from the facts as presented in the prosecution’s submissions, the prosecution established substantial grounds to believe that Mr Abd-Al-Rahman committed the crime of gender persecution in Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas between 15 and 16 August 2003; in Mukjar and surrounding areas between the end of February 2004 and the beginning of March 2004; and in Deleig and surrounding areas between 5 and 7 March 2004.
Judges Davis and Kumskova’s judgment explores the gendered dimensions of the attacks on persons from the Fur population, illuminating how the attacks were planned and committed against women and men, girls and boys in specific ways because of the gender roles they were perceived to inhabit. For example, the reimagined decision explores the targeted killing and torture of Fur men and older boys in the attacks on Mukjar and Deleig and highlights that the perpetrators were driven by the view of men as fighters and boys as revenge-seekers, based on entrenched perceptions of the biological and sociological roles of men and boys in that society. Analysing the evidence contained in the prosecution submissions with regard to the rape of Fur women and girls, the reimagined judgment explores the intersection of the perceived marginalised identities of the victims as black women, highlighting the perpetrator’s use of forced nudity and often public rapes, as well as the import of the derogatory epithets by which the perpetrators referred to the women, notably as slaves.
The reimagined judgment delves deeper into the gendered design and impact of the crimes. The judges’ analysis illuminates how the attacks on Fur men and boys draws from the understanding of males as protectors of the group, while attacks on women and girls pay heed to their role of holders of community honour – often defined in terms of socially enforced control over their sexuality. The attacks on Fur women, girls, men, and boys therefore not only serve to imprint the dominance of the perpetrator group, but also to break the will and destroy the social bonds within the Fur community.
The facts in the case render visible that targeting of the Fur lay at the intersection of race, gender, and political grounds. Indeed, that the underlying facts are present in the prosecution’s submission – which is to say, they required no reimagining – underscores the urgent need for the feminist approach that Judges Davis and Kumskova model in their reimagining.
Prosecutor v. Abd-Al-Rahman, Decision Establishing the Principles on Victims’ Representation during the Confirmation of Charges Hearing
Judge Anushka Sehmi’s feminist reimagining of the 2021 Decision establishing the principles on victims’ representation during the Confirmation of Charges Hearing in the Abd-Al-Rahman case makes up the fourth and final reimagining of the Darfur cases. The original decision centred on the way that victims from Sudan would participate, and be legally represented, in the Abd-Al-Rahman case.
Judge Sehmi rewrites this decision from a feminist perspective, looking at the importance of consulting with victims on their choice of legal representation. The reimagined decision focuses on what is meant by the need for victims’ participation in proceedings to be ‘meaningful’ – long recognised in ICC jurisprudence – as opposed to ‘purely symbolic’.Footnote 43 The single judge noted that such meaningful participation requires the implementation of strategies that aim at ensuring two-way communication between the affected communities and the Court, most appropriately via the mandates of the Public Information and Outreach Section (PIOS) and the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS).
The reimagined decision emphasises that the success of victim participation is profoundly dependent on proper outreach and public information activities directed towards victims,Footnote 44 and moves to explore the gendered implications of designing and conducting such outreach through an intersectional lens. This includes, necessarily Judge Sehmi asserts, proactive engagement with women, girls, and non-binary individuals who may qualify as victims in the Abd-Al-Rahman case. The reimagined decision reminds the international legal community that the violations committed in Darfur, and as alleged by the prosecution, were heavily gendered and exacerbated structural gender inequalities, rendering women and girls even more vulnerable to being the victims of sexual and gender-based crimes. In turn, women and girls suffered particularly physical, psychological, financial, and social traumatic impacts as a result of being the victims of alleged crimes, which magnified the entrenched pre-existing structural inequalities.
While the original decision treats victims as a monolithic group (though not always in agreement, at least as regards legal representation), Judge Sehmi takes care to embed an intersectional feminist approach, underscoring that while greater outreach is needed to ensure the meaningful participation of women and girls, strategies aimed at achieving this ‘must allow for the full diversity of women, including those of different ethnicities, minority religious or ethnic groups, as well as those from rural or urban backgrounds’.Footnote 45 She further underscores the need for a specific strategy for outreach of child victims, who are so often overlooked in trials which evince an adult-centric understanding of violence and harm.Footnote 46
Judge Sehmi illuminates how structural inequalities may limit the participation of marginalised groups, including women and girls, in the ICC proceedings – whether as a result of having more limited access to education and corresponding higher likelihood of illiteracy; being tasked with childcare; the stigma of sexual violence, with speaking out exacting high social costs; and living in a patriarchal context where men are assumed to be the ones interacting with authority, such as may be the perception of the ICC. The reimagined decision sets out clear practical steps that PIOS and VPRS should take to ensure meaningful gender-sensitive and inclusive participation in the Abd-Al-Rahman proceedings.
On victim representation, the reimagined decision tackles the widely recognised – but rarely officially discussed – matter of the Registry neither having an inclusive approach to obtaining the views of victims, expressly including those from marginalised communities, on their preferred legal representation nor tackling the lack of diversity within the pool of representation offered. Sehmi’s single judge asserts the need for a more inclusive approach to recruiting victims’ counsel and the importance, given the scale of sexual and gender-based crimes committed against women and girls in Darfur, of counsel having expertise in working with survivors of such crimes.Footnote 47
This reimagined judgment in the Darfur cases underscores that a feminist approach needs not only to inform our understanding of the planning, commission, and impact of alleged crimes, but must flow through the operations of the Court if it is to carve a path to justice that leaves no victims in the shadows.
Conclusion: Including Those So Often Obscured in the Pursuit of Justice
Early documentation of the violations committed in Darfur showed the urgent need for a feminist intersectional approach to the investigation, analysis, and prosecution of the alleged crimes and to understanding the context in which they were committed.
A troubling intersection of gender, race, and age was laid bare as early as the 2004 Human Rights Watch report, which included the testimony of an eighteen-year-old woman who recounted being assaulted by Janjaweed who inserted a knife in her vagina, saying, ‘You get this because you are black’.Footnote 48 In its 2009 Request for Warrant in the Al Bashir case the prosecution asserted, ‘Perpetrators often verbally berated the women and girls, calling them slaves, telling them that they would now bear a “free” child, and asserting that they (the perpetrators) are wiping out the non-Arabs’.Footnote 49
The interplay of violence committed against those with intersecting marginalised identities was most visible in the documentation and ensuing discussion of sexual violence committed against Darfurian women and girls. While this arguably shows the progress made on the documentation of sexual violence, it raised questions about the depth of the intersectional approach to investigating other crimes, and whether a feminist intersectional approach would also guide the Court’s own operations, including its outreach to the affected communities.
One of the clear challenges for some authors, as judges, was that they – like the judges delivering the original judgments and decisions – were constrained by the evidence adduced and arguments made by the parties before them. In Judges Radhakrishnan and Shubin’s analysis of genocide, for example, the blindness of the prosecution materials as to the multiple and potentially overlapping identities of the marginalised identities of those described as victims led to moving beyond the materials in front of the Chamber into documentation from non-governmental organisations. However, as Judges Davis and Kumskova show in their exploration of gender persecution, the foundations of a charge of gender persecution existed in the materials, obscured perhaps by the lesser seriousness with which the prosecution and the Chamber seem to approach gender-based targeting, notably, but not solely, of women and girls.
Judge Sehmi’s reimagined decision, focusing on how to achieve meaningful victims’ participation in the proceedings, shows a path very much open to, but not taken, in the original decision. Similarly, Judges Uma and Kudekallu’s reimagined judgment underscores that relatively little effort could have been expended by the original Trial Chamber to open a richer discussion of how state cooperation impacts on victim communities.
A feminist intersectional approach can, indeed, be more radical – calling into question whether the International Criminal Court, and its founding Statute and Rules for Procedure and Evidence, are suitable instruments for achieving a more equal world, with full dignity for marginalised communities, including women and girls who constitute an opposed global majority. This is particularly when questions of criminal accountability, especially in common law systems, writ large focus very narrowly on the question of criminal liability of one of more accused and are without incentive to delve into the underlying multifaceted and often historical roots of why and how individuals cross the line into becoming perpetrators of mass atrocities, and the opacity through which the international justice experiment sees (and does not see) the victims. Whether genuine progress towards a feminist permanent world court requires a more radical questioning and approach remains a core political and philosophical question with which international justice actors would do well to engage.
All four reimagined judgments and decisions, however, give weight to an arguably far more tantalising viewpoint: that much can be achieved within the current workings of the Court. Each underscores that a feminist intersectional approach could be implemented relatively easily to signal and effect the inclusion of marginalised – and often multiply marginalised – individuals and communities into the Court’s work and processes, if there was greater understanding of and commitment to such an approach by those who people the Court, now and in the future.
To be sure, the calls for revolution sit on firm conceptual ground. The reimagined judgments in the Darfur cases, however, make a firm and optimistic case for how a feminist reality can root itself in the processes and outcomes of an evolving International Criminal Court.
10.2 Genocide in the Al Bashir Warrant
In 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a Warrant of Arrest for Mr Omar Al Bashir, then President of Sudan, for two counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity.Footnote 50 The Chamber did not authorise charges for the crime of genocide; however, that aspect was later overturned by the Appeals Chamber citing an error of law.Footnote 51
In their rewritten decision on the Warrant of Arrest, Akila Radhakrishnan and Grant Shubin apply the correct interpretation of genocide to the decision but engage more thoroughly with how gender was exploited in the alleged committal of the crime. They highlight the gender differentiation used by Government of Sudan forces by exploring the different methods applied to genders, from execution-style killing to rape and sexual slavery, cultural and social humiliation to confinement in unsafe and unhealthy conditions in the displacement camps. In giving voice to the victims, Radhakrishnan and Shubin give an expansive tour of the evidence which was available to the original Chamber and include the crime of genocide in the Warrant of Arrest against Omar Al Bashir.
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir No.: ICC-02/05-01/09
Date: 4 March 2009Footnote 52
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I(B)
Before: Judge Akila Radhakrishnan, Presiding Judge
Judge Grant Shubin
SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR (‘OMAR AL BASHIR’)
Background
1. On 14 July 2004 the Prosecutor filed an application under Article 58 of the Rome Statute (the Statute) seeking a warrant for the arrest of Mr Omar Al Bashir (Bashir) for his alleged criminal responsibility in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups in Darfur from 2003 to 14 July 2008.
Whether the Common Requirements under Article 58(1) of the Statute for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Have Been Met
Whether There Are Reasonable Grounds to Believe That at least One of the Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court Referred to in the Prosecution Application Has Been Committed
2. The Court observes that under Article 58(1) of the Statute, it shall issue an arrest warrant if the existence of genocidal intent is only one of several reasonable conclusions available on the materials provided by the prosecution.
Genocide
3. The crime of genocide is defined in Article 6 of the Statute as follows:
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(i) Killing members of the group;
(ii) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(iii) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(iv) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(v) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
4. The prosecution submits that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Omar Al Bashir bears criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute for the crime of genocide as a result of:
(i) the killing of members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups [Article 6(a) – Count 1];
(ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups [Article 6(b) – Count 2]; and
(iii) deliberately inflicting on the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups conditions of life calculated to bring about the groups’ physical destruction [Article 6(c) – Count 3].
5. Having gone through other elements of genocide elsewhere, the Court here wants to pay specific attention to the gendered manner of the commission of crimes alleged by the Prosecutor.
Killing Members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa Ethnic Groups (Article 6(a) – Count 1)
6. For the purposes of the actus reus of genocide by killing, the Court must be convinced that the prosecution has shown to the applicable standard that members of each target group were killed with the intention of destroying the group as such.Footnote 53
7. Killing is often the privileged genocidal act, and consequently examinations of the commission of genocide largely revolve around the numbers killed. However, genocidal killing is in fact a highly gendered activity, with men and boys targeted for different reasons and killed in different ways than women and girls.
8. Males, particularly men and adolescent boys, are targeted for killing because they occupy gendered roles that genocide’s perpetrators find particularly threatening: those of heads of households, community leaders, political figures, religious authorities, guardians of the group’s identity (particularly so in patrilineal cultures), fighters, and patriarchs. Where women and girls are targeted for genocidal killings, those killings – like the killing of men and boys – tend to reflect the gendered view of the role and uses of females in that society. Assaults on women and girls pay heed to their roles as mothers, wives, daughters, bearers of future life, keepers of the communities’ and families’ honour, and sources of labour within the home.
9. In genocides, men and boys are also more likely to die ‘fast’ (but not necessarily less horrific) deaths. They tend to be killed first and, usually, very shortly after being located or captured. These killings are usually presaged by the separation of men and older boys from the rest of the protected group.
10. The attacks against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups bear this out, where attacks were characterised by indiscriminate killings, as well as specific targeting of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa men of military age. According to the United Nation’s Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, witness testimonies reflected in the reports describe attackers with Kalashnikovs and other automatic weapons shooting either indiscriminately or targeting specific people, usually men of military age.Footnote 54 The massacre in Surra is a revealing example of the gendered manner in which Bashir’s forces conducted their killings. There, at least 250 people were killed when Bashir’s forces attacked in the early hours of the morning.Footnote 55 Initially, they fired mortars at unarmed civilians, shooting indiscriminately with rifles and machine guns.Footnote 56
They entered the homes and killed the men. They gathered the women in the mosque. There were around 10 men hidden with the women. They found those men and killed them inside the mosque. They forced women to take off their maxi (large piece of clothing covering the entire body) and if they found that they were holding their young sons under them, they would kill the boys.Footnote 57
11. A similar gendered targeting is seen in the killings in Deleig, where Bashir’s forces went from house to house looking for specific individuals, and arrested many men who were subsequently taken to the local police station.Footnote 58 The men were then separated into different groups and certain groups were placed on a truck and transported to the Garsila area.Footnote 59 The truck would come back empty and leave again with a new group of men.Footnote 60 Most of those taken away were executed.Footnote 61 In the end, more than 120 men were killed.Footnote 62
12. The gendered undercurrent to the killings continued after the initial attacks into the context in which members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa were confined in squalid internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. According to one witness, ‘Young girls can’t leave the camp. We are scared to send them out. They rape them. We can’t send the young men out because they will kill the men’.Footnote 63
13. This gendered underpinning can also be seen in methods by which killings were carried out against male and female members of the target groups. As described above, in many cases Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa men were killed by gunshot at the onset of, or during, an attack; women and girls on the other hand were often killed by sexual violence and rape.Footnote 64 For example, take the paradigmatic case in Arawala, where Bashir’s forces captured and detained a group of women at the local military garrison.Footnote 65 Upon arrival at the garrison, the women were stripped naked and ‘inspected’ by a military commander.Footnote 66 ‘The soldiers then raped the women continuously over several days. Three of the women died while they were in captivity.’Footnote 67
14. In a particularly gruesome example of the convergence of gender killing, a Fur baby had also been killed and was lying on his back with his penis cut off and stuffed in his mouth.Footnote 68
15. In sum, the alleged methods of killing tend to display not only the specific targeting of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups on the part of Bashir’s forces, but also a deeply engrained misogyny soaked with deeply gendered conceptions of dominance, power, and masculinity. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a reasonable basis to believe that genocidal acts of killing were committed by Bashir’s forces.
Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa Ethnic Groups (Article 6(b) – Count 2)
16. For the purposes of the actus reus of genocide by causing serious bodily and/or mental harm to members of each target group, the Court must be convinced that the Prosecution has shown to the applicable standard that serious bodily or mental harm was inflicted on members of the target groups with the intention of destroying the groups as such.Footnote 69 Serious bodily or mental harm ‘must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life’.Footnote 70
17. This second prohibited act, when committed with the requisite intent, can encompass a wide range of non-fatal genocidal acts. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have held that rape and sexual violence; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; and deportation and forcible transfer are among the acts that may cause serious bodily or mental harm.Footnote 71 This understanding has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).Footnote 72
Sexual Violence in Darfur
18. Sexual violence, when employed as a genocidal strategy, aims to destroy the victim as an incremental step to annihilating the group, as famously confirmed in the ICTR’s Akayesu case.Footnote 73 It is simultaneously an assault on the victim and on the existence, identity, and cohesiveness of the group.
19. Most genocidal campaigns have explicitly and implicitly sanctioned sexual violence against women and girls of the target group. This includes, for example, the sexual enslavement of Armenian women and girls by the Ottoman TurksFootnote 74 – echoes of which reverberate in Rwanda where an estimated 100,000–250,000 women and girls were raped in three months.Footnote 75
20. Violence in Darfur fits these patterns. Bashir’s forces conducted a campaign of systematic rape of women and girls, with the frequent sexual mutilation of victims. Countless reports and testimonies indicate thousands of women and girls belonging to the target groups were raped systematically and continuously for five years.Footnote 76 Girls as young as five and women as old as seventy were raped.Footnote 77 Gang rape was a distinctive and pronounced feature of the attacks by Bashir’s forces.Footnote 78
21. From the numerous cases of rape and sexual violence allegedly committed by Bashir’s forces against Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa women and girls submitted to and reviewed by the court, a distinctive pattern emerged. First, during attacks on villages there were deliberate aggressions and violence against women and girls, including gang rapes.Footnote 79 Second, women and girls were abducted, held in confinement for several days, and repeatedly raped.Footnote 80 Third, rape and other forms of sexual violence continued during flight and subsequent displacement, including when women left towns and displaced persons’ sites to collect wood or water or perform other essential activities.Footnote 81 As to this last stage – rape and sexual violence in the context of displacement – one witness testified:
When we see them [Bashir’s forces], we run. Some of us succeed in getting away, and some are caught and taken to be raped – gang-raped. Maybe around 20 men rape one woman […] These things are normal for us here in Darfur. These things happen all the time. I have seen rapes too. It does not matter who sees them raping the women – they don’t care. They rape women in front of their mothers and fathers.Footnote 82
22. As just one example, following the joint attacks by Bashir’s forces in the surrounding area, up to 30,000 people were confined in Kailek, southern Darfur, for about fifty days.Footnote 83 Women and children were separated from the men, physically confined, and eventually transported to a new location.Footnote 84 Here, the women and girls, including some as young as ten years old, were gang raped for protracted periods of time.Footnote 85
23. Cases of rape and sexual violence are often underreported and, as previous prosecutions have demonstrated, it is difficult to assess a total number of victims.Footnote 86 Notably, however, 2.5 years after Bashir’s forces began their campaign against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups, sources in Darfur were documenting ‘new cases of rape on a weekly basis, perpetrated by armed men alleged to be members of the Government armed forces, law enforcement agencies and Janjaweed’.Footnote 87
24. While rape per se meets the severity threshold of, indeed beyond, ‘serious bodily or mental harm’,Footnote 88 the Court will nevertheless take note of the particular bodily and psychological damage suffered by Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa women and girls. The prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM) in Darfur exacerbated the physical damage inflicted during rape, in particular increased incidence of fistula.Footnote 89 According to one witness interviewed by the prosecution, for ‘virgins who had FGM and were sexually assaulted, the impact was particularly painful and debilitating’.Footnote 90 A health specialist treating victims in Darfur testified that most of the ‘victims exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, including extreme shame, grief, hopelessness, anger and rage, flashbacks, nightmares, and inability to interpret their environment’.Footnote 91 These symptoms have been aggravated by the inability to resort to state authorities for help. One victim testified, ‘those who rape you wear fatigues and those who protect you wear fatigues. We don’t know any more who to run from and who to run to’.Footnote 92
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment in Darfur
25. Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment can amount to genocidal acts. Torture occurs when someone deliberately causes very serious and cruel physical or mental suffering to another person. This encompasses a wider range of conduct including, for example, beatings, blinding, and mutilations. It also includes acts of sexual violence.Footnote 93 The findings cited above and describing gang rapes, rapes, and sexual slavery support a finding that these acts also constitute acts of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups.
26. Additionally, being forced to witness loved ones or others being killed or ill-treated can in and of itself constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.Footnote 94 In Darfur, such forced witnessing took particularly gendered hues when Bashir’s forces made mothers witness the murder of their children. According to the UN Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, ‘extreme mental torture was inflicted on many mothers who saw their children burn alive after they were snatched from their arms by the Janjaweed and thrown into the fire’.Footnote 95 In one gruesome instance, a mother was repeatedly raped in the vicinity of her baby who cried for three straight days. On the third day a member of Bashir’s forces ‘grabbed the baby, cut his throat and smashed his head on the floor’.Footnote 96
27. Finally, concerning degrading treatment, international tribunals have qualified forced public nudity as constituting such treatment.Footnote 97 In Darfur, stripping women of their clothes and the use of derogatory language as a means of humiliation and degradation were nearly ubiquitous characteristic in Bashir’s forces’ abductions and subsequent rape.Footnote 98
28. Accordingly, and in light of all of the foregoing, the Court finds adequate reason to believe that in perpetrating widespread and brutal sexual violence and torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups, the actus reus of the second act of genocide is satisfied.
Deliberately Inflicting on the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa Ethnic Groups Conditions of Life Calculated to Bring about the Groups’ Physical Destruction (Article 6(c) – Count 3)
29. For the purposes of the actus reus of genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction, the Court must be convinced that the prosecution has shown to the applicable standard that Bashir’s forces inflicted on the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.Footnote 99 Such methods include, inter alia, ‘subjecting the group to a subsistence diet; failing to provide adequate medical care; systematically expelling members of the group from their homes; and generally creating circumstances that would lead to a slow death such as the lack of proper food, water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, or subjecting members of the group to excessive work or physical exertion’.Footnote 100
30. The ICTR Trial Chamber in the Kayishema case found that rape could be a method of imposing conditions of life that do not ‘lead immediately to the death of members of the group’.Footnote 101 Moreover, in the ICJ’s 2015 judgment in Croatia v. Serbia, the Court indicated that rape could fall within Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention but noted that in that particular case, ‘it has not been shown that these occurrences [of rape] were on such a scale to have amounted also to inflicting conditions of life on the group that were capable of bringing about its physical destruction in whole or in part’.Footnote 102
31. With the backdrop of other measures imposed by Bashir’s forces to physically destroy the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups (addressed elsewhere in this decision) – including destroying food, wells, and water-pumping machines, shelter, crops and livestock, physical structures capable of sustaining life or commerce, and denying access to humanitarian relief – the characteristics of Bashir’s forces’ rape in the context of displacement can be viewed as conditions of life calculated to physically destroy the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups.
32. As a preliminary matter, the displacement of a very large part of the population of Darfur is a fact beyond dispute. Data from refugee camps in Chad and internally displaced persons’ camps within Darfur confirm that virtually the entire population of the target groups has been forcibly displaced.Footnote 103
33. Within the camps, the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa continued to be subjected to attacks. There was a complete absence of meaningful government aid, and Bashir’s forces hindered other efforts to bring humanitarian aid to the target groups. Sudan’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs works in close association with the government’s intelligence and security apparatus and blocked the publication of nutrition surveys, delayed the delivery of aid, expelled relief staff, denied visas and travel permits, and imposed unnecessary bureaucratic requirements on aid workers.Footnote 104
34. Importantly, basic amenities like food, water, and firewood were located far from where IDPs were confined. This meant that girls and women had to leave the borders of their camps to collect these essential-for-life resources (because they were less likely to be killed than men or boys), and in the process traverse areas patrolled by Bashir’s forces and local militias that Bashir allegedly recruited, armed, and purposefully failed to disarm, which are stationed in the vicinity of the camp.
35. As noted above, rape and other forms of sexual violence were widely reported during these junctures. That is, for more than five years Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa women and girls were raped continuously and systematically when they ventured from the relative, if still limited, security of IDP camps to collect essentials for life (which the Court notes is a highly gendered responsibility).Footnote 105
36. A Masalit woman from Habila, West Darfur testified:
Sometimes we go to collect grass, to sell in the market to buy things we need for our children. They [the Janjaweed] send two people, and the rest of them set up an ambush. They stop their car in a khor or a hill. Some of them act as guards. The two people then approach us and, when we see them, we run. Some of us succeed in getting away, and some are caught and taken to be raped – gang-raped. Maybe around twenty men rape one woman.Footnote 106
37. Rapes of women and girls venturing outside displaced person locations for food, water, firewood, or the market to sell goods for their families have reportedly occurred in the Abu Shouk and Kassab camps in northern Darfur, the Ardamata, Azeoni, Garsila, Krinding, Magarsa, Masteri, Mornei, Mukjar, Riyadh, and Sisi camps in western Darfur, and the Al Jeer, Derej, Kalma, Kass, and Otash camps in southern Darfur, among others.Footnote 107 Abductions and subsequent sexual slavery were also reported to occur on the borders of the IDP camps.Footnote 108
38. A health specialist treating IDPs in Darfur testified that many of the girls who had been raped when they went to get firewood outside IDP camps were repeatedly retraumatised because they had no choice but to revisit the places where they had been raped.Footnote 109 According to this witness, the absence of any mental health or psychosocial support services in the camp was an exacerbating factor that was liable to prolong or worsen the suffering of the victims.Footnote 110
39. Cases of rape by Bashir’s forces surrounding IDP camps instilled fear among women and girls of the target groups, and led to their virtual confinement inside those sites.Footnote 111 In some cases, women and girl IDPs belonging to the target groups were unable to move even a few metres from their camp for fear of being raped.Footnote 112
40. According to one witness, residents of the camps are afraid to send men out of the camps for fear of death, and afraid to send women and girls out of the camps for fear of rape.Footnote 113 Another witness shared similar experiences: ‘We were afraid to use the toilet at night because we were surrounded by the attackers, and they were on the look-out for women to rape.’Footnote 114 The impact of this sexual violence was amplified by the fact that women and their families depended on the collection of firewood for their livelihood and survival.Footnote 115
41. It is here where Bashir’s forces’ rape and sexual violence can be viewed as a condition of life calculated to physically destroy the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups. The Court is satisfied that by forcing the groups from their homes, confining them to squalid IDP camps, limiting the ingress of essential humanitarian supplies, and then raping the women and girls who are then forced to leave the camps to gather essentials for survival, thereby inflicting massive trauma that in many cases rendered victims unable to leave the camps, the natural and foreseeable outcome of which would be the slow physical destruction of all of the camp’s residents, Bashir’s forces can reasonably be seen to have committed the third prohibited genocidal act.
Intent to Destroy
42. In order to support the issuance of a warrant, the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the above-alleged genocidal acts occurred with the intent to destroy the Fur, Masalit, or Zaghawa groups, in whole or in part, as such. This means that in order to constitute genocide, ‘acts must have been committed against one or more persons because such person or persons were members of a specific group, and specifically, because of their membership in this group’.Footnote 116 Thus, the victim is targeted not because of their individual identity, but because of their being a member of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
43. Because direct evidence of the special intent to destroy is highly uncommon, courts have inferred the intent to destroy from defendants’ conduct, including their statements, as well as ‘deeds and utterances considered together, as well as from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group’.Footnote 117 Relevant conduct includes the physical targeting of the group and/or their property, the use of derogatory language towards members of the targeted group, and methodological planning.Footnote 118 The scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, and the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership in a particular group, while excluding members of other groups, are other factors from which one can infer genocidal intent.Footnote 119
44. The concept of ‘destruction’ refers to both physical and biological destruction.Footnote 120 To date, judicial and non-judicial determinations of genocide have largely focused on physical destruction through mass killing. However, it should be noted, considering the gendered underpinnings of the acts in question, that equally relevant is the intent to biologically destroy, which aims at the target group’s regenerative capacity and its ability to ensure long-term survival.Footnote 121 The Genocide Convention itself, as well as the decisions of the ICTY have consistently confirmed that acts intending to bring about biological destruction do fall under its ambit.Footnote 122
45. The intent must be to physically or biologically destroy a protected group in whole or in part. Concerning what constitutes ‘a part’ of the protected group, the ICTY and ICTR have made clear that the intended destruction must refer at least to a ‘substantial part’ of the group.Footnote 123 While there is no specific threshold or formula for understanding substantiality, courts have frequently looked to three sets of factors: numbers, function, and geography.Footnote 124 Notably, the ICTY’s Krstic appeals chamber found that ‘[t]hese considerations, of course, are neither exhaustive nor dispositive. They are only useful guidelines. The applicability of these factors, as well as their relative weight, will vary depending on the circumstances of a particular case’.Footnote 125 This view has also been endorsed by the ICJ in the Bosnia case: ‘Much will depend on the Court’s assessment of those and all other relevant factors in any particular case.’Footnote 126 Building on this analysis and giving priority to the numeric requirement, the ICJ in the Croatia case further noted that ‘in evaluating whether the allegedly targeted part of a protected group is substantial in relation to the overall group, the Court will take into account the quantitative element as well as evidence regarding the geographic location and prominence of the allegedly targeted part of the group’.Footnote 127
46. While the numerical understanding of substantiality has often been the focus,Footnote 128 geography and function can be highly illustrative of substantiality.Footnote 129 For example, in determining substantiality on the basis of prominence of the targeted part of the group, the Krstic court looked at whether the targeted members of the group were essential to the group’s survival or emblematic of the overall group.Footnote 130
47. Indeed, in the case of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups, an analysis looking at the intersections of these three factors, in particular through the lens of the widespread perpetration of sexual violence and an intent to destroy, leads to a reasonable basis to believe Bashir and his forces were operating with genocidal intent.
48. An analysis of these three factors weighing the presence of whether a substantial part of the group was targeted for biological destruction would be incomplete without special consideration of the manner and means by which Bashir’s forces sought to destroy different members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups. This necessarily includes taking into consideration the gendered reasons the forces chose certain types of violence for certain members of these groups. Under this light, the forces’ intent to biologically destroy the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups can be seen through the (1) geographical confinement to IDP camps and subsequent (2) large number of brutal rapes against (3) women and girls – members of the groups charged with ensuring the groups’ regeneration, through obtaining essentials for life as well as through reproduction.
49. Taking these factors one by one to then look at them in conjunction, the context of confinement is a highly probative geographical factor. The scale and intensity of attacks on Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa villages can be viewed as a push factor forcing surviving members of the group into enclosed and squalid conditions within IDP camps devoid of essentials for survival – in effect creating a siege environment where commerce stalled, resupply was forbidden, and resources dwindled.
50. These dire conditions had the highly predictable effect of forcing women and girls to venture outside the confines of the camps to acquire essentials. As noted above, it was the women who left the camps because of their higher likelihood of survival, and the gendered roles ascribed to them. But while women and girls might survive (not be killed) by Bashir’s forces outside the camps, they were often raped – which implicates the second factor: the numerical assessment.
51. Rape and other forms of sexual violence in atrocity situations are significantly underreported, owing to the stigma often imposed on survivors. This is no less true in Darfur than anywhere else with evidence of sexual violence of this scale. Additional factors leading to the impossibility of definitively stating a specific quantitative amount relate to the Government of Sudan’s refusal to allow humanitarian actors to access the IDP camps, as well as the general denial of the rape and sexual violence occurring in Darfur.Footnote 131 However, despite the inability to authoritatively state a specific number, evidence supports the conclusion that many, many thousands of women and girls were raped by Bashir’s forces in the context of their confinement. This conclusion is all the more evident when it is recalled that it has been widely reported that systematic rape in the context of confinement occurred in Darfur for more than five years, that Bashir’s forces allegedly only raped women and girls belonging to African tribes in Darfur (that is, they did not rape Arab women in Darfur),Footnote 132 and that there were roughly 2.5 million people living in IDP camps at the relevant time, including significant portions of the protected groups.Footnote 133
52. But a genocidal intent analysis should not be so two-dimensional as to only look at what numbers of people were targeted for destruction and where. The Court is also compelled to look at what function these targeted persons served in the targeted group. In the case of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa women and girls, these members of the groups were serving two essential functions for the groups’ continued biological survival.
53. Firstly, and as noted above in the section on the imposition of measures calculated to physically destroy the group, Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa women and girls were responsible for leaving the relative safety of the IDP camps in efforts to obtain essentials for their families. It was on these excursions that they were raped and abducted. Report after report makes clear that Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa women and girls were raped and abducted when they went to fetch water, when they went to gather firewood for cooking, when they went into towns to attempt to sell items to buy medicine for their families. By raping and abducting into sexual slavery the members of the groups performing these absolutely essential functions, Bashir’s forces were creating massive disincentives for these women and girls to continue performing these tasks, to continue exposing themselves to the risks of repeated and brutal rape and sexual violence.
54. In so doing, Bashir’s forces created an environment where the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups were deprived of essentials, which would foreseeably lead to their eventual death and physical destruction. Thus, there is a reasonable basis to believe that in confining large portions of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups to IDP camps, then subjecting those responsible for day-to-day survival to brutal sexual violence and sexual slavery, essentially guaranteeing these women and girls would stop leaving the camps and therefore stop obtaining essentials for the groups, that Bashir’s forces were acting with the intent to physically destroy the groups.
55. But these day-to-day tasks were not the only functions the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa women and girls performed. The sexual violence against them must also be seen against the backdrop of the broader social context in which they lived. That is, as a means of destroying the victim group, sexual violence has been particularly effective when employed in more strongly patriarchal cultures where the protection of female members of the group is believed to be the ultimate responsibility of their male relatives.
56. In this way, sexual violence against a group’s female members is also often perpetrated and understood as a means of deliberate attack on the group’s men, or more specifically on the gender roles that men are expected to play. Where men are expected to act as protectors of their female relatives and the female members of their particular group more generally, they may interpret the rape of ‘their’ women as evidence of their own powerlessness, and thus as a cogent assault on their identity as men.Footnote 134
57. This is particularly apparent when perpetrators commit rapes of women and girls publicly, as occurred in Darfur. Rapes were often committed in front of others, including husbands, fathers, mothers, and children of the victims, who were forced to watch and prevented from intervening, amplifying the humiliation wrought on all parties.Footnote 135 These rapes are reported as having been inflicted upon a wide age range, from girls under ten to women of seventy or older.Footnote 136
58. Moreover, rapes and episodes of sexual violence were extremely brutal. According to a report prepared by Harvard University’s School of Public Health, Bashir’s forces ‘engaged in vaginal and anal penetration, including penetration with objects. In the course of raping women, the assailants also inflicted beatings, cutting them with knives on the legs in a method similar to that used for branding slaves, and mutilate them sexually’.Footnote 137 Additionally, perpetrators often verbally berated the women and girls, ‘calling them slaves, telling them that they would now bear a “free” child, and asserting that they (the perpetrators) are wiping out the non-Arabs’.Footnote 138
59. This system and method of rape left an enduring mark on the groups’ social fabric. Individuals, families, and the wider Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa communities were highly traumatised by the systematic and brutal sexual violence they suffered and witnessed. This trauma carries with it gendered implications.
60. In contexts where women and girls are held up as repositories of the family’s honour, such as in the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa communities, female survivors of sexual violence are more likely to be cast out by their own community, left unable to marry, abandoned by their husbands. For example, one Zaghawa witness interviewed by the prosecution stated: ‘[I]n my community sexual violence is emotionally shattering. … The impact of rape and sexual violence on the victims is such that those who are not married would have difficulty finding a husband, and the people look at [a rape victim] as though she has a terminal disability.’Footnote 139 Another witness testified, ‘in this society if you rape one woman, you have raped the entire tribe’.Footnote 140
61. These consequences break down the bonds between members of the targeted communities, reducing social cohesion and diminishing the ability of the protected group to replenish itself through sexual reproduction.Footnote 141
62. In other words, the rape and sexual violence perpetrated against Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa women and girls can be seen as an effort to leverage the conservative, cultural norms of those community which equated honour and marriageability with the sexual ‘purity’ of its female members. In this way, perpetrators used gender norms to maximise the destructive impact of their geographical confinement and numerically massive rape campaign by further facilitating the traumatisation, stigmatisation, and ostracisation of victims, adversely impacting their ability to become or to remain married or contemplate procreative relationships.Footnote 142
63. In sum, the Court finds that there is a reasonable basis to believe that Bashir’s forces harboured genocidal intent to biological destroy a substantial part of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups in view of the confinement of the target groups, the subsequent and massive campaign of rape against those in the groups responsible for their daily survival and longer-term biological regeneration.
64. The Court is reminded that while the crime of genocide is a crime of intention, it does not require that the intended destruction succeed – much less when the question put before the Court in this instance is whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the requisite intent exists. On the basis of the facts elaborated above, the Court finds that such a reasonable basis does in fact exist.
65. Thus, it is the Court’s conclusion that there exists a reasonable basis to believe that the genocidal acts of killing, causing serious mental or physical suffering, and inflicting conditions calculated to physically destroy were committed with the required special intent to destroy the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups.
Judge Akila Radhakrishnan and Judge Grant Shubin
10.3 State Cooperation and Accountability in the Al Bashir Jordan Appeal
Then President of Sudan, Mr Omar Al Bashir, visited the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in March 2017. The ICC had issued a Warrant of Arrest for Mr Al Bashir on 4 March 2009Footnote 143 and 12 July 2010Footnote 144 respectively, and requested Jordan to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir during his visit.Footnote 145 Jordan refused, stating that head-of-state immunity protected Mr Al Bashir from arrest and that, further, as Sudan was not a state party to the Rome Statute, there was no obligation to arrest.Footnote 146
In 2019, the Appeals Chamber decided that Jordan was under an obligation to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir because as a state party to the Rome Statute, Jordan had accepted that head-of-state immunity cannot act as a bar to the jurisdiction of the ICC.Footnote 147
In this rewritten appeal decision, Saumya Uma and Ramya Jawahar Kudekallu confirm Jordan’s obligation to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir, but situate this obligation through an examination of how the tolerance and acceptance of immunities, such as head-of-state immunity, increases the likelihood that sexual and gender-based crimes are treated with impunity. They bolster the obligation with a close reading of the Statute, the submissions of amici and also consider how accession to international conventions, such as the conventions on torture and genocide, operate to require both state party and non-state party members to assist the ICC, further dismantling the notion that being a non-state party further authorises the lack of obligation.
Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al Bashir Appeal No. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2
Date: 6 May 2019
Original: English
THE APPEALS CHAMBER(B)
Before: Judge Saumya UMA
Judge Ramya Jawahar KUDEKALLU
SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court
In the appeal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II entitled ‘Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender o[f] Omar Al Bashir’ of 11 December 2017 (ICC-02/05-01/09-309) (Jordan Referral re Al Bashir Appeal).
After deliberation, based on a unanimous decision, the judges deliver the following judgment.
Judgment
1. Pre-Trial Chamber II found that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) had failed to comply with its obligations under the Rome Statute (Statute) by not executing the Court’s request for the arrest of Mr Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mr Al Bashir) and his surrender to the Court when Mr Al Bashir was on Jordanian territory on 29 March 2017. This decision was appealed by Jordan. While the judgment of Pre-Trial Chamber II addressed multiple issues, this decision is confined to addressing and determining one core issue, namely whether Jordan complied with its duty to cooperate with the Court.
2. The Appeals Chamber unanimously concludes that Jordan breached its international obligations under the Statute by failing to comply with the request of the Court to execute the arrest warrant issued by it, when Mr Al Bashir was on Jordanian territory on 29 March 2017. Jordan’s act of recognising head-of-state immunity, and its non-compliance with the request of this Court to arrest the suspect, affected the effective functioning of the Court in ending impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern. Thus, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on this issue is confirmed, for the reasons given below.
(i) This Court finds that immunity for heads of state as a customary practice does not eclipse or override the jurisdiction of this Court, nor should it interfere or disrupt a consistency required of the Court, which is state cooperation and ending impunity for heinous crimes. Mr Al Bashir is being charged with ten counts on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as an indirect (co)perpetrator.
(ii) These crimes include five counts of crimes against humanity, specifically murder under Article 7(1)(a), extermination under Article 7(1)(b), forcible transfer under Article 7(1)(d), torture under Article 7(1)(f), and rape under Article 7(1)(g) of the Statue.
(iii) Mr Al Bashir has also been charged with two counts of war crimes, in particular intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population and against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities under Article 8(2)(e)(i)), and pillaging under Article 8(2)(e)(v)
(iv) In addition to the above, three counts of the crime of genocide, with Mr Al Bashir allegedly committing genocide by killing under Article 6-a, genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm under Article 6-b, and genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction under Article 6-c.
(v) Pre-Chamber I considered that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Al Bashir targeted thousands of civilian women belonging primarily to Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups, subjecting them to acts of rape, forcible transfer, and torture.Footnote 148
Reasons
Key Findings
3. Customary international law has limits to immunity for heads of state. There is no suggestion in any instruments that immunity of heads of state can prevent or exonerate persons from being prosecuted before an international court for international crimes. The drafters of the Statute would have surely been aware of the immunity accorded to heads of state under customary international law, in the context of ICC crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court through Article 27(2).
Applicable Law
4. A close reading of Article 21 of the Statute lends credence to this reasoning. Article 21 reads as follows:
Article 21 Applicable law
1. The Court shall apply:
a. In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes, and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
b. In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
c. Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognised norms and standards.
5. Article 21 allows recourse to customary or treaty law only if a matter is not addressed by the sources of law enumerated in Article 21(1)(a).Footnote 149 Article 21 ranks the applicable sources by prioritising the ICC-specific sources of law. In the present case, it is clear that the Statute has addressed the issue of immunities and rejected them in Article 27. We believe and hold that customary international law cannot override an explicit statutory provision that has dismantled immunity for heads of state for ICC crimes. This was done in the Statute to facilitate accountability for the perpetration of such crimes by the highest echelons of power.
State Obligation to Execute an Arrest Warrant Issued by the Court
6. Article 58(1) of the Statute provides for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the Pre-Trial Chamber, in situations where it concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has committed an ICC crime and their arrest appears necessary. The issuance of the warrant of arrest is accompanied by the issuance of a summons to appear, in order to compel the attendance of the suspect before the Court.Footnote 150 Given that a trial cannot proceed in the absence of the suspect before the Court, as per Article 63 of the Statute, the execution of the arrest warrant is of utmost importance so as to ensure that the trial is not rendered infructuous and the effort to ensure accountability of the suspect is not aborted. Jordan had a legal and moral obligation to execute the arrest warrant. This is more so as by acceding to the Statute, Jordan accepted Article 27(2) which paved way for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction even against heads of states. As submitted by the Prosecutor, this Court agrees that Jordan understood the regime created when ratifying the Statute, including ‘the issue and execution of requests of arrest and surrender of officials of States … bound by the … Statute’.Footnote 151 Jordan’s act of refusal is not merely an unlawful act due to its breach of state parties’ obligations to cooperate with the Court as clearly mandated by the Statute, but also one that undermines rule of law and fails the victims of the alleged ICC crimes.
Irrelevance of Immunity for Heads of State
7. We acknowledge and foreground, with deep concern and trepidation, the ramifications of a sitting head of state’s access to power to potentially continue committing atrocities (including ICC crimes), to threaten victims and potential witnesses and scuttle processes for justice and accountability particularly against vulnerable communities – women, girls, and sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) minorities. We conclude that allowing immunity for heads of state could also lead to impunity for crimes against such communities – an undesirable outcome that is diametrically opposite to the objectives for which this Court was established.
8. Article 27 of the Statute is of immense relevance to the present case.
9. Article 27 explicitly states the irrelevance of official capacity as a head of state or government for serious crimes of international concern enumerated in the Statute. This standard has to be concurrent with the cooperation of states broadly while simultaneously pursuing an individual who, very obviously, wields the power, political clout, and has the means to cross state boundaries. State parties ratify the Statute, and are therefore cognisant of the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to the aforesaid crimes. Jordan, as a state party to the Statute, carries the obligation of executing the ICC’s warrant of arrest.
Importance of State Cooperation with the Court
10. From the drafting stages of the Statute, state cooperation in the Court’s investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial functions was a key principle built into the Statute. Part 9 of the Statute contains aspects of international cooperation and judicial assistance. The focus on state cooperation – an edifice of the Statute – arises from the need to delicately balance states’ concerns about infringement of their sovereignty with efforts at ending impunity for ICC crimes globally. As a result, the ICC is a judicial institution with no independent police force, enforcement agency, or prison facilities (only facilities to hold in custody those persons detained under the authority of the ICC). For this reason, the Court relies on the cooperation of its state parties to the Statute and willing states which are not parties to the Statute, and institutions. The obligation of states that are parties to the Statute to cooperate entails not only complying with requests of the ICC for arrest and surrender of the accused; it extends beyond the same and includes persuading other nations that are not state parties to the ICC (such as Sudan, in this instance) to cooperate with the ICC. This is in order to reduce or eliminate safe havens for evading prosecution and escaping accountability.Footnote 152 Jordan failed in its duty to fulfil and discharge both these state obligations.
11. Deficiency of cooperation, where war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are concerned, opens up chasms in access to justice for victims while assisting accused persons to take refuge in other jurisdictions. This court takes cognisance of the evidence submitted whereby witnesses interviewed by the prosecution, the UN Commission of Inquiry into Darfur (UNCOI), other UN bodies, and numerous NGOs have reported that, since March 2003, thousands of women and girls belonging to the target groups were raped in all three states of Darfur by members of the armed forces and militia/Janjaweed. Girls as young as five and women as old as seventy have been raped.Footnote 153 The importance of the voice and participation of victims has been an evolving key priority for the court.Footnote 154 Yet the execution of justice would ring hollow if the Court did not determine with clarity that states too, through the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, owe equity to victims and must ensure that their participation is not reduced to being tokenistic.
12. State parties have a legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC at all stages of the trial and its outcome. These include implementation of arrest warrants and surrender of suspects to the ICC for trial. Non-cooperation by state parties is addressed in Article 87(7) while non-cooperation with the Court by states not party to the Statute is dealt with in Article 87(5). The issue is not merely about what was agreed upon by the state parties at the Rome Conference, but how to make the provisions on state cooperation with the Court effective and workable in practice. The Court, being a judicial institution, has the discretion to make a judicial finding to the effect of non-cooperation by a state party to the Rome Statute. However, not every situation of non-compliance leads to a finding of non-cooperation; for instance, following Mr Omar Al Bashir’s visit to the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria) in July 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber II requested Nigeria to arrest and surrender him to the Court, without making a finding on the issue of non-cooperation.Footnote 155
13. The specific procedural moments of this Court’s process are an important factor. The Court has issued multiple warrants of arrest with obligations to multiple states, including those few that have ratified the Statute.Footnote 156 It has been over eight years of consistent follow-up by the prosecution to secure the defendant. Since March 2009, the defendant made more than eighty-five trips to more than twenty nation states without deterrence or limits to movements.Footnote 157 By failing to meet obligations of arrest and surrender for widespread crimes, particularly gendered in nature, involving sexual violence against populations, the non-cooperation of states retains a dangerous culture of tolerance and encouragement to the most heinous crimes under international law.Footnote 158
14. Mr Al Bashir has been freely travelling across the world, making numerous international trips with no fear of being arrested, founded in his confidence of non-cooperation by state parties to the Statute in executing this Court’s warrant.Footnote 159 It is pertinent to note that the ICC has been addressing the issue of non-cooperation for the past few years, in instances such as KenyattaFootnote 160 and Gaddafi.Footnote 161 Further, Jordan is not the first country to refuse to cooperate with the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Mr Al Bashir. Other such states include Malawi,Footnote 162 Democratic Republic of Congo,Footnote 163 Djibouti,Footnote 164 Uganda,Footnote 165 Kenya,Footnote 166 and Chad.Footnote 167 This is a clear indication of the fact that Mr Al Bashir enjoys an unparalleled, de facto impunity for alleged commission of most serious crimes of international concern – that which this court resolves to end.
Relationship between State Cooperation and Ending Impunity for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
15. There exist intrinsic interlinkages between state cooperation with the ICC in arresting and surrendering a suspect to the court, and ending impunity for ICC crimes, especially crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. Feminist scholars of international law have, time and again, drawn attention to the gendered impact of armed conflict on women.Footnote 168 At the Beijing conference on women in 1995, the global community affirmed this by acknowledging that ‘while entire communities suffer the consequences of armed conflict and terrorism, women and girls are particularly affected because of their status in society and their sex’.Footnote 169 In General Recommendation 30, the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) committee too expressed concern about the gendered impact of conflicts.Footnote 170 There is emerging research on the sharp rise in violence based on SOGI in countries that are adversely impacted by conflict.Footnote 171 Suffice it to note, at this juncture, the pervasive nature of ICC crimes against such vulnerable communities in the context of war and conflict, and their adverse and disproportionate impact on women and girls, as well as SOGI minorities. Thus, state parties’ non-cooperation in the arrest and surrender of suspects of alleged ICC crimes would result in impunity for ICC crimes, which would have negative ramifications on access to justice for women, girls, and SOGI minorities. Seen in this light, Jordan’s non-compliance with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s request to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir has consequences that are adverse and far-reaching. Jordan’s avoidance with respect to the arrest and surrender of the defendant is inconsistent with its obligations under international law, specifically human rights.
Rape as Torture
16. Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been recognised as torture under international law by various courts and tribunals. For instance, in Aydin v. Turkey, decided in 1997 by the European Court of Human Rights, the Court found that rape could also constitute a violation of the prohibition of torture, enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention.Footnote 172 In this case, a Turkish police officer had been charged with the rape of a seventeen-year-old Kurdish girl who had been illegally detained. Similarly in Martí de Mejía v. Perú, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that rape violated the prohibition against torture, stated in Article 5.Footnote 173 In the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), four members of the Bosnian armed forces were prosecuted for rape and sexual violence against Bosnian Serb civilians detained in a prison camp in Čelebići. The trial chamber, in its judgment of 1998, observed that the rape of any person was a ‘despicable act which strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity’.Footnote 174 It held that acts of rape may constitute torture under customary international law.Footnote 175 In 2001, the appeals chamber of the ICTY upheld the judgment.Footnote 176 This was significant as it was the first judgment of the ICTY holding that rape satisfied the prerequisites of torture. Further, the ICTY stated that it is not required that each act be widespread or systematic, provided that the act forms part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.Footnote 177 A 2014 report that examined the torture of thirty-four women by state security forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo found that rape and sexual violence ought not to be seen in isolation; it must be seen in the broader pattern of widespread torture.Footnote 178
17. The resolve to end impunity for sexual and gender-based violence is of utmost importance, particularly due to the historic wrongs committed during Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, where a deliberate failure to prosecute persons for crimes committed against women in a systematic manner during World War II was evident.Footnote 179 There is an urgent need to ‘right’ the wrongs by ending impunity for ICC crimes. On this ground, too, non-cooperation with the Court for arrest and surrender of suspects, including heads of state, can be neither tolerated nor condoned.
18. Even if some countries are not state parties of the Statute, they have a duty to discharge their state obligations under other conventions that they have ratified, including (but not limited to) the Genocide Convention and/or Torture Convention. For instance, although Sudan is not a state party to the Statute, it acceded to the Genocide Convention on 13 October 2003 and is bound to discharge its state obligations under the same. For those countries that are state parties to the Statute as well as other relevant conventions, they have additional state obligations under multiple conventions, which need to be addressed holistically. For instance, in addition to being a state party to the Statute, Jordan acceded to the Genocide Convention on 3 April 1950, and it acceded to the Torture Convention on 13 November 1991. We note that rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence constitute torture and, in specific situations, are characterised as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.Footnote 180 Thus, we conclude that Jordan’s abject failure to discharge its state obligations are not only under the Statute but also under allied conventions that it is a party to.
19. The Court will engage in the nature of power in relation to immunity enjoyed by the defendant, noting that he had access to ample resources to travel safely, and to stay in several jurisdictions. The Prosecutor has submitted that the Court could consider an agent in executing the Court’s arrest warrant, and consequently the enforcement jurisdiction would be that of the Court and not that of the requested state, Jordan.
Victims’ Right to Reparative Justice
20. This Court remains committed to a reparative justice approach that centres victim participation in legal proceedings and adjudication with reparations.Footnote 181 Essentially, such an approach would encompass ‘restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction (disclosure of the truth) and guarantee of non-repetition’.Footnote 182 Beyond individual accountability for international crimes, as well as conviction and punishment of the defendant for the same, the Court is committed to engaging with member states in support of such practices that would reinforce a deliberate intent towards prevention of future crimes.Footnote 183 Additionally, a priority of this Court is to protect and uphold the interests of the victims and affected communities. This would contribute to securing long-term stability in post-conflict societies – an imperative of state parties to the Statute.Footnote 184 This approach should be realised so that victims are perceived and treated as ‘active agents’ rather than ‘passive objects’ in international criminal justice processes.Footnote 185 Such an approach is also supported by the Office of the Prosecutor, which, in its policy paper on sexual and gender-based crimes, emphasises a gender-inclusive approach to reparations, taking into account the gender-specific impact on, as well as the harm caused to, and suffering of, the victims affected by the crimes for which an individual has been convicted.Footnote 186 Additionally, General Recommendation 30 of the CEDAW committee, on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations, provides a framework of state obligations, including due diligence obligations, prior to, during, and after a conflict.Footnote 187 It is pertinent to note that General Recommendation 30 applies to international and internal armed conflict. Jordan is a state party to the CEDAW.
Towards Universal Jurisdiction and a Borderless World
21. This Court further opines that reducing or eliminating safe havens for suspects of ICC crimes is of prime importance, given the heinous nature of such crimes. While the Statute presently does not provide for universal jurisdiction, this Court observes, with satisfaction, the positive movement towards universal jurisdiction for ICC crimes, where an increasing number of national courts are willing to prosecute suspects for serious crimes under international law. In the years 1994–2009, a number of countries, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Norway, The Netherlands, Spain, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States started to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction in relation to crimes against humanity, torture, or genocide.Footnote 188 The principle is premised on the notion that perpetrators of such crimes are hostes humani generis (enemies of all mankind), so any country should have the jurisdiction and legal authority to hold the perpetrators accountable, regardless of the country where the crime was allegedly committed or the nationality of the perpetrator or the victims.Footnote 189 In 2009, an African Union–European Union Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction emphasised as follows: ‘[T]emporal, geographical, personal and subject-matter limitations on the jurisdiction of international criminal courts and tribunals mean that universal jurisdiction remains a vital element in the fight against impunity.’Footnote 190 A 2012 report of Amnesty International notes that a total of 147 states have exercised universal jurisdiction for one or more crimes in international law.Footnote 191 We believe that universal jurisdiction for the most serious crimes under international law does not weaken or diminish the ICC’s jurisdiction over heinous crimes in any manner whatsoever; to the contrary, it complements and strengthens the philosophy behind the establishment of the ICC, which is to end impunity for ICC crimes.
22. Further, the legal concept and practice of universal jurisdiction reinforces and strengthens the futuristic vision of a borderless world, grounded in principles of freedom and equality, where people can move freely as global citizens, where migrants and refugees face no violations, and where natural resources belong to all human beings across the world.Footnote 192 Given that most wars are fought over territories or for control over natural resources, often in the name of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, with sexual and gender-based violence as a logical corollary of such wars, a borderless world would go a long way in preventing wars and their aftermath. A borderless world would also ensure justice and accountability for perpetrators of ICC crimes, as they would have no safe havens through which they could potentially thwart arrest and production before the Court. Drawing inspiration from Gayatri Spivak, the only borders to be respected should be the ‘seemingly permeable female body’.Footnote 193 Though this may sound like a feminist utopian dream, we believe that it is the spark of a dream today that lights the path towards its achievement in future.
23. In conclusion, a warrant of arrest, alongside a summons to appear, issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I of this Court against Mr Al Bashir, is intended to ensure accountability of the defendant for the alleged commission of ICC crimes, secure justice for the victims, and thereby end impunity for heinous crimes that may have been perpetrated. Jordan bears the legal and moral obligation to execute the arrest warrant and cooperate with this Court. Such an obligation is not obliterated by head-of-state immunity recognised under customary international law. Since Jordan is a state party to the Rome Statute and is presumed to be fully aware of the provisions of the Rome Statute that it accepted, including Article 27 (irrelevance of official capacity), we conclude that by refusing to execute the arrest warrant, Jordan has deliberately and intentionally failed to discharge its obligations under international criminal law to cooperate with this Court.
Judge Saumya Uma and Judge Ramya Jawahar Kudekallu
10.4 Victim Participation in the Abd-Al-Rahman Confirmation of Charges
In 2021, single judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala, appointed the Office of Public Counsel for Victims as the common legal representative for all participating victims in the case against Mr Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb).Footnote 194 This decision was made without prior consultation with any of the victims, with the single judge citing time constraints and practical limitations.Footnote 195
In her rewrite, Anushka Sehmi focuses on the agency of victims, which must be supported to provide meaningful participation. Sehmi uses the governing statutes of the ICC as well as its previous decisions to firmly assert that victims must be consulted with regard to their choice of representative. In using this agency of choice, Sehmi highlights how victims of sexual and gender-based violence may feel more empowered as victims to nominate, knowing that their experiences are to be represented by a person chosen by themselves, thereby ensuring a greater capture of evidence and testimonies. Further, in choosing their own representative, the ICC may avail itself to counsel with specific and necessary subject and socio-cultural expertise which again may ensure greater access to justice for those involved.
Decision Establishing the Principles on Victims’ Representations during the Confirmation of Charges Hearing No.: ICC-02/05-01/20-259
Date: 18 January 2021
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II(B)
Before: Judge Anushka SEHMI
SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. ALI MUHAMMAD ALI ABD-AL-RAHMAN (‘ALI KUSHAYB’)
Judge Anushka Sehmi, acting on behalf of Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (the Court), taking into consideration Articles 57(3)(c), 67(1)(c) and (2) and 68(1) and (3) of the Rome Statute (the Statute), Rules 16 and 85–93 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) and Regulations 79, 80, and 86 of the Regulations of the Court (the Regulations), I hereby issue this Decision establishing the principles applicable to victims’ participation and representation during the Confirmation of Charges Hearing.
Procedural History
1. On 9 June 2020, Mr Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Mr Abd-Al-Rahman) surrendered himself and was transferred to the Detention Centre of the Court. On 15 June 2020, as ordered by the Chamber,Footnote 196 Mr Abd-Al-Rahman made his first appearance before the single judge.Footnote 197
2. On 9 October 2020, the Registry, through the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS), submitted a request to modify the standard application form for victim participation in the present case (VPRS Request)Footnote 198 and on 4 November 2020, the Chamber granted the VPRS Request.Footnote 199
3. On 17 November 2020, the VPRS submitted observations and recommendations on aspects related to the admission process for victims seeking to participate in the proceedings (Registry Observations).Footnote 200
4. On 11 January 2021, the legal representative of potential victims requested the Chamber to clarify the temporal and geographical scope of the charges and to be provided with guidance in terms of the modalities for legal representation, including access to documents in the case file (Request for Guidance).Footnote 201 On 13 January 2021, the defence responded to the request for clarification from the legal representative.Footnote 202
Analysis
Preliminary Matter
5. The single judge notes that the Request for Guidance was filed by the legal representative on behalf of a number of individuals who have filed applications to participate in the proceedings as victims of crimes that fall within the scope of this case. In this respect, a valid power of attorney has been submitted to the Registry. Consequently, the present decision sets out the applicable principles and modalities of victim participation with respect to the upcoming confirmation of charges hearings.
Meaningful Victim Participation as the Core Principle Guiding Modalities of Victim Participation
6. In the opinion of the single judge, a discussion of the modalities of victim participation is of little value without elaborating on the concept of meaningful victim participation and what it entails in the context of these pre-trial proceedings.
7. Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute provides that:
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
8. The jurisprudence before this Court emphasises that the participation of victims in proceedings must be ‘meaningful’ as opposed to ‘purely symbolic’.Footnote 203 It is the opinion of the single judge that practice before this Court has demonstrated that there are at least three main overarching principles that must be adhered to in order to ensure that victim participation is meaningful. The first is a gender-sensitive and inclusive approach to victim participation which considers the gendered dynamics of conflict; secondly, effective communication and consultation between victims of conflict and the Court; and lastly, ensuring victim agency in their choice of legal representation.
A Gender-Sensitive and Inclusive Approach to Victim Participation
9. According to the single judge, meaningful victim participation must be gender-sensitive and inclusive. The Rome Statute is the first international instrument that expressly includes sexual and gender-based crimes, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, and other forms of sexual violence as underlying offences of both war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Statute also prohibits persecution based on gender as a crime against humanity. Sexual and gender-based crimes may also fall under the Court’s jurisdiction if they constitute acts of genocide or other acts of crimes against humanity or war crimes. Furthermore, in 2014, the Office of the Prosecutor launched its Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, which seeks to help ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of these crimes and enhance access to justice for victims.Footnote 204
10. Article 21 of the Statute outlines the sources of law that are applicable by the Court, which include treaties and ‘principles of international law’. As stated by the Appeals Chamber in relation to Article 21(3), ‘the law applicable under the Statute must be interpreted as well as applied in accordance with internationally recognised human rights. Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court’.Footnote 205 According to the single judge, applying best practices from the normative international human rights law framework is particularly important in ensuring gender-sensitive and inclusive victim participation.
11. The right of women to participate in transitional justice processes is guaranteed under a number of human rights instruments and conventions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),Footnote 206 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),Footnote 207 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).Footnote 208 This right is premised on the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable right of all people to participate in political and public life, including people of all genders.
12. In its landmark Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recognised the importance of the equal participation and full involvement of women in maintaining and promoting peace and security.Footnote 209 In Resolution 2467 (2019), the UNSC specifically called for women’s meaningful participation in transitional justice processes.Footnote 210
13. A gender-inclusive and sensitive approach to victim participation must guide the entire process of facilitating the participation of victims in ICC proceedings and their participation through their legal representative/s. Indeed, a gender-inclusive approach to victim participation is especially important as conflict often exacerbates societal gender inequalities, leaving women and girls even more vulnerable to gross human rights violations and sexual and gender-based crimes (SGBC).Footnote 211 Thus, the process of victim participation should borrow from human rights law best practices and encourage a gender and women’s rights perspective which allows women to exert their agency.
14. Furthermore, victim participation in ICC proceedings should aim to address underlying structural causes of gender inequality. For example, UNSC Resolution (2019) states as follows:
Transitional justice processes should seek to address the underlying gender inequality in societies. Redressing such inequality entails addressing the needs and priorities of all women and girls, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex individuals, and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, including men and boys, as well as guaranteeing their safe and meaningful participation in those processes.Footnote 212
15. Consequently, addressing the structural causes of gender inequality requires that the Court adopt a ‘transformative’ approach to victim participation. Rees and Chinkin argue that ‘transformative justice’ must have ‘gender relations at its center’.Footnote 213 In the opinion of the single judge, ‘transformative’ victim participation in the context of ICC proceedings requires a contextual, bottom-up, and locally grounded approach geared towards addressing structural inequalities, including those related to gender, which arguably are some of the root causes of conflict.Footnote 214
16. Furthermore, the idea of transformative justice has been articulated in several UN documents on reparations. For example, the Guidance Note of the Secretary General on Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) instructs that ‘[R]eparations should strive to be transformative, including in design, implementation and impact’.Footnote 215 In the opinion of the single judge, transformative justice is not only limited to the reparations phase of the proceedings, but also to victim participation.
17. White has articulated an ascending scale of four general forms of participation: nominal; instrumental; representative, and transformative.Footnote 216 In the opinion of the single judge, these principles of participation are wholly applicable to victim participation at the ICC and consequently victim participation should aim to be transformative, empowering victims as opposed to those acting on their behalf, and allow them to engage with the Court on their own terms.Footnote 217
18. There exist varied gendered experiences and consequences of conflict, and therefore women’s inclusion must be proactively sought throughout the process of facilitating victim participation in order to ensure that it is meaningful. However, meaningful and ‘transformative’ victim participation should not be tokenistic and performative through the mere numerical inclusion of women; rather, it should aim to ensure that they can communicate their views and concerns and have their input incorporated into any relevant processes. In addition, given that victim communities do not exist in a vacuum and often form part of larger patriarchal social and political structures dominated by men, it is necessary for the Registry to expect some resistance to gender-inclusive victim participation and design strategies that will counter such resistance.
19. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that women are not a monolithic group, and victim participation processes must allow for the full diversity of women, including those of different minority religious or ethnic groups, as well as those from rural or urban backgrounds, to participate in ICC proceedings. In particular, the Registry and their interlocutors must proactively seek to engage with women, girls, and non-binary individuals who may be eligible to participate in ICC proceedings.
20. Steps should be taken at every stage of the victim participation process in order to ensure the participation of marginalised groups or persons depending on the victim’s sex or gender identity. It is crucial for the Registry to ensure the inclusion of women and girls who may have a disadvantaged socio-economic status. In line with international human rights standards, the single judge submits that the facilitation of victim participation by VPRS and its intermediaries must be fulfilled without discrimination based on sex, gender identity, ethnicity, race, age, political affiliation, class, marital status, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, and disability, or any other status.
21. In addition to the victim’s sex or gender identity, any other intersecting factors, such as a victim’s social or political identity, must also be considered in order to prevent any discrimination against them during the facilitation of victim participation. Indeed, discrimination against women can affect them in intersectional ways (including race, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, and gender identity, amongst others).Footnote 218 Thus, it is necessary for the Registry to remain mindful of intersectional forms of discrimination when facilitating victim participation.
22. Furthermore, women and girls also face significant structural and cultural inequalities in many contexts within which this Court operates and generally worldwide.Footnote 219 For example, women and girls may face greater obstacles than their male counterparts in having their voices heard in processes that impact their interests.Footnote 220 Some of these obstacles may be practical, such as childcare responsibilities or those relating to work, especially in the home.Footnote 221 In addition, in certain cultures women’s voices may generally be marginalised due to traditional, religious, and cultural practices that operate within many contexts, including in Sudan.Footnote 222
23. In addition, women and girl survivors of SGBC may face even greater obstacles to having their voices heard given their trauma or the silencing of their experiences.Footnote 223 Furthermore, in certain communities women may be discouraged from attending school or may be married at a younger age, limiting their educational opportunities.Footnote 224 This may have a direct and disproportional impact on their levels of literacy, and consequently their ability to complete victim application forms or adequately convey their views with regard to their choice of legal representation.Footnote 225
24. Therefore, it is critical for the Registry to assess whether such obstacles exist and implement strategies in order to ensure the equal participation of women in the victim participation process. This could be through the organisation of ‘women only’ spaces which would allow women to speak more freely, or through separate meetings for survivors of SGBC.
25. Furthermore, women’s meaningful participation in roles of leadership can also actively confront patriarchal power structures and entrench women’s status as equal rights bearers within a community.Footnote 226 In relation to VPRS’s intermediaries, the single judge notes that it can be the case that men and male voices are amplified over others, such that men may be more likely to volunteer as intermediaries for VPRS. As such, the single judge submits that VPRS must take steps to ensure that women are given the opportunity to participate in this type of ‘leadership’ role as per the ICC Guidelines on Intermediaries.Footnote 227
26. The reason for this is twofold: firstly, it will engender a gender-sensitive and inclusive approach to victim participation if women are afforded such positions of leadership, effectively allowing them to exercise their agency throughout the victim participation process. Secondly, the presence of female intermediaries will possibly make it easier for other female victims or victims of SGBC to give a fuller account of the harm they have suffered. Given that it is often the case that VPRS intermediaries, rather than staff of VPRS, assist victims in the completion of victim application forms, ensuring that victims are comfortable enough to express the totality of the harm they have suffered must be a key consideration in the choice of intermediary. Furthermore, it may be easier for female intermediaries to access networks of victims who may be hesitant to speak to men. In this way, women’s inclusion in leadership positions, such as that of a VPRS intermediary, or the spokesperson for a group of victims, rather than solely as ‘victims, for example of SGBC’, can help cement the role of women in transitional justice processes.
27. The suspect in this case, Mr Al-Rahman, has been charged by the Prosecutor in Counts 8–9 of perpetrating rape as a crime against humanity and a war crime.Footnote 228 In Bindisi and the surrounding areas, militia/Janjaweed and Government of Sudan forces allegedly raped at least seventeen women.Footnote 229 However, as is often the case in times of conflict, the number of sexual violence survivors may be greater than those stated in official figures.Footnote 230 Therefore, it is highly likely that VPRS and their intermediaries will encounter a larger number of victims of SGBC.
28. Although it may be harder to ensure that victims of SGBC come forward and participate in ICC proceedings due to the possibility of stigma and ostracism, the single judge believes that a well-thought-out strategy for victim participation will ensure that victims of any gender will feel comfortable enough to participate in ICC proceedings. At the same time, it is important to remain mindful that although women are disproportionately impacted by SGBC, the Registry should avoid equating ‘woman or girl victims’ with ‘victims of sexual violence’, as this could further victimise women and sideline male and gender-non-binary victims of SGBC.
29. Lastly, special attention must be paid to the participation of child victims in ICC proceedings, including their age, maturity, and the harm that they have suffered, in order to prevent further harm or trauma. Child victims should feel comfortable enough to express their views and concerns freely and the VPRS should implement measures in order to ensure the protection of their rights, especially those girls who may be affected by SGBC. However, at the same time, VPRS and their intermediaries must remain aware of potential violations against men and boys, which tend to result in stigma and silence.Footnote 231 To this end, the single judge encourages a statistical evaluation of the number of victim application forms received in order to ensure sufficient gender representation. However, it must be borne in mind that gender inclusiveness cannot be solely represented by numbers, but, rather, ‘meaningful’ participation requires that women, girls, and non-binary individuals are able to exert their agency and influence through justice processes, such as victim participation in ICC proceedings. Thus, the single judge stresses that the representation of women and girls should not be limited to the cosmetic and numerical ‘inclusion of women’ but should also ensure that women are heard, and able to exercise their agency.
Effective Communication
30. It has been argued that an essential element of meaningful victim participation is ‘frequent communication and consultation between victims and the Court’.Footnote 232 Meaningful participation necessarily requires that victims are not treated as an ‘abstract or symbolic entity, but as individual rights-bearers with opinions’ that are relayed to the Court.Footnote 233
31. The single judge concurs that one of the foundational elements of meaningful victim participation is the implementation of strategies aimed at ensuring consistent two-way communication between affected communities and the Court. Indeed, as highlighted in the previous section, consultation is also an essential element of transitional justice.Footnote 234 This function appropriately falls within the mandate of the Public Information and Outreach Section (PIOS) and VPRS.
32. The role of the VPRS in assisting victims in completing victim application forms, as well as collecting application forms is underscored by Regulation 86(9) of the Regulations of the Court (RoC) and Rule 16(1) of the RPE. Regulations 5bis and 6 of the Regulations of the Registry outline the Registry’s role in ensuring public dissemination of appropriate, neutral, and timely information concerning the activities of the Court through public information and outreach programmes. Further to this, public information programmes must be aimed at ‘fostering public understanding and support for the work of the Court’.Footnote 235
33. Pre-Trial Chamber I in the situation in PalestineFootnote 236 called on the Registrar to create an information and communication system between the Court and victims, stating that ‘outreach and public information activities in situation countries are quintessential to foster support, public understanding and confidence in the work of the Court. At the same time, they enable the Court to better understand the concerns and expectations of victims, so that it can respond more effectively and clarify, where necessary, any misconceptions’.Footnote 237 Similarly, Pre-Trial Chamber III has stated that, ‘in order to be able to properly exercise their rights, victims should be provided with sufficient and accurate information about the Court’s role and activities’.Footnote 238
34. The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) has also underscored the importance of providing victims and affected communities with information regarding the activities of the Court, ‘in order to put into effect, the unique mandate given to the International Criminal Court towards victims’.Footnote 239
35. Furthermore, the ICC’s Integrated Strategy for External Relations, Public Information and Outreach has defined outreach as a ‘process of establishing sustainable two-way communication between the Court and communities affected by the situations that are subject to investigations. It aims to provide information, promote understanding and support for the Court’s work and to provide access to judicial proceedings’.Footnote 240
36. Consequently, for the Court to properly fulfil its mandate, it is essential that its role and activities are clearly understood by affected communities. Outreach and public information activities are critical not only to engender support for the Court but, more importantly, to establish a two-way form of communication between the Court and affected communities.
37. In the opinion of the single judge, outreach plays an integral role in informing victims of their participatory rights under the Statute. The success of victim participation in ICC proceedings is highly dependent on proper outreach and public information activities directed towards victims by both PIOS and the VPRS. Outreach regarding victim participation ensures that victims are aware of their participatory rights under Article 68(3) of the Statute. Furthermore, it lays the groundwork for the dissemination and collection of victim application forms within affected communities by the VPRS.
38. Therefore, it is crucial for the VPRS and PIOS to work together in order to inform victim communities of their right to participate in ICC proceedings under the Statute; the practicalities of the victim participation process, including the temporal, material, and territorial scope of the case; and respond to relevant questions from victim communities. To this end, the Registry must employ a bottom-up and focused strategy, and enable harmony between victims’ needs and institutional responses. Victim participation should be viewed as an ongoing process, entailing dialogue and constant adaptation, in order to ensure that it is meaningful.
39. At the same time, the single judge is cognisant of several obstacles that have prevented PIOS and VPRS from conducting outreach with affected communities and informing eligible victims of their right to participate in these proceedings.
40. Firstly, the Registry has been unable to establish a field presence in Darfur as a result of budgetary constraints and the attendant need to allocate the Court’s limited resources across multiple situations and cases.Footnote 241 Consequently, this means that at present there is potentially a huge information vacuum in Darfur regarding the Court’s activities and mandate that must be addressed.
41. Secondly, ongoing security concerns in Darfur and the surrounding areas over the past few years has meant that the establishment of a Field Office has faced significant hurdles, apart from those related to budgetary concerns.Footnote 242 The single judge is aware that the security situation has meant that many victims have left the region and are living either in other parts of Sudan or have left the country entirely and now form part of the Darfurian diaspora.Footnote 243
42. Thirdly, the COVID-19 worldwide pandemic has greatly affected the mobility and ability of staff members of the Court to conduct field missions, in Darfur or where members of the Darfurian diaspora may reside, in order to carry out general outreach,Footnote 244 inform victims of their right to participate, and solicit their views on the choice of their legal representation in proceedings, should they be eligible to participate.Footnote 245
43. However, the single judge contends that despite these obstacles the Court still has a binding duty to fulfil its mandate to the best of its ability, bearing in mind that in some instances this may necessitate adapting to a new set of circumstances, especially considering the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the Court simply cannot fulfil its mission without ensuring that the affected communities are able to understand the Court’s mandate, the judicial proceedings, and their right to participate in proceedings and claim reparations.
44. Consequently, PIOS and VPRS, in consultation with the relevant Registry sections, must consider the feasibility of conducting field missions in Chad, Darfur, or other locations where potential victims reside, in order to commence the process of consulting with victims, providing them with information regarding the application process, disseminating victim application forms either directly or through VPRS intermediaries, and collecting completed victim application forms either manually or electronically.
45. Given the pervasive and unpredictable impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the operations of the Court, the single judge supports creative solutions that would enable communication between the Court and victim communities. For example, where logistical and security considerations make it difficult to consult with victims directly, VPRS should consider the possibility of consulting victims though secure online platforms, in collaboration with VPRS intermediaries, and in consultation with the relevant security sections within the Court. In addition, given the easing of travel restrictions, PIOS and VPRS should consider the feasibility to travelling to countries where a significant number of the affected Darfurian diaspora reside.
Legal Representation of Victims
46. Lastly, meaningful victim participation is not possible without quality legal representation. It has been argued that the entire system of victim participation at the ICC ‘feminizes and infantilizes’ victims and they are consistently treated as ‘weaker’ participants who do not need to be consulted on major decisions that impact on their interests.Footnote 246 One of these major decisions is victims’ choice of legal representation. However, ensuring a meaningful and gender-inclusive system of victim participation will entrench a system of victim participation that seeks to empower victims, and not marginalise them.
47. Consultations with victims must not only be limited to their participation in legal proceedings but should include their views on their choice of legal representative. The system of victim participation at this Court must seek to empower victims, rather than marginalise them; it must ensure that victims are not ‘infantilised’ and disempowered in these processes; and consequently, victims must be consulted on decisions that impact on their interests. In the opinion of the single judge, one of the most important decisions that victims can make is their choice of legal representative/s.
48. As noted by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Situation in the Republic of Kenya:
[W]hen deciding on the selection of the Common Legal Representative, the Chamber must balance a number of requirements. These requirements include in particular (a) the need to ensure that the participation of victims, through their legal representative, is as meaningful as possible, as opposed to purely symbolic; (b) the purpose of common legal representation, which is not only to represent the views and concerns of the victims, but also to allow victims to follow and understand the development of the trial.Footnote 247
49. To this, the single judge would add that the process of in-person consultation and engagement with victim communities is arguably the core function of the legal representative and potentially may also have a restorative justice function.Footnote 248
50. Rule 90(1) of the RPE provides that ‘A victim shall be free to choose a legal representative’. However, given the often large number of victims who are eligible to participate in proceedings, Rule 90(2) provides that ‘the Chamber may, for the purposes of ensuring the effectiveness of the proceedings, request the victims or particular groups of victims, if necessary, with the assistance of the Registry, to choose a common legal representative or representatives’.
51. The single judge notes that the legal representative of potential victims in their Request for Guidance represents 102 individuals who are seeking permission to participate in the confirmation of charges hearings.Footnote 249 The legal representative in question notes that she ‘has been instructed to represent a number of victim advocacy groups’,Footnote 250 and through her work with these organisations, she has identified 102 potential survivors who have suffered harm that potentially falls within the scope of the charges in this case.Footnote 251
52. The single judge notes that the process of an appointment of legal representation for victims should be driven by consultation with victims and through an open and transparent recruitment process of counsel, whether the outcome is the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) or external counsel. In this respect, the single judge notes with concern two issues in relation to the ongoing practice for appointment of counsel for victims at the Court. Firstly, there has been a tendency to appoint the OPCV as the common legal representative for victims without due consideration to victims’ views or existing representation.Footnote 252 Secondly, it has been the case that external counsel who have been able to establish ‘first contact’, so to speak, with victim communities have the expectation that they will automatically be appointed as common legal representative in their respective cases.Footnote 253
53. Both practices are problematic in their own way. The blanket representation of victims by the OPCV in all situations before this Court clearly raises issues of a lack of diversity in representation and perhaps prevents victims from choosing lawyers from their own country, or those with a different set of expertise. This lack of diversity also has an impact on the complementary nature of the Court and the importance of creating/harnessing expertise on victim representation and international criminal law more broadly beyond The Hague through external legal representatives and their support staff.
54. For example, it could be the case that victims would like to be represented by lawyers who are able to speak to them in their own language or be able to establish a permanent field presence in the relevant country. At the same time, there may be groups of victims who would prefer to be represented by the OPCV given their institutional positioning and familiarity with the Court’s practices and jurisprudence.
55. With regard to counsel who are ‘first on the scene’, so to speak, either as a result of them being from the same country or for other reasons, and are able to obtain powers of attorney from victim communities first, the single judge notes that this practice must not be systematised within court procedures such that these lawyers are automatically appointed as common legal representative by virtue of them being the first to have obtained powers of attorney from victims.
56. Victim communities are often traumatised and vulnerable in the aftermath of conflict, and therefore may appoint the lawyer that happens to approach them first. It may be the case that these lawyers are not well versed in international criminal law, or not well suited to represent victims for other reasons – for example, there may exist conflicts of interest or potentially better suited candidates with specific expertise, on SGBC, for example. Thus, it is the opinion of the single judge that all lawyers who are interested in representing victims, including the OPCV, must go through a competitive recruitment process in order to ensure they have the necessary expertise to represent victims in a particular situation country. Furthermore, and more importantly, victims must be consulted on their opinion of the candidates, including those who may already be representing them, in order to ensure that victims are given proper agency in the appointment of a legal representative.
57. Thus, taking into consideration the above, the single judge notes that in order to ensure that the system of victim participation at this Court empowers victims, victims must be able to have a choice in the appointment of their counsel, and a fair and transparent recruitment process of victims’ counsel must take place in order to ensure that the counsel selected have the necessary expertise in representing victims in international criminal proceedings, such as those before the ICC. Such expertise may include specific language skills; familiarity with the local context; previous expertise in representing victims; expertise in international criminal law; an established practice of working with victims of SGBC; proximity to the local communities; amongst others.
58. Again, the single judge would like to emphasise the importance of ensuring that consultations with victims on their choice of legal representation include the views of women and girls, whether victims of SGBC or not, male victims of SGBC, and other non-binary individuals. Consultations with victims must not be dominated by male voices and there must be room for women and girls, as well as other marginalised and intersecting groups, to have the opportunity to air their views and opinions.
59. Lastly, given the prevalence of SGBC in conflict, whether charged or not, it is the opinion of the single judge that counsel appointed to represent victims will have the necessary expertise with working with victims of SGBC or will endeavour to appoint team members with the necessary expertise.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE SINGLE JUDGE HEREBY
ORDERS the Registry, to establish, as soon as practicable, a system of public information and outreach activities relating to victim participation for the benefit of the victims and affected communities in Darfur and report back to the single judge in compliance with the principles established in the present decision.
ORDERS the Registry, in consultation with ICC Security Section, to undertake the feasibility of a mission to South Sudan/Chad to consult with victims, or alternatively arrange meetings with victims in neighbouring states, as well as consider meeting victims who may be in the diaspora.
ORDERS the Registry to facilitate the participation of victims through outreach, liaising with intermediaries, and the dissemination and collection of victim application forms in line with the principles laid out in this Decision.
ORDERS the Registry to consult victims on their choice of legal representation and report back to the Chamber regarding the outcome these consultations, with the view to conducting an open recruitment process in relation to the organisation of common legal representation.
Judge Anushka Sehmi
10.5 Gender-Based Persecution in the Abd-Al-Rahman Confirmation of Charges
In 2021, Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Mr Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb).Footnote 254 In this rewritten decision, Lisa Davis and Marina Kumskova consider whether the original Chamber had sufficient evidence before it to establish substantial grounds to believe that Mr Abd-Al-Rahman committed the crime against humanity of gender persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute at the sites of Kodoom, Bindisi, Mukjar, and Deleig, as well as the surrounding areas, and request the Prosecutor, under Article 61(7)(c) of the Rome Statute, to amend its Document Containing Charges.Footnote 255
Davis and Kumskova dissect the requirements of gender persecution, namely that there was a deprivation of liberty, that there was targeting of a collectivity, that this targeting was on gender grounds and was in connection with any act referred to in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, and then use these requirements and available evidence to analyse the evidence presented regarding all incidents in Sudan.
Davis and Kumskova find that the evidence satisfies the threshold that both Fur males and females were the victims of gender persecution, albeit in connection with differing Article 7(1) crimes, ultimately request the prosecution to include the charge of gender persecution in all incidents, and adjourn the confirmation of charges hearing for such a request to be made. Moreover, the rewritten decision suggests that any act of rape, torture, murder, other inhumane acts, or outrages upon personal dignity, if used to target a civilian group by reason of their gender, and if proven by the Court, are enough to find charges of gender persecution.
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb) No.: ICC-02/05-01/20-433
Date: 9 July 2021
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II (B)
Before: Judge Lisa Davis, Presiding Judge
Judge Marina Kumskova
SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN
IN THE CASE OF
THE PROSECUTOR V. ALI MUHAMMAD ALI ABD-AL-RAHMAN (‘ALI KUSHAYB’)
Charges
1. This decision on the confirmation of charges in the case against Mr Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Mr Abd-Al-Rahman), also known as Ali Kushayb, a national of the Republic of the Sudan (Sudan), addresses the legal question of whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Mr Abd-Al-Rahman committed the crime against humanity of gender persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute (Statute) in Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas between 15 and 16 August 2003, in Mukjar and surrounding areas between the end of February 2004 and the beginning of March 2004, and in Deleig and surrounding areas between 5 and 7 March 2004.
2. The Chamber adjourns the confirmation of charges hearing and requests the Prosecutor to amend its Document Containing the Charges,Footnote 256 pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Statute. First, the Chamber requests the Prosecutor to consider whether all war crimes and crimes against humanity that Mr Abd-Al-Rahman allegedly committed in Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas between 15 and 16 August 2003 (Counts 1–10), in Mukjar and surrounding areas between the end of February 2004 and the beginning of March 2004 (Counts 12–20), and in Deleig and surrounding areas between 5 and 7 March 2004 (Counts 22–30) can be separately and cumulatively charged as gender persecution. Second, the Chamber requests the Prosecutor to conduct further investigation with respect to gender persecution in Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas between 15 and 16 August 2003 (in addition to political and ethnic persecution under Count 11).
3. The Chamber concludes that, in circumstances where a civilian group is targeted on gender grounds by the acts of rape, torture, murder, other inhumane acts, and outrages upon personal dignity, such crimes either separately or cumulatively rise to the level of the crime against humanity of gender persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute and should be charged as such. In other words, each one of the war crimes or crimes against humanity, if used to target a civilian group by reason of their gender, and if proven by the Court, are enough to establish the crime against humanity of gender persecution.
Background and Procedural History
4. On 31 March 2005, pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Statute,Footnote 257 the United Nations Security Council referred to the Prosecutor the situation in Darfur, Sudan, as of 1 July 2002.Footnote 258
5. In the present decision, the Chamber renders its determination under Article 61(7)(c) of the Statute as to whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Mr Abd-Al-Rahman committed the crime against humanity of persecution on the grounds of gender in Darfur, Sudan. The purpose of the confirmation of charges procedure is to ensure that the charges that are supported by ‘sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged’.Footnote 259 While having carefully considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and participants as part of its determination, the Chamber will only refer in this decision to those elements which it considers necessary to show the line of reasoning underpinning its conclusions.
Crime against Humanity of Persecution
6. For the purposes of the Statute, ‘crimes against humanity’ means any acts enumerated under Article 7(1) of the Statute, including murder, torture, and rape, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, with the perpetrator’s knowledge of the attack. The chapeau elements for crimes against humanity were found to be sufficiently met for all charges in the case against Mr Abd-Al-Rahman and thus are not discussed here.
7. The crime against humanity of gender persecution requires, under the Statute, that (1) the perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons of fundamental rights; (2) the perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such; (3) such targeting was based on gender as defined in Article 7(3) of the Statute; and (4) the conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7(1) of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.Footnote 260 These elements are discussed below. Elements (5) and (6) pertaining to the chapeau elements for crimes against humanity are omitted.
The Perpetrator Severely Deprived One or More Persons of Fundamental Rights
8. Article 7(2)(g) of the Statute defines ‘persecution’ as ‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’.
9. The Statute also requires, under the fourth element of persecution, a connection between gender persecution and an act under its Article 7(1) or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. Since all crimes under the Statute are violations of fundamental rights and all persecutory conduct violates the fundamental right to be free from discrimination, the violation of the right to be free from discrimination in connection with any relevant crime prohibited by the Statute always constitutes a severe deprivation of fundamental rights.Footnote 261
10. The Court also recognises that it is in the interest of justice to consider all human rights violations that cumulatively constitute a severe deprivation of fundamental rights in connection to an act or acts of gender persecution.Footnote 262 For this reason, the Court considers a broad range of human rights violations.Footnote 263
11. The Chamber notes that the Statute should be interpreted and applied in accordance with internationally recognised human rights pursuant to Article 21(3) and may consult ‘applicable treaties’ where ‘appropriate’ under Article 21(1)(b).Footnote 264 Such rights are enshrined in, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (taken together these are known as the ‘international bill of human rights’); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; and other international or regional instruments on international human rights.Footnote 265
12. The Chamber therefore calls on the Prosecutor to consult applicable treaties and other relevant international or regional human rights law in its analysis of the severe deprivation of fundamental rights in connection to any acts of persecution in its charges against Mr Abd-Al-Rahman.
The Perpetrator Targeted Persons by Reason of the Identity of a Group or Collectivity or Targeted the Group or Collectivity as Such
13. The Statute requires that the perpetrator targets a person or persons either based on ‘the identity of a group or collectivity’ or ‘targeted the group or collectivity’.Footnote 266
14. The ‘targeted group’ may be, and frequently is, larger than persons who are perceived to exhibit the criteria of the group and must be interpreted broadly.Footnote 267 In accordance with tribunal jurisprudence, the ‘targeted group’ is defined by the perpetrator and may include such victims who, due to their affiliations or sympathies for members of the identity protected under the prohibited grounds for persecution, may become part of the targeted group.Footnote 268 The targeted group may also be defined as non-members of a specific group, meaning persons targeted for being perceived as non-members of an accepted group.Footnote 269
15. For gender persecution, this means the targeted group may simply be anyone who does not exhibit the acceptable gender criteria such as the roles, behaviours, activities, or attributes assigned to groups relevant for discriminatory targeting.Footnote 270 As the policy on the crime of gender persecution notes, ‘[g]roups targeted for gender persecution include, for example, women, girls, men, boys and LGBTQI+ persons, and subsets of these groups’.Footnote 271
The Perpetrator’s Targeting Was Based on Gender Grounds
16. Under Article 7(3) of the Statute, the term ‘gender’ refers to ‘the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society’.Footnote 272 The policy explains that ‘gender’ refers to sex characteristics and social constructs and criteria used to define maleness and femaleness, including roles, behaviours, activities and attributes’.Footnote 273 The policy further clarifies that ‘gender persecution is committed against persons because of sex characteristics and/or because of the social constructs and criteria used to define gender’.Footnote 274 The Chamber accepts the policy’s interpretation of Article 7(3) of the Statute because this interpretation is in accordance with decades of internationally recognised human rights, which is relevant in this Court by virtue of Article 21(3) of the Statute. Accordingly, the inextricable link between ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ should not be conflated.
The Conduct Was Committed in Connection with Any Act Referred to in Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the Statute
17. As noted above, the persecutory conduct must be committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7(1) of the Statute (underlying act) and results in the severe deprivation of a victim’s fundamental rights.Footnote 275 The policy notes that,
The threshold for element one of gender persecution is always met when the crime[s] under the Statute are committed with discriminatory intent. This is because all crimes under the Statute are violations of fundamental rights and all persecutory conduct violates the fundamental right to be free from discrimination. Taken together, the violation of the right to be free from discrimination in connection with any relevant crime prohibited by the Statute always constitutes a severe deprivation of fundamental rights.Footnote 276
18. In addition to satisfying its own elements pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, an underlying act may also trigger other multiple and severe fundamental rights deprivations. As the policy notes, ‘fundamental rights deprivations based on discriminatory grounds, should always be considered cumulatively’.Footnote 277 Identifying these additional deprivations helps to establish sufficient evidence to support the charge of gender persecution, providing a holistic and accurate historical record of atrocities and a clearer pathway to the non-repetition of crimes and sustainable peace.
Amended Count 11: Gender Persecution as a Crime against Humanity Committed against the Fur Men and Women in Kodoom, Bindisi, and Surrounding Areas
19. On 22 April 2021, the prosecution submitted its second corrected version of the Document Containing the Charges,Footnote 278 charging persecution as a crime against humanity on political and ethnic grounds committed in Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas between 15 and 16 August 2003 for targeting persons perceived as belonging to, or being associated with, or supporting the rebel armed groups (Count 11).Footnote 279 The Prosecutor did not charge gender as a ground of persecution for Count 11 (Bindisi and surrounds). Nor did the prosecution recognise women and girls as victims of gender persecution for Count 11. Therefore, the Court requests amendments for Count 11 under Article 61(7)(c) to include charges for gender persecution as a crime against humanity by way of the criminal acts listed under Counts 1–10.
20. In Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas (Counts 1–11), perpetrators tortured and killed Fur men, women, boys, and girls because of their ethnicity, political views and gender. While the militia/Janjaweed and Government of Sudan forces killed fleeing ‘young boys, men, women and children’,Footnote 280 victims were targeted on the basis of gender. The militia members were specifically instructed to keep men at the checkpoints.Footnote 281 The Fur women were asked about their husbands and often rapedFootnote 282 but not targeted for killing in the same manner as men. In particular, the perpetrators captured fleeing men and women and separated them by their gender.Footnote 283 The men in particular were forced to keep their backs turned to their female counterparts and were threatened with death if they failed to obey the order.Footnote 284
21. Most women were stripped of their clothing and raped, with their clothing stuffed in their mouths.Footnote 285 Women were often referred to as khadim (servants).Footnote 286 This is according to the perpetrators’ belief that because of Fur women’s gender and their ethnicity this is their prescribed gender role. Often egregious crimes are carried out as punishments for when victims are perceived to deviate from their prescribed gender role.Footnote 287 Stripping women of their clothes and the use of derogatory language were used as a means of humiliation, and mental torture was also common to many incidents.Footnote 288 Some of the women were raped in full view and/or hearing of other detained persons.Footnote 289 Fur women were also killed, including when they resisted rape.Footnote 290 In this context, women were targeted on gender grounds as a punishment for not complying with their presumed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes assigned to women and not fulfilling their destiny to sexually serve perpetrators who are men. Gender persecution inevitably includes efforts to aggressively reinforce binary gender roles and advance punishment for any transgression.
22. Sexual and gender-based violence also reinforced masculinities and manhood among Government of Sudan forces and militia/Janjaweed. After finding a virgin, some perpetrators fired guns in the air and shouted, ‘I have found a virgin woman’.Footnote 291 Mr Abd-Al-Rahman and militia/Janjaweed demonstrated an intent to commit persecution as indicated in his language, such as ‘we have taken Tora Bora’s wives, praise be to god’, while raping women in villages.Footnote 292 In addition to reinforcing their roles as enslaved persons, women’s bodies were being used to reduce their value as the future, attack their own honour and the honour of their husbands, terrorise the population, and ensure control over the population.Footnote 293
23. The evidence also shows the gendered nature of crimes in the statements by Government of Sudan forces and militia/Janjaweed about the fact that they will take the ‘beautiful’ women as wives and the ‘ugly’ ones will be servants.Footnote 294 This capitalises on the social pressures faced by women as a result of men’s attempt to control their roles and responsibilities in public and domestic settings.
24. Other torturous or inhumane acts committed against men or boys may also rise to the level of gender persecution in Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas. In detention, men were mistreated and kept in inhumane conditions.Footnote 295 Specifically, evidence shows that victims were treated so as to show that they are in the power of the perpetrators.Footnote 296 The militia/Janjaweed and Government of Sudan forces also humiliated, degraded, or otherwise violated the dignity of their victims, amounting to an outrage upon personal dignity.Footnote 297 Finally, Government of Sudan forces and militia/Janjaweed used pejorative and derogatory language against the Fur men and boys during the course of the attack, uttering epithets such as ‘slave’ and ‘servant’, and made derogatory references linked to detainees’ skin colour, while also stating that the Government of Sudan sent them to kill every Black person.Footnote 298
25. These multiple intersecting persecutory grounds capture aspects of the targeting that go beyond killing and include other crimes or inhumane acts. Fur men and boys were targeted because of their ethnicity, political beliefs, and gender. Abuses committed against such men and boys, as well as women and girls, for said reasons constitute the grounds of gender persecution. Absent the gendered perception that all Fur men are fighters and supporters of the rebel movements (specifically supporting these movements by joining them in their fighting role), these men would not be subjected to murder, torture, and other criminal acts. Similarly, women would not be raped if not in an attempt to humiliate and destroy communities. Therefore, Fur men, women, boys, and girls were not only targeted with killing because of their ethnicity and political beliefs but also because of their gender.
26. Pursuant to Article 61(7) of the Statute, the Chamber requests the Prosecutor to amend its Document Containing the Charges, so as to charge the acts of rape, torture, other inhumane acts, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, in addition to murder and attempted murder committed against the Fur men, women, boys, and girls in Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas between 15 and 16 August 2003 as the crime against humanity of persecution on the grounds of gender.
Additional Counts 21 and 31: Gender Persecution as a Crime against Humanity Committed against the Fur Men and Women in Mukjar, Deleig, and Surrounding Areas
27. On 22 April 2021, the prosecution submitted its second corrected version of the Document Containing the Charges,Footnote 299 charging persecution as a crime against humanity on political, ethnic, and gender grounds committed against the Fur men and boys in Mukjar and surrounding areas between the end of February 2004 and the beginning of March 2004 and in Deleig and surrounding areas between 5 and 7 March 2004 (Counts 21 and 31).Footnote 300 Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c) of the Statute, the Chamber further requests the Prosecutor to amend its Document Containing the Charges to include an additional charge of gender persecution for rape, murder, other inhumane acts, and outrages on personal dignity committed against women in Mukjar and surrounding areas between the end of February 2004 and the beginning of March 2004, and in Deleig and surrounding areas between 5 and 7 March 2004. The Chamber recognises both the differential and common impact of such persecutory conduct as rape against men, boys, women, and girls of the Fur tribe.
28. In Mukjar and surrounding areas, rapes have been committed and should be interpreted as an underlying crime of gender persecution.Footnote 301 Similar to the Kodoom and Bindisi incidents, these acts of rape served to subject women and girls to severe deprivation of their fundamental rights, including through mass rape and sexual violence.Footnote 302 Upon further investigation, the prosecution could establish that the impact could have included humiliation, degrading treatment, or inflicting serious injury to the victim’s body or to their mental or physical health. Rape may be committed to enforce a role or because it is the prescribed role, which is a central characteristic of sexual slavery/enslavement.
29. In Mukjar and surrounding areas, the evidence shows that the perpetrators also demonstrated an intent to commit persecution as indicated in their language, such as ‘I am going to f*** you today’ and subjecting men to beatings.Footnote 303 Such language is used to undermine men’s status by making them appear feeble, like ‘women’,Footnote 304 and can evidence intent to discriminate against both men and women. The policy elaborates on this, explaining that perpetrators may target men and/or women through rape based on gender discrimination:
Perpetrators may target women and girls because they view them as ‘chattel’ or ‘war booty’ (based on their belief that women are lesser than men and should be treated like property). At the same time, perpetrators may target men and boys through rape as a strategy to ‘feminize’ them and/or to invoke the ‘indignity’ of being treated as a woman or a ‘homosexual’ (based on their belief that men enjoy a higher standing than women or LGBTQI+ persons).Footnote 305
30. In Mukjar, Deleig, and surrounding areas, Mr Abd-Al-Rahman also mistreated the detainees, particularly by striking them with an axe or an axe-like object, as well as by whipping them across the back.Footnote 306 Such physical abuse is an indication of dominance over the Fur men and boys. Perpetrators inflicted the pain and suffering on Fur men and boys to obtain information or a confession. The crimes of torture, other inhumane acts, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity served to terrorise and intimidate the detained Fur men and boys and constituted the crime of persecution on the basis of intersecting political, ethnic, and gender grounds. Such treatment destroys the capacity of men and boys to lead and protect their families and communities by showing dominance, thus violating their manhood and inflicting psychological trauma.
31. In connection with these crimes, Government of Sudan forces and militia/Janjaweed targeted women based on political, ethnic, and gender grounds. Women and girls comprise the majority – if not totality – of rape victims during the selected attacks.Footnote 307
32. Therefore, the Chamber finds that available evidence appears to establish gender persecution within the jurisdiction of the Court based on the acts of rape, murder, other inhumane acts, and outrages on personal dignity committed against Fur men and women in Mukjar and surrounding areas between the end of February 2004 and the beginning of March 2004, and in Deleig and surrounding areas between 5 and 7 March 2004.
Conclusion
33. Not charging rape, torture, murder, other inhumane acts, and outrages upon personal dignity conducted as the crimes against humanity of gender persecution would be a travesty. The Chamber therefore adjourns the confirmation of charges proceeding and requests the Prosecutor to amend the Document Containing the Charges, pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Statute, to (1) amend Count 11 to specify that the acts of torture, rape, other inhumane acts, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, murder, and attempted murder committed against men, women, boys, and girls in Kodoom, Bindisi, and surrounding areas between 15 and 16 August 2003 (Counts 1–11) constitute the crime against humanity of gender persecution (as well as intersecting with political and ethnic persecution); (2) amend Counts 21 and 31 to specify that the acts of torture, rape, murder, and other inhumane acts against men, women, boys, and girls in Mukjar and surrounding areas between the end of February 2004 and the beginning of March 2004 (Counts 12–20), as well as in Deleig and surrounding areas between 5 and 7 March 2004 (Counts 22–30), constitute the underlying conduct of the crime against humanity of gender persecution, in addition to political and ethnic persecution.
Judge Lisa Davis and Judge Marina Kumskova
11.1 Reflection: The Situations in the Central African Republic
Introduction
This sub-chapter provides a critical reflection on the feminist reimagining of five selected decisions from the two ICC situations in the Central African Republic (CAR), known as ‘CAR I’ and ‘CAR II’. It begins by providing background to the relevant conflicts, as well as the procedural history of the cases prosecuted at the ICC. It goes on to summarise the key facts and outcomes of the ICC proceedings, before discussing how the authors of the reimagined decisions have departed from the original in adopting a feminist perspective. The sub-chapter considers what makes each decision ‘feminist’ and reflects upon how gender justice might be effected if we were to act beyond the ‘existing rules’ of international criminal law.
Background to the Conflict
Since gaining independence in 1960, CAR has experienced political instability, military coup attempts and army mutinies, and almost a constant state of rebellion which erupted into armed conflict a number of times. In 2001, (then) President Ange Félix Patassé faced two attempted coups, and in 2002 he faced another rebellion led by General François Bozizé. Unable to rely on his weakened army to fend off Bozizé’s rebellion, Patassé obtained the support of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) politician Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s military group, the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), which operated mostly in the southern CAR regions bordering the DRC. But Patassé was unsuccessful: the MLC was unable to defeat the rebels, and in 2003 Bozizé seized the presidency. Since that 2003 coup by Bozizé, the majority of the territory, and especially the northern areas, have been controlled by rebels.
In 2004, the CAR armed forces waged war against the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) but, despite efforts to achieve peace and disarmament, attacks against civilians persisted. In 2013, a coalition of various rebel groups known as Séléka (a predominantly Muslim group) accused the government of failing to abide by the peace agreements and seized the capital Bangui. Bozizé fled the country and Séléka leader Michel Djotodia declared himself president. Renewed fighting began between Séléka and militias opposed to them, called Anti-Balaka (a predominantly Christian coalition). In September 2013, President Djotodia disbanded the Sélékan, which had lost its unity after taking power, and resigned in 2014. He was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza, but the conflict continued. Faustin-Archange Touadéra, who was elected president in 2016, ran and won the 2020 election. That triggered the main rebel factions to form an alliance opposed to the election, called the Coalition of Patriots for Change, which was coordinated by former President Bozizé. This non-international armed conflict in CAR is ongoing and has resulted in targeted violence against civilians suspected of being supporters of either group or on the basis of their religious or ethnic affiliation.
Situation in the Central African Republic I
After receiving a referral from the government of the CAR led by President Bozizé in 2004, the (then) ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, opened a preliminary examination and investigation into alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on the territory of CAR from 1 July 2002 to March 2003.Footnote 1 Notably, there would be no ICC trials against Bozizé’s forces; the ICC only prosecuted crimes committed by the opposing MLC.
The main case to be prosecuted was against Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Mr Bemba), commander of MLC forces, for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by those forces, including the murder and rape of civilians and the pillaging of their homes and workplaces.Footnote 2 Proceedings were also initiated against Bemba and four other individuals for offences against the administration of justice, in connection with the Bemba case: Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Fidèle Babala Wandu, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, and Narcisse Arido.
Bemba, as MLC president and commander-in-chief, deployed those troops to the CAR at the request of former CAR President Patassé. Between October 2002 and March 2003, MLC troops directed a widespread attack against the civilian population of the CAR, committing brutal murders, rapes, and pillaging. In 2016, he was convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes by the ICC Trial Chamber on the basis that he was responsible for the crimes committed by MLC troops in the CAR under the principle of command responsibility. However, he was acquitted of all charges on appeal in 2018, when the majority of the Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber’s findings on command responsibility.Footnote 3
The following rewritten judgments reimagine four decisions in the Bemba case, including the Warrant of Arrest, Confirmation of Charges, Sentencing, and Appeal.
Feminist Reimagining of Select Judgments and Decisions
Judge David Eichert’s Reimagining of the Crime of ‘Forced Nudity’
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s Original Judgment
In the original judgment, the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to include forced nudity in the Warrant of Arrest against Mr Bemba.Footnote 4 The Chamber decided that the alleged acts of members of the MLC in ordering civilians (including cisgenderFootnote 5 men) to remove their clothes in public could not be considered ‘other forms of sexual violence’ as charged by the Prosecutor.Footnote 6 In the Chamber’s view, forced nudity was not conduct of ‘a gravity comparable to the other offences’ in Article 7(1)(g) of the Statute, such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or enforced sterilisation, or, regarding Article 8(2)(e)(vi), of comparable gravity to a serious violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.Footnote 7 The Chamber did not give any further reasoning for the exclusion.
The Reimagined Decision and Critical Reflection
The essential legal issue for the rewritten judgment was whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the specific acts of forced nudity by MLC members were of comparable gravity to other sexual offences found in Article 7(1)(g) or Article 8(2)(e)(vi).Footnote 8 Judge David Eichert concludes that, in this case, there were such reasonable grounds.
Although international tribunals have established that forced nudity can be considered a sexual crime, this is not always the case. As noted by the rewritten judgment, whether or not forced nudity is a sexual crime depends on the context of the acts themselves.Footnote 9 However, it is the particular context where international tribunals and the ICC have declined to acknowledge forced nudity and other acts similarly not specified in Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) as ‘sexual crimes’ that has been considered problematic by scholars, including feminist scholars,Footnote 10 and specifically in cases where victims have been cisgender men.
Historically, conflict-related sexual violence against anyone was largely ignored by national and international regimes alike. Through decades of feminist scholarship and advocacy there are now well-established international instruments and norms that recognise the victimisation of cisgender women and girls by conflict-related sexual violence, including the Rome Statute itself. However, it was not until relatively recently that cisgender men and boys were recognised as a unique category of victims of such violence. The international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia tried a number of cases that defined rape and sexual violence in a way that included violence against cisgender men and boys.Footnote 11 The Rome Statute also incorporates gender-neutral definitions of sexual violence. Nevertheless, as Sandesh Sivakumaran has argued, despite the recent recognition, problems remain in the implementation of the law.Footnote 12 For example, where victimisation of cisgender men and boys was not prosecuted as ‘sexual violence’ but as torture instead,Footnote 13 or where individual acts of violence against men were acknowledged but not prosecuted at all (as in this case).Footnote 14 Such approaches reinforce the idea that the violence that happens to men during conflict is not ‘sexual’ or that it is separate from, and in some cases perceived as ‘less serious’ than, the violence perpetrated against women.Footnote 15 Failing to recognise or prosecute such violence also ignores and invalidates the unique harm that victims suffer.
The catch-all words in Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi), ‘any other form of sexual violence’, potentially capture a range of violent acts perpetrated against cisgender men and boys; however, as illustrated by Valerie Oosterveld’s research, the ICC Prosecutor is rarely successful in arguing for the inclusion of such acts.Footnote 16 Judge Eichert’s rewritten judgment seizes an opportunity for the Chamber to fill the legal gap and recognise that forced nudity may, in some circumstances, be used to weaponise cultural ideas and beliefs about ‘gender, sexuality, religion, chastity, respect, social position, or dignity’.Footnote 17 Starting from an understanding of the crime of forced nudity that captures its potential to weaponise norms of gender, Judge Eichert creates space for the recognition of cisgender men, and, as further explored below, gender-diverse people, including trans people, as victims of a ‘sexual’ crime.
Judge Eichert outlines the unique ‘sexual’ harm of forced nudity that is tied to cultural and social context. All societies have socially constructed ideas about gender and sexuality, and a perpetrator can use forced nudity to weaponise these ideas against any gender. He describes such harm as mental anguish, being traumatising and humiliating.Footnote 18 By taking into consideration the social context, Judge Eichert acknowledges the potential psychological harm that can be inflicted on victims of forced nudity. His judgment also makes clear that perpetrators of any gender can weaponise such norms against a person of any other gender.Footnote 19 Forced nudity is therefore committed within the context of the perpetrators and the victim’s gender in light of the socially constructed norms of gender and sexuality. Thus, in certain circumstances the act of forced nudity can be just as dehumanising and harmful as the physical manifestations of sexual violence specified in Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi).
Unlike in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s original judgment, where the voices of victims were absent, in assessing the gravity of the particular alleged acts presented by the ICC Prosecutor, the reimagined judgment centres the victims’ experience. Judge Eichert stresses the importance of listening to victims when considering the social and cultural context that informs the gender norms being weaponised as ‘sexual’ harm. In doing so, he decides that there are reasonable grounds to believe the acts of forced nudity are of sufficient gravity to be included in the arrest warrant as ‘other forms of sexual violence’.
Utilising queer theory, the rewritten judgment also challenges gender duality by recognising the existence of transgender, intersex, and gender minorities and acknowledging the unique harms that forced nudity inflicts on such groups.Footnote 20 Traditionally, international law has reproduced a gender binary and, with that, unequal relations of power based on (cis)gender, thereby rendering gender-diverse people invisible and at risk of violence, including sexual violence, perpetrated to enforce rigid ideas about gender – that is, to maintain the heterosexual, binary order.Footnote 21 As a result, gender-diverse people are all but absent from international law and in international criminal trials. In the rewritten judgment, Judge Eichert makes these invisible victims visible.Footnote 22 Further, the kind of harm experienced by gender-diverse people as victims of forced nudity is different to cisgender people. For example, Judge Eichert explains how gender-diverse people’s bodies may not conform to socially policed ideas about gender and so being forced to be naked may lead to social exclusion; that their gender-diverse status may be exposed, leading to increased risk of violence; they may suffer gender dysphoria and again suffer mental anguish, humiliation, and further dehumanisation.Footnote 23
Judicial decisions can serve as a source of knowledge and is one way in which societies construct or reconstruct reality. Feminists have criticised what is considered accepted ‘knowledge’ as representing a male perspective of ‘reality’, thereby excluding women’s experiences.Footnote 24 That perspective is also predominantly a Western one. Similarly, the absence of gender minorities from international criminal trials reproduces the gender binary and excludes the particular experiences of those groups. If the ICC were to listen and publish the voices of such groups, especially those from non-Western societies, it would disrupt the power of the gender binary and redistribute some of that power to gender-diverse people.
However, such inclusion of gender-diverse people must be made in connection to gender-diverse communities themselves. Although Judge Eichert impresses the importance of listening to victims, if victims themselves are reluctant to expose their gender-diverse status then the responsibility will fall to the ICC Prosecutor to bring such existence and harms to the attention of the Chamber. Accordingly, the rewritten judgment also raises important questions about the sensitivities towards gender identity and sexuality of those who conduct investigations into atrocity crimes and the Office of the Prosecutor.
Judge Loyce Mrewa’s Reimagining of Confirmation of Charges for the Crime of Rape
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s Original Judgment
In 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the charges against Mr Bemba on five counts: the war crimes of rape, murder, and pillage, and the crimes against humanity of rape and murder.Footnote 25
However, the Prosecutor’s submission and the Document Containing the Charges also included the charges of torture as a war crime and as a crime against humanity, as well as outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime.Footnote 26 These three charges utilised the same factual content that the Prosecutor presented to the Chamber regarding the charges of rape also imposed against Mr Bemba.
In the original confirmation of charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber refused to apply the doctrine of cumulative charging,Footnote 27 stating that both torture and outrages upon personal dignity were entirely subsumed by the crime of rape, and therefore declined to confirm those charges.Footnote 28
The Reimagined Decision and Critical Reflection
In her reimagined confirmation of charges, Judge Loyce Mrewa confirms the ability of the Pre-Trial Chamber to apply the doctrine of cumulative charging by using a feminist approach and reflecting on the importance of a judicial understanding of the gender implications of cumulative charging for sexual and gender-based crimes. This approach arguably prevents flawed and gender-insensitive legal reasoning and reflects the extent of victimisation on the ground.Footnote 29
Judge Mrewa first focuses on demonstrating, through the jurisprudence of international tribunals,Footnote 30 that cumulative charging is permitted under international criminal law as a component of the fair labelling of crimes, considered a general principle of law, although not explicitly spelled out in the Rome Statute.Footnote 31 Basing her reasoning on prior authoritative jurisprudence, she argues that the accused can be charged and convicted with different offences in relation to the same set of facts under international criminal law if the relevant statutory provisions are designed to protect different social interests, each offence has a distinctive element, and the charges reflect the total culpability of the accused.Footnote 32
In the case under examination, Judge Mrewa recalls that the Prosecutor submitted cumulative charges for torture and outrages upon personal dignity which are based on the same factual conduct and are mainly related to acts of rape. She argues that rape is often used to achieve different ends, which should be carefully considered and distinguished from each other. For instance, the crimes of torture and rape protect different human rights, namely physical and mental integrity and physical autonomy and protection from non-consensual violations of bodily autonomy, respectively.Footnote 33 The threshold of suffering is also different, as torture requires ‘severe suffering’ whereas for rape non-consensual bodily invasion or penetration is sufficient.Footnote 34 Similarly, outrages upon dignity committed through acts of rape expand on the psychological harm caused by rape, reflecting on its far-reaching consequences such as humiliation, degradation, and attack on personal dignity.Footnote 35
Therefore, subsuming these crimes would fail not only to respect the principle of fair labelling, but also to reflect the full culpability of the accused and the extent of the harm suffered by victims.Footnote 36 Charging and convicting the accused for torture and outrages upon personal dignity allegedly committed through acts of rape shows the severity of rape, the intent to perpetrate ‘severe suffering’ as well as to humiliate, undermine personal dignity, and disempower the victim through sexual violence.
By reimagining the confirmation of charges through a feminist lens, Judge Mrewa successfully underlines the shortcomings of judicial decisions that oversimplify the breadth of lived experiences of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and the complexity and interrelated nature of sexual crimes with other serious human rights violations and abuses.
Like Judge Eichert, Judge Mrewa places the voices of the victims at the centre of the discussion, noting that to ignore the reality of rape as a method of torture or an outrage upon personal dignity excludes the lived experiences of survivors.
While Judge Mrewa’s legal reasoning effectively encompasses a feminist lens in her analysis of cumulative charging through fair labelling of different crimes, she could have further expanded on the practical gender implications of the lack of cumulative charging for torture or outrages upon personal dignity by referring to factual elements of the case, as included in the Prosecutor’s Amended Document containing the charges. For instance, the Prosecutor indicated that:
Civilian properties were systematically looted, and civilians were forced to cook and clean for the MLC troops against their will and with no payment. Men, women and children were raped by multiple MLC perpetrators in their homes, raped in front of family members, forced to watch rapes of family members, and raped in public locations including streets, fields and farms. Many of the women victims of rapes and gang-rapes contracted HIV, and became pregnant as a result of these rapes. Civilians that were killed included those who tried to prevent or resist rapes, attacks or lootings.Footnote 37
More specifically, in the case of civilians raped in front of family members or in public locations, charging the accused solely with rape without considering the element of public humiliation through the crime of outrages upon personal dignity and related long-term psychological trauma of both survivors of sexual violence and family members forced to watch their loved ones being abused, fails to reflect the extent of victimisation on the ground and minimises the complexity of sexual violence in conflicts and its societal impact beyond the direct victims of crime.
Judge Mrewa could have also reflected on the wide range of survivors of sexual violence and the specific impact that the lack of cumulative charging could have on men or gender-diverse victims. As discussed above, historically there has been a certain reluctance to include men and boys as victims of sexual violence and whenever the abuse was recognised it was hardly seen as sexual violence ‘for the issue was often buried under the rubric of abuse or torture’.Footnote 38
Concepts of masculinity, virility, and procreative capacity also play out in relation to the frequency of violence and torture aimed at male reproductive organs during conflicts, as ‘survivors of sexual torture often relate anxiety about the possibility of having children to injury of sexual organs or fear of no longer being considered fully a man or to function as a man’.Footnote 39 Therefore, failure to recognise the interconnected nature of torture and conflict-related sexual violence, including through cumulative charging, gives the false idea that international crimes are gender-blind, whereas acts of rape may constitute torture and torture may be intrinsically gendered and perpetrated with the intention of causing a gender-based crime.
Judge Kirsten Keith’s Reimagining of Sentencing for ‘Pillaging’
The Trial Chamber’s Original Judgment
In 2016, Trial Chamber III handed down the sentencing decision for Mr Bemba.Footnote 40 Bemba had been convicted for the war crimes of murder, rape, and pillaging, and the crimes against humanity of murder and rape committed by soldiers of the MLC who were proven to be under Bemba’s effective authority and control, in CAR between 26 October 2002 and 15 March 2003.Footnote 41 For the war crime of pillaging, Bemba was sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment.Footnote 42 The ICC judgment is the first to include a conviction for rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity, marking an important turning point in terms of accountability for sexual violence as an international crime.
In determining the gravity of the crime as the principal consideration to impose the sentence,Footnote 43 the Trial Chamber noted the special nature of the crimes of rape and pillaging.Footnote 44 In particular, it considered the aggravating circumstances for both crimes, such as the location of the crime (victims’ homes, churches, hospitals), the victims’ ages (as young as ten years old for sexual violence), the duration and repeated nature of the acts (against the same victim, in the presence of the victim’s family members, and committed by multiple MLC soldiers), the perpetrator’s motives, and the violent and humiliating nature of the acts, finding beyond reasonable doubt that Bemba knew the factors relevant to prove the alleged aggravating circumstances for both rape and pillaging.Footnote 45
In determining the aggravating circumstances, the Chamber found that ‘many of the same factors considered in relation to the circumstances aggravating the crimes of rape are equally applicable in assessing the aggravating circumstances alleged for pillaging’.Footnote 46 For instance, after having displayed great sensitivity to the psychological, medical, and societal impact of rape on victims in CAR,Footnote 47 while determining the particular cruelty of the crime of rape as an aggravating circumstance, it highlighted that ‘all acts of rape were committed together with, or during the course of, acts of murder and pillaging’.Footnote 48
Likewise, when assessing the gravity of the crime of pillage, the Chamber found that ‘MLC soldiers pillaged property from CAR civilians on a large scale and with grave consequences for the victims, impacting various aspects of their personal and professional lives, often leaving victims with nothing’,Footnote 49 including the necessities. The Chamber also found that acts of pillage were often accompanied by acts of murder and rape and always by physical and verbal abuse, threats of violence, death, and/or rape.Footnote 50 The modus operandi for pillage and rape proved to be similar: during acts of pillaging, MLC soldiers often targeted the unarmed victims in their homes, places of civilian sanctuary such as churches and hospitals, or in the bush while seeking refuge. They committed the crime repeatedly against the same victims and families, without regard to the victims’ age, gender, social status, livelihood, or well-being, ‘such as the ability to seek treatment, arrange burial or funeral services, or even feed their families’.Footnote 51 Common to both rape and pillage was also the MLC soldiers’ underlying motive of self-compensation,Footnote 52 for not receiving sufficient financial gain from their military operations, confirming the traditional use of rape victims as war booty.
In sentencing Bemba for the crime of rape as a war crime and crime against humanity, the original Trial Chamber’s verdict has the merit of reiterating many of the Rome Statute’s important gender-sensitive legal standards, to provide for a detailed account of some of the most appalling rape cases against men, women, and children and even to return to expert opinions to offer a comprehensive analysis of the magnitude of negative and permanent psychiatric, medical, and social consequences faced by rape victims in CAR. However, when it comes to pillage, while the Court clearly stated that it occurred simultaneously with rape and recognised its long-term negative impact on victims’ lives and well-being,Footnote 53 it failed to further expand on the broader socio-economic context and financial consequences for victims as well as to explore its gender dimension.
The Reimagined Judgment and Critical Reflection
Judge Keith fills this gap by considering the broader socio-economic context within which the crime of pillaging occurred. In her judgment, this approach helps to ‘frame the Chamber’s understanding of the gravity of the crime and the physical, social, and economic distress it creates for its victims, rather than viewing the impacts of the crime in isolation’.Footnote 54 Keith does so by recalling that CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 169 out of 175 countries in 2003 on a world poverty index, and by identifying the personal experiences recalled by victims and witnesses during trial.Footnote 55 The gravity of the crime of pillage in CAR’s socio-economic context is particularly evident in the factual circumstances of the case reported in testimonies: many victims were killed in an attempt to protect their property from destruction or confiscation,Footnote 56 showing the centrality of certain daily items that, despite not having an objective considerable financial value, were deemed necessary to preserve victims’ human dignity and survival. In doing so, Judge Keith highlights the difficulty of international criminal law in considering individual experiences in the face of mass atrocities, as well as its selectivity and inability to redress harm experienced by all conflict-related victims. She also notes the need to refrain from considering victims of international crimes as homogenous groups while also stressing the inevitable need to consider victims’ common socio-economic background. In integrating victims’ voice into the narrative, Keith demonstrates that robbing civilians of everyday items such as clothing, food, cooking utensils, foam mattresses, money, and vehicles in a context characterised by extreme poverty deprived them of their basic necessities, whose impact is still visible today.Footnote 57 She demonstrates the grave harm caused by destruction and confiscation of property during conflict, a violation that, like many economic, social, and cultural rights violations, is often overlooked in international human rights law and, even more so, in international criminal law.Footnote 58 Importantly, she also explores the financial loss caused by pillage, with lack of access to medical treatment and education.Footnote 59
Judge Keith partially develops the notion of the gendered impact of poverty, which affects women differently as they often bear the sole financial responsibility for their children in times of conflict.Footnote 60 This is particularly true when women have been victims of rape and have to raise children born out of rape, either because their husbands left them due to cultural stigma or because they have been killed. So, even when women’s financial situation is not the direct consequence of pillaging, the ‘crime of pillaging can leave women in a position of financial precariousness’.Footnote 61 While the original judgment solely focuses on the psychological impact of rape on victims, Keith comprehensively addresses the multidimensional nature of pillaging, which also includes a psychological component as it is often perpetrated in conjunction with other heinous crimes such as rape and murder. Similar to the original judgment, Keith concludes by confirming the serious gravity of the crime of pillage, highlighting its enduring impacts on victims and their families’ lives, which ‘exacerbate their vulnerabilities’.Footnote 62
Judge Keith’s reimagined judgment reveals the limitations of international criminal law in investigating both the socio-economic dimension of conflict-related sexual violence and the gendered nature of economic and social rights violations that may amount to international crimes, such as pillage. However, her feminist approach, which considers the wider contextual lives of women in legal reasoning, could have been broadened.
While Judge Keith sheds light on some of the gendered aspects of pillage, such as the lack of financial means for girls to access education or medical treatment as a result of pillaging, she mainly focuses on the socio-economic dimension of the crime of pillage. An important element indicated in the original judgment which Keith could have built on is that ‘all acts of rape were committed together with, or during the course of, acts of murder and pillaging’.Footnote 63 This means that all rape victims have also been victims of pillage (other than having witnessed the murder of one or more family members) in their household.
Applying feminist contextual reasoning implies considering how pillage affects men and women differently because of gender discrimination, especially when perpetrated in connection with rape and against the same victims. Given that rape disproportionately affected women and girls who were also victims of pillage within their households, while the negative consequences of pillage impacted all family members, depriving them of their basic necessities, it is self-evident that women and girls had to bear the worst physical, psychological, and financial consequences resulting from both crimes. In a context already characterised by widespread poverty and gender discrimination, pillage exacerbated women’s and girls’ vulnerabilities, for instance by depriving them of the financial resources necessary to access medical treatment to prevent sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies that may have resulted from the rape suffered or by forcing them to resort to coping strategies, such as forced marriage or trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation (for example, ‘survival sex’) to feed the family and their children after having lost everything.Footnote 64 As indicated also in the testimonies of some of the victims,Footnote 65 pillage further deteriorated the already dire living conditions of many families in CAR. Extreme poverty forced many children, especially girls, to drop out of school to take up employment in the informal sector, exposing them to further risks of gender-based violence, depriving them of the opportunity to continue their education and thus access better employment opportunities with the hope to improve their lives and break the cycle of poverty and violence.
In conclusion, international justice must take seriously the intergenerational trauma for women and girls stemming from the links between conflict-related sexual violence and intergenerational poverty which is exacerbated by the crime of pillage. In a 2021 UN report by the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC), reflecting voices of survivors worldwide, sexual violence survivors from CAR noted that one of their most frequent and unmet demands over the course of the past twenty years has been the necessary financial assistance to gain economic independence, which is essential for accessing other rights (including food, healthcare, education, access to justice) for themselves and their dependants.Footnote 66 The follow-up of the SRSG-SVC in 2022 noted that survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in CAR ‘continued to come from socioeconomically marginalized communities, including in remote and rural areas’.Footnote 67 Providing a gender lens to economic, social, and cultural rights violations may help international justice to better reflect the extent and heterogeneity of victims’ grievances and experiences and move a step forward towards recognition and redress of the multifaceted nature of the harm suffered.
Judges Suzanne Varrall and Sarah Williams’ Reimagining of Command Responsibility
The Appeal Chamber’s Original Judgment
Having been convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2016, Mr Bemba successfully appealed his conviction in 2018. The Appeal Chamber’s acquittal of Bemba on all charges, including those relating to rape and sexual violence, was a bitter disappointment for victims and a setback for feminist advocates and scholars, who criticised the decision as allowing immunity for sexual and gender-based crimes.Footnote 68
The original decision was in part based on the third ground of Bemba’s appeal – that the Trial Chamber used the wrong legal standard of command responsibility according to Article 28(a). Of particular interest is the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation of Article 28(a)(ii): ‘that military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution’.Footnote 69 In the original judgment, the majority of the Appeals Chamber accepted Bemba’s argument that commanders were allowed to undertake ‘cost/benefit analysis when deciding which measures to take, bearing in mind their overall responsibility to prevent and repress crimes committed by their subordinates’, thereby de-emphasising the word ‘all’ and instead emphasising the words ‘necessary’ and ‘reasonable’.Footnote 70 Additionally, the Chamber introduced the concept of a ‘remote commander’ as Bemba was located in the DRC.Footnote 71 According to the Appeals Chamber, this impacted on what ‘necessary and reasonable’ measures were ‘feasible’.Footnote 72
The Rewritten Judgment and Critical Reflection
Judges Suzanne Varrall and Sarah Williams focus on Article 28(a)(ii) and the failure of a commander to take ‘all necessary and reasonable measures’. They begin by centralising the concept of protection under international humanitarian law (IHL) and argue that this rationale informs and underlies command responsibility itself.Footnote 73 Furthermore, the rewritten judgment utilises a textual interpretation of ‘necessary’ and ‘reasonable’ in Article 28(a)(ii) to articulate the ‘correct’ legal standard, finding that there are minimum actions that must be taken by commanders.Footnote 74 Unlike the original judgment, Varrall and Williams do not limit those minimum necessary actions according to the geographical remoteness of the commander. Applying what they argue is the ‘correct’ legal standard, the rewritten judgment dismisses Bemba’s appeal as he failed to take the minimum necessary actions informed by the protective concept of IHL which included, inter alia, ensuring troops are properly trained in IHL.
Judges Varrall and Williams place a feminist lens at the heart of their rewritten judgment by first centralising the protective concept of IHL. One of the key principles of IHL is the protection of people who do not take part in the fighting. Importantly, this includes the protection of civilians against all forms of violence and degrading treatment.Footnote 75 Additionally, certain groups considered especially vulnerable, including women and girls, are specified as needing special protection from certain kinds of violence.Footnote 76 Article 27 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions dictates that women are to be especially protected against rape and sexual violence. Varrall and Williams state that this concept of protection also underlies the notion of command responsibility. Under IHL, commanders are expected to exert control over their forces and train them in IHL, including the obligation to protect civilians.Footnote 77 Article 28(a) holds commanders responsible for the crimes committed by their own subordinates, including violence against civilians. Consequently, Varrall and Williams argue that the rationale for command responsibility must be informed by the protective principle of IHL. Therefore, the protection of everyone from rape and sexual violence, as a central part of the concept of protection, informs the rewritten judgment’s approach to the legal standard of ‘all necessary and reasonable’ measures.
Another key principle under IHL is that of ‘proportionality’. According to this principle, some degree of harm to civilians is permitted, provided it is not disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage.Footnote 78 However, Varrall and Williams state that there is no possible military advantage to be gained by the targeting of civilians for sexual violence.Footnote 79 By taking this argument off the table, the principle of protection in the context of crimes of rape and sexual violence will always be a paramount consideration. This is a powerful feminist statement. Due to the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence during armed conflict, particularly against women and girls, this approach recognises both the gravity of the harm such violence causes and elevates the protection of vulnerable groups of civilians above that of military advantage. Moreover, the rewritten judgment links this to command responsibility, arguing that all commanders should be considered to be effectively on notice of the risk of sexual and gender-based violence and of their duty to take all necessary and reasonable measures to minimise it.Footnote 80 Overall, although absent from the original judgment, Varrall and Williams consider their legal reasoning having regard to the particular nature of the crimes committed by MLC forces, specifically rape and sexual violence.
When discussing the ‘correct’ legal standard of Article 28(a)(ii), the rewritten judgment uses a textual interpretation of ‘all necessary and reasonable measures’ according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.Footnote 81 Because the protective concept of IHL underlies command responsibility, Varrall and Williams begin by asserting that there must be a high standard expected of commanders to exercise control over their troops.Footnote 82 In contrast to the original judgment, Varrall and Williams emphasise the word ‘all’ so that what is determined as ‘necessary and reasonable’ cannot be watered down.Footnote 83 Accordingly, assessment of measures must start with that which is ‘necessary’ to prevent or repress the commission of crimes by subordinates. Importantly, what is necessary should be informed by the obligation to protect civilians from known risks associated with armed conflict: sexual and gender-based violence.
Judges Varrall and Williams then break down the three distinct obligations created by Article 28(a)(ii): ‘first to prevent crimes; second to repress crimes; and third to submit criminal matters to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution’.Footnote 84 They link the protective rationale of IHL to each of these obligations. Applying this reasoning to the facts, Varrall and Williams determine that part of the basic requirements of responsible command includes ensuring that subordinates are properly trained in the rules of IHL.Footnote 85 As already set out, essential to these rules is the principle of protection of civilians from risks that armed conflict creates.Footnote 86 A further basic requirement of responsible command is ensuring adequate supervision of troops, especially where there are known risks to civilians due to the armed conflict, especially of rape and sexual violence.Footnote 87 Leaving open the possibility that there may be circumstances where such measures would not be reasonable, the rewritten judgment makes it clear that this was not the case with Bemba. The rewritten judgment finds that Bemba had extensive material ability to prevent or repress crimes and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures arising from the basic requirements of responsible command.Footnote 88 Significantly, this included a failure to ensure that MLC troops were trained in the rules of IHL and adequate supervision of troops.
The rewritten judgment’s approach to Article 28(a)(ii) frames sexual and gender-based violence during armed conflict as a central concern for commanders where their failure to train and supervise their troops contributes to an environment of rape and sexual violence. The judgment also elevates the so-called special protected status according to IHL of women and girls above that of military necessity or advantage in a way that challenges the traditional patriarchal view that sexual violence against civilians is inevitable or, in some cases, purposefully weaponised against them. Judges Varrall and Williams are careful not to limit the protection of victims to only women and girls. Such an articulation of ‘women and girls’ as an especially vulnerable and protected group under IHL, while a feminist position in and of itself (for reasons outlined above), is equally contested within feminist scholarship. The merging of ‘womenandchildren’ as one category under international law has been critiqued as both erasing the agency and individual experiences of children and infantilising women as passive victims of violence in need of masculine protection.Footnote 89 Therefore, the rewritten judgment avoids similar criticism of being a continuation of (a Western patriarchal) law essentialising the experience of women and the assumption that women lack agency and individual personhood separate to that of children. However, although Varrall and Williams specifically mention men as a class of victims, they do not acknowledge gender-diverse people, which may be criticised as silencing the experiences of such victims of sexual and gender-based violence.
Judges Varrall and Williams’ approach also has implications for the responsibility of commanders that go beyond Mr Bemba. Although the rewritten judgment highlights the importance of assessing ‘reasonable’ measures contextually and that such measures do not need to be successful, the assertion that commanders should be considered put ‘on notice’ regarding sexual and gender-based crimes raises the issue of strict liability. As noted in the rewritten judgment itself, there is a significant link between increased sexual violence and armed conflict. It is difficult to imagine a situation where such crimes are being committed by subordinates, and a commander, although they may make some efforts to repress those crimes, would not be found to have responsibility to them given the emphasis in the rewritten judgment on Mr Bemba’s overall lack of ‘adequate’ supervision of MLC forces. During the drafting stages of Article 28(a), drafters were careful not to create such situations of strict liability. However, this risk of strict liability should be considered against the risk of ongoing impunity for sexual and gender-based crimes. It can be argued that the duty on commanders should be a heavy burden.
Situation in the Central African Republic II
The ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, opened a preliminary investigation in 2014 and determined there was a reasonable basis to believe war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in CAR since 2012.Footnote 90 Alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by both Séléka and Anti-Balaka include inter alia murder, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts, use of child soldiers, rape, and sexual violence.
The subject of the final rewritten judgment is the first case arising from the ICC’s second investigation into the CAR, against Alfred Yekatom, alleged former Anti-Balaka commander, and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, alleged former senior leader in the Anti-Balaka movement, who both had warrants of arrest issued against them in 2018.Footnote 91
Judge Valerie Oosterveld’s Reimagining of Amending Charges Using Evidence of Sexual Violence
The Pre-Trial Chamber Original Judgment
In 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber II partially confirmed charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Mr Alfred Yekatom concerning events in CAR between 5 December 2013 and August 2014.Footnote 92 In March 2020, pursuant to Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute, the prosecution requested the Pre-Trial Chamber to amend the charge of rape confirmed against Ngaïssona to include and confirm a second instance of rape under Counts 40 and 41 of the Document Containing the Charges (DCC) and notified its intention to seek to add additional charges against Yekatom to include the war crimes of rape and sexual violence.Footnote 93 However, Pre-Trial Chamber II declined to include those charges, adopting a ‘precautionary and restrictive approach’, noting that such an approach was required in order to avoid ‘unjustified recourse to this prerogative by the Prosecutor turn[ing] into abuse’.Footnote 94 The Chamber cautioned the prosecution for continuing to investigate following the confirmation of charges and noted that Article 61(9), while sanctioned, cannot be used to address ‘gaps’ in the case of the prosecution.Footnote 95 Throughout its reasoning, the Chamber put at the centre the fundamental rights of the accused, including the right to be tried expeditiously, affirming that such was the rationale of Article 61(9) during the preparatory works of the Statute, which also guides international human rights treaties and the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals in relation to implementation of Article 61(9) of the Statute. Importantly, the Chamber’s reasoning almost exclusively focused on the request to amend charges for the accused Ngaïssona, on which also heavily relied the decision on the Prosecutor’s request to add additional charges against Yekatom, with no separate analysis. Consequently, although the Prosecutor submitted witness statements from victims detailing alleged sexual violence, there were no charges of rape against Ngaïssona or Yekatom.
The Rewritten Judgment and Critical Review
Judge Valerie Oosterveld expertly re-examines Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute, granting the Prosecutor’s request to introduce additional charges against Yekatom, while she rejects the request to amend charges against Ngaïssona by including and confirming a second instance of rape. Contrary to the original decision, Judge Oosterveld’s arguments largely focus on Yekatom, rather than Ngaïssona, distinguishing the Prosecutor’s request to amend charges for Ngaïssona from the request to add additional charges for Yekatom on the basis that the latter ‘considers entirely new charges with new evidence justified by different reasons’ while the former was aimed at ‘reintroducing non-confirmed charges for which evidence was lacking’.Footnote 96 As a result, regarding Ngaïssona, Oosterveld rejects the request for amendment as it ‘would not satisfy the accused’s fair trial rights’.Footnote 97
Judge Oosterveld begins by partially challenging the procedural history of the caseFootnote 98 and briefly examines the arguments of both the defence and the prosecution.Footnote 99 Importantly, she further substantiates what in the original Prosecutor’s submission was vaguely anticipated as mere notice of intention, by clarifying that the additional charges of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes against Yekatom are ‘fully substantiated and more fully reflect his alleged culpability’ and that, in light of the ‘seriousness and importance of these charges, the proposed amendment is in the interest of justice’.Footnote 100 Judge Oosterveld also anticipates the Chamber’s main objection on the need to ensure the right to defence by introducing an important factual element, namely that no trial date has been set and highlighting the Court’s duty to establish the truth.Footnote 101 Importantly, she integrates the view of the common legal representatives of the former child soldiers and of the victims of other crimes (CLRV), stating that it is in the interest of the victims that the proposed charges are added, considering also that concerns about the lack of charges related to gender-based crimes has already been expressed by the CLRV in their 9 July 2019 submissions.Footnote 102 Such an approach acknowledges that individual victims of sexual and gender-based crimes do not often report those crimes immediately, due to trauma and cultural or social barriers that are not always apparent to an international tribunal located outside of that context. Access to justice is better served when these localised and victim-centred contexts are recognised and mainstreamed throughout the entire trial process.
Judge Oosterveld’s core argument revolves around the three Article 61(9) factors, namely: (1) the importance of the additional charges to ensure a complete understanding and full consideration of the relevant issues; (2) the reasonable diligence of the Prosecutor in bringing additional charges, including the reasonableness of continuing investigations after the Pre-Trial Chamber’s confirmation of charges; and (3) whether the adjudication of additional charges would cause undue prejudice to the rights of the accused.Footnote 103 Regarding the first factor, Judge Oosterveld cites the Court’s jurisprudence as well as that of other international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which recognised that ‘the duty to establish the truth is not limited to the time before the confirmation hearing’ so the Prosecutor must be allowed to continue the investigation beyond the confirmation hearing.Footnote 104 Consequently, she found that, since the war crimes of rape and sexual slavery are the only proposed charges of conflict-related sexual violence against the accused, ‘the victims, in particular, have an interest in the full consideration of the responsibility of the accused and the extent of victimisation’.Footnote 105
The rewritten judgment’s feminist approach is most obvious regarding discussion of the second factor. Judge Oosterveld clarifies that the underlying rationale of Article 61(9) is that the continued investigation should only be related to essential pieces of evidence that were not known or could not have been collected by the Prosecutor prior to the confirmation hearing and the reasons for such an investigation must be properly justified.Footnote 106 Judge Oosterveld comprehensively expands on the Prosecutor’s original submission by meticulously detailing the factual circumstances hampering the Prosecutor in providing such evidence prior to the confirmation hearing. In particular, Oosterveld demonstrates the material lack of time for the Prosecutor to carry out field missions to CAR, including during the COVID-19 pandemic and related travel restrictions, as well as to assess risks related to witness and victim protection and related procedural matters, such as translation into French. Importantly, Oosterveld incorporates a feminist approach by highlighting the inherent challenges related to collecting credible evidence on conflict-related sexual violence, such as survivors’ reluctance in revealing the crime suffered due to security threats, as well as societal and cultural stigma. Oosterveld also recalls how trauma, lack of meaningful protection mechanisms, and health reasons should not be underestimated when dealing with survivors of conflict-related sexual violence.Footnote 107
Regarding the third factor, in assessing the right to a fair trial of the accused, Judge Oosterveld considers the duration of pre-trial custody, the extent of the delay in case of adjudication of additional charges, and whether it would amount to undue delay.Footnote 108 She skilfully relies on the same ICC jurisprudence – namely Al Hassan and Ruto and SangFootnote 109 – already cited in the original judgment, proving that it could equally serve to substantiate her arguments and showing how the Court already previously balanced the search for the truth with the fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings, prioritising the former over the latter.Footnote 110 Judge Oosterveld concludes by affirming that the proposed charges are limited both in scope and time and connected to existing charges. Hence, only the defence would have to carry out an additional investigation, which would be narrow in focus, in consideration also of the fact that the trial is unlikely to happen in the near future.Footnote 111 Finally, Oosterveld also offers mitigating steps to ensure the rights of the accused, such as prompt disclosure of witness statements to the defence and subtracting time in custody in case of conviction, showing that the Chamber could have opted for a less restrictive approach, better balancing two competing and equally relevant interests.Footnote 112
Judge Oosterveld’s reimagined judgment clearly highlights how a restrictive and excessively procedural approach to the amendment of charges following the Pre-Trial Chamber’s confirmation of charges poorly serves the interest of justice, failing to recognise the extent and complexity of survivors’ experiences and needs, especially with regard to conflict-related sexual violence. The Chamber’s blank dismissal of the charges of rape and sexual slavery, justified almost exclusively on the need to safeguard the accused’s right to defence, without even minimally factoring in the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed or the severity of the consequences on victims’ rights and lives, is concerning for international justice. Such a decision confirms, inter alia, how the gender analysis referred to in ICC policy papers is still largely lacking in practice and needs to be updated and mainstreamed throughout all phases of the proceedings.Footnote 113
By following the procedural and legal steps of the original judgment, Judge Oosterveld fills this gap, attributing gender-based crimes the centrality they deserve in an international criminal tribunal. While carefully considering the procedural and restrictive approach of the Chamber, Oosterveld strikes a balance between the need to preserve the accused’s right to a fair trial – including by offering mitigating measures to ensure an expeditious trial – and the duty to establish the truth in the interest of justice, adopting a victim-centred, trauma-informed, and gender-sensitive approach. Her feminist approach is particularly evident in the examination of the second factor, namely the reasonableness of continuing investigation after the confirmation of charges. In this context, she offers factual details on the two incidents affecting the additional victims which were missing in the original Prosecutor’s request and also delves into the specific challenges related to the collection of evidence of conflict-related sexual violence. While some of these challenges are inherent to most survivors of human rights violations, such as security risks, lack of protection measures, and investigators’ difficulties to find confidential spaces to conduct interviews during ongoing conflicts, specific cultural and societal barriers leading to further stigmatisation for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence were also highlighted. This paragraph is central to the purpose of rewriting ICC decisions through a gendered lens and could have probably been further expanded, for instance by providing a more detailed analysis on the crime of sexual slavery and additional challenges of individuals subjected to extreme forms of exploitation and completely deprived of their freedom and agency to timely and meaningfully testify on the multiple violations suffered without the risk of re-victimisation. In addition, this feminist approach could have been integrated throughout the other two factors examined in the rewritten judgment, namely that of the importance of the additional allegations to a complete understanding of the Prosecutor’s case and that of whether the additional charges would cause undue prejudice to the rights of the accused. While this was partially done, it could be further strengthened, for instance highlighting the gravity of the crimes by referring to victims’ testimonies, as well as to CLRV’s previous submissions.
Overall, Judge Oosterveld illustrates, using a feminist approach, that it is possible to respect the rationale of Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute exercising caution on the risk of abuse by the Prosecutor, while fully recognising the extent of victims’ lives and experiences, in the interest of justice and truth. Judge Oosterveld’s rewritten judgment also highlights the importance of mainstreaming a gender-sensitive and trauma-informed analysis throughout all phases of judicial proceedings and not just during the investigation phase. While survivors of gross human rights and humanitarian law violations share similar challenges in accessing international justice, survivors of conflict-related sexual violence face additional cultural and social barriers, such as family and community stigma and lack of social and economic support which may deter them from testifying before an international accountability body. The risk of re-victimisation is also higher for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, especially when they face social exclusion, have to raise children born out of rape, or are rejected by their families. Victims of sexual slavery in particular, due to the severe and protracted multifaceted exploitation, are often compromised in their capacity to take decisions for themselves, and the time required to recover from the long-term effects of such trauma may at times be incompatible with the legalistic requirements of tribunals. However, Judge Oosterveld proves that a balance between respect for the rights of the accused and recognition of the extent of victimisation on the ground is possible even when dealing with amendment of charges following a confirmation decision and that a feminist approach is key to avoiding sexual violence charges being left out of international courtrooms, failing to provide survivors with justice and redress, which is the ultimate goal for which international tribunals were created.
Imagining Gender Justice beyond the Rules
The preceding reflections of rewritten judgments highlight both the opportunities but also the limitations of using a feminist approach within the confines of international criminal law and the Rome Statute. Engaging in truly feminist legal reasoning requires reasoning from context rather than reasoning from the abstract. Thus, consideration must be given to the lived experiences of victims of international crimes, such as gender-based crimes, and how those crimes may be experienced differently depending on gender (norms). Therefore, judges should be free to incorporate information that contextualises the crimes further, and should include the contextualisation of gender norms as it relates to gender-diverse people.
As an example, in Judge Keith’s rewritten judgment, she could have further expanded on the socio-economic consequences of rape, including victims’ financial lack of capacity to be able to access a series of basic rights, such as healthcare, education, and employment opportunities as essential components of their reintegration into society. An analysis of structural gender-based discrimination predating the conflict and further exacerbated by it could also have enriched the contextual background. For instance, in its concluding observations on the Central African Republic in 2000, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its concern about ‘extensive discrimination against girls with regard, in particular, to access to education and inheritance rights’.Footnote 114 Similarly, in 2006, the UN Human Rights Committee noted with concern a persistent pattern of discrimination against women, both in the exercise of their political rights and in the area of education. It was also concerned about discrimination against women in the marriage relationship, in particular with regard to the exercise of parental authority and the choice of residence.Footnote 115 In addition, the Committee expressed its concern with regard to the practices of female genital mutilation and polygamy that adversely impact women’s rights.Footnote 116 Structural gender inequalities and stereotyping, including discriminatory access to education, employment opportunities, and therefore financial resources, significantly hamper women’s and girls’ rehabilitation, empowerment, and social inclusion, which are also key for prevention and non-recurrence of sexual violence.Footnote 117
Another example relates to Judge Eichert’s reimagining of ‘forced nudity’. The gendered harm of the crime could have been better contextualised in a non-Western setting where sexual orientation and gender identity are not really publicly discussed. In this regard, going beyond the rules may include making an extra effort to search for cultural, customary, or other traditional practices that could support integration of gender-diverse people and recognition of forced nudity as a form of gender-based violence grounded in agreed cultural norms in that society which may not necessarily coincide with codified international criminal law.
We conclude by observing that there is no one universal feminist frame used throughout all rewritten judgments. This is both purposeful and necessary. When (re)writing judgments concerning diverse peoples with diverse conceptions of pain and loss, it is useful and necessary to approach complex legal issues with fully contextualised understanding of those issues, including contexts of gender, sexuality, race, and culture.
11.2 Forced Nudity in the Bemba Warrant
In 2008, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III issued a warrant of arrest against Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo for crimes which allegedly occurred between 25 October 2002 and 14 March 2003 in CAR while Mr Bemba led the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC).Footnote 118 The prosecution’s application for arrest included forced nudity as both a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(g) and as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute.Footnote 119
The warrant issued by the Chamber authorised three counts of crimes against humanity and five of war crimes but declined to include the crime of forced nudity, stating that it did not meet the ‘comparable gravity threshold’ as either a war crime or crime against humanity; that is, the Chamber found forced nudity not to be as grave as sexual crimes such as rape or sexual slavery.Footnote 120
In his rewritten warrant of arrest, David Eichert confirms the crime of forced nudity and explores the idea of comparable gravity, focusing on the way forced nudity weaponises cultural ideas and norms of gender, utilising the approaches of international conventions and courts. Drawing attention to the social impact of such a crime, Eichert notes that any person can experience harm through this crime, but that cisgender men and gender-diverse individuals experience a unique harm which has often been disregarded at the ICC, and he directs his focus to the voices of such victims.
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo No.: ICC-01/05-01/08
Date: 10 June 2008
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER III(B)
Before: Judge David EICHERT
SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA GOMBO
Procedural History
1. On 9 May 2008 the Chamber was seized of the Prosecutor’s application, in which the Prosecutor sought the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Mr Bemba) for four counts of crimes against humanity and six counts of war crimes.Footnote 121 On 23 May 2008 the Prosecutor filed an Application for Request for Provisional Arrest under Article 92 and later that same day an arrest warrant pursuant to Article 58 of the Rome Statute was issued.Footnote 122 On 27 May 2008 the Prosecutor submitted additional information and supporting material (Prosecutor’s Submission on Further Information and Materials).Footnote 123
2. Included among these allegations was the claim that members of the MLC, under the command of Mr Bemba, committed the crime of sexual violence in violation of Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute during the time period being investigated. Specifically, the Prosecutor alleged that members of the MLC forced civilians to undress in public in order to humiliate them, and that these acts amounted to crimes against humanity and war crimes.Footnote 124 The Prosecutor alleged that Bemba, as commander in chief of the MLC forces, is criminally responsible under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, jointly with another person or through other persons, for such acts.Footnote 125
3. The Prosecutor’s allegations focus on three separate instances of forced nudity, although they included additional redacted acts of sexual violence which are not discussed here.Footnote 126
4. The first allegation of forced nudity comes from a twenty-two-year-old man who was attacked by a group of ten MLC combatants. After being beaten and robbed, the man was taken aside and forced to undress by a female combatant. Once naked, he was forced to have sex with the woman, who threatened to tell her male colleagues to beat him again if he did not comply.Footnote 127
5. Another allegation involved a male government minister who was told to strip naked by female MLC combatants. Amnesty International notes that this was done in a context of active armed conflict in which the wives of other ministers and government officials were being raped by combatants. Allegedly the perpetrators who forced the man to undress ‘wanted to see a naked government minister because they had not seen one before’, in a manner meant to humiliate the victim.Footnote 128
6. The final allegation of forced nudity involved a woman who was forced to undress by a group of MLC men who wanted to rape her. However, they saw that she was suffering from scabies and did not rape her.Footnote 129
7. The question before this Chamber is whether, pursuant to Article 58(1)(a), there are reasonable grounds to believe that such acts are of sufficient gravity as to justify further action by the Court. This gravity requirement is outlined in the Elements of Crimes: Article 7(1)(g)-6(2) requires that an act of sexual violence be ‘of a gravity comparable’ to the other sexual offences outlined in Article 7(1)(g), while Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-6(2) requires that acts alleged to be war crimes must constitute ‘a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions’.Footnote 130
Determination by the Chamber
8. This Chamber affirms that forced nudity can meet these requirements and, where appropriate, should be considered a crime of sexual violence in violation of the Rome Statute. Allegations of forced nudity and other acts of sexual violence should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine the gravity of such claims, taking into consideration the culturally situated messages about gender conveyed by such acts.
Previous Treatment of Forced Nudity in International Legal Sources
9. Forced nudity has been recognised in multiple international contexts as a serious violation that is comparable to other sexual crimes and forms of inhuman treatment. Notably, the Istanbul Protocol, an authoritative United Nations document about torture, states that ‘[s]exual torture begins with forced nudity … An individual is never as vulnerable as when naked and helpless. Nudity enhances the psychological terror of every aspect of torture, as there is always the background of potential abuse [or] rape’.Footnote 131
10. Forced nudity has been addressed in cases before other international tribunals. Notably, in Akayesu the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) ruled that the accused was criminally responsible for various crimes of sexual violence, including one episode where a young girl was forced to undress and do gymnastics for a group of soldiers.Footnote 132 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) similarly found that sexual violence had occurred in the judgment for Kunarac et al., where three women were forced to dance on a table nude,Footnote 133 and in Brđanin, where a woman was forced to undress in front of a crowd of cheering male soldiers.Footnote 134
11. Moreover, pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Statute which requires that the interpretation of law be consistent with internationally recognised human rights, it is notable that human rights courts and treaty bodies have ruled on the issue of forced nudity. Both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have found forced nudity to be a serious human rights violation, especially where the victim is forced to be nude in unhealthy or cold conditions,Footnote 135 in the presence of unmuzzled dogs,Footnote 136 or before an officer of a different gender.Footnote 137 The UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture have similarly ruled that forced nudity can amount to a serious human rights violation, such as in cases where the victim was whipped while naked,Footnote 138 forced to comply with humiliating strip searches,Footnote 139 forced into painful poses while naked,Footnote 140 or forcibly undressed before family members.Footnote 141 Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee has even ruled that being threatened with public nudity without actually being forced to undress can amount to a human rights violation, as in the case of one man who experienced threats that the police would ‘parade him naked in front of women and female children’.Footnote 142
12. The potential seriousness of forced nudity was also reaffirmed by the Appeals Chamber for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, which asserted that the prohibition on ‘inhumane acts’ could include different forms of sexual violence, including the ‘forced undressing of women and marching them in public, forcing women to perform exercises naked, … torture, sexual violence, humiliation, harassment, psychological abuse, and confinement in inhumane conditions’.Footnote 143
Discussion
Understanding Sexual Violence in Context
13. Forced nudity may be a sufficiently serious crime when such acts weaponise closely held beliefs about gender, sexuality, religion, chastity, respect, social position, or dignity. In many parts of the world public nudity is believed to be a shameful act, and many religions and legal systems restrict nudity to a small number of acceptable situations. Many societies also place special significance on being nude in the presence of individuals from a different gender, which may further intensify the harm of being forced to undress in public. Alternatively, in some social contexts public nudity in the presence of individuals of the same gender may be interpreted as perverted or homosexual, which can be similarly harmful to victims.
14. The Prosecutor has not included specific information about the cultural meaning of public nudity in the Central African Republic (CAR), but from limited UN material it appears that public nudity is often interpreted as being deeply shameful.Footnote 144
15. While being forced to undress can be a serious violation by itself, forced nudity can also be accompanied by situational considerations which aggravate the harm even more. For example, if a victim becomes involuntarily aroused during the experience, that can be personally confusing to the individual or inspire further violence. Perpetrators may take photographs and videos of the crime or threaten to tell other members of the victim’s community about the nudity. Such threats contribute to the harm and dehumanisation that can be experienced by victims, leading to mental anguish.
16. For victims of any gender, forced nudity may result in traumatic feelings associated with vulnerability, shame, and humiliation. Victims of forced nudity may have traumatic fears about the possibility of further sexual assault or rape once they are naked. This is especially true in situations like the one currently before the Court, where armed forces are alleged to have committed widespread sexual assault on civilians. Furthermore, one of the three victims included in the Prosecutor’s submission was allegedly raped after being forced to undress, while another was allegedly forced to undress so that soldiers could carry out their intention of raping her. It is therefore reasonable to conclude, given the potential for serious physical abuse and mental harm due to forced nudity, that the crimes alleged by the Prosecutor could be sufficiently serious to merit further attention from this Court.
17. Forced nudity also preys upon norms about gender and can cause long-term harm in a person’s life. For cisgender women, being forced to undress may result in social isolation or rejection for the perceived violation of norms about modesty and chastity. Cisgender women may also lose their standing in their community or be perceived negatively by community members.
18. Similarly, cisgender men who are forced to publicly undress may experience negative social repercussions for the perceived violation of community norms. Some men may lose their social position due to a perceived inability to protect themselves from sexual humiliation or be shunned for violating religious rules around nudity. In instances where a female perpetrator forces a man to undress publicly, such an act may be interpreted as humiliating or sexually exploitative due to culturally specific ideas about sexual autonomy and control. Notably, for the government minister who was forced to undress by female soldiers, it would be reasonable to assume that the alleged crime could have been influenced by social norms about nudity and social status, and therefore potentially traumatic for the victim.
19. Forced nudity may similarly be harmful to transgender, intersex, and gender-minority individuals whose bodies do not conform to widespread beliefs about gender. In such situations, forced nudity may expose individuals to further social exclusion or result in greater feelings of insecurity. This is especially true for individuals who are not public about their gender-minority status or who live in situations where knowledge about a person’s gender-minority status would put them at greater risk of physical violence. Moreover, for individuals with gender dysphoria, being forced to publicly undress may result in significant anguish and humiliation connected to their mental state.
20. These examples are not exhaustive, and ideas about modesty, chastity, social position, or strength can be weaponised to harm individuals of any gender.
21. Additionally, individuals who do not comply with cultural norms about nudity and sexuality can also be victims of forced nudity. For example, sex workers may experience tremendous harm and humiliation from being forced to undress publicly, even if they have consented to public nudity in the past. Similarly, individuals who have non-normative beliefs about nudity, who engage in non-normative sexual relationships, or who otherwise fall outside conventional beliefs about public morality may all nevertheless experience harm from forced nudity in a situation of armed conflict.
Using Victim Testimony to Understand the Gravity of Forced Nudity
22. While expert opinion may be useful for understanding the significance and gravity of forced nudity in a specific cultural context, ultimately the most reliable source is the victim or survivor who experienced the crime. Victims are the most qualified individuals for articulating how a crime made them feel, the long-term ramifications of the crime, and how ideas about gender or sexuality were weaponised by the crime. Presenting victims’ perspectives is therefore essential for understanding the gravity of a particular situation, especially for a crime like sexual violence whose use is informed by nuanced and culturally specific ideas about gender and sexuality.
23. Situating victims’ claims in the wider context of an armed conflict can clarify the significance and gravity of forced nudity. This is because the crime of forced nudity rarely happens in a vacuum; rather, forced nudity often occurs at the same time as other sexual crimes and outrages upon personal dignity. Victims’ beliefs about the gravity of their experiences can thus be confirmed by situating those claims in the wider context of sexual and non-sexual violence at the time. For example, a victim who is forced to undress in a situation where sexual assault is a well-known occurrence, such as in this case, may report much higher rates of traumatisation than a person who undresses in a more peaceful situation.
24. This deference to victims’ claims is particularly important when considering sexual crimes against men, which have featured in relatively fewer cases before international tribunals. Notably, in some instances allegations of sexual violence against men have been classified as ‘cruel treatment’ or another non-sexual label,Footnote 145 while in other cases no charges have been brought despite evidence of sexual violence against men being available.Footnote 146 While much of the international case law regarding sexual violence involves situations where cisgender women have been harmed by cisgender men, it is important to note that men sometimes also experience sexual violence which can have a serious effect on their well-being. As shown in two of the allegations submitted by the Prosecutor, cisgender women are capable of committing acts of sexual violence against cisgender men, often in conjunction with other male or female combatants, and these crimes should not be interpreted as less serious just by virtue of the victims’ gender.
25. Similarly, crimes against transgender, intersex, or gender-minority individuals have been absent from international criminal trials about sexual violence, even though they too can be victims of forced nudity and other sexual crimes. These harms demonstrate the importance of trusting victims of all genders to correctly express and articulate the gravity of their experiences, since this articulation is essential to a proper understanding of the scope of violence in a specific context.
The Categorisation of Non-Penetrative Sexual Violence
26. Finally, identifying forced nudity as a ‘sexual’ crime, rather than as an outrage upon personal dignity or cruel treatment, can be important for understanding the scope and meanings of a certain act. The crimes listed in Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) weaponise ideas about gender and sexuality in specific ways not reflected by other categorisations, and this weaponisation allows perpetrators to target both an individual’s bodily autonomy and wider community cohesion through gendered shame and humiliation. Identifying a crime as ‘sexual’ can therefore be useful for reflecting the gravity and meaning of certain crimes in a specific instance of armed conflict. This is not to say that forced nudity cannot also be categorised as an outrage upon personal dignity or cruel treatment, but rather that the categorisation of ‘sexual’ is useful for expressing some of the unique harms associated with such crimes.
27. Moreover, the delegates who drafted the Rome Statute felt it necessary to include the crime of sexual violence as outlined in Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) as a distinct category separate from other sexual crimes. The crime of sexual violence is thus distinct from rape in that there is no penetrative element, but despite this absence, the categorisation is still considered serious enough to be included as both a crime against humanity and a war crime. As noted in a previous case, ‘[t]he crimes listed in Articles 5 to 8 of the Statute have been carefully selected’Footnote 147 and thus the inclusion of a non-penetrative form of sexual violence is not accidental.
28. While the crime of sexual violence must be of comparable gravity to the other enumerated sexual crimes, there is no hierarchy among these crimes. If a victim reasonably alleges that a non-penetrative form of sexual violence such as forced nudity has occurred, and that such an act led to serious harm for the victim, the allegation should be sufficient for believing that such an act is serious enough to merit further consideration by this Court.
Request for Further Information
29. In all three allegations submitted by the Prosecutor, it would be reasonable to assume that the victims experienced significant harm from the weaponisation of gendered ideas and the humiliation of public nudity. Moreover, the threat of rape after being forced to undress could have left victims with a deep feeling of insecurity and unease, especially given the larger context of alleged rape by MLC combatants. These elements suggest that the charges listed by the Prosecutor are of sufficient gravity to merit further consideration by this Court.
30. Pursuant to Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute, the Court has ‘the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth’. Because the Prosecutor provided little background about the meaning of forced nudity in the CAR, this Chamber deems it necessary to request that all parties provide specific information about gendered norms which are relevant to understanding public perceptions of nudity in the local context. Ideally much of this information should come from the victims themselves, who are the most capable of articulating the feelings evoked by their experiences. Such testimony can be complemented by expert testimony about gender in the CAR and evidence about other crimes committed during the conflict to situate victims’ allegations of harm.
For These Reasons, the Chamber Hereby
DECIDES that forced nudity can qualify as sexual violence as described in Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute;
DECIDES to issue a warrant of arrest against Jean-Pierre BEMBA GOMBO, as a separate document in the place of the warrant issued on 23 May 2008, for his alleged criminal responsibility within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute in the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes under the following counts:
rape as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(g);
other forms of sexual violence as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(g);
rape as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vi);
other forms of sexual violence as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vi);
torture as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f);
torture as a war crime under Article 8(2)(c)(i);
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, as a war crime under Article 8(2)(c)(ii);
murder as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(a);
murder as a war crime under Article 8(2)(c)(i);
pillaging a town or place as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(v); and
REQUESTS all parties to provide additional context about the culturally specific meaning of sexual violence and forced nudity in the Central African Republic, to aid in understanding how the alleged acts may be seen in the local context.
Judge David Eichert
11.3 Charging Sexual Crimes in the Bemba Confirmation of Charges
Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the charges against Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo in 2009.Footnote 148 The Prosecutor’s submission, the Document Containing the Charges, contained the charges of torture as a war crime and as a crime against humanity, as well as outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime.Footnote 149 These three charges utilised the same factual conduct that the Prosecutor presented to the Chamber regarding the charges of rape also levied against Mr Bemba. In the original confirmation of charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm the crime of torture as a war crime because the Prosecutor failed to prove the specific intent requirement related to this crime.Footnote 150 The Pre-Trial Chamber also refused to apply the doctrine of cumulative charging, stating that both torture as a crime against humanity and outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime were entirely subsumed by the crime of rape, and therefore declined to confirm those charges.
In this reimagined confirmation of charges decision, Loyce Mrewa focuses on the charges of torture as a crime against humanity and outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime, which the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm as cumulative charges. Mrewa confirms the ability of the Pre-Trial Chamber to apply the doctrine of cumulative charging to the charges of torture as a crime against humanity and outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime. In considering the application of the doctrine from other international tribunals, Mrewa places the voices of the victims at the centre of the discussion, noting that to ignore the reality of rape as a method of torture or an outrage upon personal dignity is a failure not just to apply the requirement of fair labelling but is akin to denying the lived experiences of the victims and relegating their harm without comment.
Mrewa applies a close reading of the Elements of Crime to conclude that the charges under consideration meet the threshold of being materially different while protecting different interests and that cumulative charging is necessary to record the full culpability and blameworthiness of the accused and to accurately characterise the experiences of victims of sexual and gender-based crimes. Mrewa concludes that cumulative charging using the same factual conduct for multiple counts is authorised, and these counts would likely be confirmed if additional evidence was publicly accessible because the accused, Mr Bemba, was convicted of the crime of rape at trial.Footnote 151
Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo No.: ICC-01/05-01/08-424 B
Date: 15 June 2009
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II(B)
Before: Judge Loyce MREWA
SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA GOMBO
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II (the Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (the Court) issues this decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (the Statute), on the charges brought by the Prosecutor in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (the Case).
The Person Charged
1. The Prosecutor of the Court submits the charges against Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Mr Bemba) a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).Footnote 152 In 1998, Mr Bemba established a military movement known as the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), in Kisangani, DRC.Footnote 153 He was the president and commander-in-chief of the MLC until 13 July 2002, when he obtained the rank of a general.Footnote 154
Procedural Background
2. The Central African Republic referred to the Prosecutor of the Court the situation in the CAR in a letter dated 18 December 2004.Footnote 155 The letter referred to the situation in which crimes against humanity and war crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had allegedly been committed on the territory of the CAR since 1 July 2002.Footnote 156
3. The Presidency of the Court assigned the situation in the CAR to Pre-Trial Chamber III pursuant to Regulation 46(2) of the Regulations of the Court on 19 January 2005.Footnote 157
4. On 9 May 2008, the Prosecutor submitted an application for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Mr Bemba on four counts of crimes against humanity and six counts of war crimes.Footnote 158
5. On 21 May 2008, the Chamber issued the Decision Requesting Additional Information in Respect of the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58 of the Statute, in which, inter alia, it requested the Prosecutor to provide additional information and supporting material on various aspects of the application, in particular on the counts of other forms of sexual violence and murder, both offences being characterised under crimes against humanity and war crimes.Footnote 159
6. On 23 May 2008, the Prosecutor filed an Application for Request for Provisional Arrest under Article 92 of the Statute, in which, inter alia, he requested the Chamber to consider the prosecution’s application for a warrant of arrest of Mr Bemba, filed on 9 May 2008, on an expedited basis in light of the circumstances where the possibility of apprehending Mr Bemba could disappear, while apprehension in the Kingdom of Belgium appeared feasible.Footnote 160
7. The accused, Mr Bemba, was arrested on 24 May 2008 by the authorities of the Kingdom of Belgium, after an arrest warrant was issued against him on 23 May 2003 on two counts of crimes against humanity and four counts of war crimes.Footnote 161 On 27 May 2008, the Prosecutor submitted additional information and supporting material in response to the Chamber’s decision of 21 May 2008 (Prosecutor’s Submission on Further Information and Materials).
8. On 10 June 2008, in light of the Prosecutor’s Submission on Further Information and Materials, the Chamber deemed it necessary to issue a new warrant of arrest replacing the original warrant of arrest issued on 23 May 2008.Footnote 162 The new warrant of arrest referred to the same events allegedly committed in the CAR between 25 October 2002 and 15 March 2003 and added two counts of murder as both crimes against humanity and war crimes to the original two counts of crimes against humanity and four counts of war crimes.Footnote 163
9. On 12 January 2009, the Confirmation of Charges Hearing commenced but was adjourned by the Chamber and the Prosecutor was requested to submit amended charges establishing the mode of liability under Article 28 of the Statute, and within the context and meaning of Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Statute.Footnote 164
10. On 19 March 2009, the Presidency assigned the CAR situation to Pre-Trial Chamber II and dissolved Pre-Trial Chamber III.Footnote 165
11. On 30 March 2009, the Prosecutor submitted an amended document containing the charges (DCC) against the accused, together with the Prosecutor’s Amended List of Evidence and Amended In-Depth Analytical Chart of Incriminatory Evidence.Footnote 166 The prosecution charged Mr Bemba pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute with eight counts of the crimes against humanity and war crimes referred to in Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute. Alternatively, the prosecution charged Mr Bemba pursuant to Article 28(a) or Article 28(b) of the Statute for the crimes against humanity and war crimes in Counts 1–8 by virtue of his superior–subordinate relationship with the MLC troops.Footnote 167
12. In the amended DCC, the Prosecutor, pursuant to his authority under Article 61(3)(a) of the Statute, charged Mr Bemba with war crimes and crimes against humanity, as set forth below:
(i) Count 1 (Rape constituting a crime against humanity in violation of Articles 7(1)(g) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the Statute);
(ii) Count 2 (Rape constituting a war crime in violation of Articles 8(2)(e)(vi) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the Statute);
(iii) Count 3 (Torture constituting a crime against humanity in violation of Articles 7(1)(f) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the Statute);
(iv) Count 4 (Torture constituting a war crime in violation of Articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the Statute);
(v) Count 5 (Outrages upon personal dignity constituting a war crime in violation of Articles 8(2)(c)(ii) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the Statute);
(vi) Count 6 (Murder constituting a war crime in violation of 8(2)(c)(i) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the Statute);
(vii) Count 7 (Murder constituting a crime against humanity in violation of Articles 7(1)(a) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the Statute);
(viii) Count 8 (Pillaging constituting a war crime in violation of Articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the Statute).Footnote 168
13. The Chamber observes that the Prosecutor presented the same factual conduct, related mainly to acts of rape, for Count 3, torture as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) of the Statute,Footnote 169 Count 4, torture as a war crime under Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute,Footnote 170 and Count 5, outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime under Article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the Statute.Footnote 171 The Chamber further notes that the Prosecutor submitted cumulative charges for Count 3,Footnote 172 Count 4,Footnote 173 and Count 5.Footnote 174
14. In view of the available evidence, the Chamber will begin by assessing the permissibility of cumulative charging for Count 3 on torture as a crime against humanity and Count 5 on outrages upon personal dignity based on the same factual conduct to determine whether the Prosecutor’s submissions are in accordance with the applicable law.
The Applicable Law
Legality of Cumulative Charging in International Criminal Law
15. Concerning the question of the legality of cumulative charging, the Chamber will consider the developments in international criminal law. The Chamber notes that cases from ad hoc criminal tribunals have mapped the developments and legality of cumulative charging, including the conditions in which this practice is permissible in the field of international criminal law. Due regard will be given to relevant case law within the field.
16. At the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Appeals Chamber in the Delalic case found ‘that multiple criminal convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other’.Footnote 175 The Delalic judgment indicates that cumulative charging is permitted when the charges relate to crimes containing materially distinct elements from the other crimes.
17. Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) reached a similar conclusion in the Akayesu case by finding that:
On the basis of national and international law and jurisprudence, the Chamber concludes that it is acceptable to convict the accused of two offences in relation to the same set of facts in the following circumstances: (1) where the offences have different elements; or (2) where provisions creating the offences protect different interests; or (3) where it is necessary to record a conviction for both offences in order fully to describe what the accused did.Footnote 176
18. Multiple cases from the ICTR, ICTY, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone confirm that multiple criminal charges can be based on the same factual conduct.Footnote 177 In the Kupreskic case, the ICTY Trial Chamber endorsed cumulative charging if the statutory provisions relied on are designed to protect different social values and if each offence has a distinctive element.Footnote 178 This is demonstrated by the Trial Chamber’s finding that ‘the Prosecutor may be justified in bringing cumulative charges when the Articles of the Statute referred to are designed to protect different values and when each Article requires proof of a legal element not required by the others’.Footnote 179
19. Trial Chamber II of the ICTR also used a similar test for the concurrence of crimes and reached a similar conclusion in the Kayishema & Ruzindana case by finding that ‘it is only acceptable to convict an accused of two or more offences in relation to the same set of facts in the following circumstances: (1) where offences have differing elements or (2) where the laws in question protect differing social interests’.Footnote 180
20. Judge Tafazzal H. Khan, the dissenting judge in the Kayishema & Ruzindana case,Footnote 181 stressed the need for charges and convictions to reflect the total culpability of the accused rather than the distinct elements of cumulative crimes by finding that:
What must be punished is culpable conduct; this principle applies to situations where the conduct offends two or more crimes, whether or not the factual situation also satisfies the distinct elements of the two or more crimes, as provenFootnote 182 … where the culpable conduct was part of a widespread and systematic attack specifically against civilians, to record a conviction for genocide alone does not reflect the totality of the accused’s culpable conduct.Footnote 183
21. In assessing the tenability of cumulative charging and convictions, the ICTR Trial Chamber in Musema adopted Judge Khan’s reasoning regarding cumulative charging.Footnote 184 Thus, Judge Khan’s reasoning was used to assess the legality and scope of the application of cumulative charges and convictions in Musema, and cannot be regarded as obiter dicta: his opinion has been transformed into ratio decidendi, which has guided subsequent cases within the ICTR.
22. The ICTY and ICTR case law demonstrates the development of the criteria for cumulative charging but does not set a legally binding precedent for this Chamber. These cases, however, clarify the legality of cumulative charging in international criminal law and provide authoritative and persuasive reasoning for accepting cumulative charges. Moreover, the Rome Statute does not provide any contrary direction; thus the interpretations of the ICTY and ICTR will be considered in this Chamber’s evaluation of the cumulative charges submitted by the Prosecutor in accordance with Article 21 of the Statute.
23. The drafters of the ICC Elements of Crimes (EoC) also foresaw the likelihood of cumulative charging based on the same factual conduct.Footnote 185 The general introduction of the EoC stipulates that ‘a particular conduct may constitute one or more crimes’.Footnote 186 However, the general introduction of the EoC is a background and preamble, which is persuasive but not legally binding. The travaux préparatoires and preambular wording are used to aid the interpretation of the rights and duties arising from treaties.Footnote 187 In this particular case, the preambular wording will guide the Chamber in interpreting the Prosecutor’s submission of cumulative charges for torture (Count 3) and outrages upon personal dignity (Count 5).
24. The Chamber notes that each individual offence enshrined within the Statute has distinct elements and protects different interests. Article 7(1)(f) of the Statute recognises and prohibits ‘torture’, while Article 7(1)(g) of the Statute prohibits ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’ committed, as crimes against humanity. The Chamber, therefore, further observes that the Statute allows for the prosecution of distinct forms of sexual and gender-based crimes within its provisions. The Chamber holds that the distinct recognition of offences under the Statute demonstrates how these are separate offences that are prohibited to protect different human rights interests.
25. The Chamber gives due regard to the interests that disparate statutory provisions of the Statute are meant to protect. In this case, the prohibition of torture as a crime against humanity aims to protect physical and mental well-being whilst rape as a crime against humanity focuses on physical autonomy and protection from non-consensual violations of bodily autonomy.Footnote 188
26. In light of the foregoing, notably the guidance provided by the case law from Kayishema & Ruzindana, Musema, and Kupreskic, the preambular wording of the Elements of Crimes, and the Statute itself, the Chamber concludes that it is justified to permit cumulative charging based on the same factual conduct under certain circumstances. The Chamber observes that a criminal act that meets the elements of multiple offences may constitute one or more crimes. The Chamber, therefore, holds that cumulative charging and convictions are acceptable in international criminal law if the relevant statutory provisions are designed to protect different social interests, each offence has a distinctive element, and the charges reflect the total culpability of the accused.Footnote 189 As a result, it is generally understood that the Prosecutor is permitted to cumulatively charge offences based on the same criminal conduct.
27. Turning to the case at hand, a full assessment of the culpability of the accused includes recognition of the varied uses of rape to achieve torture (Count 3) and outrages upon dignity (Count 5). The perpetration of torture and outrages upon personal dignity, through the instrument of rape,Footnote 190 highlights the breadth of uses of sexual and gender-based violence during conflict. The evidence in the case at hand shows that rape can be used to torture (Count 3), humiliate as outrages upon personal dignity (Count 5), and disempower when the power dynamics of rape itself are considered. The Chamber notes that the charges submitted by the Prosecutor categorise the different uses of rape to achieve different ends.
The Principle of Fair Labelling
28. The Chamber notes that the Statute does not directly mention fair labellingFootnote 191 but stipulates the importance of facilitating fair and expeditious trials.Footnote 192 In the determination of charges, the accused is entitled to a fair hearing with minimum guarantees, including ‘to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge’.Footnote 193 The requirement to inform an accused of the charges in specific terms is also confirmed by scholars and cases from national and international courts such as the ICTR.Footnote 194 The Canadian Supreme Court also directly mentions the importance of labelling and punishing a person as a way to ‘stigmatise’ and attach ‘blameworthiness’ to the accused in a manner proportionate to the conduct of the accused.Footnote 195 Fair labelling of crimes accurately describes and distinguishes criminal conduct in proportion to blameworthiness.Footnote 196 Fair labelling is, therefore, important for describing, categorising, and communicating crimes to the accused clearly and fairly in accordance with Article 67(1)(a) of the Statute.
29. The Chamber further notes that Article 21(1)(c) of the Statute provides that general principles from domestic legal systems may be applied by the Court. Fair labelling is a general principle of law in most domestic legal systems because the description, distinguishing, and codification of crimes in domestic criminal codes and laws is an affirmation of fair labelling.Footnote 197 Scholars such as Zawati confirm the importance of fair labelling of crimes and argue that the objectives of domestic and international criminal law systems are similar and compatible, including fundamental principles such as fair labelling.Footnote 198 The application of fair labelling within the Chamber’s assessment of the charges brought by the Prosecutor is justified based on principles of fairness in the ICC Statute and the compatibility of general principles between domestic and international criminal law systems.
30. The Chamber notes that cumulative charging is consistent with the legal norm relating to the fair labelling of crimes in international criminal law. This principle of fair labelling requires that ‘distinctions between [the] kinds of offences and degrees of wrongdoing are respected and signalled by the law, and that offences are subdivided and labelled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the law-breaking’.Footnote 199 The Chamber further notes that the principle of fair labelling also extends to sentencing and stresses the need for the labelling of a crime to correspond to blameworthiness and proportionality between sentencing and guilt.Footnote 200 Consequently, accurate labelling of crimes and accurate descriptions of the degree of wrongfulness promotes justice for victims and the accused by ensuring the full recognition of harms endured by victims, proportionate punishment to the degree of wrongfulness, and consistency in sentencing and convictions.Footnote 201
31. In light of the above, the principle of fair labelling is important because it acknowledges the types and severity of wrongdoing and guarantees the legal recognition of various types of harm. This principle ensures an accurate description of the scope of wrongfulness, communicates reprehensible behaviour to society, recognises various types of harm, and ensures proportionate conviction and sentencing to the degree of wrongfulness.Footnote 202
32. Fair labelling of crimes also helps to fulfil the Article 21(3) requirement of the application and interpretation of the Statute in light of norms of non-discrimination on grounds such as gender.Footnote 203 The Chamber notes that fair labelling helps to bring visibility to sexual and gender-based crimes, which have failed to be adjudicated at all, or properly adjudicated, in the past, a situation which the ICC Statute aimed to remedy.Footnote 204 Such recognition also contributes to society’s understanding of the complexity of gendered violence, including its various forms, effects, and severity, which is instrumental in dispelling myths and assumptions about the nature of this violence.
33. The Chamber holds that the principle of fair labelling also demands an accurate and full representation of sexual and gender-based crimes within criminal charges. This approach avoids minimising and/or mischaracterising the experiences of victims of sexual and gender-based crimes and, therefore, contributes to the recognition of cumulative charging and convictions of these crimes.
34. The Chamber further notes that the Court attends to the crimes within its jurisdiction to protect the rights of all persons but also recognises its social function of clarifying the law and reinforcing norms. Addressing sexual and gender-based crimes acknowledges the complexity of these crimes, through the identification of acts that target and exploit gender identities, roles, and expectations, and develops progressive gender norms that could trickle down to domestic criminal justice systems.Footnote 205 The Chamber holds that fair labelling recognises and accurately describes sexual and gender-based violence, including how this violence can be used to achieve various objectives, which could guide domestic criminal justice systems in similar cases.
35. In conclusion, the Chamber holds that recognising torture and outrages upon personal dignity committed through rape as separate crimes fairly labels the types of harm done to victims and gives legal recognition to their lived realities. Therefore, fair labelling also leads to non-discriminatory and gender-sensitive recognition of torture and outrages upon personal dignity. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber deems it necessary to assess the nature and extent of the cumulative charges brought by the Prosecutor in the context of the principle of fair labelling and in accordance with Article 21(3) of the Statute.
Legal Findings of Cumulative Charging of Crimes
36. The Chamber recalls that cumulative charging and convictions are acceptable in international criminal law if the relevant statutory provisions are designed to protect different social interests, each offence has distinct elements, and the charges reflect the total culpability of the accused.Footnote 206 According to Judge Khan in Kayishema & Ruzindana, and as accepted by the majority in Musema, an assessment of charges should be proportionate to the blameworthiness of the accused.Footnote 207 A full assessment of criminal charges must reflect the total culpability of the accused.Footnote 208 The Chamber concurs with these conditions of cumulative charging in international criminal law.
37. The Prosecutor submitted cumulative charges for torture (Count 3) and outrages upon personal dignity (Count 5).Footnote 209 These charges are based on the same factual conduct and are mainly related to acts of rape.Footnote 210 The Chamber further notes that the Prosecutor’s request to cumulatively charge acts of torture and outrages upon personal dignity allegedly perpetrated through acts of rapeFootnote 211 is vital for adhering to the principle of fair labelling.
38. The Chamber recalls that the legal requirement to fairly and accurately label crimes is satisfied if criminal charges are proportionate to the blameworthiness of the accused and the severity of the criminal conduct.Footnote 212 Criminal charges must reflect the facts and the severity of criminal conduct. Acts of rape that meet the elements of torture and outrages upon personal dignity constitute forms of torture and outrages upon personal dignity that ought to be represented as such in the criminal charges against the accused.
39. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber holds that cumulative charging of torture (Count 3) and outrages upon personal dignity (Count 5), allows for the recognition of the full culpability of the accused and protects separate interests enshrined in distinct provisions of the Statute, including crimes not directly categorised as sexual and gender-based crimes. Therefore, the Chamber must consider whether the conditions for cumulative charging are met in the case at hand.
40. Despite being allegedly carried out through acts of rape, the charges brought by the Prosecutor are different crimes from rape as they have elements distinct from the crime of rape.Footnote 213 The conditions for cumulative charging require that the charges brought by the Prosecutor based on the same factual conduct, in this case of rape, contain distinct elements.Footnote 214 The Chamber will assess whether Counts 3 and 5 should be confirmed as torture and outrages upon personal dignity respectively. This assessment will analyse whether these crimes have materially different elements, are conceptually different, and protect different social values.
Count 3: Torture as a Crime against Humanity
41. The Chamber observes that the material elements of rape as a crime against humanity are different from the material elements of torture as a crime against humanity.Footnote 215 Torture requires the infliction of severe physical or mental suffering by the perpetrator whilst rape requires an act of bodily invasion by the perpetrator resulting in the penetration of any part of a victim’s body.Footnote 216
42. For the crime of rape, ‘psychological oppression’ is an element of the crime that can be used as a means to exert control.Footnote 217 Although ‘psychological oppression’ is an element of the crime of rape, the inherent material element of rape is bodily invasion,Footnote 218 unlike the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering, in the custody or control by the perpetrator, necessitated for fulfilling the material elements of torture.Footnote 219
43. Additionally, torture requires ‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering’ while for the crime of rape, bodily invasion or penetration, ‘however slight’, committed by ‘force, or by threat of force or coercion … or against a person incapable of giving genuine consent’ is sufficient.Footnote 220 The wording in the Elements of Crimes shows that for the crime of rape, any violation of bodily integrity by non-consensual invasion or penetration is considered severe.Footnote 221 In other words, any invasion of bodily integrity in a sexual manner is a severe offence that can amount to a crime against humanity. This distinction suggests differences in the nature of conduct necessary to fulfil the elements of the crime of rape and torture.
44. The crimes of rape and torture are also conceptually different and protect distinct human rights (different social interests). The prohibition of torture aims to protect physical and mental well-being and related interests whilst rape focuses on physical autonomy and protection from non-consensual violations of bodily autonomy.Footnote 222 Charging torture allegedly committed through acts of rape shows the severity of rape, including the severe violation of both the physical and mental well-being of the victims.
45. The Chamber holds that the differences between the material elements of rape and torture demonstrate that Count 3 on torture meets the conditions for cumulative charging: the fair reflection of the harm caused as well as the total culpability of the accused, distinct criminal element, and the protection of different human rights.Footnote 223 Additionally, the Chamber finds that Count 3 should not be subsumed in other crimes such as rape because it violates the principle of fair labelling, does not reflect the full blameworthiness of the accused, and fails to recognise the complexity of sexual and gender-based violence.
46. In conclusion, this Chamber finds that the three conditions for cumulative charging have been fulfilled for Count 3 on torture as a crime against humanity within the meaning of Article 7(1)(f) of the Statute.Footnote 224
Count 5: Outrages upon Personal Dignity as a War Crime
47. The Chamber recalls that the elements of outrages upon personal dignity and rape as a war crime are different.Footnote 225 The elements of outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime are focused on whether ‘the perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more persons’.Footnote 226 Therefore, this crime requires criminal conduct that is intended to inflict grave psychological and mental harm aimed at humiliating, degrading, and violating the dignity of victims.Footnote 227 The subjective psychological effect of criminal conduct that results in humiliation, degradation, and the violation of dignity is the distinct element and interest protected by this provision.
48. The material elements of the crime of rape are focused on bodily invasion ‘resulting in penetration, however slight’ and ‘committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion … or against a person incapable of giving genuine consent’.Footnote 228 This wording demonstrates how the Court ought to recognise any invasion of a person’s body in a sexual manner as a serious offence that has a severe impact on the victim.
49. The crime of rape and outrages upon personal dignity committed as war crimes are also conceptually different. The essence of each crime captures a different social value. The crime of rape deals with the violation of bodily integrity and autonomy and the crime of outrages upon personal dignity deals with violations of one’s dignity.Footnote 229 In other words, the crime of rape captures the invasion of bodily integrity, while the crime of outrages upon personal dignity captures the violation of a person’s sense of worth or being as a person.Footnote 230 The Aleksovski and Kunarac cases, of the ICTY, confirm that the crime of outrages upon personal dignity prohibits inhumane acts that cause humiliation and degradation,Footnote 231 and protects ‘respect for the human personality’.Footnote 232
50. The elements of the crimes of rape and outrages upon personal dignity also protect different social interests. The prohibition of outrages upon personal dignity aims to protect human dignity, a fundamental guarantee protected in instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.Footnote 233 The prohibition of rape protects physical autonomy and protection from non-consensual violations of bodily autonomy.Footnote 234 Given these distinct elements, these crimes should be fairly labelled as separate offences falling within the Statute and considered as separate criminal charges. Charging outrages upon personal dignity allegedly committed through acts of rape shows the psychological effects of a violation of bodily autonomy, which can have far-reaching consequences such as humiliation, degradation, and/or violation of one’s dignity.
51. This Chamber, therefore, holds that an act of physical bodily invasion in a sexual manner can satisfy the legal definition of both rape and outrages upon personal dignity. The Chamber further holds that the differences in the material elements and protected interests of these crimes demonstrate that Count 5 on outrages upon personal dignity meets the conditions for cumulative charging: the fair reflection of the harm caused as well as the total culpability of the accused, distinct criminal element, and the protection of different human rights.Footnote 235 Cumulative charging for Count 5 on outrages upon personal dignity highlights the full blameworthiness of the accused, recognises the effects of sexual acts, and complies with Article 21(3) ICC Statute in respect of fair labelling and non-discriminatory application of the law based on gender or another status.
52. In conclusion, this Chamber finds that the three conditions for cumulative charging have been fulfilled for Count 5 on outrages upon personal dignity within the meaning of Article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the Statute.Footnote 236
53. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber shall determine whether the evidentiary standard for confirming Count 3 on torture as a crime against humanity and Count 5 on outrages upon personal dignity and the other criminal charges submitted by the Prosecutor have been met. Having thoroughly assessed the evidence, the Chamber adjourns the Confirmation of Charges hearing and requests additional evidence from the Prosecutor, in accordance with Article 61(7)(c) of the Statute.Footnote 237
For These Reasons, the Chamber
(a) DECIDES to adjourn the hearing;
(b) REQUESTS the Prosecutor to consider submitting to the Chamber no later than 31 September 2009 an amended document containing additional evidence, including witness statements, and an in-depth analysis chart on the basis of any new evidence and evidence already submitted to the Chamber;
(c) INVITES the Defence to respond to the amended document, with a written submission not exceeding thirty pages, no later than 31 October 2009;
(d) INVITES the legal representatives for victims to submit written observations not exceeding thirty pages, no later than 30 October 2009;
(e) DECIDES that the sixty-day period required for the issuance of the decision on the confirmation of charges will commence anew as of the date of receipt of the last written submission.
Done in both English and French, the English version being authoritative.
Judge Loyce Mrewa
11.4 Pillage in the Bemba Sentencing
In 2016, Trial Chamber III handed down the sentencing decision for Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.Footnote 238 For the war crime of pillaging, Mr Bemba was sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment.Footnote 239 In this rewritten sentence by Kirsten M. F. Keith, the gendered aspects of pillaging are brought to the fore. Utilising evidence available to the original Chamber, Keith provides a greater analysis of the socio-economic context of Central African Republic (CAR) and how the impacts of pillaging resonate in a particular way for this society.
In considering a variety of harms, both the direct and indirect impacts are unpacked, with a particular focus on the financial and psychological aftermath. In delving into the harm experienced, Keith situates gender, highlighting realities not explored in the original sentence, noting the differentiated harms, as well as the similarities.
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute No.: ICC-01/05-01/08
Date: 21 June 2016
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER III(B)
Before: Judge Kirsten M. F. KEITH
SITUATION IN UGANDA
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA GOMBO
Introduction/Summary of Conviction
1. On 21 March 2016, the Trial Chamber convicted Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Mr Bemba) of murder as a war crime and crime against humanity under Articles 7(1)(a) and 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statue (Statute), rape as a war crime and crime against humanity under Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute, and pillaging as war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute. Mr Bemba was convicted for the crimes committed by Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC) forces based on his responsibility as a person effectively acting as a military commander of those forces, pursuant to Article 28(a) of the Statute.
Applicable Law Regarding the Determination of Sentence
2. Article 78(1) of the Statute and Rule 145 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules) provide the framework for the determination of sentence. While Article 78(1) requires the Court ‘to take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person’, Rule 145(1)(c) provides a non-exhaustive list of additional factors that may be considered in the determination of sentence. These include ‘the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the crime’. Additionally, Rule 145(2) requires the Court to ‘take into account, as appropriate’, any mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
3. In accordance with Rule 145(1)(b), the Chamber is to ‘balance all relevant factors, including any mitigating and aggravating factors and consider the circumstances both of the convicted person and of the crime’, based on ‘its intimate knowledge of the case’.Footnote 240
4. The framework for the determination of sentence, therefore, requires the Chamber to (a) identify and assess factors relevant to sentencing and (b) weigh and balance them and pronounce a sentence for each crime pursuant to Rule 145(1)(b).Footnote 241 However, the Statute and Rules are silent as to any requirements for such a process. Consequently, it falls to the Chamber, in the exercise of its discretion, to balance and weigh those factors it deems relevant to sentencing. The importance of this broad discretion was highlighted by the Appeals Chamber when it held that ‘the weight given to an individual factor and the balancing of all relevant factors in arriving at the sentence is at the core of a Trial Chamber’s exercise of discretion’.Footnote 242
Gravity
5. One of the principal considerations in the determination of a sentence, as specified in Article 78(1), is the gravity of the crime.Footnote 243 Consistent with jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), when assessing the gravity of a crime within the context of persons convicted on the basis of command responsibility, two factors must be considered:
1. the gravity of the underlying crime committed by the subordinates; and
2. the gravity of the convicted person’s own conduct in failing to prevent or repress the underlying crimes.Footnote 244
6. Gravity is generally assessed in abstracto, by analysing the legal elements of the crime and the mode of liability in general terms, and in concreto, by assessing the particular circumstances of the case, the gravity of crimes committed by subordinates and the convicted person’s culpability.Footnote 245 Factors that are considered in relation to the gravity of a crime cannot be ‘double-counted’ and taken into account as aggravating circumstances for the same crime, and vice versa.Footnote 246
Analysis of the Crimes
7. The Chamber will now address the crime of pillaging, with regard to the gravity of the offence and, if applicable, any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances. Mr Bemba’s culpability, individually and as a military commander, and his convictions for rape and murder are addressed in subsequent sections of this Decision, where the Chamber pronounces a sentence for each crime in accordance with Article 78(3).
Pillaging
8. The Chamber convicted Mr Bemba of the war crime of pillaging on the basis that pillaging was committed by MLC forces against civilians in the CAR with grave consequences for the victims.Footnote 247
Factors Relevant to the Determination of Sentencing the Crime of Pillaging
Gravity
9. In assessing the gravity of the crime, the Chamber considers Mr Bemba’s ongoing failure, as someone acting as a military commander, to fulfil his duty to prevent or repress the crime of pillaging. Such failure to act may have the implicit effect of encouraging subordinates to believe they can commit further crimes with impunity. Although this issue has not been previously considered by this Court, such reasoning accords with jurisprudence from the ICTY. In the Halilović case, the Trial Chamber considered ‘[t]he argument that a failure to punish a crime (committed by subordinates) is tacit acceptance of its commission is not without merit’.Footnote 248 Drawing on the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to the Additional Protocol, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that a commander who fails to act has ‘tolerated breaches of the law of armed conflict’.Footnote 249 In view of such judicial reasoning, this Chamber finds that Mr Bemba’s ongoing failure to act is of serious gravity.
10. In its assessment of the gravity of the crime, the Chamber also considers the following factors listed in Rule 145(1)(c): the circumstances of manner, time, and location, and the extent of damage caused, in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families. Before doing so, and in the exercise of its discretion in identifying and assessing relevant factors, the Chamber will first consider the broader socio-economic context within which the crime of pillaging occurred. This contextual approach helps frame the Chamber’s understanding of the gravity of the crime and the physical, social, and economic distress it creates for its victims, rather than viewing the impacts of the crime in isolation.
11. The Chamber is cognisant that in assessing the gravity of the crime of pillaging, it is also important to consider the harm caused from multiple dimensions. This requires the Chamber to consider the compounding effects of the harm, particularly when viewed within the socio-economic context of the CAR, and to assess the harm against victims not as a homogenous group but as persons with their own unique lived experiences resulting from the crime of pillaging.
Socio-economic Context
12. With more than 66.6 per cent of the population living on less than US$1 per day, the CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world, with the rate of poverty increasing to 75 per cent in 2003.Footnote 250 According to the Human Development Index, in 2003 it ranked 169 out of 175 countries, with a schooling rate of 31 per cent, literacy at 48.6 per cent, and a life expectancy of forty-two years.Footnote 251 As explained by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the ‘total collapse of the economy over the last ten years’ is ‘due mainly to bad government and to repeated cycles of political and military violence’.Footnote 252 Against this backdrop, the cost of provision of care and social security is prohibitive, leaving the ‘system on its last legs’.Footnote 253
13. The lived experiences heard before this Chamber reflect the above data. Witnesses recounted that, prior to the conflict, they led subsistence lives, running small businesses trading goods, such as coffee and food, or working as small-scale farmers.Footnote 254 For many, their earnings were sufficient to provide their families with shelter and basic necessities; victims worked hard for many years to accrue their possessions and any savings. Those fortunate enough to complete more advanced education were able to enter professions and provide a greater degree of comfort for their families and their homes.Footnote 255
14. Framed within this socio-economic context, it is evident that the crime of pillaging has severe, long-term consequences for victims. As considered further below, the loss of their most essential belongings, many of which are necessary for the basic provision of food and shelter, has a multifaceted and enduring impact on victims. For some, the pillaging directly and significantly impacted on their livelihoods, as they lost the means to generate an income. For others, the pillaging also resulted in the loss of a person’s own agency and independence as, faced with nothing, they are compelled to return to live with family. The pillaging of items essential for their survival therefore impacts on the victims’ most basic of human rights.
The Circumstances of Manner, Time, and Location
15. The Chamber found that large-scale acts of pillaging occurred throughout the 2002–2003 CAR military operation, across a broad geographical area where MLC soldiers were present.Footnote 256 The Chamber found that a wide range of property was taken from civilians without their consent, covering everyday items such as clothing, food, cooking utensils, foam mattresses, radios, televisions, fridges, generators, suitcases, money, vehicles, and items of personal value.Footnote 257 The Chamber found that the MLC soldiers pillaged personal items for pecuniary gainFootnote 258 and with no regard for the victim’s livelihood or well-being, which included being able to feed their families, seek treatment, or arrange burial services.Footnote 259
16. The pillaging was systematic, forming part of the MLC’s modus operandi. When they took control of an area, they conducted house-to-house searches for remaining rebels and during these searches they pillaged goods.Footnote 260 Witness P-38 testified that the MLC also erected checkpoints to control the entire area and they would stop persons and ask them for money. If they had no money, they were stripped of their clothing and if the person had jewellery or a mobile phone, they would also take that.Footnote 261 Other witnesses explained that when houses were pillaged, they took everything except for the items they destroyed.Footnote 262 Many houses were occupied by the MLC during the CAR operation. Witnesses testified about the behaviour of the soldiers, who occupied these civilian houses with blatant disrespect for their belongings and homes, destroying whatever was left in the houses.Footnote 263 For instance, the Chamber recalls the testimony of P-73, who explained that the MLC looted the houses and left them empty and damaged, with the doors used as firewood. P-73 testified that if people fled their homes, the soldiers would then occupy their homes and do whatever they wanted to them ‘and you would be forced to struggle in order to buy everything all over again’.Footnote 264 Similarly, P-108 testified that he was ‘in a state of total desolation’ when he returned to his house as he could not recognise it. ‘It was beyond recognition. They practically took away everything, except those items that were destroyed … The house was very, very dirty.’Footnote 265
17. Items were also pillaged directly from victims while they were fleeing to safety. For instance, P-68 testified that she and her sister decided to flee from their house as the shooting and shelling in their neighbourhood made them very frightened.Footnote 266 While fleeing from their house to seek refuge in PK5, they were attacked by a group of soldiers. These soldiers took the few possessions P-68 had managed to take with her while fleeing and then subjected her to multiple violent rapes.Footnote 267
The Extent of Damage Caused, in Particular the Harm to Victims and Their Families
18. The Chamber found that the consequences of pillaging were far-reaching, impacting various aspects of victims’ personal and professional lives. Victims were often left with nothing, not even basic necessities,Footnote 268 with the impacts of the crime still evident today. As P-42 testified, ‘they looted everything I had and they left me with nothing at all, so until today I continue to sleep on a mat’.Footnote 269
19. The sense of loss and destitution was a recurring theme in many testimonies.Footnote 270 P-23, for instance, stated that upon completion of his testimony in the Hague, he would return home to ‘live in the poverty that [he] was plunged into’.Footnote 271 The knock-on effect of this is that many victims have been unable to rebuild their lives and homes; as P-73 described, ‘it’s difficult for us to be able to get our lives back. Everything that we had […] we’d made a huge effort to accumulate what we had’.Footnote 272
20. While recognising that the harm caused to victims and their families by the pillaging is unique to each individual, for the purposes of assessing the extent of the harm, the Chamber finds it useful to consider the financial and psychological impact of the crime on victims’ lives.
Financial Impacts
21. The Chamber heard evidence of the severe financial impacts that the acts of pillaging had on victims. Among these, direct financial losses were incurred, including money that was taken directly from victims or their homes, much of it representing their hard-earned savings. P-87, for instance, spoke of the theft of 67,000 francs that she had earned from selling coffee and 600,000 francs that belonged to her parents.Footnote 273 It also includes the costs of trying to replace or rebuild what was pillaged. P-108, for instance, explained that the estimated loss they incurred from the pillaging is between 20–30 million francs.Footnote 274 He further explained that even today, he has not been able to return the house to its former state because as a civil servant his salary was owed in arrears and he had existing bank loans, so it was not easy to repair the house.Footnote 275 Other witnesses also spoke of being unable to rebuild their lives and their homes owing to the financial constraints they face as a result of the pillaging.Footnote 276
22. The acts of pillaging also directly impacted victims’ businesses. Many lost items that were crucial to their business operations; without such items, their businesses ceased to operate. The Chamber, for instance, found that V-20’s tailoring business never recovered after his sewing machines were pillaged.Footnote 277 V-20 described how the loss of the machines and his clients’ clothing still makes him very sad.Footnote 278 Likewise, Witness P-23 testified about the many items pillaged from his house, including the vehicle he used to earn a living.Footnote 279 He later found the ruins of his car after all its parts had been taken; this was the only item of his that was found.Footnote 280 Other witnesses spoke of their livestock or food supplies being pillaged – items that were essential to their business that provided a means of subsistence.Footnote 281
23. The financial impact on businesses and the loss of potential earnings is hard to quantify and was not fully explored during witnesses’ testimony. However, it is evident that losing a business, which generates an income, has a severe and enduring impact on victims, particularly given the socio-economic context in the CAR.
24. The Chamber recognises that while the monetary value of items pillaged from the victims varies depending on their personal and professional circumstances, these items were essential to their lives. Consequently, regardless of the actual monetary value of the items pillaged, they were of great value to the victims and their loss resulted in severe consequences for the victims; many are living in prolonged poverty unable to rebuild their lives and their homes.
25. The financial harm caused by the pillaging continues to impact other aspects of victims’ lives, including their education. Some witnesses testified that as a result of the pillaging, they no longer have access to education as they cannot afford it. As Witness A/555/08 recalled, she was a child attending school when soldiers came to her area. She was then raped and abducted by the soldiers and eventually managed to flee and return to her family home four years later. On return she found her family ‘had been totally stripped of their belongings. They were living in poverty. They were farming and involved in a little bit of trading in order to be able to afford something to eat, even clothing themselves was difficult’.Footnote 282 As a result of the pillaging, her father can no longer afford to send her to school and she is deeply hurt by this.Footnote 283 She talked about seeing some of her peers who managed to complete their schooling and who have managed to secure employment with salaries.Footnote 284 She is severely depressed and has suicidal thoughts as a result of what happened to her and when she sees the huge difference between her life and others who work and have a salary.Footnote 285
26. A/555/08’s experience also highlights the intergenerational impact of pillaging vis-à-vis access to education, with her children also unable to attend school. She explained that she survives by the small-scale trading of vegetables, enabling her to just manage to feed and take care of her children, but she lacks the financial resources to send them to school.Footnote 286
27. The intergenerational impact of pillaging on access to education is also evident in A/480/08’s testimony. She explained that due to the events that occurred, including the pillaging, her children have been unable to return to school as there is no money to pay for it.Footnote 287
28. The Chamber notes the overarching importance of an education, with education being one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals that form part of a blueprint for global peace and prosperity.Footnote 288 An education provides people with knowledge and skills to help them gain employment, which links to better health and greater financial resources. It is, therefore, a critical tool that is essential to helping lift victims and their families out of poverty. For women and girls, in particular, education provides them with opportunities that may enable them to have greater autonomy over their lives. It represents hope and aspirations for a future that includes secure employment, enabling them to determine their own lives, rather than being dependent on family.
29. The harm resulting from pillaging therefore extends beyond the immediate loss of quantifiable possessions, to that which is intangible: the loss of an individual’s access to education and the resulting loss of opportunities associated with an education. Given the socio-economic context in the CAR, this Chamber considers that the intergenerational loss of access to education is significant and contributes to the enduring impact of pillaging on victims.
30. In addition to impacting individuals’ access to education, the crime of pillaging has also resulted in many victims lacking the financial resources to access medical treatment. The Chamber, for instance, found that P-73 lacked money to pay for medical treatment following the pillaging.Footnote 289
31. The loss of financial resources to pay for healthcare has added significance when viewing this factor contextually. As considered below, the Chamber found that the pillaging was accompanied by other crimes, including rape and other sexual violence against men, women, and children. As a result of these crimes, many victims have medical issues, including HIV, which require ongoing medical treatment.Footnote 290 However, the Chamber heard evidence that many of these victims were left destitute following the pillaging and are unable to afford the treatment.Footnote 291 For instance, P-81 testified that as a consequence of the rape, she has stomach problems but she cannot afford to get ‘treatment from an appropriate doctor’. As she has no one to help her pay for a doctor, she gets traditional treatment but ‘the results have not been good’.Footnote 292 Other victims, including Witness P-68, have to rely on family for financial help for their treatment.Footnote 293 The lack of access to treatment for ongoing medical conditions caused by rape highlights the intersectionality of the crimes and the continuing vulnerabilities of victims.
32. The Chamber heard evidence regarding the shame and humiliation facing victims of rape and other sexual violence, which has devastated their lives and communities.Footnote 294 Cognisant of this, the Chamber further considers that the reliance on family members to assist with payment for medical treatment adds considerable stress to the burdens they are already carrying.
33. The impact of pillaging and the consequent lack of financial means to access medical treatment is viewed within the context of the situation in the CAR. The International Federation of Human Rights found that despite the trauma victims suffering due to the crimes committed, there is no national support programme to provide them with medical and psychological assistance. Yet such support is essential given the prohibitive cost of care and the fact that social security is collapsing.Footnote 295
34. The Chamber also recognises a gendered dimension to the impact of pillaging in relation to the poverty in the CAR. Although many live in poverty, the situation facing women with sole financial responsibility for their children is particularly acute. There are numerous reasons why they bear such responsibility. For instance, some husbands left their rape-victim wives due to the associated cultural stigma rape brings to the family, particularly where there are children born of rape.Footnote 296 In other cases, husbands were killed, either outright or as a result of injuries sustained by violent physical attacks. Faced with severe financial hardship, some women received support from organisations such as Medicines sans Frontiers or Caritas,Footnote 297 although that support was intermittent and is no longer available. With sole financial responsibility for their children, the Chamber notes that the crime of pillaging has left some women in a position of desperate financial precariousness and vulnerability. The Chamber finds, therefore, that the crime of pillaging has an additional and significant impact on women and children.
Psychological Impact
35. The crime of pillaging also has a direct psychological impact on the victims. As Witness P-108 explained, prior to the conflict he had a good life, working as a magistrate, and he did everything he could to make his family comfortable. Then, ‘in one day’s time, we had to leave, we had to sleep on rugs on the floor. Before we were able to sleep in proper beds and, therefore, the children felt the impact of that; and still today they’re suffering from that, because in one day they had lost everything. So there is really truly psychological impact’.Footnote 298 P-108 estimated that if the moral and psychological damage to his family were included in the cost of harm, ‘it would bring the amount up to 60 million francs CFA’.Footnote 299
36. The Chamber notes that the full psychological impact on victims of the crime of pillaging is hard to gauge given many victims were subjected to other crimes. Further, most of the evidence adduced regarding the psychological impacts of crime focused on the impact of rape on victims and their families rather than the other crimes. Given this, the Chamber is unable to make a finding on the psychological impact of the crime of pillaging alone. However, in assessing the gravity of the crime, and drawing on the testimony of Dr Reicherter, the Chamber recognises the compounding effects of traumatic events, including pillaging, where one traumatic event has a clear mental health impact that is then exacerbated by other risk factors, including other acts of violence or the death of family.Footnote 300
37. The Chamber finds, therefore, that the harm caused by the acts of pillaging is multidimensional. It has an enduring impact on victims and their families’ lives that exacerbate their vulnerabilities. In particular, the Chamber has considered the intergenerational and gendered impact of the crime of pillaging, which has a significant impact on women, children, and other victims of rape and sexual violence. Such impact goes beyond the quantifiable harm caused by pillaging, namely the financial loss associated with pillaged belongings, to the intangible, non-financial harm. As mentioned, this includes the loss of agency and opportunities associated with an education that victims can no longer afford to access.
38. In view of the above circumstances, in particular the harm caused to victims and their families, the Chamber finds that the crime of pillaging is of serious gravity.
Aggravating Circumstances
39. The Chamber will now consider factors that support aggravating circumstances in the determination of sentence: where the victim is particularly defenceless and the commission of the crime with particular cruelty. It notes that these aggravating factors also apply to the other crimes Mr Bemba was convicted of. However, as the Chamber is bound to apply a sentence for each crime individually,Footnote 301 it holds that the same aggravating circumstance factors can be applied for each different crime.
Victim Is Particularly Defenceless
40. The Chamber found that civilians, including children, were subject to pillaging without distinction as to age, gender, profession, or social status.Footnote 302 Armed MLC soldiers targeted these unarmed civilians in or around their homes or their businesses, places of sanctuary including churches and hospitals, on MLC bases, in isolated locations including the bush, and/or while seeking refuge.Footnote 303
41. Witnesses spoke of the general sense of insecurity and chaos that prevailed during this period, with the arrival of armed soldiers causing many to flee the area.Footnote 304 Confronted with armed soldiers pillaging their personal belongings, victims were rendered defenceless. As P-87 stated in response to a question whether the items were taken with her consent:
Well, they come into your house, they have weapons and they say, ‘Give us the money, give us the money and we won’t fire’, but if we don’t give them our belongings, if we put up a resistance, they will kill us. So when they came into our houses, we would just let them do what they wanted and take away our belongings. It was to save our own lives.Footnote 305
42. In view of the above, the Chamber finds that the crime of pillaging was committed where the victims were particularly defenceless, as an aggravating circumstance provided in Rule 145(2)(b)(iii).
Commission of the Crime with Particular Cruelty
43. The Chamber found that acts of pillaging were often accompanied by other crimes, including rape, murder, and other forms or threats of physical violence or verbal abuse.Footnote 306 As P-6 recalled: ‘The looting was concomitant with the acts of rape. It was at the time the MLC troops were being deployed in the neighbourhoods when they went from house-to-house, searching these houses. At one and at the same time as the rapes were being committed, property of interest was being stolen.’Footnote 307
44. The Chamber heard from multiple survivors, both male and female, who were raped during the pillaging events. P-68 recalled how she was fleeing to safety when she and her sister-in-law were attacked by soldiers, who took their possessions. She was then threatened with a weapon and raped by two soldiers; her sister-in-law was raped by three soldiers.Footnote 308 Others who attempted to resist the pillaging were beaten or killed. P-69 testified that MLC soldiers entered his compound and demanded money from his sister. When she refused, they threw her on the ground, taking the money off her.Footnote 309 She was then shot ‘a bullet right into the head … it was as if an animal’s skull had been hit’.Footnote 310
45. The Chamber also found that many victims and their family members were subject to multiple acts of pillaging and other forms of violence.Footnote 311 For instance, P-87 testified that groups of armed soldiers came to her house twice on the same day just hours apart. The first time they took the TV, radio, furniture, and mattresses.Footnote 312 The second time they came, she was raped by multiple soldiers while other soldiers were pillaging the savings she had earned from selling coffee.Footnote 313
46. Based on the factors considered above, the Chamber finds that the war crime of pillaging was committed with particular cruelty, as an aggravating circumstance under Rule 145(2)(b)(iv).
Concluding Remarks on the Crime of Pillaging
47. The Chamber has identified and assessed the factors it considers relevant for determining a sentence for the crime of pillaging. In doing so, it has explored the far-reaching consequences this crime has on victims and their families, many of whom have been unable to rebuild their lives as a direct result. In particular, the Chamber has considered the harm pillaging causes, from a financial and psychological perspective, and the intergenerational and gendered effect of pillaging.
48. The Chamber finds that women and children are disproportionately impacted by the crime of pillaging. It impedes their access to education, which is critical given the socio-economic context and poverty rates in the CAR, and consequently impacts their potential for independence, agency, and earnings. Further, many women and girls, but also some men, are also victims of rape. This has a compounding impact on the trauma they endure, being victims of multiple crimes. Given the cultural stigma and sensitivity associated with rape, the Chamber is particularly aware of the indirect harm pillaging has on women and girls, particularly where they have to rely on family to pay for the ongoing medical treatment that is required as a result of the rapes. In the Chamber’s view, it is important to employ such a gendered lens when assessing the harm caused by pillaging in order to more readily reflect the lived experiences of the victims.
49. The Chamber finds these were acts deliberately targeted against vulnerable, defenceless civilians, including children, women, and the elderly. Their vulnerability was further compounded by the circumstances in which the crimes occurred. The pillaging of personal items and civilian property occurred in the context of a military operation, which forced many civilians to flee their home and seek safety elsewhere. It was committed by armed MLC soldiers, and accompanied by other serious crimes, including rape and murder.
50. The Chamber found that as a result of the systematic pillaging of civilians, and their homes and businesses, the victims were stripped of their belongings and resources. Their houses were also often destroyed following the pillage. Consequently, many victims were forced to live in poverty, which continues today. The Chamber finds that, while each victim has their own lived experience, the commonality between them is the overwhelming losses they suffered due to the pillaging. This has had multidimensional and enduring consequences on their lives and those of their families. Viewed within the context of the CAR, with its socio-economic challenges, it is evident that the crime of pillaging has a significant impact on vulnerable civilians, with many living an existence of prolonged poverty.
51. In view of the above, the Chamber finds the war crime of pillaging is a crime of serious gravity. The Chamber also finds that two aggravating circumstances apply to the crime of pillaging; it was committed:
(i) against particularly defenceless victims and
(ii) with particular cruelty.
52. On the basis of the above, coupled with Mr Bemba’s ongoing failure to prevent or repress the crimes committed by his subordinates, the Chamber sentences Mr Bemba to sixteen years of imprisonment for the crime of pillaging as a war crime.
Judge Kirsten M. F. Keith
11.5 Command Responsibility in the Bemba Appeal
In 2016, Mr Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo was found guilty of the war crimes and crimes against humanity of murder, rape, and pillage.Footnote 314 He was subsequently sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment.Footnote 315 In 2018, the Appeals Chamber acquitted Mr Bemba on all charges.Footnote 316 In this rewritten appeal decision, Suzanne Varrall and Sarah Williams reflect on the significance of the case as the first before the ICC to see convictions for sexual violence charges and for command responsibility as a mode of liability. Varrall and Williams critically engage with the doctrine of command responsibility and apply a feminist lens to the interpretation of the phrase ‘all necessary and reasonable measures’ in determining Mr Bemba’s third ground of appeal.
Varrall and Williams’ decision interprets and applies the correct legal standard for ‘all necessary and reasonable measures’, reflecting the protective function of international humanitarian law (IHL) and its special regard for women and children at risk of sexual violence. While they agree with the original Appeal Chamber’s finding that commanders cannot do the impossible, and that a case-by-case assessment of the facts must be applied, they categorically dismiss the use of criteria of ‘feasibility’ or ‘proportionality’ in interpreting the standard. Instead, Varrall and Williams note that the rules and principles of IHL that underpin responsible command establish a protective rationale for the doctrine and assign a special status to women and children and to sexual violence. Drawing on this framework, Varrall and Williams highlight the basic requirements of responsible command and situate these within the distinct obligations to prevent and repress crimes, and to submit them for investigation and prosecution. Comparing these requirements to the measures taken by Mr Bemba, Varrall and Williams find the basic requirements of responsible command have not been met and dismiss this third ground of appeal.
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute No.: ICC-01/05-01/08 A
Date: 1 June 2018
Original: English
THE APPEALS CHAMBER (B)
Before: Judge Suzanne VARRALL
Judge Sarah WILLIAMS
SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA GOMBO
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court, in the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Mr Bemba) against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ of 21 March 2016 (ICC-01/05-01/08-3343), by majority, delivers the following Judgment.
Background
1. Mr Bemba’s case represents a landmark for this Court on at least two fronts. It is the first case before the Court in which a charge and conviction has been recorded on the basis of command responsibility. Mr Bemba’s case is also the first case to include charges and a conviction for crimes of sexual violence. The Appeals Chamber notes that incidents of sexual violence outnumber the other crimes in this case: Mr Bemba was convicted of murder, rape, and pillaging on the basis of three murders, approximately twenty-two cases of pillage, and the rape of twenty-eight people (comprising twenty-six women and two men).Footnote 317 The sexual violence charges in this case were found to be of ‘utmost, serious gravity’,Footnote 318 committed against particularly defenceless victims, including children, and with particular cruelty.Footnote 319
Third Ground of Appeal
Overview
2. The third ground of appeal concerns Mr Bemba’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred when it found that he was responsible as a commander, pursuant to Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute, for crimes committed by troops under his control during the 2002–2003 operations in the Central African Republic (CAR Operation) – those being the crimes against humanity of murder and rape, and the war crimes of murder, rape, and pillaging. Mr Bemba was, at all relevant times, the president of the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), a political party founded by him, and the commander-in-chief of its military branch.
3. As outlined in Article 28(a), command responsibility for crimes committed by subordinates comprises three elements: first, the commander had effective command and control, or authority and control, over those subordinates;Footnote 320 second, the commander knew, or should have known, that those forces were committing or about to commit crimes within the jurisdiction of this Court;Footnote 321 and third, the commander failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.Footnote 322
4. The Appeals Chamber accepts the reasoning and conclusions of the Trial Chamber with respect to the first and second of these elements. It will therefore limit its assessment to arguments concerning the third element and Mr Bemba’s submissions in relation to the Trial Chamber’s finding that he failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power.Footnote 323
5. The Appeals Chamber considers that the first of Mr Bemba’s five submissions, being that the Trial Chamber failed to apply the correct legal standard, is the decisive issue and will limit its considerations to this point. Because the underlying rationale for the mode of liability contained in Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute is critical to a correct interpretation of the relevant legal standard and its application, the following reasoning will commence with an exposition of how the concept of protection under IHL informs the doctrine of command responsibility. The Appeals Chamber will then outline the correct legal standard and apply this to the facts in Mr Bemba’s case.
The Protection Rationale Underlying Command Responsibility
The Relevance of International Humanitarian Law
6. As one of the oldest branches of international law, IHL forms the lex specialis governing conduct in warfare with the aim of mitigating the human suffering borne both by combatants and non-combatants. A primary focus of IHL is, therefore, the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities.Footnote 324 Crucially, under IHL, women and children are entitled to special respect and protection from sexual violence.Footnote 325 This principle recognises the heightened risk of sexual and gender-based violence that armed conflict entails and the impact of this type of violence on women and girls. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Rome Statute and Rules also accord a special status to sexual crimes, crimes against children, and the victims thereof,Footnote 326 in recognition of their especially grave nature and consequences.
7. The Appeals Chamber considers the rules and principles of IHL to be central to applying and interpreting Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute concerning command responsibility for the following reasons. First, Mr Bemba has been convicted of serious violations of the laws of armed conflict, collectively described as war crimes under Article 8 of the Rome Statute, the nature of which are directly informed by IHL.Footnote 327 Second, the Rome Statute specifically provides that the Court shall apply the rules of IHL in its application and interpretation of the Statute, Elements of Crimes, and Rules.Footnote 328 Finally, the mode of liability of command responsibility codified in Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute is derived from IHL, as will be outlined further below.
Command Responsibility under IHL
8. It is from the rules and principles of IHL that the concept of responsible command derives. The notion that armed forces should always be ‘commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates’ was contained in Article 1(1) of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention.Footnote 329 The principle of responsible command also featured in post–World War I international conventions (the precursors to the 1949 Geneva Conventions).Footnote 330
9. A positive legal duty for commanders was codified in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.Footnote 331 Article 86(2) provides that commanders are not absolved of responsibility for breaches by their subordinates ‘if they knew, or had information enabling them to conclude’ that the breaches were being committed or were about to be committed, and they did not take reasonable measures to prevent them.Footnote 332 Article 87 requires commanders to ‘prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and report’ breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, ‘ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations’, and ‘initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators’.Footnote 333
10. The imposition of individual criminal responsibility on commanders for the breach of this duty was established in the statutes of various international criminal tribunalsFootnote 334 and in jurisprudence in the aftermath of World War II.Footnote 335 The responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by their subordinates is based on the commanders’ failure to take measures to prevent, repress, or report the commission of such crimes. In the post–World War II trial of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita, a US Military Commission in the Philippines explained the liability thus:
[The] assignment to command military troops is accompanied by broad authority and heavy responsibility. This has been true in all armies throughout recorded history … where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences, and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, depending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them.Footnote 336
11. The Rome Statute codifies commanders’ criminal liability for the crimes of subordinates under Article 28. The responsibility of commanders and other superiors in this provision specifically adds to ‘other grounds of criminal responsibility’ found elsewhere in the Rome Statute. The provision distinguishes between the responsibility of military commanders and persons effectively acting as military commanders on the one hand, and other superiors (often referred to as ‘non-military’ or ‘civilian superiors’) on the other.
12. The responsibility of the former is addressed in Article 28(a), which applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts.Footnote 337 Responsibility will arise where three criteria are satisfied. First, the commander must have effective control over the troops. Second, the commander must have actual or constructive knowledge of the commission or potential commission of crimes. Third, the commander must have failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress the crimes or submit them to the competent authorities.
13. The Appeals Chamber considers that the application and interpretation of Article 28(a) concerning the command responsibility mode of liability must be consistent with the protective function of IHL and the special status it accords to women and children in relation to sexual violence. In particular, this approach must be applied in determining and applying the correct legal standard under Article 28(a)(ii) for whether a commander has taken all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent, repress, or submit subordinates’ crimes to competent authorities.
The Correct Legal Standard: Article 28(a)(ii)
14. Mr Bemba argues that the Trial Chamber failed to assess his conduct in relation to the obligation to take all necessary and reasonable measures against the correct legal standard. The Trial Chamber found that whether or not a commander failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures should be established on a ‘case-by-case basis’, focusing on the ‘material power’ of the commander.Footnote 338 Mr Bemba submits that a commander need only take such measures that are ‘within his material possibility’Footnote 339 and that his conduct should be judged by a standard of what measures were ‘feasible and practicable at that time’.Footnote 340
15. In determining the correct legal standard to be applied, the Appeals Chamber notes that Article 21 of the Rome Statute stipulates the sources of law that the Court shall apply. The first of these is the Statute itself, as well as the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.Footnote 341 In the second place, where appropriate, the Court shall apply relevant treaties, rules, and principles of international law including the established principles of IHL. The significance of this body of law has been discussed above and will be referred to throughout the following section of the judgment as relevant. Furthermore, Article 21(3) establishes a positive obligation on the Court to apply a gender-sensitive and intersectional interpretation of the law consistent with internationally recognised human rights.
16. As per the general rules of treaty interpretation, construing the provisions of Article 28(a)(ii) must commence with a textual interpretation, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.Footnote 342 The drafting history of the relevant provision may thereafter be considered in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the textual interpretation if required.Footnote 343
17. The text of Article 28(a)(ii) outlines the third criterion that must be satisfied before a military commander with effective control of his or her troops can be criminally responsible for crimes committed by those troops (the first criterion requires effective control and the second criterion requires actual or constructive knowledge). The text of the third criterion takes the following form: ‘That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.’ The following inquiry shall consider firstly the phrase ‘all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power’, and subsequently the three distinct obligations to ‘prevent’, ‘repress’, or ‘submit’.
All Necessary and Reasonable Measures within a Commander’s Power
18. The relevant categories of measures stipulated in Article 28(a)(ii) are described as those that are necessary and reasonable – not feasible, practicable, proportional, plausible, or any other formulation. The Appeals Chamber therefore cannot accept Mr Bemba’s submission that his conduct should be judged by a standard of what measures were ‘feasible and practicable at that time’.Footnote 344 A commander cannot be expected to do the impossible, certainly. But while it is appropriate to adopt a case-by-case approach to what is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, an alternative and lesser standard of ‘feasible and practicable’ is neither warranted nor permissible. Although the word ‘feasible’ is used in Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I, it was not included in Article 28(a)(ii), and we must assume this to be a deliberate choice by the drafters. Nor is ‘feasible’ used in the relevant provisions of the statutes of other international criminal tribunals, which use the ‘necessary and reasonable’ formulation.
19. An examination of the Rome Statute travaux préparatoires confirms this understanding and provides no reason to infer any intention that the provision should be construed beyond the ordinary meaning of the words ‘necessary and reasonable’. The choice of these words was not a contentious issue during the drafting process. The formulation was adopted in all drafts with no objections or amendments, and ultimately incorporated by the drafting committee.Footnote 345 It is the ordinary meaning of the words ‘necessary and reasonable’ that must guide an interpretation of the relevant provision.
20. The word ‘necessary’ means ‘needed’, ‘indispensable’, ‘vital’, or ‘essential’.Footnote 346 For example, water is necessary to sustain life. The word ‘reasonable’ means ‘within the limits of what it would be rational or sensible to expect’, ‘not extravagant or excessive’, ‘moderate’.Footnote 347 What is reasonable is inherently informed by context. Of course, what is necessary and reasonable to prevent or repress the commission of a crime by subordinates, or to submit those crimes for investigation and prosecution, is far from straightforward. Nevertheless, it is the task given to this Court under the Rome Statute to make such a determination, consistent with the rules and principle of IHL and internationally recognised human rights.
21. Attention must also be given to the use of the term ‘all’ preceding the categories of necessary and reasonable in Article 28(a)(ii). The use of this word in this context, given its ordinary meaning, stipulates that no exceptions or exclusions can be accepted in relation to the extent of measures to be taken within the relevant categories. If any necessary and reasonable measure has not been taken, then the standard has not been met.
22. However, Article 28(a)(ii) qualifies that the measures a commander must take are limited to those that are ‘within his or her power’. The Trial Chamber correctly stated that the word ‘power’ in this context is not to be understood as limited to a commander’s ‘explicit legal capacity’ but that it relates to the de jure and/or de facto power of the commander.Footnote 348 The scope of an individual commander’s power will therefore inform what measures are necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
23. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that command responsibility applies to all commanders, irrespective of their seniority, and whether they are physically in the field commanding troops or issuing orders from a distance. Both circumstances are relevant in Mr Bemba’s case. Thus, while Article 28(a)(ii) recognises the relevance of the scope of a commander’s power, it does not make any differentiation as to the standard applied to the actions (or omissions) of a commander based on either their seniority or their physical proximity to troops. Such a distinction is not only factually illogical, it would also be inconsistent with this Court’s duty to apply the Rome Statute equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.Footnote 349
24. The phrase ‘within his or her power’ allows for consideration of the circumstances that may constrain a commander’s ability. A commander cannot do the impossible. However, this does not justify the failure to take measures on the basis that they may prove difficult, inconvenient, or even disadvantageous. It is true that, at a broad level, IHL allows for the balancing of military necessity against the protection of civilians. The principle of military necessity, first codified in the Lieber Code of 1863, requires that parties to a conflict adopt only ‘those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war’.Footnote 350 So while military necessity recognises that the obligation to protect is never an absolute one, given the realities of war, it also maintains that unlawful means and methods of warfare are never permissible.
25. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the prosecution’s submission that conduct contrary to IHL, and a fortiori criminal conduct, is never a permitted means or method of warfare.Footnote 351 The Appeals Chamber considers that sexual and gender-based violence cannot under any circumstances be considered as legitimate acts in pursuance of military necessity or military advantage. The rape of women, men, and children would never bring any lawful military advantage, nor can there ever be a necessity to engage in such conduct. Such acts are always contrary to IHL.
26. In sum, the Appeals Chamber considers that the ordinary meaning of the words ‘all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power’ establishes a high standard for commanders, but one which allows for consideration of factual limitations and does not require a commander to perform impossible feats. Nevertheless, this is a standard that cannot be incrementally lowered in response to what may or not be militarily advantageous, convenient, or economical at a particular point in time.
Prevent or Repress Crimes, or Submit to Competent Authorities
27. Article 28(a)(ii) specifies that all necessary and reasonable measures within a commander’s powers are to be taken to ‘prevent or repress’ the commission of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, ‘or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution’. This approach follows that found in Article 87 of Additional Protocol I, which requires commanders to ‘prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and report’ breaches.Footnote 352 The provision thus creates three distinct obligations on commanders, who must take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power first to prevent crimes; second to repress crimes; and third to submit criminal matters to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. Each of these obligations captures a distinct temporal relationship to the commission of crimes. While IHL does not provide a list of the measures that are necessary and reasonable for a commander to take to fulfil these obligations and the standard must be considered on a case-by-case basis, basic requirements can be determined nevertheless on the grounds of the temporal dimensions of each obligation as well as the fundamental obligations of IHL and responsible command.
Obligation to Prevent
28. To ‘prevent’ means ‘to stop something from happening or someone from doing something’.Footnote 353 An obligation to prevent therefore exists in relation to a future event, and in the context of Article 28(a)(ii), a future crime. What measures are necessary and reasonable for a commander to take to prevent the commission of crimes by subordinates will be heavily context-dependent and should be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, the following observations are relevant universally on the basis that preventive measures are those measures that must be undertaken prior to the commission of a crime.
29. First, the obligation to take measures to prevent crimes compels commanders to make an assessment of the known and likely risks of military operations. The protective rationale of IHL underpinning command responsibility further requires commanders to have particular regard to the increased risk of sexual violence that accompanies armed conflicts, and the disproportionate impact of this on women and children. Armed conflict brings with it a range of characteristic and notorious risks, including but not limited to an increased likelihood of sexual and gender-based violence. According to the 2007 Paris Principles, ‘[g]ender inequalities, discrimination and violence are frequently exacerbated in times of armed conflict’.Footnote 354 It is a deeply distressing but well-known fact that there is a long-standing tendency of troops engaged in armed conflict, especially male combatants, to commit such crimes, particularly but not only against women and girls, and that this is amplified by failures of command to exercise proper control. It is the view of the Appeals Chamber that the commonly understood risk to women and girls that accompanies any and all armed conflicts must therefore inform the legal standards of both the knowledge element of command responsibility, and the requirement to take all necessary and reasonable measures.
30. Second, the obligation to take preventive measures encompasses the broadest temporal scope of the three obligations. This obligation does not only arise in the days or hours before a crime may be committed; nor does it only take effect when troops are deployed, or operations commence. Furthermore, preventive measures will not only be required in the days of operational planning or training. The obligation to take preventive measures will exist from the moment an individual takes command of troops, and it will continue to exist for the duration that the individual maintains a position of command.
31. Given commanders must consider the risks of certain crimes being committed by troops, particularly sexual violence crimes against women and children, and given the obligation to take preventive measures is ongoing from the time an individual takes command, certain basic requirements must be satisfied in order to fulfil the obligation to take all necessary and reasonable preventive measures. As noted above, some obligations under IHL are fundamental, such as the responsibility of commanders to ensure their troops are aware of their obligations under IHL.Footnote 355 Thus training troops in IHL, and particularly making them aware of prohibitions on sexual violence, at the earliest opportunity possible would constitute one such basic requirement of preventive measures. As would issuing lawful orders in accordance with the rules and principles of IHL. In addition, taking steps to ensure adequate supervision of troops and to establish clear communication and investigative and disciplinary procedures would also form basic requirements from the time of assuming command.
Obligation to Repress
32. To ‘repress’ means ‘to not allow something … to be expressed’; ‘to control what people do, especially by using force’.Footnote 356 Repression relates to something that is occurring in the present, and in the context of Article 28(a)(ii), the contemporaneous commission of a crime. The temporal context is critical to assessing what measures are necessary and reasonable for a commander to take to repress the commission of crimes by his or her subordinates. Unlike preventive measures, measures to repress crimes must be taken in response to unlawful conduct that has occurred and is continuing, or may continue, to occur. A commander must take all necessary and reasonable measures to repress the criminal conduct at the earliest possible opportunity, and must continue to do so for so long as the unlawful conduct or its probability persists.
33. The circumstances will determine what form such measures must take, and which lie within a commander’s power. Once again, however, the basic requirements of responsible command are instructive in such an assessment. Measures to repress criminal conduct must be responsive and timely and should at a minimum involve adequate supervision of troops and the issuance of lawful orders. Furthermore, investigative and disciplinary action must be undertaken to the fullest extent possible. Depending on the temporal span of the criminal activity, additional measures may become necessary and reasonable over time, including resolving the shortcomings or absence of investigative and disciplinary procedures. As with preventive measures, a commander’s obligation cannot be considered to be fulfilled on the basis of a one-off response.
Obligation to Submit Matter to Competent Authorities for Investigation and Prosecution
34. To ‘submit’ means ‘to give or offer something for a decision to be made by others’.Footnote 357 In the context of Article 28(a)(ii), what is to be submitted to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution is the details of crimes that have already been committed. To do so will require a commander to facilitate the collection and communication of such details. There are no specifications under Article 28(a)(ii) as to what form this submission must take. It can be assumed, however, that a basic requirement of fulfilling this obligation necessitates, to the extent it is within a commander’s power, that he or she must ensure all the known details of criminal conduct are collected, documented, and provided in a fulsome, unprejudiced, and timely manner.
35. This obligation also entails another complexity, through the use of the adjective ‘competent’ to describe the nature of the relevant authority. A competent authority is not defined in Article 28(a)(ii); however, elsewhere the Rome Statute does provide guidance on the competence of national judicial systems.Footnote 358 The inability to carry out investigations and prosecutions is understood here as ‘a total or substantial collapse or unavailability’ of the judicial system in question. It is unlikely that a military commander is in a position to undertake a sophisticated assessment of the competence of relevant authorities; thus, for the purposes of Article 28(a)(ii), the Appeals Chamber considers a competent authority will be that which has the jurisdiction to conduct investigation and prosecution of the criminal matter in question and which is not affected by the ‘total or substantial collapse or unavailability’ of the judicial system.
Relevance of Outcome and Motive
36. It should be noted that the nature of the obligations encapsulated in Article 28(a)(ii) is one of action, not outcome. There is nothing in this provision that requires the crimes in question to be successfully prevented or repressed – indeed, the issue of a commander’s liability may not arise if such an outcome had been achieved. Nor is there an obligation on the commander as to the outcome of any investigation or prosecution relating to crimes, although the referral must be made in good faith that the investigation and/or prosecution will be genuine and not a sham. The commander must do all that is necessary and reasonable to submit a matter to the competent authorities, not ensure any particular result.
37. The Trial Chamber effectively recognised this approach in stating that a commander that has taken all necessary and reasonable measures cannot be held liable ‘even if the crimes nonetheless ultimately occur or the perpetrators go unpunished’.Footnote 359 The Appeals Chamber considers any implication to the contrary in the Trial Chamber’s decision to be erroneous and irrelevant, as is any direct reference to the inadequacy of the results of measures taken by Mr Bemba.Footnote 360 However, it is the Appeals Chamber’s view that such implications and references do not reach the threshold of having a material impact on the outcome of the decision.
38. Furthermore, there is no mention made in Article 28(a) as to the motivations behind a commander’s actions, and the Appeals Chamber does not accept that this should be a relevant consideration in making an assessment as to whether or not a commander failed to meet the requirements of Article 28(a). Beyond the fact that determining motives is an extremely subjective endeavour, it is possible, and in fact highly likely, that a commander will have multiple motivations in following any particular course of action. It is sufficient to note for present purposes that while the Appeals Chamber does not agree with the Trial Chamber’s treatment of motivation as an ‘aggravating’ factor in the Appellant’s case,Footnote 361 this approach has not materially affected the outcome and has no impact on the Appeals Chamber’s decision in the present appeal.
Basic Requirements of Responsible Command
39. As demonstrated above, it is possible to identify a number of basic requirements of responsible command that should inform the assessment of whether all necessary and reasonable measures have been taken to prevent and repress the commission of crimes and to submit criminal matters to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. These basic requirements are reflective of what is required by international law in recognition of the inherent risks of armed conflict and the importance of properly trained, supervised, and disciplined troops. This standard is informed by the rules and principles of IHL, including the obligation to protect civilians and the special protection of women and children from sexual violence.
40. The Prosecutor’s submission identifies several such basic requirements of commanders,Footnote 362 including ensuring troops are properly trained in IHL; ensuring adequate supervision of troops; issuing proper and lawful orders; facilitating investigations, prosecutions, and punishments in light of potentially unlawful conduct; and replacing, dismissing, and removing subordinates as necessary. The Appeals Chamber concurs with this assessment and considers that it provides a non-exhaustive list of those basic requirements that must be considered in determining whether the criteria of Article 28(a)(ii) are satisfied. However, the Appeals Chamber would add that given the risk of sexual violence inherent in armed conflict, a responsible commander should adopt measures specifically aimed at the prevention, repression, and investigation/prosecution of sexual violence.
Conclusion
41. The Appeals Chamber considers that the correct legal standard in relation to the criteria contained in Article 28(a)(ii) requires a case-by-case approach to both: determining what measures were necessary and reasonable for a commander to take to prevent or repress crimes, or submit criminal matters to competent authorities, which at a minimum should include (but not be limited to) the basic requirements of responsible command; and assessing the commander’s de jure or de facto power and whether any necessary and reasonable measures were beyond this scope. Where a commander has failed to implement any necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power (and the other fault elements of effective control and knowledge have also been satisfied), then he or she will incur criminal liability.
Assessment of Measures Taken by Mr Bemba
Trial Chamber’s Findings
42. The Trial Chamber found Mr Bemba took ‘a few measures’ over the course of the 2002–2003 CAR Operation,Footnote 363 specifically that he:
(a) Established the Mondonga Inquiry which investigated alleged crimes committed by MLC troops in Bangui and produced a brief of evidence in relation to allegations of pillaging, but did not question suspects about the crime of murder or pursue reports of rape;Footnote 364
(b) Met with the UN representative in the CAR, General Cissé, and CAR President Patassé in November 2002, and reportedly committed to a progressive and organised withdrawal of troops and the punishment of soldiers who committed crimes, noting some had already been identified and disciplined;Footnote 365
(c) Addressed MLC troops in November 2002, referring to allegations of crimes against civilians and warning against further misconduct;Footnote 366
(d) Facilitated the trial of seven soldiers for pillaging at the Gbadolite Court-Martial, including by appointing the presiding judge and prosecutor (all seven accused were convicted);Footnote 367
(e) Sent an investigative commission to Zongo to investigate allegations of pillaging in December 2002, but which was unable to establish that MLC soldiers had committed the crime of pillaging;Footnote 368
(f) Wrote to General Cissé on 4 January 2003 stating that the MLC would not ignore serious violations of human rights, advising he had ordered the arrest of soldiers whose behaviour was contrary to instructions given before their departure to CAR, and requesting assistance with an investigation involving the CAR population;Footnote 369
(g) Wrote to the president of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) on 20 February 2003 responding to a report on its investigative mission in Bangui;Footnote 370 and
(h) Dispatched a delegation of soldiers and officials to Sibut in response to reports of abuses in the towns of Sibut and Bozoum.Footnote 371
43. The Trial Chamber concluded that the measures taken by Mr Bemba were ‘limited in mandate, execution, and/or results’.Footnote 372 The Trial Chamber further found that ‘[i]n addition to or instead of the insufficient measures’ Mr Bemba took, and in light of his extensive material ability to prevent or repress the crimes, he could have inter alia taken a number of other measures. These included:
(a) Ensuring MLC troops in CAR were properly trained in IHL and properly supervised for the duration of the CAR operation;
(b) Initiating genuine and full investigations into the commission of crimes and properly tried and punished any soldiers alleged to have committed crimes;
(c) Issuing further and clear orders to commanders of the troops in CAR to prevent the commission of crimes;
(d) Altering the deployment of troops, including to minimise contact with civilian populations;
(e) Removing, replacing, or dismissing officers or soldiers that committed or condoned crimes;
(f) Sharing relevant information with CAR authorities and others and supporting them in investigations.Footnote 373
Notice of Measures
44. Mr Bemba submits that he was not given notice of the measures which the Trial Chamber found he could have taken because of their ‘hypothetical’ nature, and therefore it would be unfair to convict him without giving him the opportunity to defend himself. Mr Bemba asserts that the Trial Chamber erroneously compared his conduct to ‘a list of hypothetical measures’ compiled with the ‘benefit of hindsight from its post hoc position of superior information’.Footnote 374 He claims it was not the Trial Chamber’s role to speculate as to what measures might have ‘stemmed or mitigated the commission of the crimes’ and then evaluate Mr Bemba’s conduct against this hypothetical list.
45. The Appeals Chamber unequivocally rejects these arguments. It is not in dispute that an accused is entitled to notice of the factual allegations made against him or her in order that they may prepare an informed defence.Footnote 375 However, given the assessment to be made under Article 28(a)(ii) relates to the failure of a commander to take all necessary and reasonable measures, the inquiry is naturally concerned with omissions. This requires a judicial assessment as to what was not done but should have been. One may label this as hypothesising with the benefit of hindsight, but it is the nature of the task given to this Court by the Rome Statute. The Trial Chamber made no error in identifying a list of hypothetical necessary and reasonable measures that Mr Bemba could have taken but did not, as this was precisely what was required of it.
46. The Appeals Chamber notes that notice of necessary and reasonable measures not taken may be specific or general in form. With regard to the former, notice of specific measures should be provided through the indictment and confirmation of charges procedure. In relation to the latter, all commanders should be considered at all times to be on notice of measures which are in effect the inherent duties of command and would apply in every case, as discussed above.
47. In the present case, the Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecutor that Mr Bemba was given ‘sufficient notice’Footnote 376 of the scope and nature of measures he was found to have failed to take. First, all of the measures the Trial Chamber found Mr Bemba had failed to take fell within the scope of the notice provided to Mr Bemba through the Confirmation Decision and the Corrected Revised Second Amended Document Containing the Charges. Second, the Prosecutor submits and the Appeals Chamber accepts that at least four of the measures the Trial Chamber found Mr Bemba did not take can be considered to be basic requirements of responsible command, including ensuring proper IHL training and adequate supervision of troops.
Appeals Chamber’s Findings
48. The Appeals Chamber does not dispute the findings of the Trial Chamber as to what measures Mr Bemba took, or its view that these were limited and ultimately insufficient. However, the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion differs, and is based upon the correct legal standard, as outlined above, to be applied to establish that the provisions of Article 28(a)(ii) have been met.
49. As noted above, the legal standard required by Article 28(a)(ii) sets a high threshold for the conduct of commanders in fulfilling their responsibility to exercise effective control over their troops, reflecting the protective function of IHL and its special regard for women and children at risk of sexual violence. The test to be applied is whether all necessary and reasonable measures within the commander’s power have been taken to prevent or repress crimes, or submit criminal matters to competent authorities. Although this assessment takes into account the scope of the commander’s de jure and/or de facto power, the provision contains no other criteria involving feasibility, seniority, outcome, or motive, and these do not form part of the relevant legal test for liability. While a case-by-case approach cognisant of contextual considerations is warranted, the basic requirements must be satisfied for a commander to fulfil the obligations placed upon them under international law and required under Article 28(a)(ii).
50. The Appeals Chamber notes that among the list of additional or alternate actions the Trial Chamber identified as necessary and reasonable measures that Mr Bemba failed to take are several basic requirements of responsible command, including his failure to ensure MLC troops were properly trained in IHL and adequately supervised for the duration of the CAR Operation. Mr Bemba’s submissions on appeal fail to address these findings, or offer a justification for why such measures were not within his power.
51. Ensuring troops are properly trained in IHL and made aware of the prohibitions on sexual violence against women and children is a basic requirement of responsible command and constitutes a necessary and reasonable measure for a commander to take to prevent violations of IHL by troops. Ensuring adequate supervision of troops, including issuing clear orders concerning the prohibition of sexual violence, is similarly an essential preventive measure and critical to repressing prohibited conduct. Failure to take these measures alone, without regard to the adequacy of his actions in submitting criminal matters for investigation and prosecution, mean that Mr Bemba has not fulfilled the obligations required of him. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that Mr Bemba’s conduct did not satisfy the legal test for taking all necessary and reasonable measures as per Article 28(a)(ii) and that he is subject to criminal liability under the doctrine of command responsibility.
Conclusion
52. For the reasons outlined above, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in referring to irrelevant considerations of outcome and motive in its reasoning. However, the weight given to these considerations in determining whether Mr Bemba failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures was limited and does not materially affect the findings or decision of the Trial Chamber.
53. In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber – but distinguishes its reasoning – in finding that Mr Bemba failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent or repress the commission of crimes by his subordinates during the 2002–2003 CAR Operation, or to submit the matter to the competent authorities. The third ground of appeal is therefore dismissed.
Judge Suzanne Varrall and Judge Sarah Williams
11.6 Charging Sexual Crimes in the Yekatom Charge Amendment
In 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber II partially confirmed charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Mr Alfred Yekatom concerning events in Central African Republic (CAR) between 5 December 2013 and August 2014.Footnote 377 In May 2020, the Prosecutor filed a request under Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute to add charges of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes.Footnote 378 In June 2020, Pre-Trial Chamber II declined to include those charges, adopting a ‘precautionary and restrictive approach’, noting that such an approach was required in order to avoid ‘unjustified recourse to this prerogative by the Prosecutor turn[ing] into abuse’.Footnote 379 The Chamber cautioned the prosecution for continuing to investigate post the confirmation of charges and noted that Article 61(9), while sanctioned, cannot be used to address ‘gaps’ in the case of the prosecution.Footnote 380
In this rewritten decision concerning the Prosecutor’s request to amend the charges, Valerie Oosterveld reconsiders the three Article 61(9) factors permitting the introduction of additional charges, focusing on the inescapable realities of collecting evidence regarding sexual violence faced by investigating teams. In doing so, she criticises the restrictive approach undertaken by the Chamber, turning to the experience of other international tribunals to demonstrate how, particularly in the situation of sexual crimes, there is a need for a full appreciation of the experience of victims and ultimately confirms the inclusion of such charges against Mr Yekatom.
Decision of the Prosecutor’s Request to Amend the Charges against Alfred Yekatom No.: ICC-01/14-01/18
Date: 1 June 2020
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II(B)
Before: Judge Valerie OOSTERVELD
SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC II
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. ALFRED YEKATOM AND PATRICE-EDOUARD NGAÏSSONA
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II of the International Criminal Court issues this Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request to Amend the Charges against Alfred Yekatom.
Procedural History
1. On 11 December 2019, the Chamber issued the Decision on the confirmation of charges against Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona (Confirmation Decision, Yekatom, and Ngaïssona, respectively), in which, inter alia, it confirmed the charges presented against Yekatom and Ngaïssona to the extent specified in the decision and committed them to trial on the charges as confirmed.Footnote 381
2. On 2 March 2019, the Prosecutor filed a request for reconsideration or leave to appeal this decision.Footnote 382 On 11 March 2019, the Chamber rejected this request.Footnote 383
3. On 13 March 2020, the Registry transmitted the record of the proceedings to the Presidency,Footnote 384 which constituted Trial Chamber V and referred the case against Yekatom and Ngaïssona to it on 16 March 2020.Footnote 385
4. On 31 March 2020, the Prosecutor’s Request to Amend Charges pursuant to Article 61(9) and for Correction of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, and Notice of Intention to Add Additional Charges (Ngaïssona Article 61(9) Request) was filed:Footnote 386 the Prosecutor requested the Chamber, inter alia, to ‘amend the charges of rape confirmed against’ Ngaïssona by ‘includ[ing] and confirm[ing] a second instance of rape’.
5. On 14 May 2020, the Chamber issued the Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request to Amend Charges pursuant to Article 61(9) and for Correction of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, and Notice of Intention to Add Additional Charges (14 May 2020 Decision), rejecting the Ngaïssona Article 61(9) Request.Footnote 387
6. Also on 14 May 2020, the Prosecution Motion to Amend the Charges against Alfred YEKATOM (Request) was filed:Footnote 388 the Prosecutor seeks that the Chamber (i) ‘grant permission to amend the charges’ confirmed against Yekatom ‘under Article 61(9) to add charges of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes’ and (ii) ‘issue a scheduling order for the confirmation hearing [on those charges] for as soon as practicable’.
7. On 26 May 2020, the Yekatom Defence Response to Motion to Amend the Charges (Yekatom Response), opposing the Request, was filed before Trial Chamber V.Footnote 389
8. On 26 May 2020, the common legal representatives of the former child soldiers and of the victims of other crimes (CLRV) filed their joint response, seeking that the Chamber grant the Request in its entirety.Footnote 390
Submissions of the Parties and Participants
Defence for Yekatom
9. As a preliminary matter, the Chamber notes that the corrected version of the Yekatom Response, addressed to Pre-Trial Chamber II, was received by the Registry on 27 May 2020, at 15:51 hours, after the time limit for responses to the Request had expired. The defence for Yekatom did not request an extension of time prior to the expiration of the deadline. Accordingly, the Chamber will not consider the Yekatom Response.
Prosecutor
10. The Prosecutor submits that ‘credible evidence of rape and sexual slavery allegedly committed by Anti-Balaka elements subordinate to’ Yekatom, in the form of witness statements, was uncovered ‘[d]uring the course of finalising [the] investigation into the conscription, enlistment, and use of children under the age of 15 years’. Accordingly, charges of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes should be added by amending the charges confirmed against Yekatom, pursuant to Article 61(9) of the Statute.
11. In the view of the Prosecutor, these additional charges are ‘fully substantiated and more fully reflect [Yekatom’s] alleged culpability’; in light of the ‘seriousness and importance’ of these charges, the ‘proposed amendment is in the interests of justice’.
12. The Prosecutor submits that ‘the requested amendment is timely, justified, and entails no unfair prejudice to’ Yekatom because: (i) ‘no trial date has as yet been set and … an actual trial is unlikely to commence soon’; (ii) the additional charges, being ‘predicated on sufficient evidence’, are ‘adequately substantiated’ and feature ‘among the Rome Statute’s most serious’, which renders them ‘important to the Court’s duty to establish the truth and to ensure the Trial Chamber’s “full consideration of the relevant issues”’; (iii) the Prosecutor ‘acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the investigation and the [a]dditional [c]harges’, including with regard to the gathering of the relevant evidence; and (iv) the ‘amendment of charges … would not unfairly prejudice’ Yekatom, nor would the Prosecutor ‘gain any tactical advantage’, since the defence would ‘have ample opportunity to prepare’ and there would be ‘no clear impact on the expeditious conduct of a prospective trial’.
13. Should the Request be granted, the Prosecutor also ‘requests that the Chamber schedule a date for the confirmation hearing on the [a]dditional [c]harges for as soon as practicable’. Further particulars of the Prosecutor’s argument are indicated below.
Common Legal Representatives of the Former Child Soldiers and Common Legal Representatives of the Victims of Other Crimes (CLRV)
14. In the view of the CLRV, the Request should be granted in its entirety, based inter alia on the following submissions: (i) it is in the interest of the victims that the proposed charges are added in order for them to have effective ‘access to justice, recognition of their victimisation and eventually the possibility to claim reparations’; (ii) the prosecution only received credible information on conflict-related sexual violence in mid-July 2019, which did not provide sufficient time for it to gather and integrate the evidence into the Document Containing the Charges (DCC); (iii) this timing required investigation ‘necessary to establish the truth … of grave crimes’ beyond the submission of the DCC and the issuance of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges; (iv) this investigation faced ‘practical and logistical constraints’ which explained the timing of the current request; (v) adding new charges of limited scope at this juncture ‘would not negatively impact the fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings’, given that ‘the date of the commencement of the trial is yet to be set’; (vi) concerns about the lack of charges related to gender-based crimes had already been expressed by the CLRV in their 9 July 2019 submissions; (vii) the Chamber must assess and balance the rights of victims, which include consideration of the full extent of their victimisation, as well as those of the accused; and (viii) it is not satisfactory to have a speedy trial ‘if said trial fails to uncover the truth about the responsibility of those involved’.
Determination of the Chamber
15. The Trial Chamber must consider the criminal responsibility of the accused based on the facts confirmed in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.Footnote 391 The Decision on the Confirmation of Charges therefore sets the factual boundaries for each trial and the accused cannot be convicted for acts that fall outside of those particularised in that decision.
16. Article 61(9) of the Statute provides for the possibility of amending the charges after the issuance of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges and before the start of trial. It states, in part: ‘After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to confirm those charges must be held.’ The phrase ‘before the trial has begun’ refers to ‘the true opening of the trial when the opening statements, if any, are made prior to the calling of witnesses’.Footnote 392
17. The drafters of the Statute, in adding Article 61(9), reflected the procedures to amend an indictment in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR, respectively), crafted to fit the differing procedure of the ICC.Footnote 393
18. This Court has previously determined that the Prosecutor may request permission to amend the charges up until the actual commencement of the trial, provided that a request to this effect is properly ‘supported and justified’.Footnote 394 This is not an unfettered right, as the Court must also consider whether granting such a request would ‘negatively affect other competing interests, such as the fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings, which would result in causing prejudice to the rights of the accused’.Footnote 395
19. The prosecution’s request to add entirely new and separate charges not already reflected in the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges raises issues of first instance. This Court has considered requests under Article 61(9) to amend and extend existing charges,Footnote 396 and this prior jurisprudence provides guidance. Additionally, other international criminal tribunals have considered requests for the addition of new charges under rules that bear some similarity to Article 61(9);Footnote 397 even though the procedures of those tribunals differ from the Confirmation of Charges procedures of the ICC, their jurisprudence may also be instructive.
20. These sources lead to the conclusion that the relevant factors are, when considering an Article 61(9) request for the addition of new charges:
1. The importance of the additional allegations to a complete understanding of the prosecution’s case and a full consideration of the relevant issues;Footnote 398
2. The reasonable diligence of the prosecution in bringing the additional charges, including the reasonableness of continuing investigations after the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges and whether the request is supported and justified;Footnote 399 and
3. Whether the adjudication of the additional charges would cause undue prejudice to the rights of the accused.Footnote 400
21. These factors will be considered in turn.
Importance of the Additional Allegations to a Complete Understanding of the Prosecution’s Case and a Full Consideration of the Relevant Issues
22. The Prosecutor submits that permitting the requested amendment to add charges against Yekatom of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes would lead to a more complete understanding of the case against the accused: ‘The Additional Charges are important to the Court’s duty to establish the truth and to ensure the Trial Chamber’s “full consideration of the relevant issues”.’Footnote 401
23. The Appeals Chamber has recognised that ‘[t]he duty to establish the truth is not limited to the time before the confirmation hearing. Therefore, the Prosecutor must be allowed to continue his investigation beyond the confirmation hearing, if this is necessary in order to establish the truth’.Footnote 402 The Appeals Chamber identified when such situations may be necessary: when a failure to do so would ‘deprive the Court of significant and relevant evidence … particularly in situations where the ongoing nature of the conflict results in more compelling evidence becoming available for the first time after the confirmation hearing’.Footnote 403
24. This Court has also recognised that the ICC’s ‘Statute and the Rules accord a special status to sexual violence crimes, crimes against children, and the victims thereof’ and that ‘[d]uring the drafting process of the Rome Statute, the especially grave nature and consequences of sexual violence crimes … were recognised’.Footnote 404 In the Ntaganda case, Trial Chamber VI observed, citing the ICTY trial chamber in Kunarac et al., that ‘rape is one of the worst sufferings a human being can inflict upon another’.Footnote 405 Citing Mucić et al., Trial Chamber VI also considered ‘[t]he rape of any person to be a despicable act which strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity’.Footnote 406 Trial Chamber VI concluded that rape and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity and war crimes are grave crimes, ultimately sentencing Ntaganda to seventeen and fourteen years’ imprisonment respectively.Footnote 407 Other international criminal tribunals have come to the same conclusion, with Trial Chamber II of the Special Court for Sierra Leone categorising these acts as ‘of the utmost gravity’.Footnote 408
25. The Prosecutor is requesting the addition of charges for the war crimes of rape and sexual slavery. These are the only proposed charges of conflict-related sexual violence against the accused. The victims, in particular, have an interest in the full consideration of the responsibility of the accused and the extent of victimisation.
26. Given the gravity of the proposed additional charges, they may provide ‘significant and relevant evidence’ as well as context for the previously confirmed charges. Therefore the requirement to demonstrate the importance of the additional allegations to a complete understanding of the prosecution’s case and a full consideration of the relevant issues has been met.
Reasonable Diligence of the Prosecution in Bringing the Additional Charges, including the Reasonableness of Continuing Investigations after the Confirmation of Charges and whether the Request Is Supported and Justified
27. The ‘underlying rationale [of Article 61(9)] is that continued investigation should be related only to such essential pieces of evidence which were not known or available to the Office of the Prosecutor prior to the confirmation hearing or could not have been collected for any other reason, except at the later stage’.Footnote 409 The reasons for such an investigation must be properly justified.Footnote 410
28. In June 2019, the prosecution indicated that it was ‘continu[ing] to investigate the commission of sexual and gender based crimes … and may seek the confirmation of such charges, should the evidence obtained satisfy the requisite threshold’.Footnote 411 It received relevant information relating to sexual violence in mid-July 2019.Footnote 412 The DCC was due on 19 August 2019. In order to incorporate this information into the DCC, the prosecution would have needed to organise and undertake missions (involving travel arrangements for all participants, including the witnesses), assess any risks to the witnesses based on the evidence provided and their personal circumstances before disclosure could take place, and translate the statements into French for the purposes of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Rules of the Court in order to rely on them as evidence at the confirmation hearing – all within one month.Footnote 413 There was therefore not sufficient time.Footnote 414 Additionally, the prosecution had earlier sought and obtained a delay in the Confirmation of Charges hearingFootnote 415 and it was not feasible to request a further delay.
29. The prosecution sought to interview two victims. The prosecution alleges that the first individual, a victim of rape and sexual slavery, was deprived of her liberty while with the Anti-Balaka, told that she ‘had to do anything they ordered [her] to do’, and was raped under threat of death by an intermittently armed direct perpetrator.Footnote 416 The prosecution alleges that a second individual, another victim of rape and sexual slavery, was threatened by the direct perpetrator and deprived of her liberty.Footnote 417
30. The prosecution indicates that the first individual was screened in late August 2019, and interviewed within three weeks, in September 2019, once the presence of a psychosocial expert was ensured.Footnote 418 The prosecution indicates that it faced considerable difficulties initially in contacting the second individual.Footnote 419 The date for her first interview was rescheduled to late November 2019 due to the unavailability of a psychosocial expert.Footnote 420 The prosecution conducted a second interview in January 2020 to obtain ‘additional details and clarifications in order to determine whether to seek the amendment of charges’.Footnote 421 The prosecution submits that witness-related work was hampered by the considerable budget restraints in place at the Court during the last quarter of 2019, which permitted only a single investigative team to conduct field work in the Central African Republic.Footnote 422 The prosecution viewed the evidence of the first and second individuals as interconnected,Footnote 423 which is why it secured evidence from both before proceeding to an internal evidence review, which concluded on 27 March 2020, and the filing of its motion to add additional charges on 31 March 2020.Footnote 424
31. The time period between the prosecution’s initial receipt of relevant information on sexual violence and issuance of the request to amend the charges was 8.5 months. Within this time period, the prosecution only had the evidence for both charges in hand as of January 2020.Footnote 425
32. This delayed surfacing of the evidence on conflict-related sexual violence, and the difficulties in securing such evidence and putting into place protective measures for victims, are not unusual. There are inherent challenges to collecting credible evidence of conflict-related sexual violence which have an impact upon the speed at which such evidence can be uncovered, considered, and integrated into prosecution cases.Footnote 426 Survivors may be reluctant to reveal their victimisation to investigators because they face threats to their security and well-being or societal, cultural, and other barriers such as stigmatisation and ostracism.Footnote 427 Survivors may be in a precarious position, affiliated with or living in a community with those who perpetrated the sexual violence against them. Survivors may be dealing with trauma, fatigue, health conditions, insufficient support mechanisms within their families and communities for survivors of sexual violence, and lack of access to meaningful victim protection.Footnote 428 They may therefore need to be interviewed more than once in order to build trust and secure further details.Footnote 429 Investigators may not have access to survivors or to secure private locations in which to interview survivors.Footnote 430 All of these difficulties can lead to the delayed reporting of sexual violence, as well as delays once evidence of sexual violence initially comes to light. Investigators and prosecutors have responsibilities for carrying out investigation of conflict-related sexual violence in a measured, careful manner to avoid harming victims, which takes time.Footnote 431
33. Indeed, in Al-Hassan the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that the prosecution cannot be reproached for decisions that belong solely to the witnesses, such as their hesitance to cooperate and to give evidence.Footnote 432
34. Given the prosecution’s explanation of the reasons for the timing of the investigation of the alleged incidents of sexual violence, and considering the inherent difficulties in investigating conflict-related sexual violence, the Chamber finds that it was reasonable for the prosecution to continue investigating after the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, and that the timeline indicates that the prosecution was reasonably diligent in bringing its motion to amend the charges.
Whether the Adjudication of the Additional Charges Would Cause Undue Prejudice to the Rights of the Accused
35. In considering whether the adjudication of the additional proposed charges would cause undue prejudice to the rights of the accused, this Chamber must consider: the ability of the accused to prepare a timely defence to the additional charges, and any delay the additional charges may cause to the proceedings, including to the duration of pre-trial custody.Footnote 433 These two considerations are interrelated: the granting of a request under Article 61(9) will naturally cause some disruption and delay as the defence would need to: review the information disclosed by the prosecution, conduct its own investigation, potentially adjust its strategy; and respond to the charges in an additional Confirmation of Charges hearing. It is therefore important to consider the potential extent of such a delay and whether it would amount to undue delay.
36. In Al Hassan, the Pre-Trial Chamber agreed to modify the existing charges of sexual slavery, rape, persecution, outrages on personal dignity, and other inhumane acts (forced marriage) in order to include additional facts on ten charges involving twelve victims.Footnote 434 The Chamber indicated that these additions were not so significant that they would delay the start of the trial and, although they would impact on the way the defence prepared for trial, this relatively small impact was outweighed by the necessary search for the truth by the prosecution.Footnote 435 The current case involves two new charges involving two victims, and is thus comparable.
37. In Ruto and Sang, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that an amendment done well in advance of the scheduled trial respected ‘the fairness of the proceedings, their expeditiousness and respect for the rights of the accused to receive a proper trial’.Footnote 436 The current case is also comparable, as the trial date has not been scheduled and is likely to be affected by the ongoing COVID-19 restrictions. Thus, a grant of the requested amendment sufficiently in advance of the trial can preserve the accused’s rights.
38. In Ngaïssona, this Chamber found that granting the requested amendment would not satisfy the accused’s fair trial rights. That decision can be distinguished from the current case because, in Ngaïssona, this Chamber found that the prosecution’s request to amend the charges to include a charge of rape was aimed at ‘reintroduc[ing] non-confirmed charges for which evidence was lacking pursuant to a supplemental investigation’.Footnote 437 In contrast, the current case considers entirely new charges with new evidence justified by different reasons.
39. In the view of this Chamber, the extent of any delay is likely to be minimal for two reasons. First, the proposed charges are limited both in scope and time, and are connected to existing charges. The prosecution has already completed its investigation and therefore only the defence would be required to undertake an additional investigation. This additional investigation would be narrow in focus. Second, the proceedings in this case are at an early stage. No trial date has been set and the trial is unlikely to happen in the near future due to COVID-19-related restrictions.Footnote 438 Indeed, in this situation, the prosecution would be exercising its recourse to Article 61(9) ‘under circumstances and conditions which would not impact the … trial’.Footnote 439
40. Even if the trial date is likely to be set in the near future, a short delay would not be undue. For example, in the ICTY, a delay of seven months was not considered undue and was deemed to still afford the accused a fair trial, even though the trial date had already been set.Footnote 440
41. Additionally, the effects of any delay could be substantially mitigated through the disclosure of witness statements to the defence as ‘attorneys-eyes-only’, to allow the defence immediate access to the evidence while still protecting the security of the witnesses.Footnote 441 Additionally or alternatively, witness statements could be disclosed to the accused and the CLRV in the form of extracts or excerpts, to the extent the security situation allows. In addition, any delays caused by such an amendment could also be mitigated by subtracting time in custody from the sentence in the event of a conviction, in accordance with Article 78(2) of the Statute.
42. In sum, any potential delay would not be undue and could be mitigated.
43. In light of the above, and after careful consideration of the rights of the accused, the Chamber finds that any potential disruption and delay caused to the defence by the granting of the prosecution’s Article 61(9) request may be counterbalanced by these mitigating steps: (1) disclosure of relevant prosecution witness statements to the defence as ‘attorneys-eyes-only’ within five days of the release of this decision; (2) disclosure of witness statements to the accused and the CLRV in the form of key extracts or excerpts, to the extent the security situation allows, within ten days; and (3) subtracting time in custody from the sentence in the event of a conviction, in accordance with Article 78(2).
44. In conclusion, this Chamber finds that the three factors identified in paragraph 20 above have been fulfilled.
For These Reasons, the Chamber Hereby
GRANTS the Request.
Done in both English and French, the English version being authoritative.
Judge Valerie Oosterveld
12.1 Reflection: The Situation in Côte d’Ivoire
Introduction
My observations on the contexts relevant here do not start with the alleged crimes in Côte d’Ivoire but the temporalities of feminist rewriting as a critical practice. The first feminist rewritings in international law that marked the audiences concerned old judgments, such as the judgment in the Lotus case by the Permanent Court of Justice, decided in 1927.Footnote 1 Another important one was the International Court of Justice’s decision on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, of 1955.Footnote 2 At the time when the original decisions were made, not only the international judges, counsel, and legal experts active on the cases, but almost all scholars, experts, negotiators, and professors – the most visible part of the intellectual and professional community of international lawyers – were men.
What difference does the (historical) context make? Early feminist rewriting could move freely in a realm of possibilities, in a liberty of constraints, a space of reimagination that resembles the often controversial ‘what if?’ histories, referred to as counterfactual or alternative histories in historiographical research. With the ongoing sex and gender transformation in international law that started in the 1990s, that moment of ‘what if there were a woman’ or even several women on the bench – or as counsel – has passed, in some sub-disciplines of international law at least. Amongst these disciplines, international criminal law (ICL) is generally considered the leading example of progress towards more equal sex and gender representation in authoritative and visible roles.
In the first decision concerning the alleged crimes in Côte d’Ivoire addressed here, Pre-Trial Chamber III consisted of three members, two of whom were women, Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi presiding. The second decision was adopted by an all-female panel in Pre-Trial Chamber I. This change in the context of rewriting is brought about by very positive developments which remain aleatory and primarily restricted to ICL.Footnote 3 At the same time, the new context accentuates the challenges of rewriting as a creative critical exercise, by underlining the question of the difference between a decision by an all-female panel and a feminist decision. What is feminism(s) today, and who decides on the matter? I will return to this question in the concluding remarks.
I will proceed by giving a brief account of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire which gave rise to the ICC’s intervention before outlining each of the cases concerning Côte d’Ivoire. I will then analyse each rewritten decision separately, concluding with general reflections. I start with Judge Natalie Hodgson’s rewritten Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 for a Warrant of Arrest against Simone Gbagbo and continue with Judge Sarah Easy’s rewriting of the Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Simone Gbagbo.
Background to the Conflict
Côte d’Ivoire experienced post-election violence after the results of the 2010–2011 presidential election were disputed. Mr Laurent Gbagbo claimed victory although the electoral commission stated that his opponent, Mr Alassane Ouattara, had won. It was reported that unrest ensued, with systematic and widespread attacks occurring against the civilian population. Witnesses described instances of raids with excessive force used, while others detailed incidences of rape, murder, disappearances, and mass graves. It was estimated that during the conflict, approximately 1 million people were displaced. The investigation focused on both pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces, but so far only pro-Gbagbo personnel have been charged.
Background to the Cases
Côte d’Ivoire accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC in April 2003 and ratified the Rome Statute on 15 February 2013. On 3 October 2011, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) was granted permission to open a proprio motu investigation in relation to alleged crimes committed since November 2010. On 22 February 2012, this was expanded to include alleged crimes committed since 10 September 2002. On 23 November 2011, a warrant of arrest was issued for Mr Laurent Gbagbo while on 21 December 2011 a warrant was issued for Mr Charles Blé Goudé, a military leader within Mr Gbagbo’s party. On 29 February 2012, Ms Simone Gbagbo had a warrant of arrest issued against her for the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, and other inhuman acts. While the charges against Mr Laurent Gbagbo and Mr Charles Blé Goudé proceeded to trial (where they were eventually acquitted), the warrant against Ms Simone Gbagbo was vacated on 19 July 2021.
Feminist Reimaginings
Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo, Decision of the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 for a Warrant of Arrest against Simone Gbagbo
Judge Natalie Hodgson’s rewriting appears to have two primary objectives, the first less explicit than the second. First, her revisions to the original try to bring order and logic to an ICC decision. She uses titles that structure the corpus text of the decision and organises the questions the court must resolve. Her drafting closely follows the language and order of appearance of the Rome Statute’s diverse criteria about what the Court must be convinced of at this stage of the proceedings. Her initiative suggests that feminist rewriting also comprises the general objective of communication and clarity. I welcome the suggestion for clarity, considering how gender, social class, and other structural circumstances and factors have for long restrained access to international law, to its education, its professions, and its intellectual and professional communities. Those less familiar with international law, the general public, civil society activists, students, and others should be provided with more pedagogical and approachable legal instruments, as Hodgson seems to suggest. Substantially, Judge Hodgson’s decision reproduces the findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber on jurisdiction and admissibility.
The second objective of this feminist rewriting relates to the qualification of Simone Gbagbo’s role in the examination of the ‘reasonable grounds’ test. The rewritten decision introduces supplementary information on Simone Gbagbo, thereby altering the way in which her personality, political importance, and agency are presented. In contrast to the original decision in which Simone Gbagbo is predominantly and repeatedly represented as the wife of Laurent Gbagbo, as if an auxiliary to ‘her husband’,Footnote 4 the rewritten judgment mentions the circumstance that Simone Gbagbo is married to Laurent Gbagbo only once. At a later part of the decision, Judge Hodgson refers to Simone Gbagbo’s ‘relationship with Laurent Gbagbo’, without specifying it. The fact that Laurent Gbagbo was, at the time of the alleged crimes, the president or the ex-president of Côte d’Ivoire, is noted only once.
In contrast to framing Simone Gbagbo in the Pre-Trial Chamber (para. 10) as the wife who was ideologically and professionally very close to her husband, the rewritten decision presents an inner circle ‘comprising individuals occupying formal and informal positions in Mr Gbagbo’s government’ (para. 24), of which Simone Gbagbo is a member. Under the heading ‘Whether There Are Reasonable Grounds to Believe That Ms Gbagbo Is Criminally Responsible for the Crimes Alleged by the Prosecutor’, Judge Hodgson’s decision introduces specific reasons why Simone Gbagbo should be considered an indirect co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute. The image that appears is not that of a wife following the president-husband, who even (mischievously?) ‘acted as an alter ego for her husband’ (PTC para. 10) but a power-couple of two independent, notable, long-term politicians at the centre of the inner circle of the Côte d’Ivoire government.
The rewritten decision details, for example, that ‘Ms Gbagbo had her own cabinet within the presidency with its own staff. In a country where women are significantly underrepresented in political positions, Ms Gbagbo was an active decision maker and possessed significant political power’ (para. 34). That power has a history in ‘her long political career’, including the fact that she was a ‘founding member’ of the Front populaire ivorien (para. 35). Thereafter, Judge Hodgson refers to elements concerning meetings, military equipment, and orders given to militias. These matters were also addressed in the original decision but Judge Hodgson emphasises them differently to suggest that Simone Gbagbo was able to ‘exercise joint control over the crimes’ (para. 38), ‘made a co-ordinated and essential contribution to the crime’ (para. 39), and ‘acted with the necessary degree of intent and knowledge in performing her role within the common plan’ (para. 40).
Judge Hodgson provides a more substantiated analysis of Simone Gbagbo’s role than in the original judgment by demonstrating that the legal requirements for issuing a warrant of arrest are independent (of ‘the husband’). She explains how Simone Gbagbo’s arrest warrant depends, in accordance with Article 58(1) and in addition to the reasonable grounds test addressed above, on whether the arrest is necessary to: (i) ensure her appearance before the Court; (ii) ensure that she does not use her connections and resources to obstruct or endanger the investigation; and (iii) prevent the further commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The rewritten decision proceeds to analyse these aspects individually, relying on ICC case law, commenting in paragraph 44 on how:
A person’s past and present political position, international contacts, financial and professional background, their access to necessary networks and financial resources, and the likely length of any potential sentence are factors that might increase the risk that an individual will abscond or avoid arrest.Footnote 5 Additionally, a person’s access to networks and financial status is a relevant factor in determining whether they have the means to interfere with the investigation or safety of witnesses.Footnote 6
The decision then replies to these requirements, stating how Simone Gbagbo has a ‘long political history and strong political connections throughout Côte d’Ivoire’ and that ‘her supporters have called for her release and oppose her transfer to the ICC’ (para. 45). On international connections, the decision details that Simone Gbagbo ‘has studied abroad in Senegal and France, as well as having completed multiple international training courses’ (para. 46). The decision suggests that these connections ‘could assist her to abscond’ (para. 46). Furthermore, Judge Hodgson’s decision notes that ‘the Prosecutor has provided evidence that Ms Gbagbo has access to significant financial resources’ (para. 46), and that her ‘connection to high-profile members of the former government and her relationship with Mr Gbagbo might also assist her to access relevant contacts and resources in order to abscond’ (para. 46).
To strengthen the arrest warrant further, Judge Hodgson’s decision introduces additional information on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire at the moment of the consideration of the arrest warrant. It refers to allegations about previous concealing of ‘crimes committed by members of the inner circle’ (para. 55), and provides information on how ‘supporters of Ms Gbagbo are currently discussing strategies for regaining political power in Côte d’Ivoire. The pro-Gbagbo forces that remain loyal to Ms Gbagbo and the other members of the inner circle continue to have access to significant material resources, including weapons’ (para. 49).
The rewriting culminates in a section entitled ‘Concluding Comments’ that starts with the following statement: ‘Ms Gbagbo is the first woman to be the subject of an application for an arrest warrant before this Court’ (para. 51). As such a section is not habitual in ICC or other international criminal court decisions, it somewhat diminishes the impression of reading a ‘real’ decision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. But it certainly allows Judge Hodgson to be more explicit about her message. After explaining – in a scholarly manner – how women’s general underrepresentation in politics and the military has meant the rarity of their qualification as suspects or accused in international criminal trials, the rewriting returns to a more judge-like voice: ‘The issue before this Court is not whether Ms Gbagbo’s conduct adhered to the traditional gender roles that woman are expected to perform, or whether Ms Gbagbo should be punished for her relationship with her husband, but rather the extent to which Ms Gbagbo herself is or is not guilty of perpetrating international crimes’ (para. 53, footnote omitted).
The Female Perpetrator of International Crimes as a Hard Case for Feminism(s)
An astute academic article authored by Natalie Hodgson that precedes the rewriting project by several years helpfully adds background and nuances to her reimagined judgment.Footnote 7 In her article, stereotypes regarding gender, femininity, violence, and conflict that shape legal discourses are analysed and deconstructed in the cases of six defendants in international criminal courts. Hodgson identifies three narratives used in international criminal courts to frame women defendants: mother, monster, and wife,Footnote 8 and localises them via discourse analysis in the case materials. Regarding the ICC case of Simone Gbagbo, one of the six analysed in the article, Hodgson suggests that motherly characteristics of Gbagbo are referred to by the defence. The article quotes Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility of Simone Gbagbo’s case: ‘She has devoted most of her adult life, striving to advance the education of the people of Côte d’Ivoire in so far as they came under her sphere of influence in general and the women and children of Abidjan in particular.’Footnote 9
For Hodgson, ‘the use of motherly attributes’ in the case of Simone Gbagbo ‘suggests that the themes of domesticity and motherhood pervade all stages of a female defendant’s case, and that females are analysed with respect to these themes even when the defendant’s character or conduct is not the main issue before the court’.Footnote 10 Pertinently, she gives primary importance in Simone Gbagbo’s case to the wife narrative by the ICC prosecution and the Pre-Trial Chamber. The language used, such as the recurrent choice of the word ‘husband’, ‘emphasises the personal and familial connection between the two’.Footnote 11 The patriarchal stereotyping appears most striking in how the Pre-Trial Chamber presupposes that the motivation for Simone Gbagbo’s alleged crimes was not to retain her own political power or her political party’s power, as is granted to be the case for the inner circle of President Gbagbo, but rather ‘her husband’s power’.Footnote 12
How does other academic scholarship in criminology, sociology, history, and criminal law see perpetrator women? There is a broad concordance about the starting point that women’s participation in violent crime is significantly minor in quantity compared to that of men, and that women’s participation differs in quality.Footnote 13 I entitled this section ‘The Female Perpetrator of International Crimes as a Hard Case for Feminism(s)’ to mark a focus in a discussion that risks exceeding the limited space available. Why call the female perpetrator of international crimes a hard case? I try to explain by a short excursion into the narratives of women in international law and their incompatibility with the real-life eventuality of women’s transgression to perpetration of international crimes.
Women have a history of perpetrating international crimes, including sexual violence against women and men, at all levels of responsibility.Footnote 14 National trials after World War II and the armed conflicts and episodes of large-scale violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia, to name only a few, have dealt with the criminal responsibility of women, including women who committed direct violence. Women prosecuted in international criminal trials have so far been accused as indirect perpetrators, indirect co-perpetrators, and involved in joint criminal enterprise. Despite these examples, the paradigmatic image of women in international criminal justice remains that of victims of sexual and gendered violence. That is likely to relate the arguably essentialised, ahistorical notions and narrative strategies of women’s general propensity to preserve life, aversion to violence, or otherwise higher values, hardly leaving space for deviance, violence, and crimes by women.Footnote 15
Women’s history in international law, as its explicit objects, subjects, agents, and actors, is typically considered short and modest, but perhaps it is more adequately qualified as obscured and ignored.Footnote 16 The red line can be sketched in a few main roles and routes in diverse temporalities, grossly simplified. Women are seen to have entered international law as pacifists acting in the law against war; as empathetic and solidary carers for others in international humanitarian law and abolition of slavery;Footnote 17 as equal citizens in the advocacy for suffrage and women’s rights more broadly, and as victims of sexual and gendered violence; experts of it and combatants against it in international criminal law.Footnote 18 These roles remain to a large extent, despite the diverse contexts, marked by gendered assumptions of women’s character and moral disposition, and not least by women themselves.
Should that situation be ‘redressed’ and if yes, how? Sociological and physical limits to women’s role as direct perpetrators are diminishing, as women more broadly access positions of leadership in various contexts and modern weapons technologies provide an array of ‘smart’ solutions for conducting warfare.Footnote 19 For legal academic Doris Buss, asking ‘where are the women?’ directs us to roles and places often obscured in dominant narratives and ‘opens up a range of questions about what war and armed conflict are, how they are understood, practiced, and represented, and how women and men, femininities and masculinities, are involved in and produced through war’.Footnote 20 Diversity of women’s and men’s real experiences in conflict, including violence and criminality, should be ‘recognized as valid, rather than being excluded from the discourse or reduced to stereotype’.Footnote 21
Many commentaries suggest that international criminal trials have a role in ‘writing history’.Footnote 22 From that perspective, the transformation of gender balance of the benches in international criminal trials may also alter the authorship of histories about violence and international crime. The unease that persists regarding women’s perpetuation of international crimes is, however, also current, perhaps in particular amongst women, and feminists. The infamous photos of Karen England’s and other US personnel’s cruel violence on detainees in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq shocked because, as one commentator put it, ‘this is not how women are expected to behave. Feminism taught me 30 years ago that not only had women gotten a raw deal from men, we were morally superior to them. When it came to distinguishing right from wrong, the needle of our compass always pointed to true north’.Footnote 23
On the IntLawGrls, a website on women and international law, a blog series titled ‘Women in Nuremberg’ celebrated women amongst the prosecutorial staff and defence counsels, as well as staffers, interpreters, and journalists. In contrast, the very few women accused of international crimes were barely mentioned, with the suggestion they are ‘Not Our Sisters’.Footnote 24 As the editors noted, ‘[t]he crimes of which these women were convicted ought to be unimaginable, and will remain, here at least, unprintable’.Footnote 25 The desire to identify only with the positive accomplishments of women remains. It has, however, been met with scholarship striving to dissipate the obscurity surrounding women perpetrators in crimes of totalitarian regimes. A branch of German and international academic discussion on Nazi criminality has since the 1980s sought an end to ‘the rituals of innocence in the women’s movement and in women’s history’.Footnote 26 In international (criminal) law, this turn is in the making, and the rewritten decision of Simone Gbagbo’s arrest warrant makes an important contribution to it.
Complementarity Test in Simone Gbagbo’s Admissibility Decision, Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo, Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s Challenge to the Admissibility of the Case against Simone Gbagbo
In the five years from the first International Law Commission (ILC) draft in 1993 for a statute of an international criminal court to the adoption of the Rome Statute in the 1998 diplomatic conference attended by the delegations representing 161 states, the issue of delimitation of the international and national criminal jurisdiction was among the most difficult to negotiate.Footnote 27 The solutions found, substantially in Article 17 entitled ‘Issues of Admissibility’, packaged together with Article 20 on ‘Ne bis in idem’, became parts of a multifarious compromise package that made the adoption possible. As the lengthy Articles 18–19 spell out, the concrete application of the delimitation was likely to become cumbersome. Articles 17–20 are typically read in connection with the preamble of the Statute’s tenth paragraph, ‘Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’. This paragraph provides the origin of the discourse on ‘the complementarity principle’.Footnote 28
This legal and doctrinal landscape on complementarity is at the centre of Judge Sarah Easy’s ‘Separate and dissenting opinion’ to Pre-Trial Chamber I decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Simone Gbagbo. Judge Easy explains the motivation of her dissent as follows: ‘In governing the relationship between the (ICC) and domestic criminal courts, Article 17(1)(a) is of great consequence for women and minority groups for whom such institutions have historically been unavailable or ineffective in securing justice.’Footnote 29 The dissent relates to how the Pre-Trial Chamber arrived at its conclusion to dismiss the inadmissibility challenge by Côte d’Ivoire. In doing so, Judge Easy dismisses the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision.
Judge Easy’s feminist reimagining rejects the Pre-Trial Chamber I use of the ‘same person/same conduct’ test as being too narrow and vague.Footnote 30 In doing so, she refers to the language used in the Appeals Chamber decision on Libya’s appeal against the Pre-Trial Decision in the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi.Footnote 31 In this case, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the admissibility challenge by Libya. In her judgment, Judge Easy regrets that the Pre-Trial Chamber ‘has not seized the opportunity to further clarify the content of this [same person/same conduct] test and address the gender justice concerns arising out of its application’.Footnote 32 At this point, it is necessary to return to the observations about the context of the feminist redrafting exercise that I started with. Who were the judges deciding the case that is now ‘reimagined’? Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (presiding), Ekaterina Tredafilova, and Christine Van den Wyngaert. A bench of three women resorted to an interpretation that is, to quote Easy, ‘likely [to] operate in a discriminatory manner against women who are statistically significantly more likely to be victims of sexual and gender-based violence, by precluding them from seeking redress at both the national and international level’.Footnote 33
The main critique of Judge Easy’s dissent is, however, not directed at the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, but the state of Côte d’Ivoire, its legal system, judiciary, and ‘court and law enforcement personnel’.Footnote 34 The sharp rewriting fails to pay attention to the history of Côte d’Ivoire’s relationship with the ICC as a movement towards a closer relation – the acceptance of its jurisdiction as a non-state party in 2003, the proprio motu investigation in 2011, state party to the Rome Statute in 2013. In contrast, Judge Easy underlines that the court must exercise ‘the expressive function of denouncing state conduct which fosters impunity’,Footnote 35 having inquired about the quality and the conduct of the national law enforcement authorities and judiciary. This position mirrors a contentious aspect in the Statute negotiations that the Court has tried not to dwell on extensively in its case law.
Judge Easy explains how ‘evidence before me indicates that entrenched discriminatory attitudes towards women and girls in Côte d’Ivoire present a significant barrier to the genuine investigation of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence’.Footnote 36 She quotes at length a report by an NGO describing shocking events of sexual and gendered violence in detail.Footnote 37 She further finds that there is evidence suggesting ‘that the pervasive trivialisation of these crimes is so significant that even if the justice system had not been disrupted by political turmoil and conflict, lacunae in the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes would prevail’.Footnote 38 Judge Easy further argues that ‘gender-based discrimination is not only practised by the general population but evinced by the very institutions charged with effecting justice. Of great concern is the systematic encouragement by the Ivorian police for the victims to seek an amicable solution with their rapist’.Footnote 39
I am, firstly, surprised by how this feminist rewriting outright refuses to consider whether any co-operation with or support to the Côte d’Ivoire authorities would be meaningful.Footnote 40 While Judge Easy mentions the efforts of the UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to train the national and local police in sexual and gender-based violence, they are considered as ‘unlikely to have a transformative effect … due to the nature of structural discrimination which is omnipresent across economic and socio-political spheres’.Footnote 41 Judge Easy appears to choose a straightforward polarisation of the national and the international jurisdiction – an outcome the Rome Statute negotiators struggled to avoid.Footnote 42 Her decision flags the prioritisation of international law and the ‘international community’, trusting both with inherently superior qualities, at least regarding the interests of women and girls. The ICC is presented as being able and potentially willing to completely take over the administration of criminal justice in Côte d’Ivoire. The domestic judiciary and administration of the post-colonial state are painted in indelible dark colours, as a despicable nest of violence, brutality, and injustice. Consideration is given exclusively to the interests of victimised women, in particular those who relate to the ICC favourably, potentially having received attention and promises of international reparations to be granted subsequently
A second issue with Judge Easy’s feminist reimagining is the exclusive focus on criminal trials, and on punishment in particular. A prison sentence as lengthy as possible is considered the only ever acceptable consequence for perpetrators of any sexual violence.Footnote 43 No empirical evidence is deemed necessary by Judge Easy to demonstrate the explicit and extraordinary value of international criminal trials from the point of view of victims, for example, or the societal effects of international punishments, in general.Footnote 44 This certainty of the superiority of international criminal justice departs from scholarship searching also for alternative, not criminal prosecution-based models of resolution of conflicts in transitional justice or more broadly in post-conflict societies.Footnote 45 It contrasts with the experience that ‘in terms of the relative significance of the local fit and international frame in retributive justice outcomes for women, international norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms’.Footnote 46 Judge Easy’s separate and dissenting opinion is not so inclined; instead it sees as a particular risk ‘the prevalence of customary law, particularly in northern rural regions’ (of Côte d’Ivoire) which ‘further enshrines structural discrimination and inadequate protections for victims of sexual violence’.Footnote 47
Further, Judge Easy’s dissent does not introduce any attempt to balance the goal of retribution with other interests, such as granting a fair trial to the accused. This might be because of gendered assumptions about the identity of the parties in a criminal trial at the ICC: the male perpetrators and the female victims, notwithstanding the current case. Judge Easy admits that the Court has established that ‘the assessment of the conduct forming the subject of domestic proceedings in the context of an admissibility challenge must focus on the underlying incidents and not their legal characterisation’.Footnote 48 That the reasons for that position can be seen as diverse, including the acknowledgement of the heterogeneity of legal cultures, criminal law, and justice systems in the world, is not addressed.
There is a connection, as Judge Easy also notes, to the ne bis in idem principle in Article 20, ‘which protects the accused from double penalisation of the same acts under different labels of criminality’.Footnote 49 Easy ‘regret[s]’, however, ‘that this interpretation is likely to adversely impact victims … by confining the ambit of recognition and reparations available to those prescribed for ordinary crimes’.Footnote 50 She further undertakes an astute, if somewhat complex, examination of the procedural and doctrinal minutiae of Articles 17 and 20 in light of the growing ICC case law to ground her conclusions. Because of the various ‘significant barriers to justice for women and girls in Côte d’Ivoire, it cannot be said that the ongoing investigation into Ms Simone Gbagbo’s criminality’ by the justice system of Côte d’Ivoire ‘constitutes a genuine investigation’,Footnote 51 Judge Easy believes. She therefore concurs ‘with the Majority in finding that the present case is admissible before the Court’.Footnote 52
Judge Sarah Easy’s feminist rewriting has the merit of strong internal consistency: it makes the legal and procedural interests of female victims of sexual and gender-based violence in an international criminal trial the superior, if not the only, objective of the ICC. A concern I have with the approach used by Judge Easy is that should one wish to extend the reflection to potential real-life consequences of this rewriting for Ivorians in the narrated context, several challenges appear. Who (that is, what constituency of power) guarantees the sustainability of such an exclusively punitive policy? In the tensions of the fragile ‘international community’, with its wavering and often racialised policies of international criminal justice, the ICC has so far been struggling annually to gather the financial resources for its functioning. Its longevity is a real concern: in the reimagined situation of Côte d’Ivoire, what happens to the victims when the odds are reversed in the ICC and the international crews pack their bags to focus on another situation?
The decision therefore gives reason to inquire about the nature of ‘justice’ in a feminism where everything should be sacrificed for the ambition of ‘saving’ a number of ‘women and girls’ from the hands of their own malicious post-colonial state, its authorities, customary law, the legal profession as a whole, denounced for ‘conduct which fosters impunity’,Footnote 53 ‘weak effort’,Footnote 54 ‘pervasive trivialisation of these crimes’Footnote 55 – to such a fatal and lasting extent that even any future proceedings ‘of such crimes would likely not be considered genuine’.Footnote 56 I am not ignorant of or insensitive to the suffering and injustices encountered by individuals and communities facing or having faced sexual violence. Rather, I wish to take issue with the feminist anti-impunity position upon which Judge Easy’s reasoning is based, and I would like to respectfully encourage open discussions on the civilisational assumptions of feminist approaches that emphasise international criminal prosecutions at the expense of the (post-colonial, African) national state and its own efforts towards post-conflict justice.
The issue could be approached in terms of universalism of international criminal law and ‘women’s rights’, opposing them to particularism(s), local culture, as early post-colonial feminist theory did.Footnote 57 Yet, to my understanding, the main questions are no longer there. After the ‘Me Too’ movement and the global backlash on feminism(s), including the deplorable spectacle of annihilation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Afghanistan since 2021, is it plausible to argue for some imagined perfection, a superiority of legal protection of women’s rights or universal ‘international law’ safeguarding women’s interests at the centre that could be as clearly juxtaposed with its ‘lack’ in the periphery?Footnote 58 Women’s lives and their rights, their bare existence, to start with their physical inviolability, sexuality, and their political and economic survival as members of society are globally under threat or already attacked, be it in Finland, Australia, the United States, or Côte d’Ivoire. Why should feminist reimagining so resolutely turn its back on the possibilities of exchanges and collaboration between the local, national, and international judiciary and law enforcement – experts, judicial personnel, representatives of victims? Finally, whose interests are served by excluding any chance of a transformative reform in Côte d’Ivoire as a whole: what does such a hopeless image, as one of ‘The Dark Corners of the World’,Footnote 59 convey to Ivorians of the future of their own democratic state?
The Remains of the Rewriting
I have raised many questions in the preceding pages, such as the following: Is feminist reimagining constrained by the international law in force and its established structures, its sediments of institutional practice, formed when (almost) all women, their ideas and interests were absent? How should feminism(s) relate to that long absence, so full of consequences for current law and jurisprudence? Should a feminist remain always combative or rather try to show resilience – to whom? I started my reflections by calling for attention to the contexts in which feminist rewriting takes place. In the instructions for this fascinating project, the rewriters were invited to imagine themselves in the same position of knowledge as the ICC judges were at the time of rendering their decisions. Inside the frames formed by that rule, the authors have creatively searched for ways to change, to transform, to remedy, by rewriting decisions of the ICC.
The two rewritten decisions discussed above reflect diverse and to some extent contradictory desires. Natalie Hodgson’s rewriting aims, primarily, at discrediting certain stereotypical categorisations of the roles and behaviour of women and men, deconstructing the discursive choices of the original decision and offering a new rationality for approaching perpetration of international crimes. In that sense, and in my subjective understanding, it is primarily based on the rationale of emancipation of women aiming at a formal equality of sexes and genders. The second rewriting by Sarah Easy is feminist in a different manner, more frontal and ambitious in how it aims at rewriting the political architecture of the Rome Statute: its (in)famous oscillation between the acknowledgement of national sovereignty, the past status quo of impunity and the complementary international criminal jurisdiction. The impression of a categorical, civilisational dismissal of the ailing post-colonial state is a risk that I have touched on.
Beyond the temporal contexts, feminist reimagining can be approached in terms of the places of rewriting, the situations of the exercise in geographical, political, cultural spaces, languages, and discourses: the locations of, firstly, committing the alleged international crimes, secondly, taking the original decision, and thirdly, the feminist rewriting each flavour the exercise. How do feminism(s) relate to populations, languages, everyday lived experiences ‘on the ground’ of the interventions of international criminal courts and tribunals in ‘the situation of Côte d’Ivoire’?
The violence addressed as (alleged) international crimes by the prosecutor of the ICC in The Hague took place in Côte d’Ivoire, a state that became independent from its colonisation by France in 1960.Footnote 60 The international crimes were allegedly committed both by and against nationals or residents of Côte d’Ivoire, a population of 29 million. Seventy-eight languages are spoken in Côte d’Ivoire.Footnote 61 The official language, imposed during the colonial period, is French, currently understood by an estimated 80 per cent of the population.Footnote 62 It is the language used in the media, election campaigns, and the administration of justice. The literacy rate at the time of the alleged violence (2012) was 40.98 per cent.Footnote 63 The latest estimation (2019) is 89.89 per cent.Footnote 64
The feminist rewriting took place in Australia and the United Kingdom, by native speakers of English. The draft decisions discussed in November 2022 contained no or few references to local academic or media sources or other locally produced knowledge about Côte d’Ivoire. In that sense, the feminist justice rendered may appear, from the point of view of the local population, its academic scholars, media, and civil society, to remain as distanced from the contexts of everyday life and of the violence, the victims, and the perpetrators as the regular ICC practice has been critically claimed to be.Footnote 65 A difference of importance exists, however, in how the ICC judges have access to a dedicated staff researching, collecting, translating, interpreting, analysing, and synthesising materials, and writing drafts of the decisions. Part of that work became available for the feminist rewriters via documents of the Court. The pro bono feminist judgment authors we are reading in this volume had no or very limited means at their disposal to engage translators, for example.
Distance can be seen in a positive light, as an element of impartiality, an intrinsic value in criminal justice. Even more so, one could argue, in a situation of violence that could be qualified as ‘political violence’ since it occurs, in the narrative of the ICC at least, between adherents to conflicting political parties in a national state. Distance may, however, also cause ignorance, so that the knowledge and experiences of the distant other – ‘the Other’ of what is close/known – are neglected or marginalised. Lack of local sources of information in making decisions in a central question of a particular society can signal indifference, or at worst a standing as hierarchically superior masters who believe they should have the last word. Here I would make a distinction between the legal questions of jurisdiction and competence and the intellectual, value-based positionings, bearing in mind how ‘feminist justice’ is at times associated with aspirations towards the experience of a palpable, human, material justice by the persons concerned, eventually engaged in dialogues, and less concerned for the formal procedures.
In that sense, the astute rewritings discussed here do not exhaust the possibilities of a feminist reimagining of Côte d’Ivoire. As we have been invited in this project to think ‘outside the box’, I shall shortly try to explain that remark. One example of an ‘outside-the-box’ reflection would be to openly question the choice of international criminal justice as the central instrument for a feminist reimagining of ‘the situation of Côte d’Ivoire’. It would mean countering another kind of inability or unwillingness, namely that of the ‘international community’ and international lawyers to critically evaluate the limits of their institutional practices. In such an evaluation, the Côte d’Ivoire situation might figure as a poignant example of structural violence where the focus on individual criminal responsibility is inapt, so that any international resources and attention should at best be directed differently.
To arrive at that reflection requires admitting that the actus reus of Simone Gbagbo’s and the other accused’s crimes, casually characterised as ‘election violence’, exceed the conceptual frame of criminal responsibility in which the ICC tried to make it fit. The ‘election violence’ or a threat of it was and remains recurrent and omnipresent, not restricted to the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC in ‘the situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire’, or to the acts or omissions of the accused that featured in the ICC case materials. Therefore, instead of the frame set by the ICC, a feminist rethinking might rather try to address the general, structural, constitutional, and legal difficulties of peaceful democratic governance in a young state scarred by colonialism and the slave trade, surrounded by neighbouring states confronting comparable problems, aggravated by the fact that they are situated in Africa, a continent and populations exploited, discriminated, othered, and ostracised like no other.
The thinking ‘outside the box’ would therefore question whether an efficient cure to a tense and dysfunctional political system in a confrontational social environment that is turning every upcoming election into a potential starting point for a new outbreak of violence can be found in the elegant courthouse in The Hague, or in the international prison-house in Scheveningen. A feminist rethinking might even ask to what extent the ICC and the overwhelming, passionate commitment, activism, and academic investment in international criminal punishment forms part of a global political economy that adds to the already manifold challenges faced by post-colonial states.
Another line of ‘outside-the-box’ thinking might dig even deeper, analysing the ideological, cultural, and civilisational underpinnings of the arguably ‘Western’ and gendered conceptions of the hierarchies of violence. Why is rape, in particular, as if intuitively, considered a ‘fate worse than death’?Footnote 66 Since when, where, and why should one think so? Do feminism(s) have to integrate the ideologies or cultural mythologies of the magical ‘purity’ of virgins of Christianity and other religions, thus confirming the male control of female sexuality and the patriarchal demands on the familial and national lineage of children?Footnote 67 Similarly, it comes across that diverse types of sexual conduct or victims are valued in civilisational, culture-based ways, too. Is anal sex more serious or less serious violence than vaginal penetration, for example, and what civilisational assumptions or fears might figure behind such hierarchies? Finally, why is ‘violent gang rape of … grandmothers’Footnote 68 more serious or shocking a crime than the same conduct regarding persons not having biological descendants?
These are complex and sensitive issues to study and discuss. Leaving the security of the like-minded ‘box’ may become a risky excursion into unknown or even hostile territory, thus prone to misunderstandings and manifold confusion. Yet the word ‘feminist’ would seem to call for a courageously critical reconsideration of the gendered and European-originated ‘international’ humanitarian law, the basis of the current international criminal law on sexual and gendered violence: what and who have been the protected interests behind the criminalisation of this violence, and where and among whom did these norms first take form?Footnote 69 Why should the victims of sexual violence be burdened, in addition to physical and mental pain and eventual bodily injury, with the tragic, ominous stigma, as if ‘damaged goods for life’? A feminist rewriting at its best would make sure that the shame and stigma change sides, not ‘soiling’ the victims, and this without regard to their sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, ability, motherhood or not, or civil status.
Some of the ‘outside-the-box’ feminist rewritings of the ICC decisions would abstain from applying every rule of the current order of international law. Instead, they would question and reflect. They might also choose not to use the money from donors to queue for an audience with the staff of the ICC Prosecutor’s Office at the margins of the meeting of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. They would, instead, launch a broad public reflection on the sense of trying to enforce individual criminal responsibility for long-term structural societal and political problems in a post-colonial African state by an international court in Europe. Thereby they would also question the use of resources available for and in Côte d’Ivoire, such as the short and at times erratic attention span of the Western/Global North’s governments, media, and public on a small selection of jus in bello violence, instead of focusing on peace and thus the prohibition of violence in general (jus ad bellum).Footnote 70 This would require facing the challenge of imagining together with the civil society, academia, judiciary, and law enforcement personnel of Côte d’Ivoire different, hopefully better adapted, ways to channel the general desire for justice and progress, and profit from the benevolent intellectual energies of international lawyers – perhaps feminists at the forefront.
12.2 Female Defendants in the Simone Gbagbo Warrant
In 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber III issued a warrant under Article 58 of the Statute for the arrest of Ms Simone Gbagbo,Footnote 71 the first female defendant in the history of the Court. The Chamber found there were reasonable grounds for believing that Ms Gbagbo had committed the crimes against humanity of murder, rape, other forms of sexual violence, persecution, and other inhumane acts.Footnote 72 The Chamber determined that Ms Gbagbo’s criminal responsibility could reasonably be established as an indirect co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a), based upon her involvement in the ‘inner circle’ of her husband, Mr Laurent Gbagbo.Footnote 73 Furthermore, the Chamber held that, despite Ms Gbagbo’s detention in custody, the issuance of the warrant was necessary in light of her political contacts, economic resources, and propensity to commit further crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.Footnote 74
In this reimagined judgment, Natalie Hodgson endorses the Chamber’s decision to issue the warrant of arrest for Ms Gbagbo whilst refuting the gendered stereotypes encoded in the original presentation of the facts. Employing gender-neutral language that avoids overemphasis of Ms Gbagbo’s status as a ‘wife and mother’, Hodgson challenges traditional narratives of the passive, disenfranchised female defendant, as well as broader ideas about femininity and conflict. Hodgson concludes by offering some thoughts on the relevance and irrelevance of a defendant’s gender in criminal prosecutions.
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application pursuant to Article 58 for a Warrant of Arrest against Simone Gbagbo No.: ICC-02/11-01/12
Date: 2 March 2012
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER III(B)
Before: Judge Natalie HODGSON
SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. SIMONE GBAGBO
Pre-Trial Chamber III (Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) issues the following decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Simone GBAGBO (Prosecutor’s Application).
Procedural History
1. On 3 October 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber authorised an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire.Footnote 75
2. On 30 November 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest against Laurent Gbagbo (Mr Gbagbo).Footnote 76
3. On 7 February 2012, the Prosecutor filed an application for a warrant of arrest against Simone Gbagbo (Ms Gbagbo). The Prosecutor argues that Ms Gbagbo is responsible, as an indirect co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute (Statute), for the crimes against humanity of murder,Footnote 77 rape and other sexual violence,Footnote 78 other inhumane acts,Footnote 79 and persecution.Footnote 80
4. Under Article 58(l) of the Statute, to issue an arrest warrant, the Chamber shall determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person concerned has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, and that the arrest of the person appears necessary.
The Jurisdiction of the Court and the Admissibility of the Case against Ms Gbagbo
Jurisdiction
5. For conduct to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, three criteria must be satisfied:
(i) The conduct amounts to a crime listed in Article 5 of the Statute;
(ii) The crime occurred within the relevant timeframe specified in Article 11 of the Statute; and
(iii) The crime satisfies the territorial or nationality criteria in Article 12 of the Statute.
6. Given the similarities between this application and the application against Mr Gbagbo, the Chamber adopts its earlier reasoning from the Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Mr Gbagbo and concludes that the case against Ms Gbagbo falls within the temporal, territorial, and nationality jurisdiction of the Court.Footnote 81
7. For the reasons listed below, the Chamber also concludes that the case against Ms Gbagbo falls within the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Admissibility
8. The Prosecutor submits that the current case is admissible. Although there are domestic proceedings against Ms Gbagbo, the Prosecutor submits that these concern ‘economic’ crimes which are not substantially the same conduct as the present case.
9. The Prosecutor further submits that the case is of sufficient gravity, based on the scale, nature, and manner of the commission of the crimes and the impact of these crimes on the victim.
10. Article 19(1) of the Statute grants the Chamber the discretionary power to determine the admissibility of a case on its own motion. The Appeals Chamber has held that, at the arrest warrant stage where the Prosecutor’s application is made on a confidential and ex parte basis, the Chamber should only exercise its discretion in exceptional circumstances, so as to preserve the interests of the relevant person.Footnote 82
11. The Chamber notes its reasoning from the Decision Authorising the Investigation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, where the Chamber was satisfied that potential cases arising in the situation would be admissible and of the requisite gravity. It is inappropriate at this stage for the Chamber to examine the admissibility of the case against Ms Gbagbo more fully.
Whether There Are Reasonable Grounds to Believe That One or More Crimes Falling within the Jurisdiction of the Court Have Been Committed
12. The Prosecutor submits that Ms Gbagbo is criminally responsible for the crimes against humanity of (1) murder, (2) rape and other forms of sexual violence, (3) other inhumane acts, and (4) persecution.
13. When the 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire was held, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), the political party of which Ms Gbagbo was a member, was in power. The incumbent president of Côte d’Ivoire was Mr Gbagbo, Ms Gbagbo’s husband. On 2 December 2010, the Independent Electoral Commission announced that Alassane Ouattara (Mr Ouattara) had won the election with 54 per cent of the vote. Mr Ouattara was a member of the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) political party. On 3 December 2010, the Constitutional Council announced that the election results were invalid and Mr Gbagbo was the winner.Footnote 83
14. The Prosecutor submits that in subsequent months, Ms Gbagbo along with Mr Gbagbo and other members of his inner circle orchestrated significant violence against individuals perceived to be supporters of Mr Ouattara, as part of an alleged plan to retain their political power by all means necessary.
Contextual Elements of the Crimes against Humanity
15. Under Article 7(1) of the Statute, a crime against humanity involves any of the specified acts (underlying acts) when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack. An ‘attack directed against any civilian population’ is a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of the acts referred to in Article 7(1), pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organisational policy to commit such an attack.Footnote 84
Widespread or Systematic Attack against a Civilian Population
16. The Chamber finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that between 28 November 2010 and 8 May 2011, multiple attacks were committed against civilians who were or were perceived to be supporters of Mr Ouattara.
17. The materials provided by the Prosecutor indicate that victims were attacked because they lived in areas believed to support Mr Ouattara.Footnote 85 Victims were also identified on ethnic, religious, or national grounds as perceived supporters of Mr Ouattara.Footnote 86 The attacks were carried out by the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces (FDS), youth militia, and mercenaries (collectively, the pro-Gbagbo forces).Footnote 87
18. Members of the inner circle, including Ms Gbagbo, distributed weapons to the pro-Gbagbo forces. The pro-Gbagbo forces were also given direct and indirect instructions and training on how to target supporters of Mr Ouattara.Footnote 88
19. The materials indicate that attacks continued over a period of five months and resulted in between 706 and 1,059 murders, 35 rapes, the arbitrary arrest of at least 520 individuals, and the infliction of serious bodily injury and suffering on at least 90 people.Footnote 89 The attacks involved multiple incidents and occurred in the city of Abidjan, in the west of Côte d’Ivoire (including Bedi-Goazon, Bloléquin, Duékoué, and Gagnoa), and in the coastal areas of Côte d’Ivoire (including Sassandra).Footnote 90
20. The materials indicate that violence followed a consistent pattern. The pro-Gbagbo forces erected road blocks in order to identify individuals who, based on their ethnicity or religious background, may have supported Mr Ouattara. Attacks on civilians were carried out concurrently in multiple locations, demonstrating coordination among the pro-Gbagbo forces.
21. The Chamber therefore concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that in the aftermath of the Côte d’Ivoire presidential elections, pro-Gbagbo forces attacked the civilian population, targeting people who they believed were supporters of Mr Ouattara.
22. The Chamber further concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that these attacks were both widespread and systematic.
Pursuant to or in Furtherance of a State or Organisational Policy to Commit such an Attack
23. The Prosecutor submits that Mr Gbagbo and his inner circle constituted an ‘organisation’.
24. The Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an inner circle existed, comprising individuals occupying formal and informal positions in Mr Gbagbo’s government. Ms Gbagbo was a member of this inner circle.Footnote 91
25. The materials provided by the Prosecutor indicate that the inner circle adopted a policy to attack Mr Ouattara, members of the RDR political party, and civilians who were believed to support Mr Ouattara, in order to retain their political power by all means necessary.
26. The existence of this policy can be inferred by: the consistent and widespread attacks by pro-Gbagbo forces against civilians believed to support Mr Ouattara; the provision of finance and weapons to pro-Gbagbo forces by members of the inner circle; and instructions provided by members of the inner circle to pro-Gbagbo forces.
27. The Chamber therefore concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the attacks occurred pursuant to, or in furtherance of, an organisational policy to commit such an attack.
Underlying Acts
28. The Prosecutor submits that Ms Gbagbo, as an indirect co-perpetrator, committed the crimes against humanity of murder (Count 1),Footnote 92 rape and other forms of sexual violence (Count 2),Footnote 93 other inhumane acts (Count 3),Footnote 94 and persecution (Count 4).Footnote 95
29. The Prosecutor refers to the following four incidents in support of the charges:
(i) The attacks relating to the Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI) demonstrations between 16 and 19 December 2010.
(ii) The attack on the women’s march in Abobo on 3 March 2011.
(iii) The Abobo market shelling on 17 March 2011.
(iv) The Yopougon massacre on 12 April 2011.
30. The Chamber notes that, in the Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Mr Gbagbo, the Chamber found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the acts of murder, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, persecution, and other inhumane acts had been committed by pro-Gbagbo forces during these incidents.Footnote 96
31. As such, the Chamber adopts its earlier reasoning and concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charged crimes were committed in Côte d’Ivoire during the period between 16 December 2010 and 12 April 2011.
Whether There Are Reasonable Grounds to Believe That Ms Gbagbo Is Criminally Responsible for the Crimes Alleged by the Prosecutor
32. The Prosecutor submits that Ms Gbagbo is responsible for the alleged crimes as an indirect co-perpetrator.Footnote 97
33. The Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Ms Gbagbo fulfils the elements of co-perpetration.
34. Immediately prior to the 2010 election, Ms Gbagbo had her own cabinet within the Presidency with its own staff. In a country where women are significantly underrepresented in political positions, Ms Gbagbo was an active decision maker and possessed significant political power.Footnote 98 Many perceived her as the alter ego of the president.
35. Ms Gbagbo’s significant political power reflects her long political career. She was a founding member of the FPI. In addition, she has served as a member of the Parliament for Abobo and secretary of the Congrès national pour la résistance et la démocratie (CNRD) political group.Footnote 99
36. This Chamber has already found that there is a reasonable basis to believe that members occupying formal and informal positions in the government comprised an ‘inner circle’ who operated pursuant to a policy to retain their political power by all means necessary. Ms Gbagbo was a member of this inner circle.
37. During the relevant period, the materials provided by the Prosecutor indicate that Ms Gbagbo participated in meetings of the inner circle to plan and coordinate attacks against Ouattara supporters, in order to retain her political position and her own political power. Ms Gbagbo instructed the pro-Gbagbo forces to commit crimes against individuals who were perceived to support the political opponents of the FPI. Ms Gbagbo held meetings with officials in the FDS and supplied them with military equipment. The FDS perpetrated violence on her orders. Ms Gbagbo also provided instructions to members of the youth militia to commit crimes against Ouattara supporters.
38. The Chamber finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a common plan existed among the inner circle and that Ms Gbagbo and the other members of the inner circle were aware that implementing this plan would lead to the commission of the offences discussed above in the ordinary course of events. Given her position in the inner circle, Ms Gbagbo was aware of the relevant circumstances that enabled her and other members of Mr Gbagbo’s inner circle to exercise joint control over the alleged crimes.
39. Further, by virtue of the various roles they occupied and actions they performed, Ms Gbagbo and the other members of the inner circle made a co-ordinated and essential contribution to the alleged crimes. The pro-Gbagbo forces complied with the orders they received from the inner circle with almost automatic compliance.
40. There are reasonable grounds to believe that Ms Gbagbo acted with the necessary degree of intent and knowledge in performing her role within the common plan.
41. Therefore, the Chamber concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Ms Gbagbo is responsible for the crimes as an indirect co-perpetrator.
Whether the Requirements for the Arrest of Ms Gbagbo under Article 58(1)(B) of the Statute Have Been Met
42. Pursuant to Article 58(1) of the Statute, when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Chamber shall issue a warrant of arrest if the arrest of the person appears necessary.
43. The grounds on which an arrest may appear necessary are: (i) ensuring the person’s appearance at trial; (ii) ensuring that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or court proceedings; and (iii) to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of the crime or a related crime within the jurisdiction of the Court which arises from the same circumstances.Footnote 100
44. A person’s past and present political position, international contacts, financial and professional background, their access to necessary networks and financial resources, and the likely length of any potential sentence are factors that might increase the risk that an individual will abscond or avoid arrest.Footnote 101 Additionally, a person’s access to networks and financial status is a relevant factor in determining whether they have the means to interfere with the investigation or safety of witnesses.Footnote 102
45. Ms Gbagbo has a long political history and strong political connections throughout Côte d’Ivoire. Ms Gbagbo no longer holds a position of power and is currently being detained in Côte d’Ivoire. However, evidence indicates that she still enjoys a significant degree of political support. Her supporters have called for her release and oppose her transfer to the ICC.Footnote 103
46. Ms Gbagbo has studied abroad in Senegal and France, as well as having completed multiple international training courses. This suggests that Ms Gbagbo has international connections that could assist her to abscond. The Prosecutor has provided evidence that Ms Gbagbo has access to significant financial resources. Further, Ms Gbagbo’s connection to high-profile members of the former government and her relationship with Mr Gbagbo might also assist her to access relevant contacts and resources in order to abscond.
47. As discussed above, there are reasonable grounds to believe that Ms Gbagbo is responsible for serious crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that could attract a significant penal sanction if proven.
48. Forces loyal to the FPI are alleged to have been previously involved in concealing crimes committed by members of the inner circle. The United Nations has reported that pro-Gbagbo forces allegedly involved in murder and other human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire have denied the UN access to alleged mass graves, preventing any investigation of their conduct.Footnote 104
49. Supporters of Ms Gbagbo are currently discussing strategies for regaining political power in Côte d’Ivoire. The pro-Gbagbo forces that remain loyal to Ms Gbagbo and the other members of the inner circle continue to have access to significant material resources, including weapons.Footnote 105
50. The Chamber is therefore satisfied that Ms Gbagbo’s arrest is necessary: (i) to ensure her appearance before the Court; (ii) to ensure that she does not use her connections and resources to obstruct or endanger the investigation; and (iii) to prevent the further commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Concluding Comments
51. Ms Gbagbo is the first woman to be the subject of an application for an arrest warrant before this Court. As it is likely that this case will attract interest due to the gender of the accused, it is worth making some final remarks.
52. Historically, women have been involved in conflict in a range of ways, including as perpetrators, enablers, and bystanders to violence.Footnote 106 However, the underrepresentation of women in politics and the military, particularly in leadership positions, means that women have been less likely to be identified as those who are potentially ‘most responsible’ for alleged international crimes. Thus, women have rarely been selected for prosecution before international criminal tribunals.
53. All accused persons before this Court have the right to a fair hearing conducted impartially.Footnote 107 This Court’s application and interpretation of the law must be without any adverse distinction as to gender.Footnote 108 The issue before this Court is not whether Ms Gbagbo’s conduct adhered to the traditional gender roles that woman are expected to perform,Footnote 109 or whether Ms Gbagbo should be punished for her relationship with her husband, but rather the extent to which Ms Gbagbo herself is or is not guilty of perpetrating international crimes.
54. There may be times when an accused’s gender becomes legally relevant. Similarly to how international criminal tribunals have previously drawn on expert cultural evidence,Footnote 110 expert gender evidence may provide assistance in understanding an accused’s actions and how these may have been influenced by a patriarchal social context. Hypothetically, one can imagine a situation where such evidence might assist the court in understanding, for example, the extent of an accused’s political influence.Footnote 111 Such evidence is most likely to provide an explanation for a defendant’s actions, but not legally excuse the defendant’s conduct.Footnote 112
For These Reasons, the Chamber
DECIDES that the conditions established by Article 58(1) of the Statute in order to issue a warrant of arrest against Simone Gbagbo are met in relation to her alleged criminal responsibility within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute for the crimes against humanity of (1) murder under Article 7(l)(a); (2) rape and other forms of sexual violence under Article 7(1)(g); (3) other inhumane acts under Article 7(l)(k); and (4) persecution under Article 7(l)(h) of the Statute committed in the territory of Côte d’Ivoire during the period between 16 December 2010 and 12 April 2011.
Judge Natalie Hodgson
12.3 Complementarity Test in the Simone Gbagbo Admissibility Decision
In 2014, Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected a challenge to the admissibility of the case against Ms Simone Gbagbo brought by Côte D’Ivoire in accordance with Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, and on the ground of inadmissibility under Article 17(1)(a).Footnote 113 The Chamber held that Côte D’Ivoire had failed to establish that an investigation into the same case was being conducted at the national level on the basis that the investigative steps taken by the national authorities in order to ascertain Simone Gbagbo’s criminality were not ‘tangible, concrete and progressive’ but rather ‘sparse and disparate’.Footnote 114 Furthermore, the Chamber found that the contours of the national investigation were so unclear that it was not in a position to discern, with sufficient clarity, that the subject matter of the national investigation covered the same conduct as described in the Article 58 decision.Footnote 115
In this rewritten decision, Sarah Easy injects gendered considerations into the so-called same person/same conduct test which has failed to expressly recognise the absence of the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes as a factor supporting the admissibility of a case. Easy offers a novel interpretation of the term ‘genuinely’ under Article 17(1)(a) which would restrict the class of proceedings to which the ICC has to defer to a genuine prosecution that is capable of bringing perpetrators of sexual and gender-based crimes to justice. Ultimately, Easy concurs with the Chamber in determining that Côte D’Ivoire has provided insufficient information to establish it is investigating the same conduct but goes further in identifying the gendered barriers obstructing the existence of a national genuine investigation.
Decision of Côte d’Ivoire’s Challenge to the Admissibility of the Case against Simone Gbagbo No.: ICC-02/11-01/12
Date: 6 May 2021
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER IX(B)
Before: Judge Sarah EASY
SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. SIMONE GBAGBO
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sarah Easy
1. I agree with the Majority of the Chamber that the challenge to the admissibility of the case against Ms Simone Gbagbo brought by Côte d’Ivoire (the Admissibility Challenge) must be rejected. Notwithstanding my agreement, I append the following separate and dissenting opinion to present my views on certain aspects of the judgment. I clarify that I only address the issues arising in this matter which I consider require my attention.
Applicable Law
2. As recalled by the Majority of the Chamber, the Admissibility Challenge is brought by Côte d’Ivoire as a state having jurisdiction over the case against Ms Gbagbo, in accordance with Article 19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute (the Statute), and on the ground of inadmissibility under Article 17(1)(a) of the Statute. Article 17(1)(a) provides that ‘the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where … [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.
3. The majority judgment confirmed that the second tier of the assessment of admissibility under Article 17(1)(a), concerning the question of unwillingness or inability, should only be considered when the state, having jurisdiction, is inactive in investigating or prosecuting the case before the Court.Footnote 116 As such, the Chamber must first determine whether the state has discharged its burden of demonstrating the existence of an ongoing investigation or prosecution of the case by its domestic authorities.Footnote 117
Same Person/Same Conduct Test
4. In assessing the parameters of the case before the Court, the Majority of the Chamber applied the definition of a ‘case’ as previously set out by the Appeals Chamber, being: (i) the suspect against whom the proceedings before the Court are being conducted; and (ii) the conduct giving rise to criminal liability under the Statute that is alleged in the proceedings.Footnote 118 In adopting this definition, the Majority of the Chamber implicitly accepted the narrow and vague ‘same person/same conduct’ test for determining whether the first tier of the assessment of admissibility under Article 17(1)(a) had been satisfied, being that the state is investigating or prosecuting the same case before the Court.
5. It should be noted that the so-called same person/same conduct test is not prescribed by Article 17(1)(a), having evolved through interpretations of the chambers of this Court.Footnote 119 In governing the relationship between the International Criminal Court and domestic criminal courts, Article 17(1)(a) is of great consequence for women and minority groups for whom such institutions have historically been unavailable or ineffective in securing justice.Footnote 120 As such, it is regrettable that the majority judgment has not seized the opportunity to further clarify the content of this test and address the gender justice concerns arising from its application.
6. In my view, and contrary to the opinion of the Majority of the Chamber, the same person/same conduct test, if confirmed in its current form, would likely give rise to adverse distinctions upon gender grounds, contrary to Article 21(3) of the Statute. This is of particular significance to the case at hand, given that Ms Simone Gbagbo is charged with individual criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity, including the gender-based crimes of rape and other forms of sexual violence under Article 7(1)(g), and other inhumane acts under Article 7(1)(k).Footnote 121 Some of these crimes allegedly took place in the context of the 2011 women’s march in Abobo, where thousands of women protested against the Gbagbo government.Footnote 122
7. Firstly, there remains considerable ambiguity as to what degree of similarity the conduct being investigated or prosecuted by the domestic authorities must bear in relation to the conduct charged by the Prosecutor for the case to be deemed inadmissible. This ambiguity has been exacerbated by the relaxation of the admissibility test to require only ‘substantially the same conduct’.Footnote 123 The Appeals Chamber opined that the incidents being investigated or prosecuted domestically may constitute substantially the same conduct where they ‘form the crux of the Prosecutor’s case and/or represent the most serious aspects of the case’.Footnote 124 I consider that defining admissibility criteria in relation to the ‘crux’ or ‘seriousness’ of the case is not only unworkable in its vagueness but poses a grave risk to the effective prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes. This is due to the traditional treatment of sexual and gender-based crimes as lesser crimes or simply the inevitable byproduct of conflict.Footnote 125
8. Furthermore, the Chamber has clarified that the fact that incidents which are described in the Article 58 Decision as ‘particularly violent’ or which appear to be significantly representative of the conduct attributed to the suspect are not covered by the national proceedings, may be taken into account in the Chamber’s ultimate determination of whether those proceedings cover the same conduct with which the respondent is charged.Footnote 126 To date, the Court is yet to recognise that gendered incidents, described in the Article 58 Decision as sexual or persecutory in nature, which are not covered by the national proceedings, may equally constitute a factor supporting the admissibility of a case.
9. Accordingly, under the existing interpretation of ‘substantially the same conduct’, one could argue that a domestic case investigating virtually all of the conduct charged by the Prosecutor but omitting an incident or incidents constituting sexual and gender-based crimes would be inadmissible before the International Criminal Court. Such an interpretation would likely operate in a discriminatory manner against women, who are statistically significantly more likely to be victims of sexual and gender-based violence, by precluding them from seeking redress at both the national and international level.
10. In my opinion, the definition of a ‘case’ under Article 17(1)(a) by reference to the ‘same conduct’ has textual support through the parallel definition of the closely linked ne bis idem principle under Article 20(1).Footnote 127 There is nothing, however, in the Statute or the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber which provides a sound legal basis for the easing of this test of ‘substantially the same conduct’. For this reason, and taking into account the potential gendered consequences of the existing interpretation, I consider that for a case to be deemed inadmissible under Article 17(1)(a), the conduct being investigated or prosecuted by the state must cover all of the same conduct charged in the Article 58 Decision. The degree of permissible dissimilarity between the conduct being investigated and the conduct charged should be confined to minor discrepancies in the description of the underlying facts, so that the conduct is the same in time, location, and subject matter.
11. For the avoidance of doubt, a domestic case which goes beyond the crimes charged in the warrant of arrest, by investigating or prosecuting additional conduct, will not be deemed inadmissible, provided it covers the ‘same conduct’ at a minimum.
Defining Conduct
12. It is well settled by the Chambers of this Court that the assessment of the conduct forming the subject of domestic proceedings in the context of an admissibility challenge must focus on the underlying incidents and not their legal characterisation.Footnote 128 This finding upholds the closely linked ne bis idem principle under Article 20(1), which protects the accused from double penalisation of the same acts under different labels of criminality.Footnote 129 I regret that this interpretation is likely to adversely impact victims in states which have not incorporated international crimes into their domestic law, by confining the ambit of recognition and reparations available to those prescribed for ordinary crimes. However, there is no provision in the Statute capable of supporting an alternative interpretation by mandating the manner in which states must incorporate the substantive crimes listed under Article 5 into their domestic legal system.
13. Although there may be discrepancies between the way a particular act is criminalised under the Statute and under domestic law, Article 17(1)(a) is clear that the state must nevertheless ‘have jurisdiction’ over the case, and thus criminalise the same conduct. Consequently, to use the example of the crime against humanity of rape, the Prosecutor must be careful in ensuring that all relevant incidents of penetration criminalised at the international level are punishable under domestic law. Thus, a state which restricts the definition of rape to penile–vaginal penetration only may not be said to have jurisdiction over a case involving anal, oral, or other forms of penetration. As such, I consider that an inquiry into the manner in which the conduct is criminalised by the domestic legal system is necessary and permissible to the extent of establishing that the same conduct is in fact within the jurisdiction of the state.
Genuine Proceedings
14. Article 17(a) renders a case admissible if the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution, yet the Chambers have directed little to no attention to the interpretation of ‘genuinely’ as a standalone term. There appears to be tacit understanding that this term operates so as to require a genuine unwillingness and/or genuine inability on the part of the state to render a case inadmissible. For instance, the second tier of the admissibility test has been formulated as ‘the genuineness of Libya’s willingness and ability to investigate’.Footnote 130 This formulation has sometimes led to the introduction of extraneous criteria into Article 17(1)(a): ‘the allocation of the burden to the State is also consistent with the raison d’être of the principle of complementarity: to prove a case inadmissible, the State must establish that it is undertaking a meaningful investigation that genuinely seeks to ascertain the criminal responsibility of the suspect’.Footnote 131 Reference to the investigation as ‘meaningful’, a term not present in the text of the Statute, reflects the prosecution’s struggle to establish some standard of adequacy concerning the national proceedings that would render a case inadmissible before the Court. Such a standard is in fact provided for by a proper reading of the term ‘genuinely’.
15. A closer examination of the context in which the term ‘genuinely’ is employed reveals that it in fact modifies the objective quality of the investigation or prosecution to which the Court must defer under Article 17(1)(a), requiring a genuine investigation or prosecution. This is evident under Article 17(1)(b) wherein the adverb ‘genuinely’ is repeated and positioned more closely to the verb ‘prosecute’, reading: ‘unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute’. Furthermore, Articles 17(2) and 17(3), which set out the criteria for determining unwillingness and inability respectively, make no mention of the term genuinely. This interpretation of ‘genuinely’ has been endorsed by the Court to the extent that it has confirmed that proceedings may be deemed ‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to justice’, where the violations of the rights of the suspect are so egregious that the proceedings can no longer be regarded as capable of providing any genuine form of justice.Footnote 132 In this way, the Court has acknowledged that it is the genuineness of the proceedings, as opposed to the genuineness of the state’s unwillingness or inability, which is relevant to admissibility.
16. As such, the term ‘genuinely’ restricts the class of national proceedings that requires deference from the Court. Without the inclusion of the word ‘genuinely’, any national proceedings where there was an intent to bring the accused to justice, and the system was not unavailable, would preclude action by the Court, even if the proceedings were so inadequate as to be incapable of bringing the accused to justice.
17. The drafting history of the Statute confirms that it was the states’ intention to modify the class of proceedings precluded from the purview of the Court, with the term evolving from ‘effectively prosecute’ to ‘duly prosecute’ before arriving at ‘genuinely prosecute’.Footnote 133 Whilst it is clear that the term was not intended to set aside national proceedings simply because the Office of the Prosecutor could develop a more effective prosecutorial strategy, the term cannot be interpreted in a way that is permissive to impunity and thus contrary to the object and purpose of the Statute.
18. The term ‘genuine’ is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as ‘having the supposed character, not sham or feigned’.Footnote 134 Genuineness is thus a distinct concept from unwillingness or inability. Rather, the genuineness of an existing prosecution informs the Court as to whether the state is truly willing or able to carry out the prosecution. Whilst a state may intend to bring someone to justice by appropriately investigating their criminality (demonstrating willingness) and enjoy a functioning national justice system, in the sense that it is not unavailable as a result of conflict or natural disaster (demonstrating ability), it may still, by the disingenuous design or inadequate workings of its system, be incapable of bringing the accused to justice.
19. This interpretation of genuineness is more closely aligned with the overall object and purpose of the Statute. Whilst the principle of complementarity has often been described as striking a balance between state sovereignty and an effective and credible ICC,Footnote 135 it must be emphasised that state sovereignty and effective prosecution by the Court are not competing objects of the Rome Statute. Rather, the Preamble establishes that the overall, singular object and purpose of the Statute is to ensure that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community must not go unpunished’ and to ‘put an end to impunity’. This object is pursued primarily by states through domestic proceedings and complementarily by the Court when the state is found unwilling or unable. If the prosecution of a case is so inadequate as to be incapable of ever bringing the accused to justice, it cannot be said to be a genuine prosecution for the purpose of Article 17(1)(a).
20. The requirement for a genuine investigation or prosecution in the assessment of admissibility is aligned with the ‘Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender Based Crimes 2014’, adopted by the Prosecutor, which separates the evaluation of ‘the existence of genuine proceedings’ under paragraph 40 from the assessment of ‘whether such proceedings are vitiated by an unwillingness or inability’ under paragraph 42.Footnote 136
21. As such, I find that the state challenging the admissibility of a case before the Court must demonstrate the existence of an ongoing investigation or prosecution which covers all of the same conduct against the same person being investigated or prosecuted by the Court. If the state discharges this burden, it must further establish its willingness and ability to genuinely carry out the ongoing investigation or prosecution.
Analysis
Existence of an Ongoing Investigation
22. As stated above, I agree with the determination made by the Majority of the Chamber that Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Ms Gbagbo before the Court must be rejected.Footnote 137 However, for reasons set out below, I respectfully disagree with the reasoning employed by the majority in reaching its decision.
23. The Majority of the Chamber found that Côte d’Ivoire failed to establish that an investigation into the same case was being conducted at the national level on the basis that the investigative steps taken by the national authorities to ascertain Ms Gbagbo’s criminality were not ‘tangible, concrete and progressive’ but rather ‘sparse and disparate’.Footnote 138 However, a plain reading of Article 17(1)(a) reveals that the first tier of the admissibility assessment requires only that ‘the case is being investigated’. Introducing extraneous criteria as to the efficiency of the investigation obfuscates the distinction between ‘inaction’ and ‘unwillingness or inability’ under the two-step admissibility test that the majority itself confirmed in its judgment.Footnote 139 Indeed, the majority’s consideration of the temporal aspects of the investigation are directly provided for by the second tier of the test under Article 17(2)(b), which states that ‘unjustified delay’ may be a determinative factor of unwillingness.
24. I find concerning the continued efforts to construct a hurdle to the first tier of the admissibility assessment, in what may be perceived to be an attempt by this Court to avoid the evaluation of a state’s criminal legal system.Footnote 140 The finding of unwillingness or inability by the Court serves the expressive function of denouncing state conduct which fosters impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern. It is an important judicial responsibility mandated by Article 17(2), from which we must not shy away.
25. Upon review of the uncontested evidence provided by Côte d’Ivoire, I find that the relevant domestic authorities have:
(a) formally initiated an investigation to ascertain the criminality of Ms Gbagbo;Footnote 141
(b) detained Ms Gbagbo as a result of said investigation;Footnote 142
(c) interrogated Ms Gbagbo in furtherance of this investigation;Footnote 143
(d) questioned a civil party concerning the conduct of Ms Gbagbo;Footnote 144 and
(e) attempted to collect evidence relevant to her crimes.Footnote 145
Same Conduct/Same Person Test Applied
26. I now turn to whether the case against Ms Gbagbo currently being investigated by Côte d’Ivoire is the same case, in that it is investigating all of the same conduct against the same person. In order for the admissibility challenge at hand to succeed, Côte d’Ivoire must establish that it is currently investigating conduct constituting the basis of all of the conduct forming the basis of the charges against Ms Gbagbo, including the crimes against humanity of (1) murder under Article 7(l)(a), (2) rape and other forms of sexual violence under Article 7(1)(g), (3) other inhumane acts under Article 7(l)(k), and (4) persecution under Article 7(l)(h) of the Statute committed in the territory of Côte d’Ivoire:
(i) in the context of the march on the Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI) building on 16 December 2010;
(ii) in the context of the women’s march in Abobo on 3 March 2011;
(iii) in the context of the Abobo market shelling on 17 March 2011; and
(iv) in relation to the Yopougon massacre on 12 April 2011.
27. I share the view of the Majority of the Chamber that the economic crimes alleged in the first set of proceedings against Ms Gbagbo, referred to as RI-09/2012, RI-33/2012, and RI-04/2012, are evidently of a different nature to the conduct alleged in the case before this Court.Footnote 146 Similarly, the crimes against the state alleged in the second set of proceedings, referred to as RI-01/2011, fail to cover the same conduct as the case before this Court, namely killings, rapes, or acts causing great suffering or serious injury to individuals.Footnote 147 Finally, I concur that the contours of the national investigation are so unclear that I am not in a position to discern, with sufficient clarity, that the subject matter of the third set of proceedings covers all of the same conduct as described in the Article 58 decision.Footnote 148
28. Despite the failure of Côte D’Ivoire to satisfy the first tier of the admissibility test under Article 17(1)(a), for the sake of completeness and in order to clarify the content of this test, I will proceed to assess the unwillingness or inability of the state to carry out a genuine prosecution, as detailed in Article 17(2) and (3) of the Statute.
Unwillingness or Inability
29. As described above, the Majority of the Chamber’s finding that the investigative steps taken by the national authorities in order to ascertain Ms Gbagbo’s criminality were not ‘tangible, concrete and progressive’ but rather ‘sparse and disparate’Footnote 149 should be characterised more appropriately as an ‘unjustified delay’ constituting unwillingness on the part of the state to prosecute Ms Gbagbo under Article 17(2)(b), as opposed to the non-existence of an investigation.
30. In the alternative, the fact that the state’s ongoing investigation cannot be said to be genuine, in that it is incapable of bringing Ms Gbagbo to justice, may also evince unwillingness on the part of Côte D’Ivoire. Whilst the definition of ‘unwillingness’ under Article 17(2) appears to be exhaustive, in that it enumerates the factors to be taken into account by the Court in its interpretation of this term, the state must nevertheless establish under Article 17(1)(a) willingness to carry out a genuine investigation, as opposed to any investigation which the authorities deem fit.
31. The evidence before me indicates that entrenched discriminatory attitudes towards women and girls in Côte D’Ivoire present a significant barrier to the genuine investigation of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence with which Ms Simone Gbagbo is charged. While the Criminal Code of Côte D’Ivoire (the Criminal Code) provides a prison term of between five and twenty years for the crime of rape,Footnote 150 the evidence submitted by the victims indicates that neither the Gbagbo nor the Ouattara governments enforce this law in practice.Footnote 151 Indeed, officials from both governments as well as rebel leaders have been accused of authorising the use of sexual violence against women as a tool for political control.Footnote 152 The investigative steps taken by the Ivorian authorities to date constitute a weak effort to address even the most serious incidents of sexual violence. Such incidents, which remain unpunished, allegedly include the violent gang rape of women, including grandmothers, children as young as six, and pregnant women whose family members were sometimes forced to watch or participate.Footnote 153 Other women were abducted and endured sexual slavery for extended periods of time, sometimes forced to give birth to children conceived through rape. Many died because of the egregious sexual violence inflicted upon them. Human Rights Watch describes an environment of increasingly entrenched lawlessness in which impunity for such sexual and gender-based crimes persists.Footnote 154
32. The evidence suggests that the pervasive trivialisation of these crimes is so significant that even if the justice system had not been disrupted by political turmoil and conflict, lacunae in the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes would prevail. Importantly, gender-based discrimination is not only practised by the general population but evinced by the very institutions charged with effecting justice. Of great concern is the systematic encouragement by the Ivorian police for victims to seek an amicable solution with their rapist.Footnote 155 In other instances, women’s claims of sexual and gender-based violence are simply ignored. Both court and law enforcement personnel are described as suffering from an inadequate understanding of sexual violence, typically allowing perpetrators to escape prosecution.Footnote 156 Disturbingly, women have even reported the solicitation of sexual favours from magistrates in exchange for a favourable judicial decision.Footnote 157 Whilst there have been recent efforts by the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to train the national and local police in sexual and gender-based violence,Footnote 158 these are unlikely to have a transformative effect in the short term, especially if conducted in isolation. This is due to the nature of structural discrimination which is omnipresent across economic and socio-political spheres, as well as being rooted in historically unequal power relationships.Footnote 159 Furthermore, the prevalence of customary law, particularly in northern rural regions, further enshrines structural discrimination and inadequate protections for victims of sexual violence.Footnote 160 Reports suggest that victims are further discouraged from pursuing legal recourse by members of their family who view sexual violence as a ‘family problem’ and thus may advocate for reconciliation with the perpetrator.Footnote 161
33. Furthermore, significant inadequacies in the procedural rules governing the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes in Côte D’Ivoire mean that future proceedings of such crimes would likely not be considered genuine. Although the cour d’assises has jurisdiction over cases of rape, the evidence reveals a systematic practice of mischaracterising the crime as indecent assault.Footnote 162 This is coordinated so that the crime will be tried before a lesser court in order to relieve some of the pressure on the cour d’assises, which suffers from a lengthy backlog of cases.Footnote 163 Whilst trying rape as a lesser crime may not impair the efficiency, impartiality, or independence of the proceedings, and thus still evince an intention to secure a conviction against the accused under Article 17(2), I consider the penalties available for indecent assault under the Criminal Code to be manifestly inadequate, standing at just two months’ to two years’ imprisonment.Footnote 164 The real possibility that the incidents of rape with which Ms Simone Gbagbo is charged would be tried as lesser crimes casts serious doubt as to the genuineness of the investigation being conducted by the Ivorian authorities.
34. The absence of a legislative framework establishing protective measures for victims of sexual violence in Côte D’Ivoire represents a further barrier to genuine proceedings as it is likely to significantly diminish the number of witnesses willing to testify. Indeed, in relation to the situation in Côte D’Ivoire, the Security Council determined that ‘[i]t is likely that a significant number of rapes went unreported because the victims were afraid of retaliation or did not trust the judicial system’.Footnote 165 The concern most often voiced by the victims themselves is the lack of guarantees that their rights will be respected by the Ivorian justice system, should the case against Ms Simone Gbagbo be pursued before the national courts.Footnote 166 The absence of protective measures for victims of sexual violence may also impede their ability to testify by causing additional psychological strain.Footnote 167 Although the views of victims are not mandated as part of the legal criteria for assessing admissibility, the Chamber values this opportunity to hear their perspective which is grounded in their lived experience. It should be highlighted that the vast majority of victims have expressed their desire for Ms Simone Gbagbo to be tried before this Court.Footnote 168 In light of these significant barriers to justice for women and girls in Côte D’Ivoire, it cannot be said that the ongoing investigation into Ms Simone Gbagbo’s criminality constitutes a genuine investigation.
Conclusion
35. I conclude that Côte d’Ivoire has not demonstrated that the same case against Ms Simone Gbagbo alleged in the proceedings before the Court is currently subject to genuine domestic proceedings within the meaning of Article 17(1)(a) of the Statute. Accordingly, I concur with the majority in finding that the present case is admissible before the Court.
Judge Sarah Easy
13.1 Reflection: The Situation in Mali
Introduction
This chapter reflects on the Mali situation and the cases before the ICC, including the reimagined judgments. It first offers background to the conflict in Mali, before outlining the ICC proceedings relating to ‘the situation in the Republic of Mali at the ICC. It then briefly introduces the original ICC cases in in this situation, the Al Hassan and Al Mahdi cases. The focus in on the Al Hassan judgment, sentencing decisionFootnote 1, and reparations orderFootnote 2, and the Al Hassan arrest warrant decision.Footnote 3
The chapter then considers the feminist reimagining of select judgments and decisions. It first outlines the key facts and conclusions of each real decision, then considers how those decisions have been re-imagined from a feminist perspective in this book by authors Ameera Mahomed Ismail, Melissa McKay, Laura Graham, Annika Jones, Sarah Zarmsky and Emma Irving. This is followed by critical reflection on each rewritten decision.
The discussion closes by reflecting on what is needed to achieve more gender-just outcomes at the ICC and ponders whether this can only be achieved by going beyond existing rules.
Background to the Conflict
In January 2012, a non-international armed conflict arose in the West African Republic of Mali when the armed rebel group Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, MNLA) attacked the Malian armed forces military base in Menaka, a town in the north of Mali.Footnote 4 In April 2012, the Malian armed forces withdrew from Mali’s north and armed groups subsequently took control of the area. From this point on, the conflict mostly concerned confrontations between different alliances trying to gain territorial control of the north including government forces, including government forces, the MNLA, al-Quaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, Le Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, MUJAO), and ‘Aran militias’.Footnote 5 As of the time of writing in June 2023, the conflict is ongoing.
After a military coup d’état in March 2012, the groups Ansar Dine and AQIM took control of the city of Timbuktu from early April 2012 until January 2013, imposing their religious and political stance on the local population. During the occupation, crimes against humanity and war crimes, including the destruction of historical and religious sites in Timbuktu, have been reported.
The Situation in the Republic of Mali before the ICC
The Malian government referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July 2012. In 2013, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) commenced an investigation into the alleged crimes carried out in Mali since January 2012, and concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes had been committed, including murder, the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without due process, cruel treatment and torture, intentionally directing attacks against protected objects, pillaging, and rape.Footnote 6 The situation in Mali was subsequently assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber I in 2013.
Thus far two cases exist within the situation in Mali. The first is the Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi case (Al Mahdi case), concerned with war crimes relating to the destruction of protected objects. The case was heard by Trial Chamber VIII and resulted in the 2016 conviction of the defendant, who had pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to a nine-year term of imprisonment. In 2017, Trial Chamber VIII issued a reparations order for victims in this case. At the time of writing in June 2023, the second case, the Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud case (Al Hassan case), concerned with war crimes and crimes against humanity, was being heard by Trial Chamber X [Editors’ note: in 2024 Al Hassan was convicted of certain crimes, but notably, not gender-based persecution. The judgment will not be appealed. That same year, the Court unsealed documents showing that the (then) Prosecutor had in 2017 initiated a third Mali case against the leader of Ansar Dine, with gender persecution among the charges].
Background to the ICC Cases Concerning the Situation in Mali
The below briefly introduces and provides background to the original ICC decisions within the situation in Mali, the Al Mahdi and Al Hassan cases, selected aspects of which have been reimagined in the coming chapters.
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi Judgment and Sentence
The 2016 ICC Al Mahdi judgment and sentenceFootnote 7 concerned Al Mahdi’s 2012 involvement in the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against buildings of a religious and historical character in Timbuktu, Mali, by armed forces between June and July 2012, pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute.Footnote 8 The buildings comprised nine mausoleums as well as one mosque. Most of the buildings were protected as UNESCO World Heritage sites. In 2015, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a warrant for Al Mahdi’s arrest for the aforementioned crime. After the confirmation of charges by Pre-Trial Chamber I in March 2016, Trial Chamber VIII was allocated the case, which was ultimately tried in August 2016. Al Mahdi admitted guilt in relation to the charged war crime and signed a plea agreement with the prosecution ahead of the confirmation of charges.
In September 2016, Al Mahdi was found guilty of attacking the respective protected sites as a war crime according to Article 8(2)(e)(iv), in the capacity of a principal within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a), and was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. In the context of sentencing considerations, the Court pointed out that the charge was unique, in that Al Mahdi had been charged with crimes against property only and not with crimes against persons.Footnote 9 It should be noted that this case marks the first ICC judgment concerned with war crimes in the form of destruction of monuments and buildings. On 25 November 2021, Al Mahdi’s sentence was reduced by two years.Footnote 10
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi Reparations Order
After the 2016 judgment and sentence in the Al Mahdi case, in August 2017, Trial Chamber VIII handed down a Public Reparations Order (Reparations Order) holding Al Mahdi liable for €2.7 million in individual and collective reparations associated with the above crime.Footnote 11 The Reparations Order became final in March 2018.Footnote 12
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud
In 2018, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I was tasked with deciding on the issuance of a warrant for Al Hassan’s arrest, which marks the commencement of the second Malian case before the ICC.
On 20 March 2018, an application for the arrest of Al Hassan was filed by the Prosecutor.Footnote 13 The Prosecutor submitted that reasonable grounds existed to believe that Al Hassan was criminally liable for crimes against humanity, including torture, rape, sexual slavery, persecution on religious and gender grounds, and other inhumane acts carried out in Timbuktu between April 2012 and January 2013. In addition, there were reasonable grounds to believe that Al Hassan was criminally responsible for war crimes, including violence to persons, rape and sexual slavery, as well as intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments.Footnote 14 On 27 March 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a warrant for the arrest of Al Hassan. Al Hassan was surrendered to the ICC by the Malian authorities and arrived at the Court’s detention centre in the Netherlands on 31 March 2018.Footnote 15
After the decision by Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Prosecutor’s application for the issuance of a warrant in the Al Hassan case (re-imagined by Zarmsky and Irving in this volume), on 30 September 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber I committed Al Hassan to trial, making him the first person to sent to trial for gender-based persecution in the ICC. Charges against him were subsequently partially modified on 23 April 2020 and the trial commenced before Trial Chamber X on 14–15 July 2020. Trial Chamber X declared the closure of the submission of evidence on 8 February 2023 and heard closing statements in May 2023.Footnote 16 At the time of writing in June 2023, the Chamber’s judgment has not yet been pronounced [Editors’ note: in 2024 Al Hassan was convicted of certain crimes, but notably, not gender-based persecution].
Feminist Reimagining of Select Judgments and Decisions
This section considers the feminist reimagining of select judgments and decisions from the Mali situation.
Judge Ameera Mahomed Ismail: ‘Cultural Heritage in Mali’
Original Decision
As per the established facts of the 2016 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence,Footnote 17 Al Mahdi had been a member of Ansar Dine since April 2012. During their occupation of northern Mali, Ansar Dine and AQIM established a local government, which included an Islamic tribunal and a morality brigade called Hesbah, tasked with preventing and supressing all things considered vices by the government. Al Mahdi headed up the morality brigade between April 2012 and September 2012 and was also involved in consulting for the Islamic tribunal, due to being recognised as a religious expert.Footnote 18
The mausoleums and mosques held great religious importance for the people of Timbuktu. Especially the mausoleums, which were frequently visited to perform prayers, with some people considering them places of pilgrimage.
In his role as a religious expert and head of Hesbah, Al Mahdi, together with other Islamic jurists, unanimously opined that constructions over tombs were prohibited.Footnote 19 On this basis, at the end of June 2012, the leader of Ansar Dine instructed him as head of Hesbah to destroy the mausoleums. Even though Al Mahdi harboured initial reservations about this order, based on not wanting to upset relations between the occupiers and the local population, he, together with other individuals, executed the attacks between 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012. Overall, he was involved in the destruction of ten of the most important sites in Timbuktu dedicated to religion and historic monuments, nine of which were considered UNESCO World Heritage sites. In his role, he organised the attacks and sourced the required equipment, which he distributed to brigade members during the relevant attacks.Footnote 20 He was personally present during the destruction of each site and supervised and directed perpetrators. He was actively involved in the destruction of a minimum of five sites.Footnote 21
Reimagined Decision
In her reimagined decision, Judge Mahomed Ismail points out that the original 2016 judgment and sentence in the Al Mahdi case is largely free of reference to the relationship between women and the destroyed cultural property. She therefore reimagines the decision by analysing the significance of the mausoleums in Timbuktu to women, and how women have been impacted by their destruction.
Firstly, the rewritten decision differs significantly from the original as it provides in-depth contextualisation of the importance of the impacted mausoleums and mosques, by highlighting how they form an integral part of the religious lives of the local community.
Secondly, Judge Mahomed Ismail identifies a mismatch between the seemingly gender-neutral war crime of intentionally directing attacks against buildings,Footnote 22 which is traditionally interpreted to relate only to tangible objects, and the ‘realities of cultural heritage and its destruction, which is that when tangible cultural heritage is destroyed, there is often a corresponding destruction of intangible cultural heritage’.Footnote 23 The judge defines intangible cultural heritage in line with the Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights as ‘traditions, customs and practices, aesthetic and spiritual beliefs, vernacular or other languages, artistic expressions and folklore’.Footnote 24 The reimagined decision highlights that ‘women, in particular, are central to the maintenance and vitality of cultural heritage worldwide and that this is often through women’s roles in relation to intangible heritage’.Footnote 25 Consequently, Judge Mahomed Ismail points out that they would have liked to consider whether the intangible cultural heritage of Mali ‘is so intertwined with the mausoleums and mosques that it should be considered as falling within the definition’ of a war crime.Footnote 26 Judge Mahomed Ismail concludes, however, that they are currently prevented from broadening said definition due to the provision’s clear wording. Subsequently, the judge calls upon state parties ‘to consider the need to expand the current understanding of cultural heritage to better ensure that decisions, sentences, and reparations are commensurate with the entirety of cultural loss, not merely that which is “tangible”’.Footnote 27
In the rewritten sentencing considerations, the question of the gravity of the crime is addressed. The decision highlights the particular importance of mausoleums for women, noting that a woman ‘might seek solace or pray at a mausoleum if she cannot have children’.Footnote 28 Further, in the context of the gravity of the crime, Judge Mahomed Ismail highlights that an example of intangible heritage in this context is the plastering of the mosque, also referred to as crépissage, which must occur annually to preserve the buildings. Especially women and elderly persons are tasked with preparing the clay balls on the ground level which are then passed up to males to attach to the sides of the mosque.
Critical Reflection
Judge Mahomed Ismail’s reimagined decision takes the opportunity to highlight how traditional judicial interpretations of seemingly gender-neutral war crimes can exclude the lived experiences of women from ICC decisions. By shining a light on the relationship between women and the destroyed cultural property, especially in relation to intangible property, She convincingly demonstrates that women’s lived experiences are not always appropriately reflected in traditional interpretations of war crimes. Continuing to rely on a narrow interpretation and application of the law, which in this case focuses on tangible objects only, may mean missing opportunities for gender-sensitive judging at the ICC.
Her statement that would have liked to interpret cultural heritage in a more gender-sensitive way than is currently permitted by law emphasises the shortfalls of the current definition of cultural heritage in relation to the special circumstances of women. What would be required to overcome this issue and allow for more holistic assessments would be the broadening of the current conventional narrow definition of cultural property.
Despite being unable to move beyond this restriction rooted in current law, the judge calls upon state parties to create change regarding this situation, thus providing a clear example of what makes this judgment feminist.
Judge Melissa McKay: ‘Al-Mahdi, Sentencing’
The subsequent rewriting, also concerned with the Al Mahdi case, turns its focus exclusively to the sentencing decision.
Original Decision
In the original sentencing decision, the Court found that retribution and deterrence are the primary objectives of punishment at the ICC.Footnote 29 To determine the relevant sentence, the Chamber subsequently considered the gravity of the crime, Al Mahdi’s culpable conduct, and his individual circumstances.Footnote 30 The Chamber noted that while ‘crimes against property are generally of lesser gravity than crimes against persons’,Footnote 31 the damage Al Mahdi caused made the crime significant in this case based on the following: ten sites (nine of which were UNESCO heritage sites) were completely destroyed, the attacks were carefully planned, and their impact on the population was intensified due to media reporting.Footnote 32 The Court did not find aggravating circumstances and saw mitigating circumstances in the fact that Al Mahdi was initially reluctant to destroy the respective sites and did not recommend using a bulldozer for their destruction.Footnote 33 Furthermore, he admitted his guilt,Footnote 34 cooperated with the prosecution,Footnote 35 expressed remorse and empathy for the victims,Footnote 36 and displayed good behaviour in detention.Footnote 37 On this basis, the Court sentenced Al Mahdi to nine years’ imprisonment.
Reimagined Decision
In the rewritten sentencing decision, Judge McKay identifies a third purpose of sentencing, being the rehabilitation of the convicted person and their reintegration into society. This stands in contrast to the original decision, which considers retribution and deterrence as the primary objectives of punishment at the ICC. This third purpose is informed by restorative and transformative justice concepts, which focus on the offender taking responsibility for their actions as well as the provision of restitution to victims.
In the rewritten decision, Judge McKay, through treaty interpretation, clarifies that Article 77 provides the Court with discretion as to what type of penalty it can apply, and that penalties are not limited to custodial sentences. This marks a departure from traditional interpretations of Article 77, which seem to suggest that the ICC penalties regime does not allow for non-custodial sentences.Footnote 38 In support of this wider interpretation, however, Judge McKay draws on the Tokyo Rules, an international instrument designed to ‘promote greater community involvement in the management of criminal justice’,Footnote 39 in support of non-custodial sentences at the ICC. After providing an overview of domestic legal traditions and the imposition of ‘alternative’ sentences, the rewritten sentencing decision concludes that imposing alternative sentences is in accordance with the Rome Statute and that the Chamber has the authority to consider whether an alternative sentence is appropriate in this case.
Judge McKay outlines the respective mitigating circumstances, namely: (1) admission of guilt; (2) cooperation with prosecution; (3) remorse and empathy expressed to the victims; (4) initial reluctance to commit the crimes; and (5) good behaviour in detention, then departs from the original decision by also focusing on Al Mahdi’s rehabilitative potential and capacity for him to give back to the harmed community.
Consequently, the sentence imposed in the rewritten judgment does not exclusively rely on incarceration, as the original decision does, but sentences Al Mahdi to seven years of custodial imprisonment along with 3,765 hours of community service in the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), UNESCO, or, pending Court and community approval, another similar organisations focused on culturally relevant and appropriate activities. Judge McKay points out that while the focus of this community service must be ‘on rebuilding what Mr Al Mahdi helped destroy’, the work undertaken in the context of the community service may also focus more broadly ‘on building respect for religious diversity’.
Critical Reflection
Judge McKay finds a gap in the interpretation of sentencing objectives at the ICC which traditionally do not focus on rehabilitation. The conventional narrow interpretation of the purpose of sentencing excludes the possibility for offenders to make amends with victims and communities in the context of international criminal law. The rewritten decision seeks to close this gap by making the case for imposing non-carceral sentences at the ICC, thus calling into existence a new sentencing pathway. Such a novel approach requires not only an offender who is willing to undertake community service but also a harmed community which is willing to accept the service provided by the offender. While the formal structure of sentencing decisions limits the reimagined decision in commenting on this tension in depth, the decision does touch on balancing potentially competing interests by ordering the community service to be undertaken at the same time as the imprisonment. Consequently, the offender will not perform community service directly in the impacted community but serve it in the TFV or similar. Imposing non-carceral sentences at the ICC, although not without opposition, has the potential to positively impact both victims and offenders in future and marks a departure from the traditional focus on punishment in sentencing.
Through the rewrite of the Al Mahdi sentencing decision, Judge McKay builds on ideas from the feminist abolitionist movement. The rewritten decision emphasises the need to move away from the traditional, punitive interpretation of sentencing objectives and towards integrating rehabilitative approaches within sentencing at the ICC, if making amends with harmed communities and individual victims is to be taken seriously. That traditional punishment and mass incarceration does not necessarily have the potential to prevent crime against womenFootnote 40 has long been noted in the national context by the anti-carceral feminist movement.Footnote 41 This movement challenges traditional punitive criminal responses to gendered violence, instead pointing to alternatives such as transformative and restorative justice.Footnote 42 Through the reimagined decision, Judge McKay ultimately advances these national reflections to the sentencing level at the ICC. Yet, and while acknowledging its structural constraints, the reimagined decision could have taken this further by emphasising the link to a greater extent, thereby strengthening the decision’s feminist approach.
Laura Graham and Annika Jones: ‘Reparations for Destruction of Cultural Property in Mali’
Judges Graham and Jones focus on rewriting the 2017 reparations order handed down in the Al Mahdi case.
Original Decision
In its 2017 Public Reparations Order decision in the Al Mahdi case, Trial Chamber VIII highlighted the importance of international cultural heritage,Footnote 43 noting that the attacks on protected buildings in this case had ‘not only destroyed and damaged the physical structures’,Footnote 44 but heavily impacted the identity of the local population. The decision identified that the reparations in the case at hand were designed ‘to relieve the suffering caused by the serious crime committed, address the consequences of the wrongful act committed by Mr Al Mahdi, enable victims to recover their dignity and deter future violations’. The Chamber concluded that reparations could also assist in ‘promoting reconciliation between the victims of the crime, the affected communities and the convicted persons’.Footnote 45 The order defined cultural heritage in line with its importance to the local community, here the people of Timbuktu, as well as its importance to humanity in general.Footnote 46
The Chamber ordered reparations for three kinds of harm. Firstly, it noted that for the damage caused to the protected buildings, the reparations should be ‘aimed at rehabilitating the Protected Sites with effective measures to guarantee non-repetition of the attacks directed against them’.Footnote 47 The liability was set at €97,000.Footnote 48 Secondly, for consequential economic loss from the attacks, it ordered individual reparations, in the form of compensation, to address the losses suffered by those ‘whose livelihoods exclusively depended upon the Protected Buildings’. This included, for example, businesses selling holy sand from the respective sites.Footnote 49 Moreover, as consequential economic losses also existed for the community of Timbuktu as a whole, the Chamber ordered collective reparations in the form of rehabilitation to address the economic harm to the community. The liability was set at €2.12 million.Footnote 50 Thirdly, the Chamber ordered individual reparations to compensate for the moral harm suffered by those whose ancestors’ grave sites had been damaged by the attacks. In addition, it ordered collective reparations for the disruption of the culture of the Timbuktu community and the causing of mental pain and anguish, in the form of ‘collective rehabilitation to address the emotional distress suffered as a result of the attack on the Protected Building’.Footnote 51 The liability was set at €438,000.Footnote 52
Reimagined Decision
In their rewritten reparations order, Judges Graham and Jones argue that the original Trial Chamber’s findings as to which victims could receive individual damages for economic loss discriminated against women. On this basis, the judges reimagine the decision by incorporating a feminist perspective.
In contrast to the original reparations order, the rewritten order refers to traditional gender roles when contemplating the impact of economic harm. It highlights that women’s economic links to mausoleums are more likely indirect as they are only allowed inside once they reach a certain age. In the rewritten order, Judges Graham and Jones caution that in order to avoid entrenchment of discrimination, there should not be a distinction between direct and indirect economic losses in relation to the destruction of the protected buildings. Rather, the focus should be on the extent to which victims were impacted by their destruction.
In the original reparations order, the Chamber did not consider Al Mahdi’s crime as the proximate cause of property loss incurred when victims fled Timbuktu in the aftermath of the attacks.Footnote 53 In stark contrast, however, the rewritten decision does recognise economic losses suffered in this context. It highlights that this loss should be included in the reparations to ensure that particularly women and children are not negatively affected by an otherwise exclusive focus on the economic losses of business owners.
Comparable to the original decision, in the rewritten reparations order the judges award collective reparations for the community of Timbuktu as a whole. However, departing from the original, the rewritten order suggests, inter alia, that collective reparations could include programmes or actions designed to assist women, youth, and others towards generating income, as well as initiatives which promote the training of women and ‘fostering discussions of the issue of non-discrimination in access to cultural heritage sites as a means of guaranteeing non-repetition of the abuses in this case’.Footnote 54
The original decision simply ordered that Al Mahdi make necessary individual reparations for the mental pain and anguish of those whose ancestors were buried in the mausoleums damaged in the attacks.Footnote 55 Applying a feminist perspective to this aspect, Judges Graham and Jones in the rewritten order identify that male victims are more readily able to establish this connection due to the patrilineal method of family record keeping. As a consequence, the judges emphasise the importance of recognising ‘female-based lines of ancestry’, in the context of identifying groups which have a ‘strong emotional connection to the destroyed sites’, and orders individual reparations for ‘those with a stronger emotional connection to the destroyed sites than the rest of the Timbuktu population’.Footnote 56
Based on the above, the rewritten decision expands the award of individual reparations for consequential economic losses from only those ‘whose livelihoods exclusively depended upon the Protected Buildings’,Footnote 57 to also include those ‘whose livelihoods were significantly affected by their destruction’ and ‘those who otherwise suffered significant personal economic loss as a consequence of their destruction, such as the loss of their homes as a result of displacement’. The Chamber concludes that this is warranted as ‘their loss relative to the rest of the community is more acute and exceptional’.
The reimagined order also goes beyond the original in the context of implementation, noting that ‘women’s views are ordinarily only heard in certain conditions, such as “when they are old and considered wise”’, thus cautioning that care must be taken to ensure that women are included in the process of developing a reparation scheme and as victims wishing to access the scheme. The Chamber remarks that this is particularly the case as the wife is subordinate in the ‘Malian traditional family structure’ and that women may therefore struggle to access the reparation schemes. The Chamber thus calls upon the TFV to introduce a process designed to allow women to increase their recognition and involvement in the development of a reparations scheme.
Critical Reflection
Judges Graham and Jones identify parts of the original decision in which the Chamber failed to consider traditional gender roles. The original decision interprets economic harm extremely narrowly. The economic losses of business owners, who are more likely to be male than female, with women having more indirect economic links to the mausoleums, are considered economic harm. Yet the original Chamber refused to recognise the loss of personal property, including, for example, household items of persons fleeing Timbuktu, as consequential economic loss. The narrowness of the interpretation has the potential to negatively impact women and children as the loss of household items, livestock, and store wares will primarily impact females, who, in the traditional Malian family setting, are largely responsible for domestic tasks. By applying a feminist lens, Judges Graham and Jones demonstrate how the original decision discriminates against women by failing to consider their unique circumstances and the existence of power relationships.
In addition, the narrow definition of eligible victims qualifying for reparations for moral harm as only those persons whose ancestors had been buried in the destroyed mausoleums largely excludes women unable to prove this connection due to traditional record keeping. The judges clearly demonstrate that reliance on narrow interpretations, which fail to consider notions of privilege, discrimination, and gender roles, more likely exclude women from reparations schemes and hinder them from recuperating their losses. Judges Graham and Jones plausibly outline how the law could have been applied to avoid disadvantaging women and sketch convincing avenues of how women can be included to a greater extent in the process of developing and carrying out reparation schemes.
The rewritten order highlights the importance for ICC judicial decisions to be more mindful of traditional gender roles and how these roles may impact a particular situation.
Sarah Zarmsky and Emma Irving: ‘Digital Evidence’
While the previous rewritten decisions all focused on the Al Mahdi case, Judges Zarmsky and Irving deal with aspects of the Al Hassan case.
Original Decision
Pre-Trial Chamber I decided on the Prosecutor’s Application for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Al Hassan on 27 March 2018. It provided the analysis of the evidence and other information submitted by the Prosecutor separately on 22 May 2018.Footnote 58 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to issue a warrant for the arrest of Al Hassan is based on the following considerations.
Firstly, Al Hassan was a member of Ansar Dine and de facto chief of the Islamic police, playing a significant role and providing essential contributions between May 2012 and January 2013 in northern Mali. He was also involved in the work of the Islamic tribunal in Timbuktu and participated in executing its decisions. As part of his role, he participated in the destruction of mausoleums through the Islamic police.Footnote 59
In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Al Hassan, as a co-perpetrator, had committed crimes against humanity against civilians as per Article 7 and war crimes according to Article 8.Footnote 60 The Chamber noted that evidence submitted by the Prosecutor inter alia included videos showing public whippings ordered by the Islamic tribunal, some of which were carried out by Islamic police and Hesbah.Footnote 61 The evidence particularly showed that women ‘were insulted, beaten and whipped relentlessly, sometimes until they bled, at the market and in their homes, for reasons such as that they were not sufficiently covered’.Footnote 62
Reimagined Decision
In their reimagined decision, Judges Zarmsky and Irving depart from the original decision concerning the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Al Hassan by providing additional remarks on the use of video evidence and its evidentiary value before the Court. The first part of the additional remarks is concerned with the importance of the use of video evidence in the context of offences pertaining to violence against women, while the second part focuses on what impact crime recordings posted on internet platforms can have on victims.
After pointing out that the application by the Prosecutor in this case contains more than seventy mentions of the term ‘video’ in relation to various submissions, Judges Zarmsky and Irving note the increasing significance of video evidence in front of the ICC. This includes the Al Mahdi case, where video evidence was introduced at trial showing the accused destroying, and participating in the destruction of, protected buildings. The judges identify that video evidence appears to be traditionally used for crimes occurring in public spaces, such as the destruction of protected buildings in the Al Mahdi case, as opposed to crimes frequently occurring in private settings, including sexual and gender-based violence. The judges therefore note ‘with satisfaction’ that the use of video evidence in the Al Hassan case departs from this traditional approach as it is also used to support arguments relating to violence against women and girls. The judges call for an end to considering video evidence unsuitable in these cases and suggest that its value in establishing sexual and gender-based violence crimes should not be overlooked.
Judges Zarmsky and Irving then turn to the posting of recorded crimes on the internet by perpetrators and others and contemplate the question of additional harm arising from this conduct. They conclude that the posting should be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the context of assessing the gravity of the crime in relation to the threshold that a case must meet to be admissible before the ICC. In the case at hand, Ansar Dine publicly posted videos of crimes on the internet, including executions and whippings. The judges argue that this conduct increases the gravity of the crime as victims are likely to experience additional harm through posts about their ordeal on internet platforms, which greatly widens the audience of their suffering. The harm may also be more severe in this case as unsuspecting relatives may come across the videos on the internet, thus leading to additional suffering. The sharing of videos via the internet, which is difficult to end, and which may continue for decades, may particularly impact female victims. The Chamber points out that stigma continues to be associated with certain offences which women frequently experience. Therefore, women may be haunted by these videos shared on the internet for the rest of their lives. With reference to domestic trials in which the posting of war crime videos on the internet was found to be a war crime itself, the Chamber leaves open the possibility for similar findings in future at the ICC under Article 8.
Critical Reflection
Judges Zarmsky and Irving offer unique insights into the importance of not overlooking the value of video evidence for establishing sexual and gender-based violence crimes as appears to have been standard practice at the ICC in the past. In addition, they apply a feminist lens when contemplating the consequences for victims of posted video recordings of crimes. It may not be legally plausible that judges at the ICC provide ‘additional remarks’ on issues they consider particularly important. Nevertheless, Judges Zarmsky and Irving’s rewritten decision generally highlights the scope for gender-sensitive analysis when using digital evidence at the ICC.
The rewritten decision begins where the original decision ends. It reflects on the importance of video technology and what it means, especially for women, to have war crimes against them broadcast on the internet. The narrow and traditional use of video evidence in practice means that it is frequently considered unsuitable in cases concerning sexual and gender-based violence and is not relied upon. In addition, the rewritten decision calls attention to the fact that the posting of videos can have particularly severe and long-lasting consequences for female victims as stigma remains for certain offences frequently committed against women and girls. Yet the ICC has not given due consideration to this aspect in past decisions – in the context of the gravity threshold a case must meet to be admissible before the ICC or in considering the posting of respective videos as a war crime itself. Changing the above approaches may increase the use of video evidence in proceedings concerned with domestic and sexual violence offences, possibly increasing conviction rates. It may also lead to a more appropriate reflection in ICC judgments of the suffering and stigma women can experience when crimes against them are broadcast on the internet.
After considering the original and reimagined decisions and pondering what makes them feminist, the below reflects on what would be needed to achieve more gender-just outcomes in ICC cases.
Imagining Gender Justice beyond Existing Rules?
Some may argue that law reform and going beyond existing rules is required to enhance gender-justice principles at the ICC. However, to effect change and improve a particular situation it is important to firstly identify any underlying issues. The feminist judgments relating to the situation in Mali have done precisely that. The four rewritten decisions focus on different aspects of ICC proceedings. Each shines a feminist light on gaps and spaces in the original decisions, where the situation and experiences of girls and women could and should have been considered, but where the Court failed to do so or did not do so holistically. As such, all rewritten decisions begin where the original decisions stop short. In addition, all rewritten decisions apply the law in a more gender-sensitive way than the original, thus showing what would have been possible in this context or how the law could be applied in future cases.
Without the feminist judgments relating to the situation in Mali, the gaps and blank spaces each rewritten decision identifies may have gone undetected. Illuminating these omissions and rewriting how they could have been addressed in a more meaningful gender-sensitive way offers exciting new perspectives on how gender can be taken more seriously in the context of ICC judicial decisions.
The point of feminist judgment writing is to demonstrate how the law can be applied in a gender-sensitive way within the existing legal system as opposed to focusing on how the law could be changed to achieve more gender justice. The novel perspectives offered in the rewritten judgments have the potential to influence and inspire ICC judges to strengthen their commitment to gender-sensitive judging. As such, the judgments are not only an important aspect of identifying shortfalls but also vital examples of how a gender-sensitive approach to judging at the ICC could look in future.
While law reform, including, for example, reform of the Rome Statute, may be one approach to achieve gender justice, this does not mean that change cannot be accomplished without such law reform. The feminist judgment project has the potential to inspire an attitudinal and behavioural change regarding gender justice at the ICC which may offer greater benefits than law reform could in this context. It remains to be seen whether more judges at the ICC will adopt a gender-sensitive perspective and, relatedly, whether gender justice will become an integral part of ICC processes.
13.2 Cultural Heritage in the Al Mahdi Judgment and Sentence
In 2016, Trial Chamber VIII handed down the judgment and sentence in the case of Mr Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi.Footnote 63 Mr Al Mahdi pleaded guilty to the Article 8(2)(e)(iv) war crime of intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, committed during the occupation of Timbuktu by Ansar Dine in 2012. As part of a common plan, Mr Al Mahdi help to destroy ten of the most well-known and important mosques and mausoleums in Timbuktu. Trial Chamber VIII sentenced Mr Al Mahdi to nine years’ imprisonment and the reparations orderFootnote 64 required him to pay €2.7 million in individual and collective reparations.
Ameera Mahomed Ismail confirms the judgment and sentencing decision of the Trial Chamber, but considers the shortcomings of Article 8(2)(e)(iv), which permits a sole focus on tangible cultural heritage, and how Article 65 can result in the Court not hearing from marginalised victims. In doing so, Mahomed Ismail comments that ‘hidden’ labour, often undertaken by women, can only then be considered at the sentencing and reparations stage rather than forming part of the judgment itself. Mahomed Ismail’s work discusses the current international norms and understanding of culture and asks that the ICC’s jurisprudence be broadened when addressing this specific crime and plea agreements.
Judgment and Sentence No.: ICC-01/12-01/15
Date: 27 September 2016
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER VIII(B)
Before: Judge Ameera MAHOMED ISMAIL
SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MALI
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. AHMAD AL FAQI AL MAHDI
TRIAL CHAMBER VIII(B) (Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (Court or ICC) issues the following judgment and sentence, in the case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, having regard to Articles 8(2)(e)(iv), 23, 25(3)(a), 65 and 76 to 78 of the Rome Statute (Statute) and Rules 139 and 145 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules).
Introduction …
The Accused and the Charge
9. Mr Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Mr Al Mahdi), also known as Mr Abu Turab, was born in Agoune in the region of Timbuktu, Mali,Footnote 65 to a family recognised in his community for having a particularly high knowledge of Islam.Footnote 66 He is a Touareg from the Ansar Touareg tribe and the son of a marabout (a Muslim religious leader and teacher)Footnote 67 who has a thorough knowledge of the Quran.Footnote 68 He is between thirty and forty years old.Footnote 69 In April 2012, Mr Al Mahdi joined Ansar Dine.Footnote 70
10. Mr Al Mahdi is charged with intentionally directing attacks against ten buildings of a religious and historical character in Timbuktu, Mali, between around 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012: (i) the Sidi Mahamoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit Mausoleum; (ii) the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum; (iii) the Sheikh Sidi El Mokhtar Ben Sidi Mouhammed Al Kabir Al Kounti Mausoleum; (iv) the Alpha Moya Mausoleum; (v) the Sheikh Mouhamed El Mikki Mausoleum; (vi) the Sheikh Abdoul Kassim Attouaty Mausoleum; (vii) the Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi Mausoleum; (viii) the Sidi Yahia Mosque door; and the two mausoleums adjoining the Djingareyber Mosque, being (ix) the Ahmed Fulane Mausoleum and (x) the Bahaber Babadié Mausoleum.
Judgment
Applicable Law
Crime Charged
11. The war crime of attacking protected objects under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute punishes the following act: ‘Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.’
12. This is the charge to which the defendant has admitted guilt.
13. In order to prove the crime charged, the prosecution must show that:
1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.
3. The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.Footnote 71 …
19. The conventional understanding of cultural heritage is that it is made up of both tangible and intangible aspects. Nonetheless Article 8(2)(e)(iv) reflects the twentieth-century understanding of culture as solely constituting tangible objects. For example, Article 1 of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict defines ‘cultural property’ as ‘a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people … b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve the movable or cultural property … c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property’. This ‘tangible objects’ approach continued in the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, where ‘cultural heritage’ was defined in Article 1 as being confined to ‘monuments’, ‘groups of buildings’, and ‘sites’.
20. On the other hand, intangible cultural heritage is made up of ‘traditions, customs and practices, aesthetic and spiritual beliefs, vernacular or other languages, artistic expressions and folklore’.Footnote 72
21. Intangible cultural heritage is defined in Article 2 of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage as ‘the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills … that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage’. Article 2 notes that intangible cultural heritage ‘is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity’.
22. Further, the Preamble to that Convention considers ‘the importance of the intangible cultural heritage as a mainspring of cultural diversity’ and ‘the deep-seated interdependence between the intangible cultural heritage and the tangible cultural and natural heritage’ (emphasis added). It also recognises ‘that communities … play an important role in the production, safeguarding, maintenance and re-creation of the intangible cultural heritage, thus helping to enrich cultural diversity and human creativity’.
23. Earlier this year, the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights reported that both tangible and intangible cultural heritage ‘should be understood in broad and holistic terms’.Footnote 73 The Special Rapporteur’s report pointed out that there is a significant overlap between tangible and intangible heritage, and that attacks on each are interconnected.Footnote 74
24. Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute is therefore in conflict with the realities of cultural heritage and its destruction, which is that when tangible cultural heritage is destroyed, there is often a corresponding destruction of intangible cultural heritage. In fact, some say that tangible and intangible cultural heritage are two sides of the same coin.Footnote 75
25. The Chamber also recognises that women, in particular, are central to the maintenance and vitality of cultural heritage worldwide and that this is often through women’s roles in relation to intangible heritage.Footnote 76
26. Here, the Chamber would have liked to consider whether the intangible cultural heritage of Mali is so intertwined with the mausoleums and mosques that it should be considered as falling within the definition of Article 8(2)(e)(iv). However, the Chamber is currently unable to do so due to the clear wording of Article 8(2)(e)(iv).
27. The Chamber therefore urges state parties to the Statute to consider the need to expand the current understanding of cultural heritage to better ensure that decisions, sentences, and reparations are commensurable to the entirety of cultural loss, not merely that which is ‘tangible’. This would allow the Court to consider the destruction of cultural property from a holistic perspective. …
Article 65 of the Statute …
30. As this is the first time Article 65 has been applied at this Court, the Chamber will briefly address some relevant matters relating to this provision. …
37. Pursuant to Articles 64(8)(a) and 65 of the Statute, an accused may make an admission of guilt at the commencement of the trial. However, Article 65 requires the Chamber to conclude that the admission is ‘supported by the facts of the case’, such that the admission of guilt must be considered ‘together with any additional evidence presented’.Footnote 77
38. The Chamber acknowledges the Separate Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács,Footnote 78 in particular Judge Kovács’ concern that Pre-Trial Chamber I’s majority opinion ‘gives the impression that it rests on mere assumptions due to the lack of support from the evidence presented to the Chamber’. It is unlikely that Judge Kovács’ concerns would have been valid if Mr Al Mahdi had pleaded not guilty.
39. While this Chamber does not arrive at the same conclusion as Judge Kovács, it concedes that plea negotiations might necessarily confine the issues and truncate the court process. However, the process by which the prosecution and defence make oral submissions by way of evidence, from the bar table, may not foster an environment such that the Chamber can deliver a decision that presents a ‘full account of the relevant facts and law in order to reveal the transparency of the judicial process and guarantee a considerable degree of persuasiveness’.Footnote 79 This is notwithstanding the fact that the Chamber can access freely all evidence relevant to the case without the requirement that evidence must be tendered through a witness.Footnote 80
40. Furthermore, the Chamber acknowledges that victim participation can be lost when the prosecution and defence enter into plea negotiations rather than the case proceeding to a contested trial. This means that the Chamber cannot be certain that it has heard from a diverse range of witnesses, in particular marginalised categories of victims.
41. Lastly, the Chamber acknowledges the view that international criminal courts establish ‘an accurate and publicly accessible historical record’.Footnote 81 The convenience of an admission of guilt must weigh against this, and other factors.
Established Facts of the Case
42. The Chamber now turns to the established facts of the case.
43. The Chamber notes that Mr Al Mahdi’s decision to plead guilty has the unfortunate effect of limiting the types of evidence that the Chamber was presented with, namely the views of victims and a consideration of the types of harm that the crime engages with. …
Context
45. Mali has a diverse cultural heritage,Footnote 82 and Timbuktu is at the centre of this. The residents of Timbuktu are diverse,Footnote 83 and Islam is the common denominator that brings together the city’s residents.Footnote 84
46. Timbuktu played an important role in the early dissemination of Islam, and became a centre of training and education in the West African region due to the existence of scholars, universities, and the city’s status as a centre of trade.Footnote 85 Most of these scholars became saints.Footnote 86 Timbuktu is also known as ‘the City of 333 Saints’.Footnote 87
Contextualising the Mausoleums and Mosques
47. The mausoleums of these saints and the mosques were an integral part of the religious lives of the city’s residents, who frequently visited them as places of worship and pilgrimage.Footnote 88 They reflected the people’s commitment to Islam and provided psychological safety nets, to the extent that they were viewed as protection.Footnote 89
48. The Sheikh Sidi El Mokhtar Ben Sidi Mouhammed Al Kabir Al Kounti Mausoleum was visited by the people of Timbuktu to pray if they were faced with a dilemma or important decision.Footnote 90 Locals attended the Alpha Moya Mausoleum to make offerings, and to pray on Tabaski and in Ramadan.Footnote 91 Many worshippers prayed at the tomb of Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi, including pilgrims of Kunti origin from Morocco, Algeria, Niger, Libya, Mali, and Tunisia.Footnote 92 Worshippers would go to the Sheikh Mouhamed El Mikki Mausoleum for spiritual retreats.Footnote 93 The Sidi Yahia Mosque door had not been opened for 500 years, and, according to legend, opening it would lead to the Last Judgment.Footnote 94 The Ahmed Fulane and Bahaber Babadié Mausoleums adjoined the western wall of the Djingareyber Mosque, located at the heart of Timbuktu; many people visited them on Mondays and Fridays, as well as during major religious festivals.Footnote 95
The Role of the Community
49. The Chamber can gather from the material before it that the mausoleums and mosques were ‘cherished by the community’.Footnote 96 The population of Timbuktu itself was involved in the upkeep of the monuments through the process of crépissage, or the plastering of the mosque.Footnote 97 At the neighbourhood level, materials are collected and meetings are held.Footnote 98 The event brings together the community as a whole.Footnote 99
50. The Chamber considers this further in its analysis of the gravity of the crime.
Decision to Attack the Mausoleums and Mosques …
The Attack and Mr Al Mahdi’s Responsibility
54. The attack was carried out between 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012.Footnote 100 Mr Al Mahdi and other individuals adhering to the same common plan destroyed ten of the most well-known and important sites in Timbuktu.
55. These sites were all dedicated to religion and historic monuments, and none were military objectives. Except for the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arwani Mausoleum, all of the buildings were protected UNESCO World Heritage Sites.Footnote 101 …
Findings
72. In view of these findings, the Chamber considers that all of the elements for the war crime of attacking protected objects are established. …
Conclusion
74. The Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that all of the essential facts of the crime charged are proven, having regard to the admission of guilty, the hearings held, and the evidence brought forward.
Sentence
75. Having concluded that Mr Al Mahdi is responsible for intentionally attacking the above-mentioned objects as a co-perpetrator, the Chamber will now turn to the determination of the appropriate sentence. The submissions made by the parties and participants are addressed in the course of the analysis. …
Applicable Law
Analysis
84. In order to determine the appropriate sentence, the Chamber will consider: (i) the gravity of the crime; (ii) Mr Al Mahdi’s culpable conduct; and (iii) his individual circumstances. Rule 145(1)(c) factors and aggravating and mitigating circumstances are discussed in the course of the analysis when relevant. …
Gravity of the Crime
88. Mr Al Mahdi has been charged with crimes against property. Although this may be considered of lesser gravity than crimes against persons,Footnote 102 this crime has ‘hit and harmed the people in question at all levels, intellectually, spiritually, and at the very core of their being’.Footnote 103
89. The legal representative for victims, Mr Mayombo Kassongo, provided valuable assistance to the Chamber in determining the gravity of the crime. He submitted that ‘heritage is not something frivolous or a luxury item, heritage is part of whom we are, it is an extension of ourselves … if heritage is destroyed we are like a traveller without any belongings, like beings without a soul, history or memory’.Footnote 104
90. The Chamber also accepts the Prosecutor’s assertion that ‘culture is who we are. Our ancestors created paintings, sculptures, mosques, temples and other forms of cultural possessions all around us. They put their hearts and souls into the creation of such cultural heritage so that it represents the cultural identity of their times and is passed on for the benefit of future generations’.Footnote 105
91. The impact of the destruction had a calamitous effect on the citizens of Timbuktu. During the destruction of the mausoleums, an inhabitant of Timbuktu cried out in desperation that ‘Timbuktu is about to lose its soul … Timbuktu has on its throat the sharp knife of coldblooded assassins’.Footnote 106 Another inhabitant said, ‘[t]hey have destroyed everything we have’.Footnote 107 The Minister of Culture of Mali called the destruction ‘an attack on the lifeblood of our souls, on the very quintessence of our cultural values. Their purpose was to destroy our past … our identity and, indeed, our dignity’.Footnote 108
92. It is clear that the mausoleums and mosques are important to the people of Mali and the international community. They are not merely walls and stones.Footnote 109 At a national level, the mausoleums and mosques have important religious, cultural, and social significance.Footnote 110 At the international level, they stand as symbols of Timbuktu’s intellectual and spiritual past.Footnote 111 In fact, the Chamber heard evidence that Timbuktu is considered to match the role that the city of Florence played in Renaissance Europe as a centre of intellectual and religious life and teaching.Footnote 112 In that way, the mausoleums and mosques were the embodiment of Malian history in tangible form.Footnote 113
93. In some Muslim countries such as Mali, mausoleums are used by the community when they find themselves in a position of weakness and an inability to find solutions to the problems themselves.Footnote 114 The community then looks to the saints, who are perceived to be close to God, and pleads with them.Footnote 115 For example, a woman might seek solace or pray at a mausoleum if she cannot have children.Footnote 116
94. According to UNESCO Witness P-151, the population is extremely attached to both their tangible heritage, being the mosques and mausoleums, and intangible heritage.Footnote 117 One example of intangible heritage is crépissage, or the plastering of the mosque. Due to climatic events that erode the plastering, crépissage must be done annually to preserve the structures.Footnote 118 Witness P-151 testified that crépissage is a collective effort done by the population.Footnote 119 Women and the elderly prepare balls of clay at the bottom, which are passed up to the males hanging on the sides of the mosque.Footnote 120
95. The practice of crépissage is not merely technical. Rather, it corresponds with a ritual found in many African societies which aims to ward off bad luck and to ensure good rains.Footnote 121 This link is important; the belief that blessings will be received (good rains) makes the task of crépissage more attractive.Footnote 122
Defence Submissions on Gravity
96. The defence, in their oral submissions, outlined how different schools of thought within Islam were created.Footnote 123 They submitted that Ansar Dine considered that it followed the Wahhabi school, which totally forbade people from building tombs.Footnote 124
97. Mr Kassongo confirmed that the notion of seeking assistance from saints has become a debated issue within Islam. He submitted that the Maliki sect, prominent in North Africa and some sub-Saharan regions, has allowed for Sufism to find a place for seeking this assistance.Footnote 125 This is in contrast to the Wahhabi sect, which prohibits and condemns these practices.Footnote 126
98. While the Chamber considers this to be a relevant factor, it does not consider it to be a mitigating or aggravating factor.
Further Evidence the Chamber May Have Considered
99. The Chamber appreciates that it has received evidence regarding the views of the community. However, the Chamber reiterates its view that given the circumstances of this matter, it has not had the benefit of being presented the views of further victims and a consideration of the types of harm that results from such a crime, specifically with respect to women and other minority groups.
100. As this is the first time this Chamber has considered the application of Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute, it may have benefited from submissions regarding the destruction of cultural heritage at a national level.
101. In a similar fashion, commencing in October 2011, several Sufi shrines, tombs, and libraries were desecrated or destroyed in Libya.Footnote 127
102. Earlier this year in Tasmania, Australia, ochre stencils on a cave wall were destroyed. Indigenous Australian traditional owners said the hand stencils were made during large clan gatherings between 800 and 8,000 years ago. The chairman of the Tasmanian Land Council, Clyde Mansell, reported that ‘what makes it sacred is the way in which it was used, and the process that went into making those hand stencils … It’s not just a hand stencil, it’s the story that goes with the hand stencils that turns it into a sacred site. If we can’t protect that hand stencil, then we can’t keep it in our interpretation for generations to come’.Footnote 128
103. An understanding of how the destruction of cultural heritage affects communities at large would have benefited the Chamber in its determination of the sentence. …
Determination of the Sentence
110. The Chamber finds that the crime for which Mr Al Mahdi is being convicted is of significant gravity. The Chamber has considered the aggravating and mitigating factors. Taking into account all of these factors, the Chamber sentences Mr Al Mahdi to nine years of imprisonment.
111. The Chamber notes that none of the parties or participants requests the imposition of a fine or order of forfeiture under Article 77(2) of the Statute and Rules 146 and 147 of the Rules. As such, the Chamber finds that imprisonment is a sufficient penalty.
112. Pursuant to Article 78(2) of the Statute, Mr Al Mahdi is entitled to have the time he has spent in detention deducted from his sentence, in accordance with an order of this Court.
For the Foregoing Reasons, the Chamber Hereby
CONVICTS Mr Al Mahdi of the war crime of attacking protected objects as a co-perpetrator under Articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and 25(3)(a) of the Statute;
SENTENCES Mr Al Mahdi to nine years of imprisonment;
ORDERS the deduction of the time Mr Al Mahdi has spent in detention, pursuant to an order of this Court, from his sentence; and
INFORMS the parties and participants that reparations to victims pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute shall be addressed in due course.
Done in both English and French, the English version being authoritative.
Judge Ameera Mahomed Ismail, Presiding Judge
Dated 27 September 2016
At the Hague, The Netherlands
13.3 Sentencing Al Mahdi
In 2016, Trial Chamber VIII sentenced Mr Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi to nine years’ imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to the Article 8(2)(e)(iv) offence of intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to culture and religion in Mali, Timbuktu, in 2012.Footnote 129
In this rewritten sentence, Melissa McKay disrupts the notion that Articles 77 and 78 of the Rome Statute restrict the ICC to imposing sentences of imprisonment. Using principles of restorative justice and placing a strong focus on the objective of rehabilitation, McKay explores how non-carceral sentences are available at the ICC due to the use of the permissive language of ‘may’ rather than the directive language of ‘shall’. She notes that such a sentence should only be considered where the situation of the crime and the affected community permit such a sentence to be delivered. McKay places the convicted offender as part of the global community that the preamble of the Rome Statute professes to advocate for, noting that while each person will have a different rehabilitative potential, the gains from such an approach are evident through domestic jurisprudence.
In applying this approach, McKay sentences Mr Al Mahdi, with the support of the community of Timbuktu and Mr Al Mahdi himself, to seven years of custodial imprisonment with 3,765 hours of community service to be served concurrently. In doing so, McKay provides a framework for future judicial officers to examine the possibilities available to them in sentencing applications and appeals.
Judgment and Sentence No.: ICC-01/12-01/15
Date: 27 September 2016
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER VIII(B)
Before: Judge Melissa MCKAY
SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MALI
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. AHMAD AL FAQI AL MAHDI
Sentence
1. Having concluded that Mr Al Mahdi is responsible for intentionally attacking the above-mentioned protected objects as a co-perpetrator, the Chamber will now turn to the determination of the appropriate sentence. The submissions made by the parties and participants are addressed in this analysis.Footnote 130
Applicable Law
2. For the purposes of determining the sentence, the Chamber has considered, inter alia, Articles 21, 23, 76, 77, and 78 of the Statute and Rules 143–148 of the Rules.
Purposes of Sentencing
3. Articles 77 and 78 of the Statute do not specify the purpose of sentences at the Court.
4. Deterrence is one objective of sentencing, as is denunciation, or the ‘expression of society’s condemnation of the criminal act and of the person who committed it’.Footnote 131 A third objective is the rehabilitation of the convicted person and the promotion of their reintegration into society.Footnote 132 Rehabilitation of the perpetrator is crucial where criminal sentences seek to incorporate concepts of restorative and transformative justice, which have, in the past few decades, become increasingly common elements of domestic criminal law while also gaining international prominence.Footnote 133
5. The Chamber understands restorative justice to focus on the provision of restitution to the victims, the perpetrator taking responsibility for their actions, and the role of a sentence in contributing to reconciliation.Footnote 134 In essence, it focuses on repairing the broader harm caused by criminal behaviour, ideally through an inclusive and cooperative process.Footnote 135 In placing a greater emphasis on restorative justice, a sentence may assist in repairing harms suffered by individual victims and the community as a whole, as well as developing a more meaningful opportunity for the convicted person to take responsibility for their actions. A correct application of restorative justice approaches will consider the needs of the victim, the community, and the perpetrator, which necessitates an analysis of their rehabilitative potential.Footnote 136
6. The Chamber notes the unique circumstances of the present case, where Mr Al Mahdi has pleaded guilty to the crime with which he has been charged, and considers that a ‘guilty plea is accepted as a first step to rehabilitation of the perpetrator and a positive factor towards reconciliation of the offended community’.Footnote 137
7. The Chamber views this as an opportune moment to provide further guidance on the sentencing objective of rehabilitation.
8. Regrettably, the rehabilitative objective has not been judicially examined in earnest by this Court, as the Katanga sentencing decision simply stated that rehabilitation was to be accorded limited weight.Footnote 138 There, without reference to jurisprudence or any other sources, the Katanga Chamber held that the objective of easing the convicted person’s reintegration into society ‘cannot be considered to be primordial as the sentence on its own cannot ensure the social reintegration of the convicted person’.Footnote 139 The Katanga Chamber provided no further analysis on this point.
9. With respect to the Katanga Chamber’s suggestion that, for an objective of sentencing to be primordial the sentence must, on its own, ensure the objective is achieved, this Chamber disagrees. Were the Katanga Chamber’s statement true with respect to rehabilitation then, likewise, neither deterrence nor denunciation could be primordial objectives of sentencing. A sentence cannot ensure on its own that an individual, or the general public for that matter, is deterred from committing a crime.Footnote 140 Nor can a sentence be said to satisfy every party to the process, or global observer for that matter, in terms of denunciation – it is trite to say that the appropriateness of a sentence, for either being too harsh or too lenient, is an oft-debated topic, in both domestic and international criminal law.
10. Sentencing, at its core, is about judging another human being – a member of our global community, with whom we share common bonds. It is a delicate science, guided by the law of this Court as well as general criminal legal principles, where judges are tasked with imposing sentences that best reflect each objective in light of all the circumstances of the individual and the crime in question. Though it is the intention of any criminal court to impose a sentence that achieves its objectives, the law is subject to the practical limitations of reality: ‘Justice is the aspirational application of law to life.’Footnote 141 A court, on its own, cannot ensure any single objective; a court can only impose a just and appropriate sentence that is mindful of each of its objectives, and enforceable pursuant to its law.
11. Acknowledging life outside the legal corridors through which we tread, including the reality that sentences pronounced in a courtroom are subject to limitations in terms of their practical impact, is not to say that the sentencing process and its underlying objectives are moot. Rather, it is to acknowledge the complexities of the overarching context, and that the criminal trial process is but one avenue through which justice, accountability, and healing are pursued.
12. In the international criminal context, certain perpetrators may be prosecuted as the relevant conflict rages on, while others may appear before a court decades after the fact. Each of these scenarios, and those existing between the two ends of that spectrum, present challenges in crafting appropriate sentences.
13. The existence of such challenges, combined with the apparent tension between the objective of rehabilitation and a traditionally punitive approach to sentencing, have regrettably served to sideline the rehabilitative component of sentencing in the international criminal context.
14. Turning to the consideration of rehabilitation at the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, the Chamber considers the Čelibići Trial Chamber’s general reference to the objective of rehabilitation, where it noted the following:
The factor of rehabilitation considers the circumstances of reintegrating the guilty accused into society. This is usually the case when younger, or less educated, members of society are found guilty of offences. It therefore becomes necessary to reintegrate them into society so that they can become useful members of it and enable them to lead normal and productive lives upon their release from imprisonment. The age of the accused, [their] circumstances, [their] ability to be rehabilitated and availability of facilities in the confinement facility can, and should, be relevant considerations in this regard.Footnote 142
15. In a separate opinion, Judge Mumba expanded on rehabilitation: international justice ‘is not about unfair retribution; if that were the case, humanity should forget about reconciliation’.Footnote 143 Judge Mumba further cautioned against an overemphasis on vengeance, which could manifest through harsh sentences following guilty pleas, and opined that ‘rehabilitation, after turmoil, may serve to reduce the incidence of political instability and conflict’.Footnote 144
16. Generally, ad hoc tribunals have supported access to rehabilitative programming,Footnote 145 but, as in Katanga, have held the objective itself subject to an ‘undue weight’ caveat.Footnote 146 For example, the Čelibići Appeals Chamber considered that:
Although both national jurisdictions and certain international and regional human rights instruments provide that rehabilitation should be one of the primary concerns for a court in sentencing, this cannot play a predominant role in the decision-making process … Accordingly, although rehabilitation (in accordance with international human rights standards) should be considered as a relevant factor, it is not one which should be given undue weight.Footnote 147
17. The jurisprudence from the ad hoc tribunals has not, however, provided guidance on the threshold for undue weight in balancing any sentencing objective.Footnote 148 Though rehabilitation has typically been accorded lesser weight, judges have equally held that deterrence ‘must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment of the sentences to be imposed’.Footnote 149 In fact, the Čelibići Appeals Chamber further held that it was erroneous for a trial chamber to state that deterrence was the most important factor to consider.Footnote 150
18. Meanwhile, domestic sources of law suggest that, for certain crimes, though the objectives of deterrence and denunciation may be more prominent, this does not negate the rehabilitative component of the sentence.Footnote 151 Domestic law additionally suggests that rehabilitation is to be considered for all perpetrators, not simply those who are subject to personal or social disadvantages.Footnote 152
19. Given the gravity of the crimes before the Court, the Chamber is of the view that victims, including both the specifically harmed community and the global community, are owed sentences that have a strong emphasis on denunciation and deterrence.
20. The Chamber, however, also views the first line of the Preamble to the Statute as a significant directive, and considers that all parties are likewise owed sentences that attempt to contribute to the healing of the ‘common bonds’ and ‘shared heritage’ through which all people, including the convicted person, are united.Footnote 153
21. The Preamble’s acknowledgement that international crimes may shatter the ‘delicate mosaic’ of humanity is reminiscent of the way in which certain indigenous communities view crimes as a tear in the ‘community fabric’, which may be repaired through restorative justice mechanisms.Footnote 154 In this regard, the Chamber considers that a more a deliberate emphasis on rehabilitation is required in its sentencing practices.
22. In considering how the Court can more effectively incorporate the rehabilitative objective, it is important to examine how the sentencing objectives intersect.
23. The Chamber first notes the long-standing principle in criminal law that it is the certainty rather than severity of punishment that more effectively deters criminality.Footnote 155 Perpetrators serving longer prison sentences may, in fact, be more likely to reoffend, due to the negative impact of being removed from factors that promote rehabilitative potential.Footnote 156 The Chamber thus views the imposition of lengthy sentences as fulfilling, primarily, the denunciatory objective.
24. With respect to deterrence, it appears as though sentences focusing on an individual’s rehabilitative potential through initiatives such as job and education training, therapeutic treatment, and social connections are more likely to reduce recidivism.Footnote 157
25. Additionally, these sentences benefit the perpetrator through various outcomes, including the acquisition of knowledge and skills, strengthened self-perception, and greater self-understanding.Footnote 158 It is suggested that rehabilitative programming may allow an individual to transform their perspectives to become more inclusive, open, and reflective, thereby gaining greater control over their lives as socially responsible, clear-thinking decision-makers.Footnote 159
26. The Chamber thus notes the potential for a positive impact on the convicted person themselves through a sentence emphasising rehabilitation. Not only does such a sentence aim to protect the community by reducing recidivism; it also has the additional benefit of allowing the perpetrator the opportunity to take meaningful accountability for their crimes, and to possibly return to the community at some point in the future as a contributing member who is better equipped to make decisions with the entire community in mind.
27. The Chamber further views that the rehabilitation of the perpetrator is an inextricable component of deterrence and, indeed, opines that without considering how the convicted person can be rehabilitated, specific deterrence is entirely unmet. The objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation are distinct, yet indivisible, as meaningful deterrence requires rehabilitation, and the aim of that rehabilitation is to allow the perpetrator the opportunity to make better, non-destructive choices in the future, thereby deterring future criminal activity.
28. Finally, the Chamber considers the way in which sentences that incorporate aspects of restorative justice, such as rehabilitation, may contribute to a community’s sense of peace and justice. Overall, restorative justice programming in domestic settings, which includes a focus on rehabilitation in sentencing, appears to result in increased victim and perpetrator satisfaction with the overall process, greater fear reduction for victims, and the development of increased empathy in the convicted person.Footnote 160 The Chamber notes that, depending on the status of the conflict at issue, outcomes in the international criminal context may differ significantly. Nevertheless, the Chamber considers that at least some of these outcomes may result.
29. Based on the above, the Chamber is of the mind that there is no implicit hierarchy between denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation. In other words, no one objective of sentencing is determinative, but rather each objective is relevant to the balancing test that sentencing judges must perform. These objectives are fulfilled through the imposition of a just and appropriate sentence, which ‘reflects the degree of culpability while contributing to the restoration of peace and reconciliation in the communities concerned’.Footnote 161
30. Each perpetrator will have a different rehabilitative potential. A trial chamber has broad discretion in determining an appropriate sentence considering all the unique circumstances of the individual and case,Footnote 162 and equally holds such discretion in assessing how the sentence properly fulfils each objective.
31. The sentence should make its objectives plain. To do so, the sentence must simply speak to each objective in the context of the case. This is distinct from articulating a particular objective as primordial or assigning a hierarchy amongst the objectives. It is sufficient that the sentence reflects each of the objectives logically and accessibly. This is a fact-specific analysis, and, as such, there may be some cases where a certain objective is more relevant than another. It is the context of the specific case before it that will determine the weight a chamber attributes to each objective in delineating the sentence.
32. Based on the inclusion of rehabilitation as an equal objective of sentencing, the Chamber, in undertaking to pronounce a just, appropriate, and individualised sentence within the context of this case, turns to consider the types of sentences that may be imposed upon convicted persons at this Court.
Applicable Penalties
33. At the outset, the Chamber notes the principle of nulla poena sine lege,Footnote 163 which prevents the arbitrary imposition of criminal sanctions and ensures legal certainty.
34. The Chamber considers the text of Article 77 of the Statute, which states that the Court may impose one of the following penalties: imprisonment for a specified number of yearsFootnote 164 or life imprisonment.Footnote 165 In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order a fine and/or a forfeiture of proceeds, property, and assets derived from the crime.Footnote 166
35. This Chamber first notes that the text of the Statute employs the permissive language of ‘may impose’ but does not state that the Court ‘shall impose’ those penalties. Both Articles 77(1) (setting out terms of imprisonment) and 77(2) (setting out pecuniary penalties) employ this permissive language. This is distinct from Article 78, which prescribes factors the Court ‘shall … take into account’Footnote 167 in determining a sentence, and further states that the Court ‘shall deduct’Footnote 168 previous time spent in detention.Footnote 169
36. International jurisprudence has interpreted that the statutory inclusion of ‘shall’ prescribes a mandatory directive,Footnote 170 while ‘may’ has been interpreted to confer a discretionary power.Footnote 171 This interpretation likewise appears in domestic jurisprudence.Footnote 172
37. To be clear, the Chamber is not of the view that the drafters of the Statute intended to create a situation wherein no penalty would be imposed – this would produce an unreasonable result and run contrary to the Preamble’s determination to end impunity – but rather that flexibility in what the judges may impose in terms of ‘imprisonment’ was contemplated.Footnote 173
38. The travaux préparatoires further illuminate the level of judicial discretion in sentencing. For example, mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment were contemplated,Footnote 174 but ultimately not included in the Statute. The drafters considered mandating the imposition of the highest penalty provided for by the law of the state of which the convicted person was a national, the state where the crime was committed, or the state which had jurisdiction over the accused;Footnote 175 such requirement, likewise, was not included.
39. Conditionally suspended sentences were also contemplated,Footnote 176 as was probation in limited circumstances.Footnote 177 Though these were not explicitly included in the Statute, certain documents from the travaux préparatoires suggest that judges could have recourse to sentencing practices and provisions from certain states.Footnote 178 This aligns with the final text of the Statute, which includes general principles of domestic legal systems as a source of law.Footnote 179
40. Finally, it is noteworthy that the drafters of the Statute considered it to be a living document, that could be revisited and reassessed as the number and types of cases grew,Footnote 180 and of further relevance that the application and interpretation of the law at the Court must be consistent with internationally recognised human rightsFootnote 181 – a field of law that continues to evolve through the inclusion of more diverse voices and legal approaches.
41. Sentencing judges thus have significant discretion regarding all aspects of the penalty imposed upon a perpetrator, including the type of penalty. This corresponds with the need for an individualised sentence, and the fundamental principles underlying the discretion of a sentencing judge.Footnote 182 Sentencing discretion is nevertheless limited by the requirement that the punishment be appropriate to the crime while maintaining consistency with internationally recognised human rights,Footnote 183 and that the punishment respect the Statute and the Rules of the Court.
42. As for the types of penalty that judges may impose, the Chamber notes that ‘imprisonment’ is not defined in the Statute or the Rules and has not been judicially interpreted at this Court. It further does not appear as though the meaning of ‘imprisonment’ has been judicially examined in the hybrid or ad hoc tribunals, though there has been flexibility in the types of sentences imposed.
43. In contempt proceedings, for example, international chambers have imposed sentences that are variations on those specifically articulated in the relevant Statute and/or Rules.Footnote 184 Further, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) held that, when the relevant texts provide that certain punishments may be imposed by setting out a maximum sentence without reference to a minimum sentence, sentencing judges have ‘an inherent power to impose a sentence other than a fine or imprisonment … [including] a conditional discharge … subject to the particular circumstances of the case’.Footnote 185
44. This Chamber has difficulty imagining a scenario outside a contempt proceeding where a conditional discharge would be appropriate in this jurisdiction; however, the Chamber views this jurisprudence as reinforcing the significant discretionary power of sentencing judges in terms of the type of sentence imposed. The Chamber also considers that the omission of a mandatory period of imprisonment is indicative of the high discretionary authority to craft an appropriate sentence without necessarily resorting to a custodial sentence.Footnote 186
45. There are several international instruments that support the use of non-custodial measures, perhaps most notably the Tokyo Rules, which predate this Court, having been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1990. The Tokyo Rules serve as ‘a set of basic principles to promote the use of non-custodial measures’ and are ‘intended to promote greater community involvement in the management of criminal justice, specifically in the treatment of perpetrators, as well as to promote among perpetrators a sense of responsibility towards society’.Footnote 187
46. Rule 2.1 requires the rules to be applied to all persons subject to prosecution, at all stages of the administration of justice, and Rules 1.5 and 2.4 encourage the development of new non-custodial measures. Possible non-custodial measures are enumerated in Rule 8.2, including, inter alia: conditional discharge; economic sanctions; restitution orders; suspended sentences; judicial supervision; community service orders; and house arrest.
47. The more recently pronounced Doha Declaration additionally calls upon States to ‘adopt comprehensive and inclusive … criminal justice policies and programmes that fully take into account … the root causes of crime, as well as the conditions conducive to its occurrence’, to ‘implement and enhance policies for prison inmates that focus on education, work, medical care, rehabilitation, social reintegration and the prevention of recidivism’, and to ‘create[e] opportunities for community service and support … the social reintegration and rehabilitation of perpetrators’.Footnote 188
48. Domestically, there exist multiple flexible sentencing regimes that can be tailored to individual circumstances and to the gravity of the crime. Such sentences include conditional or community-based sentences, where an individual serves their sentence in the community subject to strict rules;Footnote 189 intermittent sentences, where an individual serves the custodial portion of their sentence intermittently while being subject to conditions when not in custody;Footnote 190 or suspended sentences, where an individual’s sentence is deferred, subject to their following the conditions of release and not reoffending.Footnote 191
49. Domestic legislation has further included more substantive definitions of ‘imprisonment’, and jurisprudence addressing these regimes has considered its meaning extensively. For example, the Irish Criminal Justice Act defines imprisonment to include detention in ‘places other than prisons’,Footnote 192 and the South Australian Sentencing Act includes community-based custodial sentences and suspended sentences under the ‘sentence of imprisonment’ umbrella.Footnote 193 The Canadian Criminal Code expressly names community-based sentences as ‘conditional sentences of imprisonment’.Footnote 194
50. The Supreme Court of Canada has also articulated that a conditional sentence is a term of imprisonment.Footnote 195 South African courts have used the term ‘direct imprisonment’ to distinguish sentences that involve time spent in prison, while taking care to note that these are not necessarily more lenient sentences,Footnote 196 and Australian courts have imposed sentences of imprisonment to be served in the communityFootnote 197 while explicitly stating that these are sentences of imprisonment.Footnote 198 Zimbabwean jurisprudence has articulated community service as a form of imprisonment,Footnote 199 while the Supreme Court of India has held that ‘sentenced to imprisonment’ does not equate to ‘condemned to prison upon conviction’.Footnote 200 Courts in the United Kingdom, meanwhile, have defined a term of imprisonment as ‘an order of restriction of freedom on the perpetrator’,Footnote 201 and held that ‘every confinement of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison, or in a private house’.Footnote 202
51. Generally, the appropriateness of these ‘alternative’ sentences is guided by legislation, which may restrict their use based on the severity of the crime, the vulnerability of the victims, or the length of a maximum sentence. Domestic courts, however, and in some cases domestic legislation itself, have further articulated that carceral imprisonment is a last resort, and should only be used in the absence of suitable non-custodial sentences,Footnote 203 particularly when a convicted person is themself a victim of systemic inequality.Footnote 204
52. Domestically, alternative forms of imprisonment have been imposed upon individuals convicted of violent offences, including killings and attempted killings;Footnote 205 sexual assaults, including where the victim is a minor;Footnote 206 other physical assaults, including spousal violence, instances where the victim was strangled, and where there was intent to injure;Footnote 207 death threats;Footnote 208 and kidnapping,Footnote 209 among others.Footnote 210
53. In imposing non-custodial sentences, the involvement of the community is essential, to rehabilitate the perpetrator as well as to ensure that meaningful reconciliation is considered.Footnote 211
54. The Chamber recalls that it may, in certain circumstances, apply national principles of law if they are not in conflict with the Rome Statute or international law.Footnote 212 The Chamber finds that the imposition of ‘alternative’ sentences, a widespread practice in domestic legal traditions, is in line with international law, as evidenced by the Tokyo Rules and the European Prison Rules. The Chamber further finds that imposing alternative sentences does not conflict with the Rome Statute.
55. Finally, the Chamber notes that each case must be carefully considered in light of all the relevant circumstances before finding an alternative sentence is appropriate, with attention to each of the sentencing objectives, the gravity of the crime, the circumstances of the accused, and the input of the victims.
56. The Chamber holds that it has the legal authority to consider whether an alternative sentence is appropriate in this case.
Factors to Be Considered pursuant to the Statute and Rule 145
57. To determine the appropriate sentence, the Chamber will consider: (i) the gravity of the crime; (ii) Mr Al Mahdi’s culpable conduct; and (iii) his individual circumstances. Rule 145(1)(c) factors and aggravating and mitigating circumstances are discussed when relevant.
[The author relies on paragraphs 76–105 of the original judgment.]
Determination of the Sentence
58. The prosecution submits that Mr Al Mahdi’s sentence should be between nine and eleven years.Footnote 213 The defence made extensive submissions on the adequate assessment of the gravity of the crime charged, the absence of aggravating circumstances and the importance of the mitigating circumstances in this case.Footnote 214 The victims’ legal representative (LRV) requests that the sentence handed down to Mr Al Mahdi be severe and exemplary, without specifying a sentencing range.Footnote 215
59. The Chamber stresses that sentencing an individual for crimes that they committed is a unique exercise for which comparison with different cases can be of only very limited relevance, if any.
60. As set out above, the Chamber must balance all the relevant factors, including any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and consider the circumstances of both the convicted person and the crime. To sufficiently and adequately reflect the moral and economic harm suffered by the victims of the present case and fulfil the objectives of sentencing, the Chamber must impose a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances and culpability of Mr Al Mahdi.
61. The Chamber finds that the crime for which Mr Al Mahdi is being convicted is of significant gravity. That said, the Chamber has found no aggravating circumstances and five mitigating circumstances, namely: (i) Mr Al Mahdi’s admission of guilt; (ii) his cooperation with the prosecution; (iii) the remorse and the empathy he expressed for the victims; (iv) his initial reluctance to commit the crime and the steps he took to limit the damage caused; and (v), even if of limited importance, his good behaviour in detention despite his family situation.
62. The Chamber additionally notes the defence submissions regarding Mr Al Mahdi’s profession and ‘good character’.Footnote 216 Though not mitigating, the Chamber views these as positive factors in assessing Mr Al Mahdi’s rehabilitative potential, as well as determining how Mr Al Mahdi’s sentence could incorporate his education and skills to allow him to give back to the harmed community, while also allowing him the opportunity to rebuild his positive life skills.
63. The Chamber further considers that the defence submissions regarding Mr Al Mahdi’s background, in terms of the social context in which he was raised,Footnote 217 are pertinent to the sentence.
64. As noted above,Footnote 218 there is life outside these processes, as well as a broader context to consider when judging a fellow human. Though the criminal process serves a strict purpose in determining guilt or innocence and the penalty for convicted persons, such determinations should not occur in a void: ‘Judges should be encouraged to experience, learn and understand “life” – their own and those whose lives reflect different realities.’Footnote 219
65. Mr Al Mahdi grew up as an ethnic minority, a Tuareg, in northern Mali, a region that has suffered from political and economic exclusion, ethnic conflicts, and violence, as well as environmental hardships.Footnote 220 Mr Al Mahdi was further educated with a strict interpretation of Sharia,Footnote 221 and does not appear to have previously had the opportunity to effectively challenge that interpretation. Given his background, it is perhaps not all that surprising that Mr Al Mahdi engaged in destructive behaviour and extremist methods.
66. To be clear, Mr Al Mahdi’s background is not an excuse for his actions, which were manifestly criminal. The Chamber further rejects the defence submissions that Mr Al Mahdi’s motive is mitigating.Footnote 222 So-called good intentions are no excuse for the crimes under this Court’s jurisdiction, and a stated motivation or goal that is not inherently criminal, if it nevertheless involves the commission of crimes to achieve it, cannot mitigate a convicted person’s actions. As articulated by the LRV, ‘to attack the culture and heritage of a people is to attack its soul and its roots’, which is precisely what Mr Al Mahdi did.Footnote 223
67. Nevertheless, the Chamber considers his background and overarching social context as relevant in considering Mr Al Mahdi’s rehabilitative potential, as it provides greater understanding of how and why Mr Al Mahdi made the choices that led him to this Court.
68. Finally, in considering Mr Al Mahdi’s rehabilitative potential, the Chamber again notes his genuine remorse for his actions.
69. Considering all these factors, the Chamber departs from the Court’s traditional reliance on incarceration as the sole form of punishment, and sentences Mr Al Mahdi to seven years of custodial imprisonment, along with an additional 3,765 hours of community service.Footnote 224
70. The hours of community service will be served in the Trust Fund for Victims, UNESCO, or, with approval of the Court and in consultation with relevant stakeholders from the harmed community, another similar organisation focused on culturally relevant and appropriate activities. The work undertaken as part of his community service must focus on rebuilding what Mr Al Mahdi helped destroy, but can be contemplated in broader terms that the work could, for example, focus on building respect for religious diversity. A panel of relevant stakeholders from the harmed community as well as the above-named organisations will be assigned to monitor Mr Al Mahdi’s work to ensure it is relevant, assess his contributions, and provide updates to the Court.
71. While performing his community service hours, Mr Al Mahdi will not have any access to the internet or a cell phone. Any tasks that require access to a computer or phone will be supervised to ensure that he does not send any communications.
72. The hours of community service are to be completed concurrently, while Mr Al Mahdi is serving his custodial sentence.
73. The Chamber notes that it did not hear submissions from any party with respect to a prospective imposition of community service, and given the impact that this sentence will have on Mr Al Mahdi’s time in custody, considers it appropriate to allow Mr Al Mahdi to respond. Mr Al Mahdi is to file a written response to this decision within thirty days, indicating whether he wishes to participate in the community service sanction. If Mr Al Mahdi is unwilling to engage in community service as part of his sentence, for whatever reason, the community service portion of the sentence, equivalent to two years, will be applied as an additional two-year period of incarceration, bringing his sentence to nine years of incarceration.
74. If Mr Al Mahdi fails to complete the hours of community service by the end of the seven-year custodial sentence, the outstanding balance will be converted into a custodial period.
75. For clarity, notwithstanding this directive, all parties, including Mr Al Mahdi, retain the right to appeal this decision through the regular channels and procedures.
76. Lastly, noting that none of the parties or participants requests the imposition of a fine or order of forfeiture under Article 77(2) of the Statute and Rules 146 and 147 of the Rules, the Chamber finds that this term of imprisonment and community service is a sufficient penalty.
77. Pursuant to Article 78(2) of the Statute, Mr Al Mahdi is entitled to have deducted from his sentence the time he has spent in detention in accordance with an order of this Court, namely since his arrest pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued on 18 September 2015.
Judge Melissa McKay
13.4 Destruction of Cultural Property on the Al Mahdi Reparations Order
In 2017 Trial Chamber VIII issued the reparations order for Mr Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi,Footnote 225 a decision that was confirmed on appeal in 2018.Footnote 226 The order required Mr Al Mahdi to pay €2.7 million in individual and collective reparations to the victims of the destruction of cultural heritage in Mali, Timbuktu, in 2012. This order found that those who could demonstrate direct economic loss from the destruction would be eligible for consequential economic loss reparations, without considering the informal economy operating from the sites, mainly managed by women and girls. The order also focused on the patrilineal succession lines marking ancestral connection to the sites, again overlooking the moral connections of women and girls.
In this rewritten reparations order, Laura Graham and Annika Jones emphasise the cultural underpinnings that may result in women’s harm being indirect rather than direct and how that aspect needs to be considered in the distribution of reparations. They also critique traditional implementation and application methods used to identify victims, noting that cultural and social norms may impact women and girls applying. As a practical way to counter these issues, Graham and Jones support matrilineal as well as patrilineal ancestral mapping, and recognition of the impact on the informal economy, in the allocation of individual reparations; include initiatives focusing on marginalised communities as part of collective reparations; and emphasise the importance of including women in the implementation of the order.
Reparations Order No.: ICC-01/12-01/15
Date: 17 August 2017
Original: English
TRIAL CHAMBER VIII(B)
Before: Judge Laura GRAHAM
Judge Annika JONES
SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MALI
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. AHMAD AL FAQI AL MAHDI
Principles on Reparations and Applicable Law …
Harm Suffered, Types of Reparations and Modalities
Harm
42. To be eligible for reparations, a victim must have suffered harm as a result of the commission of the crime of which Mr Al Mahdi was convicted. …
45. As the ‘First Expert Report’ rightly notes, this is the first engagement of the ‘ICC’ with the situation in Mali and it is, therefore, essential that the Chamber understands the harms that flow from this crime in the context of the wide range of abuses that were carried out during the occupation and the ideology that informed the attacks.Footnote 227
46. The Chamber has noted that the destruction of the protected buildings was ordered because the attackers considered them to be sites of vice.Footnote 228 Mr Al Mahdi, as head of the Hesbah morality brigade, was entrusted with regulating the morality of the people of Timbuktu, and of preventing, suppressing, and repressing anything perceived by the occupiers to constitute a visible vice.Footnote 229 These visible vices included freedom of dress and freedom of movement, especially for women.Footnote 230 Mr Al Mahdi has personally referenced ‘not wearing the veil, revealing one’s physical appearance [and] gender mix[ing]’ as examples of vice suppressed by Hisbah.Footnote 231 The Hesbah organised patrols to make sure that women complied with the dress codes imposed by the armed groups.Footnote 232 In addition, women were subjected to a range of abuses, including rape and sexual assaults, which escalated as the attackers were mobilised.Footnote 233
47. It is within this context that the war crime of attacking the Protected Buildings occurred. Therefore, while the reparations order must focus on compensation for the effects of Mr Al Mahdi’s crimes, the Chamber notes the importance of taking a gender-sensitive approach to reparations in this case,Footnote 234 ensuring that the losses and harms experienced by women are not further marginalised by this reparations order, or through its implementation. …
Consequential Economic Loss
72. When pronouncing Mr Al Mahdi’s sentence, the Chamber concluded that Mr Al Mahdi caused economic harm.Footnote 235
73. The victims have requested compensation for the effect that the attacks on the protected buildings had on their livelihood. The tourist economy was decimated as a result of the attacks.Footnote 236 Prior to the destruction of the protected buildings, people came from all over the world to see the mausoleums and to pray to the saints.Footnote 237 On given days, people would visit the mausoleums to offer monetary donations or sacrifice animals (mostly in the case of women, who could not enter the mausoleums).Footnote 238 The destruction of the protected buildings was understood by the community as destroying the souls and spirits of the saints.Footnote 239 Without the belief that the saints might listen to the prayers and grant their wishes, visitors have become rare.Footnote 240 According to one victim, ‘the damage sustained by the Timbuktu area is incommensurable. It will take generations for the situation to return to how it was before 2012’.Footnote 241
74. The Chamber notes three overlapping categories of economic losses. There is no hierarchy between these categories. Instead, the losses incurred by the victims should be understood on their own merits. This is important given that women, children, and the elderly are unlikely to be included in the first category and should not be disadvantaged in the implementation of the reparations order.
75. The first category comprises those victims whose livelihoods exclusively depended upon the protected buildings. These include the guardians of the mausoleums, the maçons tasked with prominent responsibilities in maintaining them,Footnote 242 and people whose businesses could not exist without the protected buildings. The victims’ legal representative (LRV) has drawn attention to the particular harm suffered by this category of victims.Footnote 243
76. The second category includes victims whose livelihoods have been indirectly harmed, including as a result of the losses of tourism and economic activity in the years following the attack.Footnote 244 Consequential economic loss falling into this category has been detailed in the ‘Second Expert Report’.Footnote 245
77. The Chamber notes that traditional gender roles may have an impact on the way the economic harm is felt. Individuals who are restricted from entering into the mausoleums, including women under a certain age,Footnote 246 are more likely to suffer indirect harm as a result of their destruction. Attacks on the informal economy are also likely to have a particularly strong impact on some sectors of the population, including women and girls. These economic losses are more difficult to quantify because of the absence of accounting records. Nonetheless, as the LRV has observed, the effect of the destruction has been no less real for the victims.Footnote 247 It is important that distinctions are not drawn between direct and indirect economic loss when assessing the impact of the destruction of the protected buildings on victims for the purpose of allocating reparations. This is to ensure that reparations do not contribute to the entrenchment of discrimination and, to the extent that it is possible, play a role in disrupting pre-existing inequalities and patterns of structural discrimination.Footnote 248
78. The third category of economic losses comprises those resulting from the abandonment of property as a result of fleeing Timbuktu in the wake of the destruction out of fear that ‘Mr Al Mahdi and his co-perpetrators would turn their attention to people after striking stone and mortar’.Footnote 249 In fleeing, victims ‘were forced to abandon not only their property, livestock and money, but their occupations and businesses as well’.Footnote 250 This economic loss should be included in reparations to ensure that affected victims, including women, children, and the elderly, are not excluded by a narrow focus on loss of business owners alone.
79. The Chamber is satisfied that Mr Al Mahdi’s crime is both the actual and proximate cause of these three categories of economic harm. It was reasonably foreseeable that attacking cultural property integral to the community in Timbuktu would have a lingering economic impact. Indeed, the protected buildings were targeted in large part because of their prominent community role.Footnote 251
80. As noted in the Second Expert Report,Footnote 252 the general consequential economic loss caused by the attack reverberated across the entire community in Timbuktu. The Chamber considers that the harm caused by Mr Al Mahdi’s actions is primarily collective in character. It is much larger and of a different nature than the harm suffered by the 139 applicants grouped together. Aggregating their losses and prioritising their compensation would risk dramatically understating and misrepresenting the economic loss actually suffered.
81. Nevertheless, the LRV argues that compensation should be given to all reparations applicants who suffered financial losses, and that a further €250 be granted to each victim applicant to address their collective harm.Footnote 253
82. When focusing on the extent of compensation, the Chamber considers it more equitable to use individual reparations to compensate victims on the basis of the extent of the harm suffered or sacrifice made, whether as part of the formal or informal economy, directly or indirectly, rather than solely on whether a victim had applied for reparations. To do otherwise would exacerbate gender-based discrimination faced by women who may, in this cultural context, be less likely to make individual applications.
83. The Chamber notes that reparations applicants in the present case already obtain several procedural advantages which are not necessarily available to other members of the Timbuktu community who suffered similar harm. By virtue of having already prepared applications and supporting materials, the applicants can take part in the screening procedure, specified later in the present order, without significant additional effort. The applicants provided information considered by the Chamber in tailoring the reparations award, giving them more influence over the parameters set in the present order. The applicants also continue to avail themselves of the assistance of the LRV, a Court-appointed lawyer who receives legal assistance to represent their interests and advocate for them. Furthermore, inclusion and participation in the reparations process has been understood to provide reparation in itself, insofar as it restores agency to victims.Footnote 254
84. Compensating the applicants – to the exclusion of similarly harmed people – beyond these procedural advantages puts undue emphasis on the filing of applications rather than on the extent of the harm suffered or the sacrifice made by the victims. Doing so may exacerbate gender-specific disadvantages where women’s voices have not been heard as part of these applications. There is no reason to believe that the reparations applicants, simply by virtue of applying, suffered to a different degree compared with the rest of the Timbuktu community. It is important to ensure that a broader range of victims, including women, children, and the elderly, benefit from the reparations process to promote their agency and challenge their previous exclusion. As noted by the LRV, there is a high risk of frustration in awarding reparations only to those who have reparations applications pending before the Chamber.Footnote 255 The Second Expert Report also recommends that reparations in the present case should be ‘awarded on a collective basis as far as possible’.Footnote 256
85. Accordingly, the Chamber awards individual reparations for consequential economic loss only to those (i) whose livelihoods exclusively depended upon the protected buildings, including those whose livelihood was to maintain and protect those buildings; (ii) whose livelihoods were significantly affected by their destruction; or (iii) those who otherwise suffered significant personal economic loss as a consequence of their destruction, such as the loss of their homes as a result of displacement. An individualised response is more appropriate for them, as their loss relative to the rest of the community is more acute and exceptional.
86. The Chamber considers that the number of victims and the scope of the consequential economic loss make a collective award more appropriate for those beyond these identified groups. This is not to say that other individual businesses and families beyond these three categories could not receive financial support in the implementation of these collective reparations, but rather that the Chamber considers a collective response is more appropriate to adequately address the harm suffered. As indicated by the Appeals Chamber, ‘the decision not to award reparations on an individual basis does not prejudice the individuals who filed individual reparations requests with respect to their eligibility to participate in any collective reparations programme’.Footnote 257
87. The Chamber therefore considers that the economic harm caused by Mr Al Mahdi necessitates: (i) individual reparations for those whose livelihoods exclusively depended upon the protected buildings, who were significantly affected by their destruction, or who otherwise suffered significant personal economic loss as a consequence of their destruction; and (ii) collective reparations for the community of Timbuktu as a whole.
88. As for the modalities, the Chamber considers that individual reparations are to be implemented through compensation to address the financial losses suffered. The modalities for collective reparations should be aimed at rehabilitating the community of Timbuktu to address the economic harm caused. Collective measures in this regard may include: community-based educational and awareness-raising programmes to promote Timbuktu’s important and unique cultural heritage; return/resettlement programmes; the development of actions or programmes aimed at assisting women, youth, and others towards generating income; a ‘microcredit system’ that would assist the population to generate income; a school/university; a project that would generate jobs not only for the women, but for youth and others; or other cash assistance programmes to restore some of Timbuktu’s lost economic activity.Footnote 258
89. Moreover, a fully gender-sensitive approach to the protection of cultural heritage and to combating its destruction is essential.Footnote 259 As recommended in the First Expert Report, such reparations could include initiatives such as promoting training for women and fostering discussions of the issue of non-discrimination in access to cultural heritage sites as a means of guaranteeing non-repetition of the abuses in this case.Footnote 260 As the First Expert Report notes, ‘if there was no specific provision made for reparations for women, women will be unlikely to be beneficiaries of the reparations. The reparations process can afford an opportunity to strengthen their recognition and involvement in the protection, care and transmission of cultural heritage’.Footnote 261
Moral Harm
90. When pronouncing Mr Al Mahdi’s sentence, the Chamber concluded that Mr Al Mahdi had caused moral harm.Footnote 262
91. Every victim applicant before the Chamber alleges some sort of moral harm as a result of the attack on the protected buildings. The Chamber considers that the victims established the following forms of moral harm to the requisite standard: (i) mental pain and anguish, including losses of childhood, opportunities, and relationships among those who fled Timbuktu because the protected buildings were attacked and (ii) disruption of culture.Footnote 263
92. The Chamber has also received other information describing the emotional distress and harm suffered across the Timbuktu community. In particular, the protected buildings were widely perceived in Timbuktu as being the protectors of the community from outside harm. The attack on the protected buildings not only destroyed cherished monuments, but also shattered the community’s collective faith that they were protected.Footnote 264 Collective events at the mausoleums also brought members of the community together; the crépissage, or plastering of the mosques, is done collectively, with women and the elderly at the base and young men at the top.Footnote 265
93. In relation to moral harm stemming from the disruption of culture, the Chamber has acknowledged in its sentencing judgment the particular loss of intangible cultural heritage that women have faced in their ritual of cleaning the shrines.Footnote 266 Women were the most frequent visitors to the mausoleums, even though they were unable to enter the protected buildings.Footnote 267 They often prayed at these buildings, making wishes to have children, or wishing for the success of their children.Footnote 268 Having acknowledged the particular links that women have with the mausoleums, the First Expert Report stresses the significance of including a ‘gender specific component of the reparations that recognizes women’s connections to the cultural heritage that was targeted, their suffering during the jihadist occupation and the [REDACTED] in countering the fundamentalist ideology that inspired the destructions’.Footnote 269
94. The Chamber is satisfied that Mr Al Mahdi’s crime is both the actual and proximate cause of this moral harm. It was reasonably foreseeable that attacking cultural property integral to the community in Timbuktu would cause these kinds of distress.
95. The LRV argues at length that the moral harm suffered is best addressed by giving compensation to the applicants as individual and collective reparations.Footnote 270 For the same reasons provided when discussing consequential economic loss, the Chamber considers such a compensation-centric approach for the benefit of the reparations applicants to be problematic. The Chamber again emphasises that it considers that such a course understates the variety of other information proving that Timbuktu’s community at large – and not only the victim applicants – suffered moral harm.
96. The Registry has noted that documentary evidence of harm, proving a victim was ‘faithful’ or was harmed by the destruction of the buildings, and quantifying moral harm would prove difficult for most victims.Footnote 271 The defence argues in its submissions that psychological harm in the present case can be proven only by asking for a direct kinship between the people claiming the harm and the deceased whose mausoleums were attacked.Footnote 272 The Chamber agrees with the defence – and LRV,Footnote 273 for that matter – that those whose ancestors’ burial sites were damaged in the attack (such as the ‘descendants of the saints’) have a different kind of emotional connection to the destroyed sites than the rest of the Timbuktu population. However, it considers that the community-wide impact of moral harm is minimised by sole reliance on direct kinship as a means of proving moral harm. Furthermore, given that male victims are more likely to be able to prove a connection with the ‘descendants of the saints’, due to the patrilineal way that familial records are kept, narrowly interpreting this moral harm could reinforce structural and material exclusion of women.
97. With this in mind, the Chamber stresses the importance of recognising female-based lines of ancestry alongside ‘descendants of the saints’ when identifying groups that have a particularly strong emotional connection to the destroyed sites. The Chamber considers that individual reparations through compensation are necessary to address the mental pain and anguish that these victims suffered. But the remainder of the reparations awarded to the entire community of Timbuktu must be collective in character and should prioritise collective opportunities for sections of the population who may be marginalised in the distribution of individual reparations.
98. The Chamber therefore orders that the moral harm caused by Mr Al Mahdi necessitates: (i) individual reparations for the mental pain and anguish of those with a stronger emotional connection to the destroyed sites than the rest of the Timbuktu population, including those whose ancestors’ burial sites were damaged in the attack and (ii) collective reparations for the mental pain/anguish and disruption of culture of the Timbuktu community as a whole.
99. As for the modalities, the Chamber considers that individual reparations are to be implemented through compensation and collective reparations through rehabilitation to address the emotional distress suffered as a result of the attack on the protected buildings. These collective reparations can also include symbolic measures – such as a memorial, commemoration, or forgiveness ceremony – to give public recognition of the moral harm suffered by the Timbuktu community and those within it. As noted by the LRV, the implementation of reparations must not result in any discrimination – including gender-based discrimination – among victims.Footnote 274 It is important, therefore, that all victims, including women, children, and the elderly, be included in decisions around collective reparations. …
Implementation
135. The Chamber has concluded that Mr Al Mahdi is liable for €2.7 million in expenses for individual and collective reparations. The Chamber has also ordered some symbolic measures. …
137. The LRV has suggested that the reparation scheme should involve local traditional and religious leaders to ensure communication with and inclusion of communities in decision making.Footnote 275 It is recognised that some methods of reparation ‘could unintentionally strengthen the dominant group, and leave the marginalised members of the community worse off’.Footnote 276 The Chamber notes, in particular, evidence in the Second Expert Report that women’s views are ordinarily only heard in certain conditions, such as when ‘they are old and considered wise … [where they] do not expose themselves in public … [or where they play a] role of counsellor … [to] their husbands’.Footnote 277 The report also notes that women are at a disadvantage in relation to property rights given that male descendants receive twice as much as female descendants and widows are only entitled to one-eighth of the property of their deceased husband.Footnote 278 With this in mind, the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) must ensure that the involvement of community leaders does not further the exclusion of women, but rather that women’s inclusion both in the process of developing the scheme and as victims using the scheme is facilitated.
138. It is not the Chamber’s responsibility at this time to give detailed information about the implementation component of the reparations phase. However, the Chamber will advance the following preliminary considerations to guide the implementation of its order. …
140. Second, the Chamber notes that the modalities of reparations it has ordered mutually reinforce each other. In other words, addressing the discrete moral harm may have residual effects that ameliorate the discrete forms of economic harm and vice versa. Care must be taken, however, to avoid any assumption that addressing economic harms to a family unit, which is traditionally headed by a man, does not supersede reparations for moral harms to other members of the family, including women and children, who occupy a vulnerable and submissive position in society.Footnote 279 The TFV is not limited to the Chamber’s intermediate liability calculations when designing an implementation plan; the TFV is limited only by the Chamber’s final determination on the defendant’s liability.
141. Third, specific provisions must be made in the implementation phase to ensure equitable distribution of reparations to women.Footnote 280 Women may find it difficult to make individual claims for reparations because of the Malian traditional family structure and subordination of the wife. The TFV should consider a process that affords an opportunity for women to strengthen their involvement in developing an appropriate reparations scheme, which ensures adequate financial reparation and inclusive participation.
142. Fourth, the Chamber notes that it has received only 139 applications during the reparations phase, despite determining that collective harm was suffered across Timbuktu (a city of approximately 70,000 people around the time of the attack). The LRV acknowledges that ‘the victims whom he met on his assignment in Mali represent just a fraction of the victims in the case’.Footnote 281 The Chamber notes the potential for these applications to be gendered because of the effect of conservative social values that curtail women’s ability to negotiate or advocate for themselves in legal processes.Footnote 282 The Chamber also notes the information received that the security situation in Timbuktu makes travelling there or contacting victims difficult,Footnote 283 a situation exacerbated for women. For these reasons, the Chamber considers that the names of all the victims meeting its parameters for individual reparations are simply not known and considers that it would be impracticable for the Chamber to attempt to identify and assess them all itself.
143. As recognised by the Appeals Chamber,Footnote 284 the regulations of the TFV explicitly contemplate individual reparations for unidentified beneficiaries.Footnote 285 This is in juxtaposition to the TFV regulations governing individual reparations in cases where the Court identifies each beneficiary.Footnote 286 When the Court does not identify the beneficiaries, it falls to the TFV to establish a verification procedure to determine that any persons who identify themselves to the TFV are in fact members of the beneficiary group.Footnote 287 The Chamber considers that proceeding in this manner is an alternative to an application-based process, whereby the Chamber assesses the reparation requests of identifiable beneficiaries filed pursuant to Rule 94 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
144. For the reasons above, the Chamber considers that the impracticability of identifying all those meeting its individual reparations parameters justifies an eligibility screening during the implementation phase. The Chamber therefore considers it best that individual reparations be awarded on the basis of an administrative screening by the TFV.Footnote 288 However, the TFV should recognise that because of the patrilineal nature of familial records, the particular role of women in the informal economy, and the submissive position of women in society, these verification procedures must be such that they do not reinforce exclusion.
145. The Chamber notes that given the particular role of the descendants of the saints in guarding and maintaining the protected buildings, it is likely that many of those identified as suffering economic loss and moral harm will be the same individuals. Bearing this in mind, the Chamber considers that one screening for both categories is sufficient for these applicants. It is also emphasised at the outset that anyone not participating in the screening can still participate in collective reparations programmes – the screening process concerns only individual reparations.
146. This screening process itself must respect the rights of both the victims and the convicted person.Footnote 289 The Chamber considers that the full details of this screening are to be determined by the TFV, but it can already set out the following general parameters:
(i) Reasonable efforts must be made to identify individuals who may be eligible under the screening process, within a timeframe to be proposed by the TFV. These efforts must ensure the inclusion of eligible women, and identify and ameliorate difficulties for women in meeting eligibility criteria.
(ii) Individuals who wish to be considered for the screening process are to provide a reparations application and any supporting documents. It is noted in this regard that this step has already been taken by the reparations applicants in the present case, and these persons should be considered first by the TFV if they apply to be screened. However, it must also be recognised that in the provision of reparations this must not prioritise those who have already made applications, as that would have an indirect effect of reinforcing exclusion of marginalised groups.
(iii) Both the applicant, on their own or through a legal representative, and the defence must be given an opportunity to make representations before the TFV assesses any applicant’s eligibility. In assessing eligibility, the TFV may base itself only on information made available and to which the defence has had an opportunity to access and respond. Recognition must be made that the informal economy and patriarchal family registration means that women in particular may be reliant on informal documentation or accounts to support their eligibility. For instance, to demonstrate that they are descendants of the saints, women may be more likely to rely upon oral testimony and statements rather than registration documents.
…
147. Fifth, the Chamber has received conflicting information about the extent to which traditional justice mechanisms should be used in implementing the Chamber’s order. Some note the paramount role these play in Timbuktu’s culture and how the validity of any reparations order depends on using them.Footnote 290 Others emphasise that certain traditional justice mechanisms in Timbuktu have a history of discrimination, especially against neglected groups such as women, children, and slaves, and that care should be taken in relying upon them.Footnote 291 Given this conflicting information, and the Chamber’s commitment to equitable distribution of reparations, the Chamber will not require that traditional justice mechanisms be part of the implementation of its award.
148. Lastly, the Chamber emphasises that implementation of the present order must be responsive to local conditions while being consistent with the Court’s reparations principles, including the principle of non-discrimination. The TFV is expected to devise a draft implementation plan bearing this dichotomy in mind, consulting all relevant stakeholders – including the parties – and recommending any implementation measures it considers appropriate.Footnote 292 The parties will also be given an opportunity to file written submissions on the draft implementation plan proposed. As emphasised above, the TFV’s discretion in drafting the implementation plan will be subject to approval by way of a second decision of the Chamber.
Judge Laura Graham and Judge Annika Jones
13.5 Digital Evidence in the Al Hassan Warrant
In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a Warrant of Arrest for Mr Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud.Footnote 293 In this rewritten decision, Sarah Zarmsky and Emma Irving provide additional remarks on the aspect of digital evidence that is intended to come before the Chamber at trial.
Zarmsky and Irving explore how the benefit of digital evidence is also the disadvantage, namely that the violence can be shared globally and never completely eradicated. Zarmsky and Irving note that the digital aspect of the evidence compounds the harm experienced by victims while also providing a clear portrayal of the violence and thereby greatly assisting the Court. They highlight the safeguards that should be enacted to protect victims but note that as digital evidence becomes more frequently used, the lack of such evidence, notably in regard to sexual and gender-based crimes, should not act as a barrier to conviction and should still enjoy proper and thorough investigatory practices.
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud No.: ICC-01/12-01/18
Date: 22 May 2018
Original: French
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I
Before: Judge Sarah ZARMSKY
Judge Emma IRVING
SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MALI
IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. AL HASSAN AG ABDOUL AZIZ AG MOHAMED AG MAHMOUD
Additional Remarks
1. Having found reasonable grounds to believe:
(a) That crimes against humanity and war crimes were committed in Timbuktu, Mali, between April 2012 and January 2013;
(b) That Mr Al Hassan has incurred individual criminal responsibility under Articles 25(3)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute for these crimes; and
(c) That the conditions under Article 58(1)(b) of the Rome Statute for arresting Mr Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud are satisfied,
2. The first subject is that of video evidence and its evidentiary value before this Court. The second subject concerns the additional gravity considerations which arise due to the fact that the crimes committed were filmed and posted online.
The Use of Video Evidence
3. The Chamber notes the Prosecutor’s inclusion of a number of videos in the evidence supporting her application for the present arrest warrant. In said application, the term ‘video’ is mentioned seventy-four times in support of a range of submissions.Footnote 294 This conspicuous use of video material reflects the growing importance that video evidence – as well as digital evidence more generally – is coming to play in international criminal accountability. For this reason, the Chamber considers it opportune to issue some remarks on the subject of video evidence.
4. Videos have played a role in International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings since its first case, when videos depicting child soldiers were shown in the courtroom during the trial the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.Footnote 295 Since that time, two cases have come before this Court in which video evidence was a significant part of the case.
5. The first such case was the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. On 27 September 2016, Mr Al Mahdi was found guilty as a co-perpetrator of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012. The evidence presented to Trial Chamber VIII included a large number of videos that, among other things, depicted the accused taking part in the destruction of protected buildings and giving instructions and moral support to others to do the same.Footnote 296
6. The second such case was the Prosecutor v. Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli. In 2017 and 2018 respectively, two warrants of arrest were issued for Mr Al-Werfalli for both directly committing and ordering the commission of murder as a war crime.Footnote 297 The alleged murders took place in the context of eight incidents, seven of which were captured on video and uploaded to social media sites. The total number of alleged murder victims is forty-three, corresponding to the number of individuals whose death is purportedly depicted in the videos. At the time the present arrest warrant was issued, Mr Al-Werfalli was still at large, and reported by some sources as deceased.
7. In both above cases, the Prosecutor limited her charges to one war crime: in Al Mahdi the intentional directing of attacks against religious and historic buildings, and in Al-Werfalli murder. This narrow focus fed into and reinforced (and was possibly a consequence of, though that is not for this Chamber to say) a commonly held belief that video evidence is predominantly of use for a certain category of crimes only. These are crimes that take place in public or semi-public spaces, such as the very public destruction of buildings in Mali or executions on the street in Libya. This stands in contrast to crimes more often perpetrated in private and frequently stigmatised, in particular sexual and gender-based violence crimes (SGBV).
8. In addition to noting the extensive use of video evidence in the Prosecutor’s application for the present arrest warrant, the Chamber notes with satisfaction that video is used to support a range of submissions, including arguments relating to violence against women and girls.Footnote 298 This marks a move away from the approach seen in Al Mahdi and Al-Werfalli and gives force to the idea that video evidence can play a larger evidentiary role than hitherto thought.
9. On the basis of the evidence presented by the Prosecutor in her application, including videos, the Chamber has made a number of findings in this arrest warrant. While these are addressed in detail elsewhere in this decision, the Chamber will draw attention to a few points that pertain to the use of video evidence in submissions related to SGBV.
10. First, in establishing – as a contextual element of crimes against humanity – that Ansar Dine and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had a policy of attacking the civilian population, the Chamber takes note of videos showing how the armed groups wished to impose their authority and new religious order on the civilian population. Under this policy, those who failed to demonstrate the necessary religiosity, in particular women and girls, were to be punished.Footnote 299
11. Second, video evidence played a part in establishing reasonable grounds to believe that torture and persecution as crimes against humanity took place in Timbuktu, Mali, and that women and girls were particular targets. With respect to the crime of torture, the Prosecutor submitted video evidence of women being subjected to whipping at the market and in their homes.Footnote 300 The reasons given for this conduct included not being sufficiently covered or wearing colourful clothes.Footnote 301 With respect to the crime of persecution, the Prosecutor referenced videos showing that under the pretext of enforcing Ansar Dine and AQIM’s religious vision, women were harassed in the street, in hospitals, in schools, and in their own homes;Footnote 302 they were subjected to daily abuse, searches, and detention.Footnote 303 In one video referenced by the Prosecutor, Ansar Dine/AQIM preacher Abou Al Baraa declares that women ‘must not speak seductively and softly; and they must not make tingling sounds when they walk; and they must not embellish themselves’.Footnote 304
12. These findings illustrate that some categories of SGBV crimes can take place in public spaces and that video recordings capturing elements of these crimes do exist and can have evidentiary value. It is time, therefore, for a shift in mindset away from viewing video evidence as limited in utility, and in particular away from viewing video evidence as unhelpful in proving crimes against women and other victims of SGBV crimes.
13. The Chamber does not deny that some SGBV crimes are more difficult than others to establish using video evidence. Notably, the Chamber finds reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes against humanity of rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage as an inhumane act, and the war crime of rape, were committed in Timbuktu, Mali; however, the Chamber does not cite video evidence as supporting evidentiary material for these findings.
14. Recent research shows, however, that while direct video evidence of sexual violence being perpetrated is rare,Footnote 305 video evidence has a valuable role to play in corroborating and supporting other forms of evidence. Alexa Koenig and Ulic Egan found through interviews with practitioners that digital open-source information (including video evidence) can be useful in establishing contextual elements of international crimes, for example by documenting television statements made in the lead-up to an attack, or recording troop and vehicle movements.Footnote 306 Furthermore, digital evidence can capture more ‘visible’ conflict-related phenomena that correlate with sexual violence. That way, the ‘visible phenomena can act as a signal that evidence of sexual violence may be nearby’.Footnote 307 Events such as village burnings, forcible transfers, the use of detention centres, slave labour, and the presence of large groups of armed men are often indicators that sexual violence could have taken place.Footnote 308 Koenig and Egan recommend that investigators work creatively when looking for SGBV-related evidentiary material and that they take into account the fact that evidence of this category of crimes may not be labelled as suchFootnote 309 and may be reported in different ways than other crimes.Footnote 310 When carrying out investigations online, they found that SGBV-related material was often hidden on the dark web, and therefore more challenging to find.Footnote 311
15. The Chamber has been keen to express its support for widening the understanding of the role that video evidence can play in proceedings before this Court and in other accountability fora. In an age when videos are so easily made on smartphones and other digital devices, and so easily shared through social media and communication apps, to overlook the value of this source of evidence for establishing SGBV crimes risks rendering such crimes more invisible than they already are. The digital age provides a wealth of tools for investigators and lawyers that should be put to work to address marginalisation and silence. That being said, there are two cautionary notes that these additional remarks on video evidence will conclude with.
16. First, where there is video evidence of SGBV crimes, especially direct evidence of the perpetration of such crimes, a strong and robust ethical framework is needed to ensure victims’ rights and the safety of the individuals who captured the video.
17. Second, in cases where video evidence simply does not exist, caution should be exercised to ensure that SGBV crimes are still given the proper investigatory attention. There are a range of reasons why video evidence may be scarce, including that the internet was cut off during the conflict, a lack of digital infrastructure in the conflict-affected area, unequal access to technology between men and women/young and old/rural and city dwellers, unequal (digital) literacy, the existence of domestic legislation that makes reporting SGBV crimes difficult, a lack of services, and so on. Crimes where the perpetrator is captured on video directly perpetrating or ordering the crime are attractive from an investigative and prosecutorial standpoint, but the relative ease of prosecuting these crimes should not mean that other crimes, and in particular the often difficult to prosecute SGBV crimes, should escape investigation and accountability.
Gravity Considerations
18. In addition, with the development of smartphones and the accessibility of the internet around the globe, it is now common for individuals to post footage of atrocities to social media. This phenomenon occurs for multiple reasons; sometimes bystanders may begin recording as an instinctual mechanism to deal with the shock of seeing a crime, or witnesses may post footage to try and raise awareness about a particular event or conflict. However, sharing videos of crimes may not always be done with the purest of intentions, as terrorist organisations and other perpetrators now frequently use social media to distribute footage for purposes of spreading propaganda, instilling fear, and further humiliating the victims and their families.Footnote 312
19. When footage of crimes is shared on social media, this element of publication can aggravate the gravity of the crimes. As the Pre-Trial Chamber stated in the case against Mr Al-Werfalli, ‘the posting on social media of the videos depicting executions’ and ‘the manner in which the crime was committed and publicized was cruel, dehumanizing, and degrading’.Footnote 313 This Chamber considers that the publication element should have been further discussed in the case against Mr Al-Werfalli when assessing gravity. Focus should have been placed on the additional harm suffered by the victims from having their suffering posted to public online platforms, which extended the audience of this suffering far beyond the group of onlookers on the street that day.
20. Returning to the present case, the Prosecutor submits in her application that one of the reasons the attacks against the population of Timbuktu can be considered widespread and systematic is ‘the mode of executions, in public and in the presence of the population summoned for this purpose’.Footnote 314 The Prosecutor argues that the executions were ‘brutal and public’ in order to ‘instil fear in the population’.Footnote 315 Further, the Prosecutor emphasises that the public nature of the executions rendered them particularly humiliating for the victims.Footnote 316 These elements of the application add to this Chamber’s view that the way in which offences were committed publicly and posted online aggravate the seriousness of the crimes.
21. Further, in her application the Prosecutor makes frequent reference to videos of the executions, some of which were posted to social media platforms such as YouTube by Ansar Dine.Footnote 317 The Prosecutor submits that these videos ‘show the victims bent over in pain. The repetition of the blows contributes to accentuate their suffering, perceptible through their cries and their groans. Some have bloodstains, others have their private parts exposed for all to see, contributing to a sense of public humiliation’.Footnote 318
22. The Chamber considers that the posting of videos of executions to social media platforms such as YouTube by Ansar Dine itself demonstrates a desire to further degrade the victims before a widespread audience. It is the Chamber’s view that this factor aggravates the offence and should be noted in considering the gravity of the crimes committed. When footage of crimes is posted to the internet, those depicted are victimised even further through the humiliation of their suffering being shared globally and the fear of not knowing how far the footage will be circulated. Once a video is posted online, it is extremely difficult to remove it completely and stop it from being continuously shared, which can leave victims feeling helpless and humiliated for much longer than if the crime was not filmed and shared. It is also important to note that in instances where footage of crimes is posted to social media, women and girls may likely be affected disproportionately to men. This is due to the fact that the stigma surrounding being victims of certain crimes may be worse for women and girls, and can continue to haunt them throughout their lives.
23. The Chamber also considers that the public nature of the executions and the fact that they were circulated online adds to the harm experienced by those close to the victims, such as friends and family members, who may come across the footage and be unable to escape the reality of what has happened to their loved ones. The mental toll of seeing crimes perpetrated on relatives of victims was considered by the Chamber in the cases of the Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al. at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. For example, in Fofana and Kondewa, the Trial Chamber stated that ‘a third party could suffer serious mental harm by witnessing acts committed against others, particularly against family or friends … the Accused may be held liable for causing serious mental harm to a third party who witnesses acts committed against others’.Footnote 319 Further, in Kvočka, the Trial Chamber found that ‘the mental suffering caused to an individual who is forced to watch severe mistreatment inflicted on a relative would rise to the level of gravity required under the crime of torture’.Footnote 320
24. Thus, in both the aforementioned cases, the Court decided that the harm caused by viewing a crime committed against others could constitute the level of gravity needed to constitute its own crime. In the present case, the additional element of posting of crimes to social media could have potentially increased the number of family members or friends of the victims who bore witness to the heinous acts committed against them. Therefore, the Chamber considers this elevated risk of vicarious victimisation as well in its assessment of the gravity of the acts charged.
25. In addition, the publication of footage of international crimes can also harm not just the victims and those close to them, but the community and broader population as well. This was noted by the Trial Chamber in the case against Mr Al Mahdi, in which it was found that ‘the impact of the attack on the population was heightened by the fact that it was relayed in the media’.Footnote 321 When making this finding, the Trial Chamber referred to the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP’s) submissions on sentencing, in which the OTP argued that publicity was used ‘as a tool in the attack’, and that this ‘intentionally “high-profile” nature of the attack heightened the suffering of the people of Timbuktu and allowed the armed groups to reach, and thus to victimise, a broader audience’.Footnote 322 The Chamber considers that this argumentation may be applied to the present case, in which social media was used to publicise the executions.
26. Further, it is commonly known that terrorist and armed groups such as Ansar Dine and AQIM utilise social media to spread fear and political messages to a global audience.Footnote 323 The Chamber is thus of the view that in posting execution videos online, members of Ansar Dine intended not only to degrade the victims depicted in the footage, but to harm other internet users who may have stumbled across the content. Notably, in its sentencing judgment for the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda case, Trial Chamber VI considered that crimes ‘irreversibly impacted not only the direct victims but also those who witnessed them’.Footnote 324 The Chamber therefore submits that this should also be factored into the assessment of gravity, as by sharing videos to platforms like YouTube, Ansar Dine expanded its range of victims outside of those executed and in the direct vicinity of the crimes to include virtually any internet user as well.
27. The Chamber notes that the posting of executions online has been acknowledged as a separate crime and charged as an outrage on the dignity of the deceased in domestic trials. For example, in The Netherlands, a man was convicted for the war crime of assault on personal dignity for posting a photo to Facebook of himself posing next to a man who was executed and tied to a cross.Footnote 325 Months later, another man was convicted for the same crime for posting to YouTube footage of him kicking and spitting on dead bodies.Footnote 326 In both instances, the Hague Court ruled that the footage posted to social media constituted the level of humiliating and degrading treatment necessary to be considered a war crime.Footnote 327 Similar cases have occurred in Finland, Germany, and Sweden, in which individuals were sentenced to imprisonment for war crimes for sharing videos of dead bodies and crimes being committed to the internet.Footnote 328 The Chamber leaves open the possibility of applying the same analysis at the ICC, which has jurisdiction over the war crimes listed under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.Footnote 329
28. Further, regarding the consideration of other victims outside those directly affected by the executions, such as online users, the Chamber notes that other crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court take into account victimisation outside of those in the immediate vicinity of the crimes. For instance, in its Policy on Cultural Heritage, the OTP notes that ‘[t]he victims of crimes against or affecting cultural heritage may include persons affected both directly and indirectly … The impact of an attack on cultural heritage may transcend the socio-geographical space it occupies, resulting in a global impact’.Footnote 330
29. Including this element in the gravity consideration renders visible harms perpetrated through digital means important in all cases where violence is published online. This will be particularly significant in cases involving sexual and gender-based violence, where the additional stigma involved in the violence being made public requires recognition as part of what renders the crimes particularly grave.
Conclusion
30. The digital age is changing how international crimes are committed and how accountability for crimes is pursued before criminal courts, both international and domestic. These additional remarks have drawn attention to two issues that will be important going forward and to which attention must be paid by actors in the accountability space, from lawyers to investigators. First, video evidence will continue to grow in importance and its potential should be viewed more broadly than has been the case until now. Second, there is an additional harm that takes place when a recording of a crime is posted to social media, and this harm should be acknowledged and factored into an assessment of the gravity of the crime.
Judge Sarah Zarmsky and Judge Emma Irving
14.1 Reflection: The Situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar
Introduction
This sub-chapter provides a critical reflection on the feminist reimagining of two selected decisions from the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar at the ICC. It begins by providing background to the 2016 ‘clearance operation’ carried out by the government of Myanmar, as well as the procedural history of the situation at the ICC. It goes on to summarise the key facts and outcome of the ICC proceedings, before discussing how the authors of the reimagined decisions have departed from the original in adopting a feminist perspective. The sub-chapter considers what makes each decision ‘feminist’ and reflects upon how gender justice might be effected if we were to act beyond the existing rules of international criminal law.
Background to the Conflict
From 9 October 2016 until 9 February 2017, the government of Myanmar carried out what it labelled ‘clearance operation’ in northern Rakhine State, in response to an attack by insurgents on three border guard posts.Footnote 1 During this period, according to a report by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, government forces carried out a series of atrocities against local populations.Footnote 2 The military, known as the Tatmadaw, used helicopters to fire bullets and drop grenades on villagers as they worked on their farms, shopped in markets, or fished. On the ground, soldiers burned and looted villages, raped and tortured the inhabitants, and summarily executed imams, religious scholars, and community leaders. Tens of thousands of people fled over the border into Bangladesh.Footnote 3
The targets of the 2016 operation were known as the Rohingya, an ethnic and religious minority within the majority Buddhist, predominantly ethnic Bamar population.Footnote 4 The Rohingya follow Islamic faith practices, speak Chittagonian dialect, and are not recognised as one of the ethnic groups entitled to citizenship under Myanmar law.Footnote 5 They have been marginalised, discriminated against, and oppressed by successive governments. In the 1970s and 1990s, pogroms displaced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya. In 2012, following sectarian violence, government forces participated in the burning of Rohingya villages and the murder of hundreds of Rohingya men, women, and children. Many Rohingya people were displaced and herded into ghettos, where they were denied the ability to work or to access adequate food, water, medical care, education, or humanitarian assistance.Footnote 6
Against this backdrop, the brutality and scale of the 2016 attacks led United Nations officials and some of Myanmar’s Southeast Asian neighbours to accuse the Tatmadaw of carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya.Footnote 7 In April 2017, the United Nations Human Rights Council resolved to establish an Independent International Fact Finding Mission (IIFFM) to investigate allegations of arbitrary detention, torture and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary killings, enforced disappearances, forced displacement, and unlawful destruction of property.Footnote 8
In August 2017, as the IIFFM prepared to begin its work, the Tatmadaw carried out a second and more extensive campaign against the Rohingya. In response to another coordinated attack by Rohingya insurgents, the Tatmadaw mobilised forces across a broad geographic area of Rakhine, encompassing hundreds of predominantly Rohingya villages. Soldiers carried out similar procedures in each village. They approached at dawn, while families slept, and opened fire indiscriminately. Some people were killed while fleeing their homes. The elderly, people with disabilities, and young children, who were unable to escape, were forced back into burning houses, or locked in buildings which were then set on fire.Footnote 9 In at least ten village tracts, soldiers perpetrated large-scale gang-rapes, often in public spaces and in front of families and the community.Footnote 10 Following the rapes, many women and girls were killed.Footnote 11 Pregnant women were among those specifically targeted, and rapes were accompanied by language such as: ‘We are going to kill you this way, by raping you.’Footnote 12 Men and boys were also subjected to rape, genital mutilation, and sexualised torture.Footnote 13
In October 2017, the military declared that the clearance operation was complete.Footnote 14 By that time, 10,000 people had been killed, 392 villages had been totally or partially destroyed, and 750,000 Rohingya had fled across the border to Bangladesh,Footnote 15 many of whom remain there at the time of writing in June 2023.
The IIFFM published its final report into the violence in September 2018. It concluded that there was sufficient information to warrant the investigation and prosecution of senior Tatmadaw officials for the international crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In relation to genocide, the IIFFM stated that the Rohingya had been subjected to four of the five prohibited genocidal acts (killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part; imposing measures intending to prevent births).Footnote 16 The IIFFM considered that the critical element of ‘genocidal intent’ was likely to be present, given the manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, their similarity, and their gravity and scope.Footnote 17 The IIFFM considered the possible argument that the Tatmadaw’s intention may not have been to commit genocide – the ultimate destruction of the Rohingya, in whole or in part – but merely to drive the Rohingya out of Rakhine State.Footnote 18 The IIFFM rejected this argument because of the scale and scope of the violence, the intensity and brutality of the attacks, and the mass demolition of Rohingya villages and homes.Footnote 19 The only possible conclusion that could be drawn from the facts, in the view of the IIFFM, was that the Tatmadaw intended to obliterate the Rohingya, at least in part.
In 2019 the IIFFM published a second report, titled ‘Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar and the Gendered Impact of Its Ethnic Conflicts’.Footnote 20 The report described a situation of sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against Rohingya (and other ethnic minority) women and girls, men and boys, and people from the transgender community. The IIFFM amassed ‘a vast amount of information about incidents of mass gang rapes, rapes, sexually humiliating acts, sexual slavery and sexual mutilations’.Footnote 21 The gravity and brutality of the violence was striking. The Mission concluded that the sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls was a factor that indicated the Tatmadaw’s genocidal intent to destroy the Rohingya people, including by means of killing female members of the Rohingya community, causing Rohingya women and girls serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting on the Rohingya women and girls conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the Rohingya in whole or in part, and imposing measures that prevented births within the group. The killing of women and girls was widespread and systematic, women and girls of reproductive age were targeted for rape, pregnant women and babies were attacked, the reproductive organs of girls and women were mutilated and injured, there was physical branding of bodies by bite marks on their cheeks, neck, breasts, and thighs, and victims were so severely injured that they may be unable to have sexual intercourse with their husbands or to conceive or carry children.Footnote 22
Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute and therefore not directly subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The IIFFM recommended that the Security Council refer Myanmar to the ICC or that the Security Council create an ad hoc international tribunal to investigate and prosecute international crimes carried out in Myanmar. Practically and politically, however, Security Council action was unlikely. Two of the Council’s permanent members, China and Russia, routinely blocked action against Myanmar.Footnote 23 The following section explains how the jurisdictional issue was addressed and the Prosecutor was granted authorisation to proceed with an investigation.
Situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court confers jurisdiction in cases where the conduct that gives rise to the crime occurs on the territory of a state on the territory of a state party, inter alia.Footnote 24 In April 2018, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) requested a ruling on whether the ICC could exercise jurisdiction over the displacement of the Rohingya across the border separating Myanmar and Bangladesh.Footnote 25 The Prosecutor argued that the crime against humanity of deportation may have occurred.Footnote 26 The crime of deportation, argued the Prosecutor, involves conduct that takes place on the territory of two states: the state from which the victim population is displaced and the state into which the victim population is moved. In the case of the Rohingya, this may mean that part of the crime of deportation took place on the territory of Bangladesh. Bangladesh signed the Rome Statute in 2010. Thus, argued the Prosecutor, the Court has jurisdiction to investigate the crime against humanity of deportation in relation to the Tatmadaw’s treatment of the Rohingya.
On 6 September 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I delivered its opinion. The Chamber agreed with the Prosecutor that the crime of deportation involves the victims’ displacement across an international border.Footnote 27 For this reason, the ‘conduct’ of the crime necessarily takes place in two different states. In cases where coercive acts that instigate deportation are initiated in a state that is not party to the Statute and are completed in a state that is a party to the Statute, then the Court has jurisdiction. It was the drafters’ intention, the Chamber held, to allow for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction where one element of the crime is committed on the territory of a state party.Footnote 28 Therefore, in relation to the alleged deportation of Rohingya civilians across the Myanmar–Bangladesh border, the Court had jurisdiction to investigate.
The Chamber emphasised that the Rome Statute definition of deportation specifies that displacement takes place by means of ‘expulsion or other coercive acts’.Footnote 29 Deportation is therefore an ‘open-conduct crime’, meaning that ‘several different conducts can amount to expulsion or other coercive acts’.Footnote 30 The relevant conduct can include deprivation of fundamental rights, killing, sexual violence, torture, enforced disappearance, destruction, and looting. The Chamber held that examination of evidence relating to all these acts, which may have occurred solely on the territory of Myanmar, was within the Court’s jurisdiction.
The Chamber also emphasised that the cross-border rationale which provided jurisdiction for the crime of deportation might apply to other international crimes as well. The Chamber provided two examples. One was the crime against humanity of persecution.Footnote 31 The Rome Statute defines ‘persecution’ as ‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law’. The Chamber noted that under international human rights law, no one may be arbitrarily deprived of the fundamental right to enter their own country. The Rohingya, forced to endure appalling conditions in the refugee camps of Bangladesh while the authorities of Myanmar impeded their return home, may have been deprived of their fundamental right to enter their own country, contrary to international law. Part of this conduct, which could amount to the crime against humanity of persecution, may also have taken place on the territory of Bangladesh. The other example provided by the Chamber was the catch-all crime against humanity provision of ‘[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’.Footnote 32 Such acts, the Chamber noted, were also potentially inflicted on the Rohingya when they were uprooted from their homes and forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Bangladesh. The overall conclusion was that in circumstances where victims are made to flee to the territory of a state party, or victims languish on the territory of a state party and are prevented from returning to their homes, then the jurisdiction of the Court may be invoked.
The Pre-Trial Chamber decision on jurisdiction caused significant controversy. Some critics feared that in providing a ‘backdoor to the Hague’Footnote 33 the Chamber had overreached, and that the Court’s legitimacy, already precarious, may be undermined.Footnote 34 Others were concerned with the practical question of how the ICC would prosecute cases for crimes committed by Myanmar officials on Myanmar territory without the support of the Myanmar government. The Court’s track record in states not party to the Statute, for example, in Sudan in relation to the arrest warrants issued against former President Omar al-Bashir and in Libya in relation to the arrest warrant against Saif al-Islam Gaddafi – provided little ground for optimism.Footnote 35 There were also concerns about the legal foundations of the decision, because the Chamber seemed to blur the line between ‘conduct’ and ‘consequence’ in relation to a particular action.Footnote 36 Other commentators noted that the Chamber’s decision did not address (although nor did it rule out) the possibility of jurisdiction extending to the crime of genocide.Footnote 37 It seemed arguable that certain forms of genocide, such as genocide ‘by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction’,Footnote 38 could – similar to the crime of deportation – be thought of as involving several elements, some of which might occur on the territory of a country that was not a party to the Rome Statute, while other elements occurred on the territory of a state that was. In the Rohingya case, the difficulty would be in establishing that the dolus specialis of genocide – an intention to destroy – was not incompatible with the mens rea of deportation – an intention to displace.Footnote 39
The Prosecutor faced unpalatable choices. Investigating crimes other than genocide, even serious crimes against humanity such as deportation, might be viewed as only partial or inferior justice for the victims. Those who defended the Chamber’s decision answered that surely partial justice was better than no justice at all.Footnote 40 But an outcome of ‘no justice at all’ was also a possibility, and even a likelihood, given that Myanmar was not a party to the Rome Statute, was not cooperating in the case, and the Prosecutor was unlikely to be able to execute any arrest warrants.
In July 2019, following the decision on jurisdiction, the Prosecutor requested authorisation to investigate crimes in which at least one element took place on the territory of Bangladesh, and which occurred within the context of the 2016 and 2017 waves of violence in Rakhine State. The Prosecutor submitted that there was reasonable basis to believe that since 9 October 2016, members of the Tatmadaw, with the border guard police and the Myanmar police force, committed the crime against humanity of deportation; other inhumane acts; and persecution on the grounds of ethnicity and/or religion. Other crimes, submitted the Prosecutor, might also come to light once an investigation commenced. Pre-Trial Chamber III authorised that investigation on 14 November 2019, and parts of that decision have been re-written from a ‘feminist’ perspective in this volume [Editors’ note: in 2024, the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for Myanmar's acting President, General Min Aung Hlaing, in connection to alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution against Rohingya people committed in part in Myanmar, and in part in Bangladesh].
Feminist Reimagining of Select Judgments and Decisions
Judges Emma Palmer and Phyu Phyu Oo
The rewritten judgment by Judges Palmer and Oo examines the ‘coercive acts’ which forced the Rohingya to leave Bangladesh. The judges employ devices that allow the reader to appreciate the historical and contextual background to the violence perpetrated on the Rohingya, and the impact of intersecting grounds of persecution. The opening of the judgment, for example, is striking. The authors use direct quotations from Rohingya refugees to signal to the reader that it is the concrete person before the Chamber, rather than the abstract legal person. Palmer and Oo also describe in detail the long-term oppression and dispossession suffered by the Rohingya, and the climate of impunity in which the specific violence of 2016 and 2017 took place. For many decades, the Rohingya were denied citizenship, limits were set on the number of children they could have, and they were prohibited from marrying, working, and receiving education or medical care.Footnote 41 When the immediate violence commenced, the Rohingya knew from the experience of generations of persecution that if they wished to save their lives, then they must flee. Those who fled, Judges Palmer and Oo note, were not an abstract mass, but hundreds of thousands of individuals.Footnote 42 Palmer and Oo also draw attention to the wretched conditions that awaited those who fled to the refugee camps of Bangladesh, and they also note the absences – those who did not arrive in the refugee camps of Bangladesh but who lost their lives in Rakhine or along the way. They ask future Trial Chambers or other Chambers to inquire specifically into what happened to people of different genders, including Hijra people (see below), to children, and to disabled persons, who suffered violence and coercion in Rakhine, and whose experiences of terror and pain will be distinct.
In their reasoning, the approach adopted by Judges Palmer and Oo pursues a feminist method in that it assists a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the complex history of Rohingya suffering. The authors make clear that the setting in which interactions take place must be considered in depth and detail, including the background of ‘racial, patriarchal, repressive, environmental, discriminatory, economic, or other structures upon individuals and communities’.Footnote 43 The authors set out the wretched history of the Rohingya in Rakhine State and the long-term misery of their existence in a country where they were not recognised as citizens. The authors might have added that Myanmar society – which existed under British colonial rule for more than 100 years and then under military rule for almost half a century – was profoundly militaristic and heteronormative in nature. In its Report on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, the IIFFM notes the larger problem of extreme gender inequality in Myanmar and that Myanmar ranks 148 of 189 countries in the United Nations’ Gender Inequality Index.
Rakhine was under a state of emergency from 2013 to 2016. There are long-term societal effects to existence under conditions of colonial and military oppression, and to subjection to continual arbitrary exercises of power and denigration. For more than a century, ‘race’, ‘sex’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘religious association’ were viewed as calcified categories by those who held power in Rakhine State. By 2016, the potential for choice or self-determination over any aspect of the lives of Rohingya women was close to non-existent. How they married, raised families, gathered food and fuel, provided shelter, and survived was severely circumscribed.
One important contribution of Palmer and Oo’s judgment is that it clarifies, where the original decision does not, that the jurisdictional question addressed in relation to the crime against humanity of deportation may also apply to the crime of genocide. This, again, is a ‘feminist’ contribution in the sense that the conclusion gives voice to what victims themselves experienced as happening. Rohingya people believe that the military was trying to wipe them out.Footnote 44 In Palmer and Oo’s discussion of the crime of genocide, they appropriately leave it for a later court to clarify whether the ‘special intent’ to destroy, necessary for the crime of genocide, has a sufficient nexus with the acts and consequences that took place.
An alternative feminist judgment might have delved more deeply into issues around the nature of harm. Linear and dichotomising conceptions of time (acts/consequences) used in the reimagined judgment preclude more multi-layered, complex, interactive, and cyclical notions of time that encompass longer-term and intergenerational pain. Judges Palmer and Oo might at least have called for the need for further evidence of harm at later stages of the case. In their discussion about the consequences of violence and deportation, they do note some longer-term, complex consequences of sexual violence.Footnote 45 But at times the language used is clinical and objective: for example, ‘negative coping strategies’ is used as a term to describe consequences of sexual violence such as forced labour and forced prostitution.Footnote 46 Judges Palmer and Oo might have drawn attention, as did the IIFFM, to self-harm and suicide as a result of sexual violence.Footnote 47 The isolation and disconnection bound up in the crime of deportation, and the psychological trauma that accompanies the rupture to routine daily life, also warrants attention. There is an established body of literature on social and geographical embeddedness,Footnote 48 on the psychological and social effects of displacement,Footnote 49 and on the ways in which the effects of deracination are not gender-neutral.Footnote 50 Deportation punctuates the concrete practices of daily existence (in Rohingya villages, these include collecting firewood, attending the mosque, fetching water, shopping at the market, readying children for school) in ways that disproportionately impact women. The need for emotional and caring labour, also provided by women, is acute. Dislocation manifests in a myriad of quotidian traumas, which feminist jurisprudence must speak to.
Judge Claerwen O’Hara
The central problem Judge O’Hara wrestles with in their decision is whether it is possible, given the Rome Statute’s definition of ‘gender’, for the crime of persecution to apply to Hijra persons. Hijra people are third-gender persons from the region of South Asia. Some Hijra people follow Hindu faith practices, and may choose to undergo a castration ceremony as part of Hindu ritual; others follow the Muslim faith. The common characteristic most Hijra people share is communal life with other Hijra people, removed from wider society. Following the attacks on the Rohingya in Myanmar, some Rohingya Hijra reported to the IIFFM that they believed they had been targeted for sexual violence due to a combination of their non-conformity with gender norms and their Rohingya ethnicity.Footnote 51
Persecution on the basis of gender is a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. The difficulty with applying this provision to the persecution of Hijra people is that the Rome Statute defines gender restrictively. Article 7(3) of the Statute states: ‘For the purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.’ On one reading of the text, the definition of gender in the Rome Statute includes only the two sexes – male and female – as recognised targets for persecution.
Judge O’Hara overcomes the restrictions of the Article 7(3) definition using a process of reasoning that emphasises the significance of the phrase ‘in the context of society’. O’Hara reasons that the inclusion of this phrase means that ‘male and female’ cannot be understood solely to refer to the narrow biological categories denoted.Footnote 52 ‘Male and female’ must, O’Hara argues, encompass the social context, dynamics, and interactions that give those dyadic categories meaning. O’Hara draws support for this interpretation from debates about the definition of gender at the time of the Statute’s drafting. States rejected a non-social definition of gender, insisting on the inclusion of the phrase ‘in the context of society’ as part of the definition.Footnote 53 Judge O’Hara also notes developments in the jurisprudence of UN human rights treaty bodies and human rights instruments that support a broad contextual and social interpretation of gender, such as the definition of gender in the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.Footnote 54 O’Hara notes that the Rome Statute must be interpreted in a manner consistent with international human rights law.Footnote 55
Applying the broader understanding of gender to Hijra people in Rakhine State, Judge O’Hara finds (i) that some Hijra people may have been targeted on the basis of their non-conformity with norms and expectations that have formed around sex-based categories of male and female, which may constitute gender-based persecution for the purposes of Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute; (ii) that some Hijra people who are intersex may have been subjected to persecution because they do not conform with expected bodily appearances of males and females;Footnote 56 and (iii) that other Hijra people may have been targeted for rape and sexual violence because they do not conform with expected bodily appearances of males and females.Footnote 57 O’Hara concludes that ‘to the extent that the Hijra people who were allegedly targeted for rape and sexual violence were also Rohingya, the persecution may have been based on the intersecting grounds of gender, ethnicity, and religion’.Footnote 58
Judge O’Hara succeeds in reinterpreting the definition of gender in a way that encompasses gender as a social construction – which in Western law and society generally is the more common way in which ‘gender’ is now understood. The Office of the Prosecutor confirmed this interpretation in its 2022 policy paper on the crime of gender persecution:
As for all forms of persecution, persons may be targeted for gender persecution because of sex characteristics and/or because of the social constructs and criteria used to define gender roles, behaviours, activities and attributes. For example, persons may be targeted for gender persecution when they are perceived to have or carry (gender) criteria prohibited by the perpetrator; or are perceived to not have or carry (gender) criteria required by the perpetrator.Footnote 59
On Judge O’Hara’s argument, not only is persecution on the grounds of male or female sex criminalised, but also discrimination that takes place because perpetrators have gendered ideas about males and females, including towards intersex, non-binary, inter-gender, and transgender people, and Hijra persons. Judge O’Hara thus brings the discrimination and harm suffered by Hijra people in Myanmar within the scope of the Rome Statute. Following O’Hara’s redefinition of gender, the relevant issue is whether one of the reasons the Tatmadaw inflicted pain and suffering on Hijra people is because the victims were not a ‘man or woman’ as traditionally, biologically understood. O’Hara’s judgment has the salutary effect of advancing the jurisprudence on recognition of impermissible persecution. O’Hara follows a line of scholarship that lays the foundation for this interpretation, which includes the work of Grey,Footnote 60 Suhr,Footnote 61 Leddy,Footnote 62 and Oosterveld.Footnote 63
One question Judge O’Hara might have asked a future Trial Chamber to consider is whether all or most Hijra people believed they were persecuted because they are something other than male or female. It might be, for example, that some Hijra people feel that atrocities were committed against them for a different reason – not because of what they are not, but perhaps because of what they are – which is an altogether different thing to just an ‘absence’ of male or female biological attributes.Footnote 64 The distinction in this regard is not trivial. One of the points of a feminist interpretation is to reflect, speak to, and recognise harm as it is experienced by the victim. Reliance on the negative (‘Hijra people were persecuted on the basis that they did not conform to the male/female binary’) runs the danger of drawing us into to the very tendency that a feminist approach might wish to avoid: the constitution of the subject through negation of the gender categories male and female. In O’Hara’s decision, Hijra and others are constructed to mirror the male/female binary. This approach replicates traditional (colonialist) gender hierarchies and accepts difference as relational, rather than upholding the fluid potential that inheres in the intersubjective constitution of gender.
Judge O’Hara’s negation of the binary as a basis for advancing an interpretation of how Article 7(3) might apply to Hijra persons matters because the language of the Rome Statute has a constructive aspect. Our concern with O’Hara’s judgment is that in using an interpretive technique that bends the law into a more favourable shape to do justice in the immediate case,Footnote 65 a seemingly progressive decision may disqualify, repress, and absorb counter-discourses that may have more affinity with the truth as it is experienced by those who are persecuted. In Judge O’Hara’s decision, value is attributed to the socially constructed roles of man and woman at the expense of the unmentioned ‘Other’. A more expansive feminist method, in contrast, would attempt to favour that which most severely disrupts identity-bound thought. The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity affirm that ‘each person’s self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom’.Footnote 66
The OTP’s Policy on Gender Persecution confirms that ‘all persons can be subjected to gender persecution because all persons have gender identities just as all persons have racial and ethnic identities’.Footnote 67 Women, girls, men, boys, and LGBTQI+ persons may be discriminated against on the basis of their roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes. O’Hara’s judgment makes a salutary contribution to jurisprudence by demonstrating what is possible within the law as it stands – but from our perspective, this should not be the end of the story. Reform of the Statute is required, to recognise ‘gender’ without any constraining definition. The preservation of the word ‘gender’ within the text of the Rome Statute, without any caveats as suggested by the feminist lawyers involved in its drafting, would signal acceptance of the mutability, fluidity, and ambiguity of ‘gender’. Such reform would do more to honour the particularised harm experienced by victims than adopting the perpetrator’s view that harm was inflicted because the victim was not what they ought to be. ‘Gender’ standing alone would affirm the discursive openness of the term, including its gaps and the possibility of multiple meanings and ways of being.
Conclusion
Hospodaryk observes that the pre-trial ICC proceedings in the Rohingya case represent an incomplete attempt to elevate the voices of victims (the point made by Judges Palmer and Oo), and that the proceedings fail to capture the full range of sexual crimes, particularly against gender-diverse people (the point made by Judge O’Hara).Footnote 68 Hospodaryk suggests that one reason why the Court fails to present a more inclusive picture of what happened to Rohingya people is because of structural limitations to the capabilities of the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) of the OTP. In this reflection we have suggested that feminist reimaginings such as those provided by Judges Palmer and Oo and by Judge O’Hara function as a reminder of law’s potential to expand the possibilities for justice, even within the confines of the existing statutory framework and limited evidentiary resources.
14.2 Deportation as a Gendered Crime in the Bangladesh/Myanmar Investigation
In 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber III authorised the Prosecutor to commence an investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar in accordance with Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute.Footnote 69 The Chamber held that the Prosecutor could reasonably believe that coercive acts towards the Rohingya forced them to leave Bangladesh, which may amount to the crimes against humanity of deportationFootnote 70 and persecution on the ground of religion and/or ethnicity.Footnote 71 In establishing jurisdiction, the Chamber was satisfied that the alleged crimes had been committed at least partially on the territory of Bangladesh, which ratified the Statute on 23 March 2010.Footnote 72 The Chamber held that the scope of the investigation extended to acts committed on at least part of the territory of other states which would accept the jurisdiction of the Court, insofar as they were sufficiently linked to the situation.Footnote 73 Furthermore, the Chamber expanded the scope of the investigation beyond the crimes alleged by the Prosecutor in the request to any crimes sufficiently linked to the situation, stressing that limiting the incidents to be investigated at the preliminary stage would be contrary to the obligation under Article 54(1)(a) to ‘cover all facts and evidence … [i]n order to establish the truth’.Footnote 74
In this reimagined decision, Emma Palmer and Phyu Phyu Oo explore the underlying crime of deportation from a gendered perspective by expanding the definition of ‘coercive acts’ in a way that considers the lived experience of women and girls. Palmer and Oo employ a historical perspective that investigates the structural nature of violence and lasting legacies of colonialism in Myanmar. Their decision considers whether there is scope to elevate the findings on deportation to constitute the crime of genocide. In doing so, they ultimately reach the same conclusion as the Court in authorising the investigation.
Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar No.: ICC-01/19
Date: 14 November 2019
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER III(B)
Before: Judge Emma PALMER
Judge Phyu Phyu OO
SITUATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH/REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR
Judgment
Deportation
1. The Chamber recalls again that one victims’ representation noted: ‘We lost our family members. We survive with [gunshot] wounds. We lost our property, our houses, our lands and cattle and everything. Kicked out from our motherland and made us refugee. Destroyed our everything.’ Another representation, submitted on behalf of women, also states that the ‘atrocities of August 2017 were the turning point of the Rohingya crisis, after this date none of the women represented could return to their motherland Myanmar’. A representation submitted on behalf of alleged victims living in the same refugee camp in Bangladesh similarly states that victims ‘decided to escape and save our lives from the extra-judicial killings […] the people had just one way to save their lives. [It] was to come to Bangladesh’.Footnote 75
Applicable Law
2. The Chamber now turns to the question of whether, based on the facts, a reasonable prosecutor could believe that coercive acts towards the Rohingya forced them to flee to Bangladesh, which may amount to the crime against humanity of deportation.
3. The Chamber notes that, under international law, deportation of a state’s nationals as well as the arbitrary or collective expulsion of aliens is generally prohibited.Footnote 76 There is a long history of instruments that have aimed to prevent or ensure accountability for forcible displacement.Footnote 77
4. Article 21 of the Rome Statute sets out a hierarchical list of sources of interpretation: firstly, the Statute, its Elements of Crimes, and its Rules; secondly, applicable treaties and principles of international law; and thirdly, principles of law derived from national and other international criminal courts and tribunals.
5. Article 21(3) provides that the ‘application and interpretation of law … must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights’. In that context, we note that crimes that may appear apparently ‘gender neutral’ can have differently gendered effects,Footnote 78 intersecting with other cultural, social, and economic issues.
6. Article 7 of the Rome Statute addresses crimes against humanity: ‘any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: … (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population’.
7. ‘Deportation or forcible transfer of population’ is defined as ‘forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law’.Footnote 79
8. The terms ‘expulsion’, ‘coercive acts’, ‘lawfully present’, ‘grounds permitted under international law’, and ‘territory’ have been elucidated in the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),Footnote 80 the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) (forced transfers were charged as a crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’),Footnote 81 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).Footnote 82
Deportations or Forcible Transfers
9. While the Rome Statute defines deportation or forcible transfer as forced displacement, after some contradiction and, arguably, confusion,Footnote 83 ICTY jurisprudence indicates that forcible transfers do not necessarily have a trans/cross-boundary nature,Footnote 84 although deportations might encompass forcible transfers.
10. The Prosecutor chose to argue that the crime of deportation requires or ‘inherently’Footnote 85 involves the crossing of a boundary,Footnote 86 given the need to establish this Court’s jurisdiction, based in this situation upon territoriality.
11. However, we see no need to minimise potential intersections between deportation and forcible transfers, including, for example, for womenFootnote 87 and others who may flee to a range of places as part of their deportation/displacement.
‘Expulsion or Other Coercive Acts’
12. Forced displacement must be perpetrated ‘by expulsion or other coercive acts’.Footnote 88 The Elements of Crimes do not define these terms, but international courts and tribunals have considered the meaning of ‘forced’ alongside the concepts of coercion and expulsion.Footnote 89
13. The Elements of Crimes at Article 7(2)(d) notes that the term ‘forcibly’ is ‘not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment’.
14. This definition is supported by other international criminal tribunals’ jurisprudenceFootnote 90 and is the same wording adopted in the Elements of Crimes for the commission of the crime against humanity of rape, for example.Footnote 91
15. The ICTR Trial Chamber observed, in the context of sexual violence, that ‘[c]oercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force’ but can ‘be inherent in circumstances like armed conflict or military presence of threatening forces on an ethnic basis’.Footnote 92 International crimes can (and should) be understood within their dynamic contexts, including or especially when analysing the coercive environments underlying allegations.
16. Coercive acts can include shelling, burning property, and other acts designed to terrify the population into leaving,Footnote 93 such as sexual and gender-based violence.
17. However, those specific acts are not necessarily required, as confirmed in the Ruto case at the ICC.Footnote 94 The attacks should also not ‘be viewed in isolation, but must be seen in the context of the pattern of excessive use of force’, which may also provide evidence of criminal responsibility, intention (to change the ethnic composition of an area, for example),Footnote 95 and other elements of the crime (such as the ‘chapeau’ elements of crime against humanity).
‘By’/Causation
18. To show that displacement was really ‘forced’ and not voluntary, and occurred by expulsion or other coercive acts or ‘as a result of the force’, some courts have required a ‘link’ between the ‘threat of force or coercion’ and the displacement.Footnote 96
19. To do so, in the Simic case ICTY Trial Chamber II suggested that it ‘should look beyond formalities to all the circumstances surrounding the person’s displacement’ to determine whether the person was ‘faced with a real choice’.Footnote 97 The Chamber analysed the ‘intention’ of the person, despite noting that this is difficult given the potential ‘lack of genuine choice’ in ‘circumstances of discrimination or persecution’. The Chamber proposed that: ‘whether a person would have wished to leave the area absent circumstances of discrimination or persecution may also be considered as indicative of a person’s wish.’Footnote 98
20. However, determining what anyone’s intention might have been ‘absent’ the circumstances is incredibly difficult within situations of long-term structural and intersecting discrimination, violence, and other human rights violations. The need for any examination of the ‘leaving’ person’s subjective intent is undermined by the reality also recognised at the ICTY that, ‘[w]hile those displaced may consent to, or even request to be removed, that consent must be given voluntarily and as a result of the individual’s free will, assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances’.Footnote 99 We consider that the ‘trier of fact must consequently consider the prevailing situation and atmosphere, as well as all relevant circumstances, including in particular the victims’ vulnerability, when assessing whether the displaced victims had a genuine choice to remain or leave and thus whether the resultant displacement was unlawful’.Footnote 100
21. It is hard to see what assistance would be gained from requiring evidence of the actual, subjective intention of the person(s) fleeing – or what that intention might have been in different circumstances. This is particularly important for marginalised (rather than necessarily ‘vulnerable’) communities, including women, who may have had multiple changing reasons to consider, or even dream of, leaving a particular social setting, even before the immediate circumstances that led to their displacement. These reasons may result from the impacts of (for instance) racial, patriarchal, repressive, environmental, discriminatory, economic, or other structures upon individuals and communities.
‘Lawfully Present’
22. The wording about individuals transferred being from ‘the area in which they were lawfully present’ should be given its ‘common meaning and should not be equated to the legal concept of lawful residence’.Footnote 101
23. As the ICTY Trial Chamber opined in 2010:
The clear intention of the prohibition against forcible transfer and deportation is to prevent civilians from being uprooted from their homes and to guard against the wholesale destruction of communities. In that respect, whether an individual has lived in a location for a sufficient period of time to meet the requirements for residency or whether he or she has been accorded such status under immigration laws is irrelevant. Rather, what is important is that the protection is provided to those who have, for whatever reason, come to ‘live’ in the community – whether long term or temporarily.Footnote 102
24. This broad understanding of ‘lawful presence’ is consistent with the Elements of Crimes mens rea requirement that the ‘perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of such presence’. This wording indicates that it is only awareness of the ‘factual circumstances’ of individuals or communities living or having their home in a particular place that must be established – even ‘temporary homes after being uprooted from their original community’.Footnote 103
25. We agree with Pre-Trial Chamber I’s observation that the ‘legal interest commonly protected by the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer is the right of individuals to live in their area of residence. However, the legal interest protected by the crime of deportation further extends to the right of individuals to live in the State in which they are lawfully present’.Footnote 104 While (as noted) there is overlap between the crimes of deportation and forcible transfers, deportation outside of one’s state may have particular impacts (for different people, including, for example, for displaced children and children born of rape) denied the right to live in their home state. Those deported across borders may lack documentation, become stateless, be at risk of further displacement (including trafficking and other intersecting harms), and be adversely affected by their engagement with various ‘regimes of care’, including access to health and education, all affected by the fragility of their residence within other states.
‘Without Grounds Permitted’
26. There are situations where evacuations might be permitted, but this should be ‘an exceptional measure’.Footnote 105 Examples of grounds that might permit forced displacements under international humanitarian law include where the transfer is of prisoners of war out of combat zones and into internment facilities the text inside the round brackets should be Article 19 of Geneva Convention III or where conducted for the security of those involved ‘or for imperative military reasons’ the text inside the round brackets should be Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV and Article 17(1) of Additional Protocol IIthe text inside the round brackets should be Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV and Article 17(1) of Additional Protocol IIthe text inside the round brackets should be Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV and Article 17(1) of Additional Protocol IIthe text inside the round brackets should be Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV and Article 17(1) of Additional Protocol II Footnote 106 – including intensive bombing.Footnote 107
27. If evacuations do take place, those affected must be properly provided for in terms of accommodation, hygiene, health, safety, and nutrition.Footnote 108 This would include responding to the particular needs of women and other genders, including, for the avoidance of doubt, Hijra and trans/intersex persons, children, and for intersecting cultural needs.
28. It follows from these exceptions that the evacuation should last only while the circumstances warranting evacuation persist, after which the transferred population should (be able to) return home.Footnote 109 The Chamber considers that it would therefore be relevant to consider the medium- and longer-term ongoing effects of any displacement when assessing this element.
29. However, the ICTY consistently held that it ‘is not necessary for the Accused to intend to displace the victims on a permanent basis’.Footnote 110
30. For the purposes of this section, we note that although it is for the Prosecutor to establish that the exceptions were not met,Footnote 111 it is sufficient to observe that the ordinary meaning of the wording concerning ‘exceptional measure[s]’ and ‘imperative’ reasons suggests that these exceptions are limited.
31. Further, these exceptions do not apply where the humanitarian crisis that caused the displacement resulted from the perpetrators’ unlawful activity.Footnote 112
Deportations and Other Crimes
32. The Chamber notes that there is scope to consider forcible displacements as part of other international crimes beyond crimes against humanity (including persecution and other inhumane acts as discussed elsewhere in this Decision). These include war crimes most explicitly in the Rome Statute (see Articles 8(2)(a)(vii), (b)(viii)), but also, in particular circumstances, genocide.
33. During the drafting of the Genocide Convention in 1948, Syria presented a proposal to include ‘imposing measures intended to oblige members of a group to abandon their homes’ as a form of genocide.Footnote 113 This was not taken up, resisted by the Allies apparently ‘out of fear that it might imply the ethnic cleansing perpetrated against German minorities in Europe following the war’,Footnote 114 which had involved sexual violence,Footnote 115 could be captured by that crime.
34. Nevertheless, deportation could be charged under Article II(a), (b), or (e) of the Genocide Convention if other requirements, including the presence of genocidal intent, are met,Footnote 116 as recognised by later ICTY and ICTR cases finding that practices of forced displacement might cause ‘serious bodily or mental harm’,Footnote 117 or ‘conditions of life … calculated to bring about’ a group’s destruction.Footnote 118
35. The Chamber considers that the underlying practice of forcible displacements could therefore in principle – subject of course to other admissibility, jurisdiction, and chapeau requirements, and the requirement for the special intent to destroy the group in whole or in part – in some circumstances also fall within at least Article 6(b) of the Rome Statute as causing ‘serious bodily or mental harm’, (c) deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the relevant group’s physical destruction in whole or in part, or (e) forcibly transferring children. At least it remains open to this Court to determine that the intent behind these crimes is not mutually exclusive, since (for instance, as noted) both displacement and genocide could potentially involve an intent to impose intolerable conditions that destroy a group, and it seems plausible that attempts to perpetrate genocide could be associated with displacements, given our discussion about ‘coercive acts’. The Chamber recalls the victims’ representation that victims ‘decided to escape and save our lives from the extra-judicial killings […] the people had just one way to save their lives. [It] was to come to Bangladesh’.Footnote 119
36. In addition, where displacement appears gendered, in the sense that more women and children are recorded as being deported, there may be a suggestion that men were possibly targeted for other crimes, including killings. Especially when considered alongside intersectional cultural considerations (including in patriarchal or patrilineal societies), in such circumstances displacements would also seem consistent with an attempt to destroy a group in whole or in part.Footnote 120
37. Therefore, this Chamber considers that there is no in principle legal barrier to investigations of certain practices associated with deportation being considered as part of an investigation of other crimes, such as genocide (persecution is addressed elsewhere in this Decision).
Alleged Facts
Deportation
38. The Chamber now turns to the specific situation involving Myanmar and Bangladesh. The Chamber has noted the breadth of relevant conduct and importance of appreciating dynamic contexts and ‘vulnerability’ when assessing both ‘expulsion’ or ‘coercive acts’ in relation to deportation, and whether ‘victims had a genuine choice’. It follows that the so-called waves of ‘clearance operations’ in 2016 and 2017 cannot be disaggregated as separate events and assessed in semi-isolation, but rather form part of a pattern of violence and a ‘coercive environment’ that in this case has a long and difficult history.Footnote 121
39. The emergence of Rohingya movements within and since the post-colonial independence era in Myanmar demands recognising the ‘Rohingya’ as an ethic national identity, and the cultural formation of Muslims as an important part of the fabric of the country.Footnote 122 Instead, Rohingya people have endured, and continue to endure, multiple forms of oppression from the military regime in Myanmar and discrimination from many Buddhist communities in Rakhine State, who have promoted Buddhist nationalism in Rakhine since the early 1950s. The adoption of the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act and subsequent implementation of ‘Operation Nagamin’ in 1977 involved an effort to filter out those labelled or perceived as foreigners prior to a national census and reportedly forced over 200,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.Footnote 123 These events were reportedly accompanied by human rights violations perpetrated against Rohingya by the Burmese army.Footnote 124 In addition, the 1982 Citizenship Law and accompanying registration process clearly denied the citizenship rights of Rohingya. Individuals already holding citizenship cards (pink or green) as assigned by the former regime were no longer eligible to receive those cards, but instead were issued ‘white cards’.Footnote 125 White cards as defined under the 1951 Union Residents Registration Rules are understood as an interim form of documentation, and a substitute for permanent identification documents, and nearly a million Rohingya people in Myanmar held white cards.Footnote 126
40. Following the transition towards democracy and civilian government in 2011, the government created different pathways for Rohingya to claim their identity without success. For instance, in 2011, the government cancelled the white cards and offered a pathway to register and verify their national identity for those who had lost ‘white cards’, although it was soon suspended due to public opposition.Footnote 127
41. Beyond these successive processes that have complicated Rohingya’s entitlement to secure formal citizenship, the government has also imposed several measures restricting Rohingya people’s activities, including restricting their movement between villages and townships. Such measures applied to men and women, but affected all aspects of the lives of women and girls, and non-binary persons, differently,Footnote 128 including by limiting their access to medical care, food, adequate housing, and involving forced labour and restrictions on marriages and pregnancies.Footnote 129 For instance, women seeking emergency obstetric care have been required to secure approval and pay fees to the local authority before they can access the appropriate medical care, increasing the risk of maternal death. In addition, Rohingya women do not have equal access to registering births.
42. The Chamber observes that systematic state-based discrimination intersects with other experiences to exacerbate coercive circumstances. For instance, gendered social norms and stereotypes within the Rohingya communities compounded the effects of discriminatory laws and institutions. In Rohingya society, we understand that women and girls and non-binary persons are often expected to remain in the domestic realm and take up traditional gender roles, such as housework and childcare.Footnote 130 Women mainly interact with women in their own household, family members, and their closest neighbours and rely on the women in their households for religious knowledge and information about women’s health and reproductive issues,Footnote 131 access to which was then further restricted by state-based discrimination. Women generally do not work outside the home, and thus marriage is the only form of financial security for them. Consequently, early and forced marriage is a common practice among the Rohingya population, not only as an element of culture but also as an adaptation for economic security.Footnote 132 The Chamber observes that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that over 40 per cent of Rohingya girls who have fled Myanmar since 2012 were married before the age of eighteen,Footnote 133 without legal protection.Footnote 134
43. The Myanmar government appears aware of the impact of its discriminatory policies within this cultural context and indeed particular decisions seem designed to exacerbate these effects. In the late 1990s, a local order was issued in North Arakan requiring Rohingya communities to seek permission from the local authority before couples can get married (unlike other groups in Myanmar) and to sign a document agreeing to limit the number of children, violating the reproductive rights of women.Footnote 135 Marriage authorisations are granted on the payment of fees and bribes and the process can be prolonged.Footnote 136 Those requirements of seeking approval for marriage and the lengthy process increase the risk of exposing women and girls to multiple harms. For instance, women who become pregnant without official marriage authorisation often undergo unsafe abortions, an illegal practice in Myanmar, contributing to the number of maternal deaths. Some women register their newborn child with another legally married couple, or with their own parents, while many children born are reportedly unregistered. In some cases, young couples, unable to obtain permission to marry, flee to Bangladesh to live together.Footnote 137
44. Furthermore, the adoption of Race and Religion Protection Laws in 2015 presented a clear threat to Rohingya women, compounded with these other violations. The Religious Law discriminates against women by restricting their ability to marry men of other religions. The Population Control Law also restricts the reproductive rights of women. For example, and in the context of publicised fears about Rohingya population growth,Footnote 138 the Population Law provides the regional governments an authority ‘to request a presidential order limiting reproductive rates if it is determined that population growth, accelerating birth rates, or rising infant or maternal mortality rates are negatively impacting regional development’, or that there exists an ‘imbalance between population and resources, low socio-economic indicators and regional food insufficiency because of internal migration’.Footnote 139
45. The combined effect of these discriminatory policies was to restrict Rohingya’s population growth and ability to move and engage in social life, generating a pattern of excessively discriminatory policies openly aimed at changing the ethnic composition of the area.
46. In addition to these state-directed oppressive policies over many decades, communal tensions between largely Buddhist communities and the Rohingya persisted and were encouraged in the Rakhine State region. The creation of the ‘969’ campaign in early 2012 led by Buddhist extremists fuelled these communal tensions between Muslims and Buddhists across different parts of the country. The campaign specifically aimed to increase hatred against Muslims in Myanmar by calling upon followers to boycott Muslim-owned businesses, displaying 969 logos in businesses owned by Buddhists to show their solidarity with the campaign, and leading to multiple forms of violence against Muslims, while encouraging anti-Muslim feelings across the nation.Footnote 140 In the same year (2012) two violent outbreaks between Rakhine and Muslim groups, in June and October, were triggered by the reported rape and killing of a Buddhist woman by Rohingya men, followed by the killing of Muslim Rohingya by Buddhist mobs, driving 125,000 Rohingya and other Muslims to internally displaced camps.Footnote 141 Instead of protecting the population, the government further repressed Muslims by preventing their access to markets, livelihoods, and humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, responses from the national and local government promoted anti-Rohingya hatred and encouraged the departure of Rohingya from the area.Footnote 142 For example, the then president, Thein Sein, called for ‘illegal’ Rohingya to be sent to ‘third countries’, stressing their lack of legal status in the country and implying that the majority of Rohingya did not belong in Myanmar.Footnote 143
47. Rohingya communities have for many years witnessed crimes committed against their family members and suffered from sexual and gender-based violence (including perpetrated by military officers without commensurate accountability),Footnote 144 a lack of adequate food, shelter, education for their children, and medical care. These have wider consequences for families, for instance women are direct victims of human rights violations, but also suffer indirectly as family members of those who were killed and disappearedFootnote 145 and may be forced to become the breadwinners in addition to, or affecting, their culturally promoted family and home-focused roles.Footnote 146 These factors illustrate the violence, and its gendered effects, in the period prior to the so-called waves of violence, which already presented multiple intersecting factors that had in the past led to mass forcible displacement of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh on several occasions.
48. We note that these factors of historic violence against the Rohingya are so serious that they are alleged to amount to genocide at the International Court of Justice. To be clear, we do not think that such a high threshold of contextual violence as is found in this situation is required to establish that there may be ‘coercive acts’ in relation to deportation. We observe again that acts such as shelling, burning property, and others including sexual violence, are sufficient to amount to ‘expulsion or other coercive acts’ leading to forcible displacement. These acts also occurred, among them the killing of babies and young children and sexual violence, as detailed elsewhere in this Decision, including in paragraph 86 noting that ‘Hijra’ individuals, non-binary, transgender, and intersex persons were reportedly targeted for sexual violence.Footnote 147
49. While enmeshed within earlier contexts and structures of violence and dispossession, events in 2016 resulted in a further intensification of oppressive measures against the Rohingya inside Myanmar, forcing 87,000 Rohingya people, some of whom would have been carrying or leaving family members as well as homes, cultural lives, and livelihoods, to flee to Bangladesh – although we note there is a lack of available gender-disaggregated data. In addition to existing restricted movements, security forces, camps, and checkpoints were increased, with even more extreme restrictions on movement.Footnote 148 During these security searches, women are disproportionately affected, including the intruders strip searching their bodies for valuables and possible weapons.Footnote 149
50. The scale, brutality, and systematic nature of sexual and gender-based violence indicate that rape and sexual violence formed part of a deliberate strategy to intimidate, terrorise, or punish a civilian population, and were used as a tactic to generate a violent environment.Footnote 150 In many cases, sexual violence was accompanied by degrading behaviour, including insults and spitting, as recounted in numerous victims’ representations.Footnote 151 However, the national government defended the acts of the military and denied the allegations of the crimes, responding to the misconduct in official press statements as ‘fake rape’ claims.Footnote 152 This degree of normalisation and dismissal of sexual violence reflects the climate of long-standing impunity, including for military perpetrators of violence – across Myanmar as well as, or especially, in Rakhine State.Footnote 153
51. Many internally displaced Rohingya from the 2016 and earlier events remained in precarious situations and even temporary accommodation in 2017. The events of 2016 alone had internally displaced more than 23,000 individuals, over half of them women and girls.Footnote 154 The protracted displacement with limited access to international humanitarian aid, restrictions of movement, and overcrowded shelters with no privacy led to increased pressure on families, increasing the various forms of gender-based violence towards women and children. Adolescents have had limited access to youth services and other opportunities, further increasing the incidence of child marriage, child labour, and risky migration.Footnote 155
52. Those remaining in Myanmar ‘lived’ there, and were in that sense ‘lawfully present’.
53. The further violence in 2017 represented a continuation, albeit of greater scale (see elsewhere in this Decision), of the violent and allegedly genocidal context and appears to be a culmination of long-term efforts to change the ethnic composition of Rakhine State by removing, through multiple discriminatory policies and violent acts, the Rohingya population.
54. While both men and women are affected by this violence, women were (and are) disproportionately traumatised by the gendered forms and severity of crimes, including the incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. The United Nations and other organisations noted an increase in the number of pregnant women and girls in the refugee camps in Bangladesh between May and June 2018.Footnote 156 Recognition of children born out of rape is challenging for women due to the stigma associated with rape and often the resentment of the husband. A survivor of rape described her child born out of rape as ‘not our child – a lost child’.Footnote 157 Further, losing the male household members forced women to become breadwinners, yet many have limited skills and literacy. The circumstances have led them to engage in negative coping strategiesFootnote 158 to overcome economic hardship. After 2017 this continued to include early marriage and selling child brides, as was noted above after 2016.Footnote 159
55. For the purposes of this Decision, it is sufficient to observe that these reported experiences alone illustrate a coercive environment in which, among so many orchestrated oppressive factors, it is arguably pointless to isolate particular subjective motivations for leaving. Indeed, it is correspondingly easy to identify how ongoing forms of displacement and enduring harms were caused by multiple and deliberately intersecting coercive circumstances.
Exceptions and Limitations
56. The Chamber observes that there is no suggestion that any of the limited exceptions potentially applicable to the crime of deportation were present, and that no humanitarian assistance of any kind, let alone of a gender-sensitive nature, was provided by the government to those displaced. Further, the Chamber observes that the Rohingya population largely remains displaced as there has been no meaningful guarantee of their safety upon any return to Myanmar.Footnote 160
57. The displacement was also not temporary.
58. At this point, the Chamber stresses that this ‘Rohingya population’ that fled Myanmar is not an amorphous mass or abstract concept, but many hundreds of thousands of individuals, 80 per cent of whom are women and children,Footnote 161 as well as non-binary people, and all of them have experienced systematic discrimination and direct or indirect forms of violence and displacement.
59. Reports also clarify that this includes ‘single mothers (11%), persons with serious medical condition (4%), older persons at risk (4%), persons with disabilities (4%), child-headed households (3%), older persons with children (2%), separated children (2%), unaccompanied children (1%), single fathers (1%). Increasing gendered isolation and restricted mobility of women and girls limits their access to life-saving assistance, services and information’.Footnote 162 These are individuals who continue to experience the crime of deportation in their daily lives, whether they now live in refugee camps or elsewhere. Victims’ representations also suggest that many still fear further deportation or forced displacement, including back to Myanmar or to other destinations within Bangladesh, such as Bhasan Char.Footnote 163
60. Those who did not arrive include family members – men, children, elderly parents, and others with restricted mobility – many of whom were killed. The fact that 80 per cent of those displaced have been recorded as being women and girls suggests that gender was a factor, and even that numerous men may have been killed. The Prosecutor might further investigate the extent to which gender and intersectional considerations (including ‘hate speech’ concerning population control discussed elsewhere in this Decision) contributed to the non-temporary nature of the displacement, as well as the intent of those behind it.
61. The report issued by an international independent fact-finding mission in 2018 showed a clear pattern of racial discrimination and prohibition of cultural and religious rights, formally and informally, within refugee camps.Footnote 164 This includes unsafe living conditions, high levels of sexual and gender-based violence, risks of trafficking for women and children, income insecurity, challenges in securing culturally appropriate health or education services, children born of rape (and cultural stigma), lack of shelter, and other intersectional issues.Footnote 165
62. Again, the Chamber observes that, although women’s civil society organisations are emerging among refugees, some materials suggest that forcible displacement has exacerbated existing, partly cultural or religious, challenges for Rohingya women. A growing number of domestic violence incidents and child marriages have been reported within the Rohingya community in protracted and overcrowded displaced camps, compounded by the lack of livelihoods (including because of the absence of primary earners and lack of culturally appropriate work opportunities) and increases in poverty.Footnote 166
63. The Chamber considers this context to be relevant to the crime of deportation, even though these circumstances occur outside of Myanmar, since, as noted above, even if met, the exceptions allowing for displacement require the preservation of such rights to the extent appropriate. There is no information suggesting any intention on the part of Myanmar authorities or Tatmadaw to maintain the safety of those displaced, while the long history and ongoing nature of the challenges and risks in refugee camps in Bangladesh was very likely known to them.
64. In light of the above, a reasonable prosecutor could believe that coercive acts towards the Rohingya forced them to flee to Bangladesh, which may amount to the crime against humanity of deportation.
Cultural and Gender Considerations
65. The Chamber takes this opportunity to note that the information provided suggests that the alleged facts occurred in a very complex context involving nuanced and layered forms of harm. We expect that the parties will find it useful to present evidence, including expert evidence, to assist any future Trial Chamber or other Chambers to better understand specific and intersecting gendered, cultural, and religious influences among Rohingya women, those of non-binary genders (including Hijra), children, and other groups such as the disabled.
66. While the crime of deportation may appear gender ‘neutral’ in the sense that it does not directly refer to gendered issues, the Chamber also observes that the ICC Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes has recognised that deportation and forcible transfer of population ‘may also have a sexual and/or gender element’,Footnote 167 although such recognition has not led to convictions on that basis.Footnote 168 The Chamber considers that investigators, prosecutors, and judges also do not operate in ‘gender-neutral’ institutions, and there remain opportunities for the ICC to interpret ‘seemingly gender-neutral crimes in order to reflect the distinct experiences of women and girls’.Footnote 169 At the very least, the Chamber reminds the parties that careful and culturally sensitive approaches to investigation are warranted in international crimes trials.Footnote 170
67. We also reiterate our support for the Registry and other parties to ensure that culturally and gender-appropriate witness protection initiatives, including trauma-informed and psychosocial supports, are in place.
68. Finally, the Chamber invites amicus curiae briefs providing culturally informed analyses of the intersecting effects of the alleged crimes, including upon women and children.
Judge Emma Palmer and Judge Phyu Phyu Oo
14.3 Persecution of Non-Binary People in the Bangladesh/Myanmar Investigation
In 2019, the Pre-Trial Chamber III authorised the Prosecutor to commence an investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar in accordance with Article 15(4) of the Statute.Footnote 171 The Chamber held that the Prosecutor could reasonably believe that coercive acts towards the Rohingya forced them to leave Bangladesh, which may amount to the crimes against humanity of deportation,Footnote 172 and persecution on the ground of religion and/or ethnicity.Footnote 173 In establishing jurisdiction, the Chamber was satisfied that the alleged crimes had been committed at least partially on the territory of Bangladesh, which ratified the Statute on 23 March 2010.Footnote 174 The Chamber held that the scope of the investigation extended to acts committed on at least part of the territory of other states which would accept the jurisdiction of the Court, insofar as they were sufficiently linked to the situation.Footnote 175 Furthermore, the Chamber expanded the scope of the investigation beyond the crimes alleged by the Prosecutor in the request to any crimes sufficiently linked to the situation, stressing that limiting the incidents to be investigated at the preliminary stage would be contrary to the obligation under Article 54(1)(a) to ‘cover all facts and evidence … [i]n order to establish the truth’.Footnote 176
In this rewritten judgment, Claerwen O’Hara authorises the investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar in a manner which brings the experience of Hijra, transgender, and intersex peoples to the forefront of the decision. Whilst the Chamber’s original decision only briefly references sexual violence against Hijra individuals,Footnote 177 O’Hara discusses in depth the persecution of gender-diverse Rohingya people on the intersecting grounds of gender, ethnicity, and religion. In doing so, O’Hara offers an interpretation of gender under Article 7(3) of the Statute which encompasses gender-diverse people and the socially constructed nature of gender.
Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar No.: ICC-01/19
Date: 14 November 2019
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER III(B)
Before: Judge Claerwen O’HARA
SITUATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH/REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR
[Extract from the judgment]
The Facts
1. In 2016 and 2017, the armed forces of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, are alleged to have launched ‘clearance operations’ against the Rohingya civilian population in Myanmar, resulting in waves of violence which forced over 700,000 Rohingya to seek refuge in Bangladesh.Footnote 178
2. Representations submitted on behalf of alleged victims recount frequent occurrence of incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence during the 2016 and 2017 waves of violence.Footnote 179 Most alleged rapes were reportedly carried out by the Tatmadaw, although members of the border guard police, the Myanmar government, Myanmar police force, and local civilians are also alleged to have committed such acts.Footnote 180
3. The available information suggests that in some instances Hijra individuals, who are third-gender persons, transgender women, and intersex persons in South Asia who were assigned a masculine gender at birth,Footnote 181 were targeted for rape and sexual violence.Footnote 182 In its report on sexual and gender-based violence in Myanmar, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar found that the gender-diverse people who were allegedly subjected to rape and sexual violence during the ‘clearance operations’ were also largely of Rohingya ethnicity.Footnote 183
Applicable Law
4. Having established that that there exists a reasonable basis to believe that the contextual elements of crimes against humanity may be fulfilled in relation to the 2016 and 2017 waves of violence, the Chamber will now consider whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the alleged rape and sexual violence perpetrated against Hijra and other gender-diverse people in Myanmar may constitute persecution within the meaning of the Statute.
Persecution
5. Persecution, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(h) and (2)(g)Footnote 184 of the Statute, is committed, either through a single act or a series of acts,Footnote 185 when:
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,Footnote 186 one or more persons of fundamental rights.
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religion, or gender, as defined in Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Statute, or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law.
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.Footnote 187
Serious Deprivation of Fundamental Rights
6. Not every infringement of human rights amounts to persecution, but only a ‘severe deprivation’ of a person’s ‘fundamental rights contrary to international law’.Footnote 188 The commission of an act considered to be a crime against humanity will, in principle, result in a sufficiently severe deprivation of fundamental rights to meet the threshold for persecution.Footnote 189
7. As stated above, there is evidence before the Chamber that Hijra and other gender-diverse people were targeted for rape and sexual violence by Tatmadaw soldiers, police, and members of ethnic Rakhine communities during the waves of violence in Myanmar in 2016 and 2017.
8. Alleged victims recount being tied up, beaten, and subjected to anal and oral rape, sometimes by large groups of men.Footnote 190 Some victims have described the sexual violence they experienced as a form of torture. In recounting her experience during the 2016 and 2017 waves of violence, one transgender woman told the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar: ‘They always tortured transgender women like myself. They threatened us and did bad things to us; they forced me to do bad things. They remove our clothes and did bad things if we refused. We were threatened and risked being killed.’Footnote 191
9. The Mission also concluded that these instances of sexual violence amounted to torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment for the purposes of both international human rights law and international criminal law.Footnote 192
10. Further, this sexual violence is alleged to have occurred against a backdrop of general coercion, in which gender-diverse Rohingya people were routinely subject to harassment and arrest by the authorities. According to local activists, Article 377 of the Penal Code, which forbids ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’, has long provided legal cover for ill-treatment of gender and sexually diverse people in Myanmar.Footnote 193 One transgender victim described the effects of this ill-treatment on her as follows: ‘I can’t be myself because of fear … Sometimes we are insulted and called names, motherfuckers, all sorts of abusive language.’Footnote 194
11. Rape and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity are recognised by Article 7(1)(g) of the Statute as acts that may constitute crimes against humanity. Torture is also designated as such an act by Article 7(f) of the Statute and it is well established that rape can constitute a form of torture in both international criminal lawFootnote 195 and international human rights law.Footnote 196 In addition, deportation by coercive acts is recognised as a crime against humanity by Article 7(1)(d) of the Statute, as are other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to the body or to mental or physical health by Article 7(k).
12. As the rape and sexual violence allegedly committed against Hijra and other gender-diverse people in Myanmar in 2016 and 2017, causing many of them to flee to Bangladesh, may amount to such acts, the Chamber finds that there is a reasonable basis to believe that there may have been a sufficiently severe deprivation of fundamental rights to qualify as persecution under the Statute.
Identifiable Group or Collectivity
13. The second element of the crime against humanity of persecution is that the perpetrator must have targeted the person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity, or targeted the group or collectivity as such.Footnote 197 This requires there to be an identifiable group or collectivity.
14. The separation of elements two and three of the crime against humanity of persecution in the Elements of CrimesFootnote 198 indicates that the identity of the group or collectivity need not be defined according to the political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other impermissible grounds mentioned in Article 7(2)(g) of the Statute. Those grounds constitute the prohibited reasons for targeting an identifiable group or collectivity, rather than the characteristics of the group in question.
15. Pre-Trial Chamber II’s decision confirming the charges against Dominic Ongwen illustrates the separate operation of elements two and three of the crime against humanity of persecution. The identifiable group alleged to have been targeted in that case were civilian residents of certain internally displaced person camps. Mr Ongwen’s alleged targeting of the group was said to have been based on political grounds, as he perceived them to be affiliated with and/or supporting the Ugandan government.Footnote 199
16. In assessing whether a group is identifiable, a mixed approach may be adopted,Footnote 200 considering both objective and subjective criteria.
17. The academic literature indicates that Hijra people have been culturally recognised as a distinct gender or sex-based group in South Asia for millennia.Footnote 201 Encompassing non-binary, transgender, and intersex persons, Hijra people often live together in communal householdsFootnote 202 and have their own myths, rituals, and spiritual practices.Footnote 203
18. In the twenty-first century, several South Asian states have legally recognised Hijra people as having a third gender or sex. In 2014, for example, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that ‘Hijras, Eunuchs, apart from binary gender, be treated as “third gender” for the purpose of safeguarding their rights under Part III of our Constitution’.Footnote 204 That same year, the Government of Bangladesh published in its Gazette that it had ‘recognized the Hijra community of Bangladesh as a Hijra sex’.Footnote 205 Despite this recognition, Hijra and other gender-diverse people in India and Bangladesh continue to face marginalisation and social exclusion.Footnote 206
19. Hijra people have also been specifically named as having a distinct cultural and gender identity by international human rights courts and bodies, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,Footnote 207 the UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,Footnote 208 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.Footnote 209
20. Although Hijra people are not legally recognised as having a third sex or gender in Myanmar, the academic literature suggests that they view themselves as a distinct group or collectivity. For example, as in other parts of South Asia, Hijra people in Myanmar tend to live together in communities, with their own distribution of labour and communal living practices.Footnote 210 Tight kinship networks are also common amongst transgender and non-binary people living in Myanmar who do not necessarily identify as ‘Hijra’.Footnote 211
21. Further, Hijra and gender-diverse people in Myanmar appear to be viewed as a distinct group or collectivity by others. In early 2016, for example, there were widespread reports of transgender people being targeted by police for arrest, bribes, and sexual violence in Myanmar on account of their gendered appearance.Footnote 212 Further, research reports on the marginalisation and social exclusion of Hijra Rohingya in refugee camps in Bangladesh suggest that gender-diverse people from Myanmar continue to be viewed differently by others, including the wider Rohingya community.Footnote 213
22. In light of the above, the Chamber is satisfied that Hijra and other gender-diverse people in Myanmar may constitute an identifiable group or collectivity and that Hijra and other gender-diverse individuals were targeted for rape and sexual violence during the 2016 and 2017 ‘clearance operations’ by reason of the identity of that group or collectivity. As there is no requirement for the identity of the group to be based on the characteristics mentioned in Article 7(2)(g) of the Statute, it is unnecessary for the Chamber to consider whether, as a group, Hijra and gender-diverse people in Myanmar come within the definition of ‘gender’ in Article 7(g) of the Statute.
The Targeting Was Based on Prohibited Grounds
23. The targeting of the group or collectivity must have been based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender – as defined in Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Statute – or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law.Footnote 214
24. Article 7(3) of the Statute provides: ‘For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.’
25. According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,Footnote 215 treaty provisions are to be interpreted in good faith according to their ordinary meaning in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty. The ordinary meaning of the term ‘sexes’ is ‘the two main categories (male and female) into which humans and many other living things are divided on the basis of their reproductive functions’.Footnote 216 The ordinary meaning of ‘context’ is ‘the situation within which something exists or happens, and that can help explain it’.Footnote 217 The ordinary meaning of ‘society’ is ‘a large group of people who live together in an organised way, making decisions about how to do things and sharing the work that needs to be done’Footnote 218 or ‘an enduring and cooperating social group whose members have developed organised patterns of relationships through interaction with one another’.Footnote 219 A good-faith interpretation of Article 7(3) of the Statute requires reading these words together.
26. When read together, the ordinary meaning of the words ‘sexes’, ‘in the context of’, and ‘society’ suggests that ‘gender’, as defined in Article 7(3) of the Statute, refers to the division of people into two reproductive categories (male and female), as exists within, and which may be explained by, the interactions of groups of people living together in an organised way. There are two implications that can be drawn from this understanding of gender. The first is that the Statute appears to recognise that the division of people into two biological categories based around their reproductive functions is itself socially constructed. This does not mean that biology is irrelevant to the designation of people as ‘male’ or ‘female’. Rather, the combination of the words ‘sexes’ and ‘in the context of society’ in Article 7(3) acknowledges that it is through large-scale group interactions that any bodily differences associated with the sex-based categories ‘male’ and ‘female’ are given meaning.
27. The second implication that can be drawn from reading the words ‘sexes’ and ‘in the context of society’ together is that, for the purposes of the Statute, the term ‘gender’ encompasses not only the division of people into sex-based categories, but also the ‘organised patterns of relationships’ that have formed around, and which help to produce and sustain, those categories. These organised patterns of relationships may include expectations about how people who are assigned ‘male’ or ‘female’ are to interact with one another, as well as norms, behaviours, and social and economic roles associated with each category.
28. This reading is consistent with the Office of the Prosecutor’s understanding of Article 7(3): ‘This definition acknowledges the social construction of gender, and the accompanying roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes assigned to women and men, and to girls and boys.’Footnote 220 An interpretation of the term ‘gender’ that emphasises social dynamics also coheres with the Preamble to the Statute, which begins by recognising all peoples as living in a ‘delicate mosaic’ made up of ‘cultures’, ‘shared heritage’, and ‘common bonds’.
29. The ordinary meaning of the second sentence in Article 7(3), which reads ‘[t]he term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above’, is that the first sentence in Article 7(3) exhaustively defines the term ‘gender’ for the purposes of the Statute.
30. To confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 32 of that treaty provides that recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.Footnote 221 The travaux préparatoires to the Statute reveal little about the meaning of ‘gender’ in Article 7(3), other than that some states wished to emphasise the binary categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’ around which the notion of gender is organised.Footnote 222 Some states also queried whether the use of the term ‘gender’ in connection with the crime against humanity of persecution may be broad enough to bring the criminalisation of homosexual acts within the jurisdiction of the Court, but the matter was not resolved.Footnote 223
31. Literature on the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion indicates that there was some debate about the inclusion of a reference to the social dimension of gender, with several states preferring a biological definition.Footnote 224 However, a majority of states disagreed with that position and the words ‘in the context of society’ were ultimately included in Article 7(3) by consensus.Footnote 225 The fact that a non-social definition of gender was considered and rejected by the states parties supports the conclusion that the words ‘in the context of society’ must be given work to do.
32. Article 21(3) of the Statute provides that the Court’s interpretation of the applicable law, including the Statute itself, must be consistent with internationally recognised human rights. The term ‘gender’ only appears in one international human rights treaty: the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.Footnote 226 In that treaty, ‘gender’ is defined as ‘the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men’.Footnote 227 This definition is consistent with an interpretation of the term ‘gender’, as defined in Article 7(3) of the Statute, that encompasses the social patterns of relationships that produce and regulate the division of people into two reproductive categories.
33. Although the term ‘gender’ does not appear in other international human rights treaties, some UN human rights treaty bodies have read the notion into their respective treaties. In its General Recommendation 28, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) stated that although the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against WomenFootnote 228 only explicitly mentions sex-based discrimination, references to ‘customs and practices’Footnote 229 and ‘social and cultural patterns of conduct’Footnote 230 in the Convention indicate that it covers gender-based discrimination as well.Footnote 231 The CEDAW Committee went on to distinguish between the notions of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. In the Committee’s view, whereas ‘sex’ refers to ‘biological differences between men and women’, the term ‘gender’ encompasses ‘socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women and men and in the distribution of power and rights favouring men and disadvantaging women’.Footnote 232
34. While the Statute does not draw such a clear distinction between the notions of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, the CEDAW Committee’s comments lend weight to a reading of the term ‘gender’ in the Statute that includes socially constructed norms, behaviours, and roles. Its comments also support the idea that the concept of ‘sex’ must be understood in light of these social patterns because they are, in the words of the CEDAW Committee, what give ‘social and cultural meaning’ to any bodily differences associated with the two dominant sex-based categories.
35. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has taken a different approach to the CEDAW Committee. Rather than drawing a clear distinction between the concepts of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, in its General Comment No. 20, the CESCR provided an expansive reading of the term ‘sex’ in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,Footnote 233 which included social elements. It said: ‘Since the adoption of the Covenant, the notion of the prohibited ground “sex” has evolved considerably to cover not only physiological characteristics but also the social construction of gender stereotypes, prejudices and expected roles, which have created obstacles to the equal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.’Footnote 234 These comments confirm that, in contemporary international human rights law, sex and gender should not be construed in ways that overlook social dynamics.
36. Having determined the meaning of ‘gender’, as defined in Article 7(3) of the Statute, the Chamber must now turn to whether the targeting of Hijra and gender-diverse people was based on gender grounds.
37. The UN Committee against Torture has recognised that actual or perceived non-conformity with social gender roles can put people at risk of torture and ill-treatment.Footnote 235 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has also recognised people whose bodies do not fit with binary perceptions of sex can be exposed to harm.Footnote 236 Given the Statute’s recognition of the centrality of both social dynamics and binary thinking to the notion of ‘gender’, both of these forms of targeting could constitute persecution on gender grounds.
38. As noted above, the term ‘Hijra’ applies to third-gender persons, transgender women, and intersex persons in South Asia who were assigned male at birth.Footnote 237 Some members of this group may have been targeted for rape and sexual violence during the ‘clearance operations’ in 2016 and 2017 due to their non-conformity with gendered behaviours and social roles. For example, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar reports that transgender women, who are women who were assigned male at birth, face high levels of discrimination in Myanmar because their feminine mannerisms, clothing, and behaviour do not align with social expectations regarding the gender expression of people who are assigned male at birth.Footnote 238 This may also be the case for Hijra and gender-diverse people who identify as non-binary or third gender, rather than as women or men.
39. As the notion of gender, as defined in Article 7(3) of the Statute, appears to encompass the social norms and expectations that have formed around, and which help to produce and sustain, the sex-based categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’, the targeting of Hijra people on the basis of their non-conformity with such norms and expectations may constitute persecution on the grounds of gender for the purposes of Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute.
40. Other Hijra people may have been targeted for rape and sexual violence during the ‘clearance operations’ due to their non-conformity with the very sex binary around which the notion of gender is organised, such as Hijra people who are intersex. The UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights defines intersex people as people who ‘are born with physical sex characteristics that do not fit the normative definitions for male or female bodies’.Footnote 239 These sex characteristics may include sexual anatomy and/or chromosome patterns that do not fall neatly into either of the dominant sex-based categories.Footnote 240
41. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, intersex people can be subjected to persecution because they do not conform with expected bodily appearances of ‘males’ and ‘females’.Footnote 241 To the extent that intersex Hijra people in Myanmar were targeted on a similar basis, this may also constitute persecution on the grounds of gender, as defined in Article 7(3). This is because the social belief that humanity can be divided into two binary sexes would be the motivating force behind the targeting.
42. Earlier in this decision, the Chamber established that there exists a reasonable basis to believe that members of the Tatmadaw, jointly with other security forces and with some participation of local civilians, may have committed acts that qualify as the crime against humanity of persecution on grounds of ethnicity and/or religion against the Rohingya population. To the extent that the Hijra and other gender-diverse people who were allegedly targeted for rape and sexual violence were also Rohingya, the persecution may have been based on the intersecting grounds of gender, ethnicity, and religion.
43. UN human rights bodies have recognised that discrimination based on sex and gender is often inextricably linked with other factors, including race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, and sexual orientation and gender identity.Footnote 242 In the case of gender-diverse Rohingya people, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar received reports from transgender women who believed that they had been targeted for sexual violence during the ‘clearance operations’ in 2016 and 2017 due to a combination of their non-conformity with gender norms and their Rohingya ethnicity.Footnote 243 This led the Mission to conclude that, ‘transgender people of Rohingya ethnicity are victimised twice: as Rohingya and as transgender people’.Footnote 244 The actual or perceived identity of Hijra Rohingya people as Muslim may have also contributed to their alleged targeting.
44. In light of the above, the Chamber is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the targeting of Hijra and other gender-diverse people may have been based on gender grounds, as well as ethnic and religious grounds in the case of Hijra and gender-diverse Rohingya.
The Conduct Was Connected with a Crime within the Jurisdiction of the Court
45. The final non-contextual element of the crime against humanity of persecution is that the conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.Footnote 245
46. Earlier in this decision, the Chamber determined that a reasonable Prosecutor could believe that coercive acts perpetrated against the Rohingya civilian population in Myanmar in 2016 and 2017 forced them to flee to Bangladesh. If established, this may amount to the crime against humanity of deportation under Article 7(1)(d) of the Statute. The Chamber further determined that the Court may assert jurisdiction ratione loci over this alleged crime as Bangladesh is a state party to the Statute and it is possible to conclude that the actus reus of the crime of deportation was completed in the territory of Bangladesh.
47. The rape and sexual violence perpetrated against Hijra and other gender-diverse people in Myanmar during the 2016 and 2017 ‘clearance operations’, causing many of them to seek refuge in Bangladesh, may also amount to the crime against humanity of deportation by coercive acts.
48. As the conduct that allegedly deprived Hijra people in Myanmar of their fundamental rights would be the same conduct that allegedly forced them to flee to Bangladesh, the Chamber is satisfied that there is a sufficient connection between the conduct underlying the persecution and the crime against humanity of deportation under Article 7(1)(d) of the Statute.
Conclusion
49. Upon review of the available information, the Chamber accepts that there exists a reasonable basis to believe that since at least 9 October 2016, members of the Tatmadaw, jointly with other security forces and with some participation of local civilians, may have committed rape and sexual violence that could amount to the crime against humanity of persecution against Hijra and gender-diverse people in Myanmar under Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute on the grounds of gender and, in the case of Hijra and gender-diverse Rohingya, gender, ethnicity, and/or religion.
Judge Claerwen O’Hara
At the time of writing in 2023, it was four years since the Office of the Prosecutor commenced an investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar in accordance with Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute.Footnote 1 It was also six years since the mass displacement of Rohingyas from Rakhine state in Myanmar, which Pre-Trial Chamber III held may amount to the crimes against humanity of deportationFootnote 2 and persecution on the ground of religion and/or ethnicity.Footnote 3 According to the United Nations, around 10,000 people were killed in an alleged genocidal operation, and more than 700,000 people fled to Bangladesh.Footnote 4 Most of these people have found themselves in the Kutupalong-Balukhali expansion site in Cox’s Bazar – the largest and most densely populated refugee camp in the world.Footnote 5 Living conditions in the camp are challenging. Shelters are built from bamboo and tarpaulin and are closely packed together. Access to clean water, sanitation, healthcare, and education is limited. Residents must contend with overcrowding, outbreaks of disease, fires, monsoons, and cyclones. The COVID-19 pandemic added another layer of complexity to the crisis. The future for refugees in the camp remains uncertain, with limited prospects for safe and voluntary return to Myanmar, local integration in Bangladesh, or resettlement to a third country.
In this photo essay, Azimul Hassan, Omal Khair, and Dil Kayas – Media Fellows with Fortify Rights – have captured the hardships of camp life, but also the resilience and adaptability of the refugees living there, as well as their moments of joy and hope. These images and the photographers’ accompanying text are evidence of the ongoing impacts of the atrocities committed in Myanmar, yet at the same time they are testament to the tenacity of the human spirit and the great power of art and creative expression to transcend the physical and non-physical borders we construct between us.
15.1 The daily life, suffering and culture of Rohingya refugees
These images tell the world about the situation of the Rohingya people in the refugee camps. They not only illustrate the daily lives and suffering of Rohingya people in the camps but also Rohingya culture.

Photo 15.1 Boy on roof at sunset by Azimul Hassan

Photo 15.2 Boys playing football behind barbed wire by Azimul Hassan

Photo 15.3 Man receiving vaccination by Azimul Hassan

Photo 15.4 Woman drying fish on a net in the sun by Azimul Hassan
15.2 A window into the life of Rohingya refugees
These photos offer a window into Rohingya refugees’ lives. For example, one of the photos shows the makeshift infrastructure refugees create to navigate the challenging living conditions. One captures the everyday reality of how Rohingya refugees manage essential tasks like bathing in a constrained environment and another shows how refugees collect water from a hand pump well. I’ve also highlighted the limited play spaces available for children in the overcrowded camps, but the photo shows the incredible resilience of the kids, finding moments of joy in this challenging situation. Another photo shows how the children of Rohingya refugees are studying at a learning centre. This is against the breathtaking scenery surrounding the camp, providing viewers with a unique perspective on the refugees’ daily lives.

Photo 15.5 Girls collecting water by Azimul Hassan

Photo 15.6 Children at school by Azimul Hassan

Photo 15.7 Man showering with pot by Azimul Hassan

Photo 15.8 Boys looking out over refugee camp by Azimul Hassan
15.3 Tell the world
The images taken between 2018 and 2022 show on-the-ground reality in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. From daily life to the hardships endured, the photos tell the world about the lived experience of the Rohingya refugees.

Photo 15.9 Two men wading through flood water by Dil Kayas

Photo 15.10 Girls by a barbed wire fence by Dil Kayas

Photo 15.11 Refugees after the fire by Dil Kayas
16.1 Reflection: The Situation in Afghanistan
Introduction
In August 2021, the Taliban marched into Kabul and once again became the de facto government of Afghanistan, overthrowing the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan which held power from 2004 to 2021. The Taliban takeover came just a little less than two decades after the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York that started the US-led ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan and beyond. For some, the Taliban takeover marks an end to the conflict: both the US forces and the elected Afghan president departed the country, leaving a security and governance void that the Taliban filled. For others, the relative stability of the first years of Taliban rule is simply a lull in the conflict. Since 1978, Afghans have experienced many phases of conflict, each with its own dynamic of human rights violations and war crimes.Footnote 1
At the time of writing in 2023, there has been next to no accountability for any past crimes in Afghanistan, and few attempts to deal with conflict-related grievances and trauma. In the sporadic peace and power-sharing deals of the past four decades, de jure and de facto amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity has been the general rule [Editors’ Note: In January 2025, the Prosecutor applied for arrest warrants for Taliban leaders on the charge of gender-based persecution, including against women, their allies, and LGBTIQ+ persons.].
The aim of this sub-chapter is to contextualise the rewritten decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the situation in Afghanistan, from a feminist perspective. For the time being, the ICC is the only justice mechanism focusing on Afghanistan. Its engagement is a reminder that there should be no amnesty for war crimes. When embarking on a feminist reflection of the role of the ICC in Afghanistan, it is important to note that while accountability for atrocity crimes has been scarce in Afghanistan, accountability for these crimes have even more seldom included a gender dimension, although this dimension is ever present. Throughout the Afghanistan conflict, women and girls, their appearance and role in society and the family, have been one of the key ideological battlegrounds. The conflict has accentuated and brutalised already existing discriminatory practices, and lessened opportunities to challenge existing gender norms. With men away fighting the war or abroad trying to earn a living, women have been left to head large multi-generational households in complicated and insecure circumstances. The conflict has also changed the lives of men and boys while strengthening and privileging opportunistic and violent forms of masculinity.
Background to the Conflict in Afghanistan
The conflict in Afghanistan started in 1978 with a communist coup that set the stage for the Soviet occupation a year later. By the time Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, the occupation had cost at least a million civilian lives.Footnote 2 The Mujahideen government that was formed after the withdrawal quickly imploded and a new phase of the civil war started. During the civil war over 6 million Afghans sought refuge in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.Footnote 3 The Mujahideen’s failure to form a centralised state contributed to the birth of the Taliban movement. The Taliban came to power in 1996 and under their regime, women and ethnic and religious minorities were the main targets of serious human rights violations. The Taliban also provided a haven for the Al Qaeda network, and it is believed that the 9/11 attacks against the United States were planned from Afghanistan. Consequently, Afghanistan become the first theatre in the US ‘War on Terror’, with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and a ‘coalition of the willing’ fighting the Taliban and non-state actors.
The ‘War on Terror’ continued until a peace agreement was signed in February 2020 between the Taliban and the US government under the Trump administration. In April 2021, President Biden announced a full US withdrawal from Afghanistan by August of that year, leaving the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to fend for itself. The Taliban had already, for several years, been the de facto powerholders in much of rural Afghanistan; after the US withdrawal they quickly took provincial capitals and finally the national capital, Kabul. While overrunning cities and districts, the Taliban committed revenge killings of people supportive of the former government, targeted killings and torture of civilians and human rights defenders, and looted civilian properties.Footnote 4
The Afghanistan conflict came at a heavy price. After two decades of war, official reports record the deaths of 47,245 Afghan civilians, 66,000 Afghan forces, 51,191 Taliban and other fighters, 444 aid workers, 72 journalists, and 3,846 US and other fighters from the ‘coalition of the willing’.Footnote 5 These deaths represent but a fraction of the human rights violations and war crimes committed in Afghanistan.
Throughout Afghanistan’s history and the conflict, Afghan women have been used as political tools. The women’s issue has shaped rulers’ political agenda – some seeking to limit women’s rights, some ‘liberating’ them through socialism or liberal democracy. Gender – the role of men and women in society and family – runs across cleavages within Afghan society. However, the politicisation of gender issues has further deepened existing cleavages between the elites and the poor, the educated and the illiterate, the secular and the religious, the Western-oriented liberals and the conservatives.
Besides the political and ideological football that the different factions have played with women’s rights, they have also used women and their bodies as weapons of war.Footnote 6 To protect themselves from attacks, women had to at times unveil and at other times veil.Footnote 7 During the civil war, insecurity and poverty reached record levels; families were forced to sell their daughters into marriages and sexual violence was rampant.Footnote 8 The Taliban’s treatment of women was even harsher. During their 1990s reign, they outlawed women’s public appearance ‘for the sake of their protection’.Footnote 9 They deprived women of a wide range of civil-political, socio-economic, and judicial rights, including freedom of thought and expression, freedom of religion, freedom to travel, and the right to education and work. The group was accused of women’s rights violations, which included stoning, public beatings, execution, arrest, and penalties for inappropriate dress.Footnote 10
Progress was made to improve women’s rights after the 2001 US military intervention and the UN-supported state-building exercise: laws, policies, and institutional practices changed in order to open up opportunities for women. By the time of the collapse of the government of President Ashraf Ghani, a quarter of civil servants across the country were women, women accounted for 36 per cent of media workers, 28 per cent of parliamentarians, and the governors or deputy governors in more than half of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces.Footnote 11 Progress was uneven though, and sexual harassment and violence was rampant.Footnote 12 As girls and women are considered to carry the family honour, reporting harassment or violence remained challenging as girls and women often choose not to report so as not to bring shame on the family.
Each phase of the conflict has had its own dynamic of atrocities, while only a handful of perpetrators have been held to account.Footnote 13 To date, all Afghan power-sharing or peace agreements have included direct references to amnesty or have left the issue of legacies of war crimes unaddressed. Although Afghanistan acceded to the Rome Statute of the ICC in 2003, efforts to promote transitional justice have largely failed.Footnote 14
In the post-2001 era, there have been a few exceptions to the culture of silence and impunity for war crimes that has reigned in Afghanistan. A few low-level commanders or commanders who no longer could rely on friends in high places have been prosecuted in Afghanistan.Footnote 15 In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, there have also been some prosecutions making use of universal jurisdiction.Footnote 16 There is no indication that the Taliban will change the trend of impunity. The possibility of an ICC investigation into war crimes in Afghanistan remains the only accountability mechanism open to victims of the conflict.
Background to the ICC Cases Concerning the Situation in Afghanistan
The Afghan government was an early adopter of the Rome Statute, acceding to it in 2003. At that point there was a lull in the conflict, and the ICC did not have jurisdiction over crimes committed during previous phases of the Afghanistan conflict. That is, adopting the Rome Statute did not seem to have any practical significance for Afghanistan, as the warring decades of the 1980s and 1990s were outside the Court’s remit. The lull in the conflict did not last.
In 2007, the first ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, initiated a preliminary analysis into the situation in Afghanistan. It took a decade for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to conclude that crimes meeting the ICC’s gravity threshold had been committed in Afghanistan since the Rome Statute’s entry into force in respect of Afghanistan in 2003.Footnote 17 In its 2016 Preliminary Examinations report, the OTP concluded that there was reasonable basis to believe crimes reaching the ICC threshold had been committed in Afghanistan.Footnote 18 The alleged crimes identified all parties to the conflict, including crimes against humanity and war crimes by the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, war crimes by the Afghan government, in particular the Afghan intelligence agency, and war crimes by the US military forces deployed in Afghanistan. The OTP report provided a detailed account of the crimes, including extensive targeting of civilians, extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, and illegal detention.
The Afghanistan case was not referred to the ICC, rather it was initiated by Prosecutor Ocampo under the proprio motu powers of the Rome Statute. In such cases, a decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber is needed to decide whether to open an actual investigation. Before starting its deliberations, the Pre-Trial Chamber invited victims to share their views on whether an investigation would ‘serve the interests of justice’. The responses showed resounding support for an investigation.Footnote 19 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided to go against the OTP and the victims’ recommendations. In 2019, the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to authorise the investigation, holding that although the jurisdiction and admissibility tests were satisfied, an investigation at this stage ‘would not serve the interests of justice’ because the likelihood of successful prosecutions was too limited.Footnote 20
The ICC’s second Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and victims’ groups successfully appealed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision. On 5 March 2020, the Appeals Chamber decided to allow the Prosecutor to pursue an investigation, but few concrete steps were taken in the year before the Taliban takeover.Footnote 21 Shortly after the takeover, the third ICC Prosecutor, Karim Khan, stated that, since the Taliban’s recapture of power, the Prosecutor had decided to continue the investigation but, referring to the limited resources available, he proposed only to investigate crimes committed by the Taliban and Islamic State in Afghanistan.Footnote 22 This new prosecution strategy excluded both the crimes committed by the Afghan intelligence service of the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government, as well as by US and other international forces present in Afghanistan during the ‘War on Terror’.
Feminist Reimagining of Select Judgments and Decisions
In this chapter, six authors – Mashal Aamir and Adrienne Ringin, Jill Marshall, Kathryn Gooding, Souheir Edelbi, and Susana SáCouto – have each undertaken a feminist reinterpretation of different aspects of the ICC’s Afghanistan proceedings.Footnote 23 The five legal issues were: (1) the notion of gender-based persecution by the Taliban in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to open an investigation into Afghanistan; (2) the jurisdiction test; (3) the gravity test; (4) the complementarity test; and (5) the interests of justice test. In line with the feminist methodology used for this volume, the authors were asked to write their contributions as if they were ICC judges.
The five legal issues chosen are all central to the ICC’s engagement on Afghanistan from 2007 to 2020. Importantly, however, all the issues pre-date the August 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Consequently, the authors are reimagining ICC decisions adopted when the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, backed by US and other international forces, was fighting the Taliban and other non-state armed groups, not at the time when the Republic has fallen, US forces have left the country, and the Taliban has become the de facto government.
Judge Susana SáCouto: Gender-Based Persecution in Afghanistan
In 2019, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber accepted the Prosecutor’s submission that there was a reasonable basis to believe that Taliban forces had committed gender-based persecution in Afghanistan.Footnote 24 However, in its decision the Chamber offered no commentary on what that crime involved, and what ‘gender’ means in the ICC Statute. The Chamber’s decision focused on if, based on the Prosecutor’s submission, the Court has jurisdiction and if the cases met the threshold of the Court. The Prosecutor’s submission encompassed alleged crimes committed by all parties to the conflict, including the Taliban and other non-state armed groups, the Afghan government, and the US and other international forces.
In her reimagined decision, Judge Susana SáCouto examines gender-based persecution in the decision through a feminist lens. Judge SáCouto takes as her starting point the Rome Statute’s definition of gender under Article 7(3), which defines gender as referring to ‘the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society’. The definition can be read as an attempt by the drafters of the statute to equate gender with biological sex. Judge SáCouto takes a different view. She makes use of the rules of interpretation, focusing on the ordinary meaning of the terms and their drafting history. In her reinterpretation, she argues that the meaning of gender has evolved since the adoption of the Rome Statute so that its ordinary meaning, when situated in the ‘context of society’, is socially and culturally construed and changeable. That is, what Judge SáCouto does is attempt to show that the ordinary meaning of equating gender with ‘male and female in the context of society’ has changed between when the Rome Statute was adopted and now: in the early 2000s we may have understood the reference as meaning gender equals sex, today we understand gender as a social construction and changeable.
Using this interpretation, Judge SáCouto proceeds to analyse what an understanding of gender as evolving, and as socially and culturally construed, means for the crime of gender-based persecution, and for the ICC’s investigation into crimes committed in Afghanistan. She notes that ‘gender-based persecution includes persecutory acts that are motivated by beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions regarding appropriate social behaviour for males and females’, and concludes that,
having examined not only direct harms to the women and girls targeted by the Taliban, but also the long-lasting adverse impacts of these acts on the ability of victims and their families to subsist and on women’s and girls’ access to critical services and support, this Chamber finds that women and girls in Afghanistan were severely deprived of their fundamental rights.
Judge SáCouto’s analysis differs from the original decision in that she focuses on the definition of gender-based persecution. She seeks to update the ICC’s definition of gender by arguing – successfully so, in our view – that since the adoption of the Rome Statute our common understanding of gender has changed. Her analysis also differs from the original decision regarding the amount of attention given to the gender-based crimes committed by the Taliban. Judge SáCouto places these crimes at the centre. We welcome the shift made by Judge SáCouto’s reinterpretation: it is unusual and refreshing to read such extensive focus on crimes committed towards women in an international criminal law decision.
Judges Mashal Aamir and Adrienne Ringin: The ‘Jurisdiction’ Test in Afghanistan
To open an investigation, the ICC Prosecutor must first establish under Article 53(1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes within the ICC’s subject-matter jurisdiction were committed. In 2019, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that this jurisdiction test was satisfied in relation to the situation in Afghanistan.
Rewriting this decision from a feminist perspective, Judges Aamir and Ringin do not change the decision. As in the real ICC decision, they decide that the jurisdiction test is satisfied, as there is reasonable basis to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed. However, the rewritten judgment increases the focus on crimes with a gender-based and sexual nature. Judges Aamir and Ringin have used public sources to include more and different violations to the list of crimes within the scope of the investigation. Their account provides an overview of gender-based and sexual violence committed by all parties to the conflict, including rape of men and women, torture and threats of torture focused on genitalia, forced nudity, and other forms of degrading treatment. What the increased attention to gender-based and sexual crimes starkly shows is the deeply gendered and sexualised nature of the conflict, and the brutality of all parties to the conflict.
The fact that Judges Aamir and Ringin focus not only on violence by the Taliban, but also on how members of the Taliban have been treated when detained by the security forces of the Islamic Republic and international forces, is relevant also for the current situation wherein the Taliban are the de facto government of Afghanistan. The recorded brutality of the Taliban in and out of government clearly includes extreme violations of international criminal law. However, as this judgment makes clear, they are not the only ones to have committed atrocities; indeed over the past decades attention to the crimes committed against Taliban members by international forces have been cursory at best. Judges Aamir and Ringin’s feminist analysis therefore contributes to a levelling of the playing field: violations by all parties to the Afghanistan conflict get the attention they deserve.
Judge Jill Marshall: The ‘Gravity’ Test in Afghanistan
After the ‘jurisdiction’ test, the ICC Prosecutor must establish that the alleged crimes meet the ‘gravity threshold’ to be authorised to open an investigation. In its 2019 decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the Afghan army and the Taliban within Afghanistan, and by American forces against Afghan detainees, were sufficiently serious to pass this ‘gravity threshold’.Footnote 25 In her decision, Judge Marshall reimagines the ‘gravity threshold’ through a gender lens.
Specifically, Judge Marshall guides the reader through the ICC’s assessment of the gravity of the crimes by all parties to the conflict. The assessment focuses on the scale, nature, manner, and impact of the violations. In contrast to the original decision, Judge Marshall’s decision includes a gender analysis to assess both how the violations have been committed, and what they mean in the context of the Afghan conflict and the discrimination, deprivation, and trauma that they have caused in this situation. This analysis is further strengthened by Judge Marshall in the impact section, underlining the importance of recognising the consequences of living with the experiences of the violations in the broader context of the conflict.
In explicating her decision, Marshall also reflects on the challenge of using feminist analysis while remaining within the limits of what the ICC and legal rules prescribe. Feminism in law, Judge Marshall notes, ‘makes use of the power that law holds, whilst resisting that same power’. Navigating this paradox is not an easy task; it demands making the most of law, without falling into the trap of reproducing patriarchal structures that view Afghan women mainly as victims. Judge Marshall manages this but her judgment points to the balancing act underlying the exercise of feminist reimagination in itself.
Judge Kathryn Gooding: The ‘Complementarity’ Test in Afghanistan
The ‘complementarity’ test must also be satisfied for the ICC Prosecutor to open an investigation. Under this test, the ICC can only investigate and prosecute crimes in the absence of genuine proceedings at the national level. In its 2019 decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the crimes of interest to the ICC were not already the subject of genuine proceedings in Afghanistan or the United states, making them admissible to the ICC. Judge Kathryn Gooding’s rewritten decision approaches the complementarity test from a feminist angle.Footnote 26
Judge Gooding argues it is unlikely that either the Afghan or the US judicial system would be able and willing to prosecute the alleged gender-based crimes genuinely. She notes in her decision that, given the record of the current Afghanistan government, it is likely that the proceedings would focus on crimes against the state, and not the many gender-based crimes committed during the conflict. Similarly, Judge Gooding is of the view that, given its record, the US government would most likely not give enough attention to the gender-based and sexual offences committed by US forces in particular. She notes that Afghan law does not adequately recognise sexual and gender-based crimes, and that the United States has demonstrated a lack of political will to prosecute its own soldiers for such atrocities. Therefore, in the view of Judge Gooding, the ICC can jurisdiction. Gooding’s focus is potentially the most radical of the rewritten Afghanistan decisions because it puts gender-based and sexual crimes at the centre of the complementarity test. Given the history of the ICC, this focus still seems like an improbability. By taking this stance, Judge Gooding’s decision is revelatory, demonstrating how marginalised gender-based and sexual crimes remain in the sphere of ICC crimes.
Judge Souheir Edelbi: The ‘Interests of Justice’ Test in Afghanistan
Judge Souheir Edelbi’s feminist redrafting relates to the Appeal Chamber’s 2020 decision on Afghanistan, which focuses on whether the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in its interpretation of Article 15(4) of the Statute when it found itself bound to assess the factors under Article 53(1) (interests of justice test) of the Statute.Footnote 27 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision received considerable attention from both the international legal community and Afghan human rights activists.Footnote 28 The Pre-Trial Chamber originally took a very far-reaching interpretation of the interests of justice, allowing it to decide that largely because of the ICC’s financial situation, there was little chance of successful prosecutions in Afghanistan. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s determination that the investigation was not in the interests of justice centred on the ‘availability of evidence dating back so long in time’ (para. 93), ‘the prospects of securing meaningful cooperation from the relevant authorities’ (para. 94), and the ‘significant amount of resources’ required to conduct the investigation (para. 95). As such, pursuing prosecution in Afghanistan was not in the interests of justice. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision was overturned by the Appeals Chamber in March 2020.Footnote 29
Judge Edelbi’s rewritten version of that 2020 decision agrees with the Appeals Chamber’s verdict, but takes the decision further. She underscores that the interests of justice test in the Rome Statute is a negative test, and that the Afghanistan investigation is in the interests of justice unless it is clear that potential victims consider that an investigation would harm them. However, Edelbi extends the reasoning, noting that the ICC’s task is a complex one: to provide justice for victims in situations where national avenues for justice are limited or unavailable, but to do this within its own legal system of the Rome Statute that is itself limited and cannot provide real redress for the many victims and many crimes of, in this case, the Afghanistan situation. Judge Edelbi also adds a dimension of meta reflection to her decision, noting that the abstract reasoning of the ICC creates a false sense of detachment and objectivity. While some consider abstraction necessary for judicial decision making, it can be counterproductive to the interests of justice for victims who seek accountability from the Court.
Critical Reflection
Reading the rewritten decisions was an interesting experience for us. First, because they focused much more on gender-based and sexual crimes than the original decisions did. Second, because some of the rewritten decisions broadened the scope from the immediate violations to showing the cost of conflict in terms of lost socio-economic opportunities and the crippling effects of conflict-related trauma. And, finally, because these reimagined judgments focus on violations by all parties to the conflict, not just one side of the conflict. The decision by the ICC Prosecutor to mainly focus on the violations committed by the Taliban over the past two decades gives the impression that a generation of violations have been swept under the carpet. The rewritten statements counterbalance this, emphasising that the past two decades, violations have been committed by the Taliban and other non-state armed groups, but also by the Islamic Republic and its international allies.
Since the late 1970s, Afghans have lived with conflict and/or repressive governments. Women’s rights have been an ideological football throughout the conflict, and the conflict itself has cemented discriminatory attitudes and harmful customary practices. As lamented by a female judge whom one of the authors interviewed several years back, Afghanistan is the only country where the next generation is always more conservative and less educated than the previous one.Footnote 30
For many proponents of transitional justice in Afghanistan, an ICC prosecution is the only remaining hope for some form of accountability. While it is important that the ICC pursues its investigation into Afghanistan, it will take time for the Prosecutor to build cases against specific individuals, and even the most ambitious prosecution strategy would only capture a fraction of the possible cases. While the original preliminary analysis by the Prosecutor focused on alleged crimes committed by all parties to the Afghan conflict, his final decision means that there will be no accountability for crimes committed by the Islamic Republic and its international allies. The decision will also not help the often-voiced criticism that the ICC is a European or Western court, as opposed to a truly international criminal court.
The challenge for any efforts to reimagine ICC decisions on the Afghanistan situation is that they all focus on the time prior to the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, before the fall of the Islamic Republic and the Taliban takeover, and the current period of the Taliban as the de facto government of Afghanistan. The Taliban is of course also an exceptionally misogynistic and brutal regime. A refreshing feature of the rewritten decisions is that all the judges expand the view to focus on alleged crimes committed by all parties to the conflict. Consequently, the rewritten decisions do not fall into the all-too-common trap of (Western) feminist analysis of viewing Afghan women as oppressed victims to be saved by the United States and its allies.
All the rewritten decisions for the Afghanistan situation not only take a more complex approach to the violations suffered by Afghan women, but they also expand the focus of the ICC’s decisions in a few important ways. First, the rewritten decisions focus extensively on sexual and gender-based violations committed by all parties to the conflict, including how sexual humiliation was allegedly part of both the US and the Islamic Republic’s repertoire in detention. The focus on these crimes shows the gendered nature of conflict itself and the extent to which power is sexualised in conflict and that this needs to be recognised and addressed by the ICC and other post-conflict justice mechanisms. Second, the rewritten statements also focus on the broader effects of conflict, making the socio-economic consequences relevant for the contextual understanding of the ICC’s decision. That is, while the ICC may focus only on specific crimes, it is important to understand these crimes in the wider context of conflict. This last point is particularly significant in the case of ICC proceedings on Afghanistan. The ICC is currently the only existing accountability mechanism focusing on Afghanistan, and even in the best-case scenario it will only focus on a fraction of the violations committed over the past two decades. Afghans have faced uncountable violations in a conflict that has been going on for over four decades.
It is interesting to try to do a feminist reinterpretation within law, as these reimagined judgments have done. However, if we think beyond the limitations of the Rome Statute, and provide a meta reflection, the complexities of the Afghanistan case become much more apparent, and it reminds us that law can only ever provide a partial solution. For the sake of the many victims of gross violations, it is also important to recognise that the language of law does not capture the experiences of all those who have suffered. Accountability for gross violations is important, but it very seldom equals justice. It is important that feminist judicial reimaginings are clear about these limitations, while also recognising the need to also look elsewhere to achieve accountability and change.
16.2 The Jurisdiction Test in the Afghanistan Investigation
In 2017, the Prosecutor requested authorisation from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate an investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since 1 May 2003.Footnote 31 In 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber II denied that request, stating that such an investigation would not be in the interests of justice.Footnote 32 This decision was subsequently overturned unanimously by the Appeals Chamber in 2020.Footnote 33
In their rewritten version of that 2019 Pre-Trial Chamber decision, Mashal Aamir and Adrienne Ringin reconsider the evidence used to determine the jurisdiction test. As in the real decision, Aamir and Ringin find that there is satisfactory evidence that crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction were committed, but they use the information presented to the original Chamber to further emphasise the satisfaction of the jurisdiction test and thereby centre the lived experiences of victims throughout the decision.
Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan No.: ICC-02/17
Date: 12 April 2019
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II(B)
Before: Judge Mashal AAMIR, Presiding Judge
Judge Adrienne RINGIN
SITUATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II(B) (the Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (the Court) issues this Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute (the Statute) on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan).
This request originates from a proprio motu examination conducted on the initiative of the Office of the Prosecutor in accordance with Article 15(1) of the Statute.
History
1. The situation in Afghanistan has been in a state of flux, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001 and the resultant global ‘War on Terror’.Footnote 34 There have been numerous incidents of both brief and protracted conflict within the territory, initiated by various actors. This turbulence has led to continued suffering by the people of Afghanistan. In 2016 alone there was a 66 per cent increase in the number of people fleeing their homes due to conflict, 56 per cent of whom were children.Footnote 35 Indeed, even at this early stage of examination, the Court has received 699 representations on behalf of victims including 668 representations on behalf of 6,220 individuals, 17 representations on behalf of 1,690 families, 13 representations on behalf of several millions of victims including 26 villages, and 1 representation on behalf of an institution.Footnote 36
2. Afghanistan acceded to the Statute on 10 February 2003, therefore accepting the jurisdiction of the Court over Article 5 crimes, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression committed on its territory after 1 May 2003.Footnote 37
3. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) began conducting a preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan in 2006.Footnote 38 This led to an official request on 20 November 2017 through the submission of the Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15 (the Request). Through the Request, the OTP petitions the Pre-Trial Chamber
to authorise the commencement of an investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in relation to alleged crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan in the period since 1 May 2003, as well as other alleged crimes that have a nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan and are sufficiently linked to the situation and were committed on the territory of other States Parties in the period since I July 2002.Footnote 39
4. The OTP has deliberately excluded from the Request acts that occurred on the territory of Cuba, namely at Guantanamo Bay. The Chamber will therefore not make a comment on that topic in this decision.
5. The Request specifies the following actors as those responsible for the crimes committed: (1) The Taliban and other armed groups; (2) Afghan forces; and (3) Forces of the United States of America (US forces) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).Footnote 40
6. The Chamber wishes to emphasise that at this stage of the proceedings, all persons, organisations, and acts mentioned in this decision are alleged and that decisions of other Chambers at later dates will deliberate on the veracity of such allegations.
7. The Chamber draws attention to the implicit assertion made by the OTP that, despite the length of time Afghanistan has endured conflict, there has been a distinct lack of prosecution for the crimes at domestic, regional, and international levels. While it is not the place of this Chamber to make a determination at this stage, and leaving open the possibility for dispute from concerned parties, the Chamber wishes to note that should this allegation be true, then there has been a distinct failure of the international global community in allowing ongoing impunity for such crimes.Footnote 41
Elements of Jurisdiction
8. The test for jurisdiction is satisfied through the fulfilment of three separate checks: ratione loci or personae, ratione materiae, and ratione temporis.
9. To satisfy the jurisdiction test, the OTP has relied on evidence from organisations and bodies such as the following: the United National Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), the CIA, the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, and the United States Department of Defence.
10. While at this stage of the analysis the Chamber is limited to the evidence placed before it, the Chamber notes that it considers the information relied upon to be from reputable sources and therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, there is no reason to doubt the information presented before this Chamber.
11. The Chamber will turn to an analysis of each of these elements in the present application.
Ratione Loci or Ratione Personae
12. Article 12(2) is satisfied should either ratione loci or ratione personae be met, that is, whether the alleged crimes were committed on the territory of a state party by a national of any state, or by a national of a state party on any territory.
13. As Afghanistan is a party to the Rome Statute, ratione loci is satisfied concerning the crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan by the Taliban and other forces, Afghan forces, US forces, and the CIA.
14. Turning to the crimes committed on the territory of the states parties, the Republic of Poland, Romania, and the Republic of Lithuania, the Chamber notes that the temporal period articulated in the Request is specific to when a non-international armed conflict was occurring. In this way, the Chamber is required to analyse whether there is a sufficient nexus between the crimes and the armed conflict.
15. The Chamber wishes to reinforce that an analysis of each situation will reveal whether sufficient nexus has been achieved. The test is not as simplistic as to whether or not a criminal act occurred on a specific territory of interest. Rather, it is whether the criminal act occurred in the context of and associated with the armed conflict on the specific territory of interest.
16. This interpretation accords with the originating article, Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, and subsequently reflected in Article 8 of the Elements of Crime, whereby the nexus requirement is stated as ‘the conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict [or alternatively not of an international character]’. Note the lack of reference to territory.
17. The Chamber therefore agrees with the OTP that ‘the transfer of a detainee outside of a theatre of armed conflict does not render the protections to which he/she is entitled under international humanitarian law inapplicable’ and that the detention and treatment of detainees on the territories of Lithuania, Poland, and Romania after their detention and treatment in Afghanistan does constitute a sufficient nexus.Footnote 42
18. To avoid confusion, this finding does not provide legitimacy, tacit or otherwise, to whether the crimes were committed by any of the parties so far nominated. The Chamber is instead concerned with the correct interpretation of the relevant law. A decision regarding the committal of any offence on any territory will be made by an appropriate Chamber at an appropriate date. Parties concerned may then avail themselves of the Article 19(2) procedure to challenge the question of jurisdiction.
Ratione Materiae
19. For jurisdiction to be satisfied, the subject matter must be categorised as one of the crimes in Article 5: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or the crime of aggression.
20. The OTP states that, based on the information acquired so far, there is a reasonable basis to believe that incidents amounting to crimes against humanity and/or war crimes have occurred.
21. The Chamber will now examine the information provided.
Contextual Elements of Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes …
22. […] Therefore, the Chamber agrees that that contextual elements of crimes against humanity and war crimes have been satisfied.
Taliban and Other Armed Groups
23. The OTP has limited its application to the conduct of the Taliban and its affiliate, the Haqqani Network.Footnote 43
24. The Request categorises the following crimes against humanity under Article 7 against the Taliban and Haqqani Network: murder (Article 7(1)(a)), imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty (Article 7(1)(e)), and political and gender persecution (Article 7(1)(h)).
25. The Request further categorises the following war crimes under Article 8 against the Taliban and Haqqani Network: murder (Article 8(2)(c)(i)), intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population (Article 8(2)(e)(i)), intentionally directing attacks against humanitarian personnel (Article 8(2)(e)(iii)), intentionally directing attacks against protected objects (Article 8(2)(e)(iv)), conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen or using them to participate actively in hostilities (Article 8(2)(e)(vii)), and killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary (Article 8(2)(e)(ix)).
26. The Chamber recognises, but does not validate, the existence of the Layha, a document utilised by the Taliban and referred to as a type of Code of Conduct.Footnote 44 The Chamber gives no weight to the assertion that such a document negates the formal, institutionalised, and universally approved laws of war.
27. The following acts are illustrative of conduct that the OTP claims the Taliban or the Haqqani Network have declared responsibility for or have been implicated in:
Murder – Article 7(1)(a) and Article 8(2)(c)(i)
(a) In September 2006, Director of Women’s Affairs Safiye Amajan was executed in Kandahar province. Taliban commander Mullah Hayat Khan stated ‘she worked for the government … “We have told people again and again that anyone working for the government, and that includes women, will be killed”’.Footnote 45
(b) In 2010, UNAMA and AIHRC documented 381 assassinations and executions.Footnote 46
(c) In 2016, the Taliban claimed responsibility for 149 civilian causalities from targeted and deliberate killings.Footnote 47
Imprisonment or Other Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty – Article 7(1)(e)
(a) In 2007, a man was detained by the Taliban for three months, allegedly due to his brother working as a Prosecutor.Footnote 48
(b) In January 2008, a man was abducted by the Taliban and only released after accepting the demand for his wife to cease her teaching job and after the provision of a financial payment.Footnote 49
Political and Gender-Based Persecution – Article 7(1)(h)
(a) The 2009 provincial and parliamentary elections were deemed insecure enough that women candidates from Kandahar campaigned from outside the province,Footnote 50 while 196 of the 200 students reportedly poisoned were female.Footnote 51
(b) On 3 June 2011, the head of the Bamyan provincial council was abducted and his body was found on 7 June 2011.Footnote 52
Intentionally Directing Attacks against the Civilian Population – Article 8(2)(e)(i)
(a) In December 2005, Taliban insurgents demanded that farmers pay tax. Those who could not afford to pay financially were reportedly told to pay in kind, including being beaten, shot, or having their sons abducted.Footnote 53
(b) On 25 October 2006, Taliban spokesperson Qari Yousef Ahmadi stated: ‘There is no difference between the armed people who are fighting against us and civilians who are co-operating with foreigners.’Footnote 54
(c) In May 2011, the Haqqani network claimed responsibility for the deaths of thirty-six construction workers and the wounding of thirteen others when a road construction company was attacked in Paktika province.Footnote 55
(d) In 2016 the Taliban claimed responsibility for 358 civilian deaths, 1,106 civilian causalities, and 260 civilian abductions through 225 incidents.Footnote 56
Intentionally Directing Attacks against Humanitarian Personnel – Article 8(2)(e)(iii)
(a) In June 2011, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a twenty-year-old female suicide bomber attack on an international military convoy in Marawara district, Kunar province.Footnote 57
(b) The Aid Worker Security Database recorded twenty-seven attacks against humanitarian personnel during 2015.Footnote 58 Three of those attacks were attributed to the Taliban while the rest were largely identified as ‘unknown’ or ‘not applicable’.Footnote 59
Intentionally Directing Attacks against Protected Objects – Article 8(2)(e)(iv)
(a) From April to August 2009, 102 schools were attacked leading to the deaths of 105 students and teachers.Footnote 60
(b) In May 2011, the Taliban claimed responsibility for an attack on a military hospital in Kabul which killed six students and wounded twenty-three others.Footnote 61
(c) The UNAMA 2012 mid-year report found seventy-four incidents against schools and education. These incidents included burning of schools, threats to teaching staff, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) near schools and fourteen incidents of occupation of schools.Footnote 62
(d) In 2013, attacks against mullahs and places of worships tripled.Footnote 63
Conscripting or Enlisting Children under the Age of Fifteen or Using Them to Participate in Hostilities – Article 8(2)(e)(vii)
(a) On 12 February 2007, local Afghani children were used as human shields during fighting in Kajaki district, Helmand province.Footnote 64
(b) A 2017 Human Rights Watch report detailed thirteen boys who were recruited to various Taliban units, some when under the age of fifteen, and who were subsequently active in hostilities.Footnote 65 Two of these boys, Qasem, fifteen, and Ahmad, fourteen, were killed after being deployed during a ground incident with Afghan forces.Footnote 66
Killing or Wounding Treacherously a Combatant Adversary – Article 8(2)(e)(ix)
(a) In April 2011, the Taliban used an ambulance to conduct a suicide attack on a police training centre in Kandahar.Footnote 67
(b) On 6 December 2012, a male suicide bomber falsely presented himself as a peace envoy before detonating himself in an attempt to kill the National Directorate for Security (NDS) chief, Asadullah Khalid.Footnote 68
28. Victims have spoken about the impact of experiencing such events:
(i) A man in Zabul province stated: ‘After receiving this warning [about his daughters attending school] I disconnected my phone. Since that time, I have stopped my two daughters from attending school.’Footnote 69
(ii) A victim of a remote-controlled improvised explosive device stated: ‘Since that day, my life has changed for the worse. My leg is injured and is often painful. I can no longer walk easily to attend lessons at university. Sometimes, I hear children crying as I remember that terrible day.’Footnote 70
(iii) Kathreen Wida, the editor of Cheragh Daily explained: ‘Women journalists have been murdered, like Zakia Zaki and Shakiba Sanga Amaaj, so of course I worry that the same thing will happen to me … I worry for my children.’Footnote 71
(iv) The difficulty faced by health officials are evidenced by the following: ‘We were … transferring a pregnant woman in an ambulance. Suddenly, Anti-Government Elements opened fire on the ambulance and wounded the patient in her neck … After two hours, and negotiations by community elders with the Anti-Government Elements, it was clear to them that the ambulance was transporting a pregnant woman and not any Afghan Local Police members. They finally allowed us to transfer the patient to Mehterlam public hospital for treatment.’Footnote 72
(v) The relative of a fifteen-year-old boy, Mati, who was recruited by the Taliban, stated: ‘They cheated him. Mati’s uncle went to bring him back, but the Taliban would not let him go … Then fighting [with Afghan government forces] erupted [in July 2015], and … Mati was killed in an airstrike.’Footnote 73
(vi) Nasima Niazi explained her decision not to contest an election in 2010 due to the security risks: ‘Every day when I leave home to go to parliament, I fear that they might blow me up, so I say goodbye to my daughters, and give them advice, and leave them some money just in case I don’t come back.’Footnote 74
(vii) A community elder described: ‘The local population cannot say anything against the Taliban, or to the benefit of the government since they are always scared of being executed by the Taliban in accusation of spying for the government.’Footnote 75
(viii) A female police officer stated after her close encounter with a suicide attack: ‘My daughter is nine years old and every day before I leave for work she cries and says “Mama don’t go to work. I don’t need to eat”.’Footnote 76
Afghan Forces
29. The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANSF) consists of several organs such as: the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan Air Force (AAF), the NDS, the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Local Police (ALP), and the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP).
30. The Request alleges the following war crimes under Article 8: torture and cruel treatment (Article 8(2)(c)(i)), outrages upon personal dignity (Article 8(2)(c)(ii)), and sexual violence (Article 8(2)(e)(vi)). These alleged incidents have taken place at various ANSF facilities throughout the territory of Afghanistan.Footnote 77
31. The Chamber notes the inability to provide a ‘bright line’ test to differentiate between the crimes of torture, cruel and degrading treatment, and outrage upon personal dignity. In this way, the Chamber agrees with the reality that ‘experience demonstrates that the conditions that give rise to ill-treatment frequently facilitate torture and therefore the measures required to prevent torture must be applied to prevent ill-treatment’.Footnote 78
32. The Chamber notes that UNAMA has been systematically reporting on the treatment of conflict-related detainees since 2011 and has revealed a continued disregard for the protection and proper treatment of such persons.Footnote 79
33. The use of torture to elicit confessions during interrogations had implicit approval, as was articulated by a provincial chief of the ANP Criminal Investigation Department: ‘All suspects have the right to remain silent. That presents an obstacle to our police work. What can we do if they don’t speak? We have to find out what happened; we need to use certain methods to find out what really happened.’Footnote 80
34. Information gathered has revealed the following acts as being illustrative of those which allegedly occurred:
Torture and Cruel Treatment – Article 8(2)(c)(i)
(a) UNAMA and AIHRC reports detail the following: beatings on the soles of the feet, legs, shoulders, back, and chest with instruments such as cables, pipes, hoses, and/or wooden sticks; punching, hitting, kicking, and/or jumping on a detainee’s body; suspension by the wrists for a period of time; electric shocks; forced prolonged standing; stress positions – such as standing and sitting down repeatedly and standing outside in cold weather conditions for long periods; use of cigarette lighters to burn the soles of detainees’ feet; removal of fingernails and/or toe nails; and the stuffing of cloth or plastic bags in the mouths of detainees in order to cause asphyxiation.Footnote 81
Outrages upon Personal Dignity – Article 8(2)(c)(ii)
(a) UNAMA and AIHRC reports detail the following: forced drinking of excessive amounts of water; denial of food, water, and prayer time; threats of execution and/or sexual assault.Footnote 82
(b) In October 2016, ANA Special Forces reportedly stripped a seventeen-year-old boy naked and photographed him at a school in Paktya province.Footnote 83
Sexual Violence – Article 8(2)(e)(vi)
(a) UNAMA and AIHRC reports detail the following: deliberate injuries to the genitalia of victims by twisting, squeezing, beating, or burning their penises and/or testicles including with pliers or wrench-like devices; administering electric shocks to the testicles; hanging weights from the testicles; and whipping their penises and testicles with cables.Footnote 84
(b) In 2012, ALP members were found to be involved in the process of baad, where a female member of a perpetrator’s family was ‘given’ to a victim’s family as compensation for a crime.Footnote 85
(c) Also in 2012, a commander in the Chahardara district was found to have carried out or ordered torture, sexual assault, and ill treatment, including the sexual assault of a sixteen-year-old boy,Footnote 86 while in Baghlan province, an ALP commander detained five boys for five years who were reportedly sexually abused while performing the roles of bodyguards and ‘dancing boys’.Footnote 87
(d) In 2016, two incidents of sexual violence, including rape and sexual exploitation, against boys by the ALP were reported.Footnote 88
35. Victims have recounted the following in relation to alleged experiences:
(i) ‘He showed me a cable and said, “I will shock you with electricity.” And then he shocked me [displays visible injury]. After that, I did not know where I was or who I was. When I was okay again, I saw that I was back in my cell. But both of my thumbs had ink on them. I did not know it, but they had taken my thumbprints [as proof of a confession].’Footnote 89
(ii) ‘[O]ne of them held my penis in his hand and twisted it severely until I passed out. After I woke up, I had to confess because I could not stand the pain, and I did not want that to happen to me again and suffer the same severe and unbearable pain.’Footnote 90
(iii) ‘I was beaten with a cable for half an hour and they accused me of being a Talib and being involved in a murder case. They beat my body cruelly and told me to confess. During the interrogation they also had two electric wires which they used on my body until I became unconscious. I forcibly confessed that I was involved in the person’s killing. Then I was transferred to the NDS provincial facility, they again slapped me and one of them choked me four times. They wanted me to confess my membership of the Taliban but I denied this. They threatened me to death if I did not confess and so I did.’Footnote 91
(iv) ‘On the third day, NDS officials threatened me that they would insert a wooden stick pasted with chilli powder in my anal canal.’Footnote 92
(v) ‘They tied me on the door of the interrogation office and I was hanged from it for few hours and I was not feeling anything in my hands. The process continued for almost a week.’Footnote 93
US Forces and the CIA
36. The Request states that in pursuit of answers to the 11 September 2001 attack, US forces and the CIA aggressively pursued a detention and interrogation plan of persons suspected of being connected to the planning and execution of the attack.Footnote 94 The existence and approval of this plan is demonstrated through official US reports, documentation, and authorisations as well as independent UN reports.Footnote 95
37. During the course of this detention and interrogation plan, the Request alleges the following war crimes under Article 8 were committed: torture and cruel treatment (Article 8(2)(c)(i)), outrages upon personal dignity (Article 8(2)(c)(ii)), and rape and other forms of sexual violence (Article 8(2)(e)(vi)).
38. The Request states that these crimes occurred in CIA-run detention facilities on the territory of Afghanistan and on the territory of third-party states such as Poland, Romania, and Lithuania predominantly during 2003–2004.Footnote 96
39. The following information is illustrative of the acts alleged to have been conducted by the US forces and the CIA:
Torture and Cruel Treatment – Article 8(2)(c)(i)
(a) Documents reveal the use of: solitary confinement for various amounts of time; sensory deprivation including the use of black-out goggles and sound-blocking earphones; sensory over-stimulation including the use of loud music and flashing lights; stress positions; suspension including from the ceiling; sleep deprivation and/or manipulation; physical assault including grasping, slapping, hitting, or kicking, ‘rough take downs’,Footnote 97 and ‘wallings’;Footnote 98 confinement in small spaces such as boxes; ‘water boarding’,Footnote 99 water dousing or deluging, and/or placing detainees in ice baths.Footnote 100
Outrages upon Personal Dignity – Article 8(2)(c)(ii)
(a) Documents reveal the use of: items of religious importance in an offensive way; sexual humiliation in the form of being exposed to a member of the opposite sex while naked; being photographed naked; diapering; phobias such as dogs to intimidate and threaten detainees; insulting language; food manipulation and/or deprivation; forced nudity including in front of other detainees; being shown pornography; forced grooming; manipulation of the environment including the use of extreme cold or heat; and mock executions.Footnote 101
Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence – Article 8(2)(e)(vi)
(a) Documents reveal the use of: physical sexual molestation; sexual assault by a female soldier; beatings focused on the testicles of a detainee; penetration of the anus; rectal feeding;Footnote 102 forced masturbation; and the posing of detainees in sexually degrading positions.Footnote 103
40. The experience and the immediate as well as ongoing impact of such acts were articulated by victims either themselves or through the medium of a care institution:
(i) PHR notes: ‘Short and long-term effects can include memory impairment, reduced capacity to concentrate, somatic complaints such as headache and back pain, hyperarousal, avoidance, irritability, severe depression with vegetative symptoms, nightmares, feelings of shame and humiliation, and posttraumatic stress disorder.’Footnote 104
(ii) Some detainees reported ‘depression, thoughts of suicide and nightmares, memory loss, emotional problems, and are quick to anger and have difficulties maintaining relationships and employment’.Footnote 105
(iii) The Berlin Center for the Treatment of Torture Victims (CVT) found that ‘Muslim victims of sexual torture forever carry a stigma and will often be ostracised by the community’Footnote 106 and that ‘merely being stripped naked implies the breaking of a strict taboo, which leaves victims feeling extremely exposed and humiliated’.Footnote 107
(iv) Said Nabi Siddiqi, an Afghan citizen allegedly detained at several facilities in Afghanistan between July and August 2003, reported that he ‘has had depression, thoughts of suicide and nightmares, is quick to anger, and has suffered from memory loss’.Footnote 108
(v) Haji Abdul Rahman, allegedly detained at several facilities between December 2003 and May 2004, reported that he ‘suffers vision problems and memory lapses, has emotional problems and is quick to anger, “which has caused difficulties with his family and work”’.Footnote 109
(vi) Tarek Dergoul, allegedly detained at facilities in Afghanistan as well as Guantánamo Bay, reported: ‘I get migraines, I’m depressed and I suffer from memory loss. There’s stuff that happened, embedded in my head, that I can’t remember.’Footnote 110
Ratione Temporis
41. Article 11 restricts jurisdiction to crimes committed after the Statute came into force, which occurred on 1 July 2002. Where a state becomes a party after that date, then jurisdiction is held over crimes committed following the accession date. Afghanistan acceded to the Statute on 10 February 2003,Footnote 111 while Poland, Romania, and Lithuania ratified the Statute on 12 November 2001, 11 April 2002, and 12 May 2003 respectively.Footnote 112
42. Therefore, ratione temporis is satisfied …
The Impact on the Lives of the People of Afghanistan
44. Decades of conflict in Afghanistan have left its citizens facing layered and multifaceted impacts. Mass migration to flee the instability has resulted in millions leaving their homes and seeking refuge in neighbouring states, such as the Islamic Republics of Pakistan and Iran.Footnote 113 Those who remain continue to suffer from a deteriorating security situation in many parts of the country and face routine attacks. The governor from a district of the Kandahar province explained:
45.
The life of civilians in this district is extremely difficult. On the one hand, when the Taliban plants IEDs, civilians cannot defuse them for fear of Taliban reactions. If they defuse them, the Taliban will kill them. On the other hand, the government pressures people to tell them where and why the Taliban plants IEDs in their villages … Civilians are stuck in between, and are always in trouble. There is no third source to listen to the people and solve these problems.Footnote 114
46. The conflict has left local infrastructure, systems, and politics in a state of dilapidation. One area where the ramifications will continue to be seen is in the area of education, where generational and cyclical poverty is endemic due to low literacy rates translating into limited employment options. Women in particular face insurmountable challenges in pursuit of education, first from a safety perspective and then from official decrees from the Taliban and Haqqani Network.Footnote 115 Refugee children face similar barriers to educational opportunities, particularly when they are forced to flee to states with little to no welfare support.
47. That children are constantly affected is a concern for this Chamber. This state of despair was articulated by a man who lost one of his nieces to an improvised explosive device in 2011, while another niece and his daughter were also injured: ‘These children were not part of the conflict, they had very hopeful aspirations for their future, but this useless war took their future dreams and lives.’Footnote 116
48. Health and medical services have suffered similarly. Afghanistan is one of only two countries in the world where polio is still endemic. The ‘failure to deliver poliomyelitis vaccinations has serious consequences for children’s health and a direct effect on the efforts to eradicate poliomyelitis in Afghanistan. Cases of polio in Afghanistan tripled in 2011, creating concern of a reversal of several years of decline’.Footnote 117
49. The Chamber wishes to note that civilian deaths and injuries have also resulted from tactics used by pro-government forces.Footnote 118 While not addressed in the list of crimes thus far alleged, these should by no means be less regretted, or be overlooked or forgotten. Furthermore, evidence of rape and sexual assault is presented in the information provided but not brought forward at this stage. Therefore the Chamber calls upon the OTP to investigate such instances for inclusion if evidence dictates.
Conclusion on Jurisdiction
50. In light of the above, the Chamber is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the contextual elements of both crimes against humanity and war crimes are satisfied in respect of the alleged events, in particular in light of their scale and magnitude. Suffice to say, at this stage, that according to UNAMA, civilian casualties in the period 2009–2016, as witnessed throughout the Afghan territory, exceed 50,000, of which 17,700 are deaths and over 33,000 injuries.Footnote 119
Judge Mashal Aamir and Judge Adrienne Ringin
16.3 The Gravity Test in the Afghanistan Investigation
In 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber II decided whether to authorise an investigation into crimes allegedly committed on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since 1 March 2003.Footnote 120 While the Chamber ultimately decided that an investigation would not be in the interests of justice, the Chamber did conclude that the crimes allegedly committed by the Afghani army, the Taliban, and American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) forces against Afghani detainees were severe enough to merit passing the ICC’s gravity test.
In this rewritten decision, Judge Marshall concurs with the original Chamber’s finding through a critical engagement with the role of gender, and in particular sexual violence, prevalent in the crimes allegedly committed. In doing so, Marshall expands the section on gravity, allowing for an exploration of the intersectionality of race, ethnicity, and other social factors, placing the survivors at the centre of the discussion and analysing the actions of all protagonists in the conflict.
Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan No.: ICC-02/17
Date: 12 April 2019
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II(B)
Before: Judge Jill MARSHALL
SITUATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
Introduction
1. This Chamber notes the importance of victims’ representations complementing and supplementing the information provided by the Prosecutor on the facts alleged in support of the Request. A high number of victims of the situation have come forward to present their views on whether the Chamber should authorise the commencement of this Prosecutor’s investigation. The Court has received a large number of representations in various languages: 668 representations on behalf of 6,220 individuals; 17 representations on behalf of 1,690 families; 13 representations on behalf of several millions of victims, including 26 villages; and 1 representation on behalf of an institution. It is fundamental to hear the voices of women and girls, as well as other alleged victims and survivors of the acts falling under investigation. A survivor-centred approach is in keeping with norms and resolutions of other parts of international law, and international criminal law will be enriched by considering these issues holistically within the wide international legal framework.Footnote 121
2. In terms of court procedure, Article 15 of the Rome Statute states that the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation on their own motion. Such investigation must be authorised by a pre-trial chamber with the assessment being provisional in nature because it is conducted in abstract pending commencement of investigations. To reinterpret and transform laws for a better, more just future as a court, we need to use those tools currently at our disposal as a starting point.Footnote 122
Admissibility …
Gravity
19. The next decision relates to gravity. Any crime falling within the jurisdiction of this Court is serious. However, Article 17(l)(d) states that a case may be inadmissible if it ‘is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’. The prosecution makes detailed submissions arguing that all the crimes alleged in the Request meet the threshold of sufficient gravity. Assessing gravity is crucial, requiring information regarding those most responsible for the most serious crimes within the situation. Any assessment must be carried out consistently, irrespective of the states or parties involved, or the person(s) or group(s) concerned.Footnote 123
20. The Rome Statute does not define gravity. It generally refers to the seriousness of the crimes but lacks a clear definition. The Appeals Chamber has dismissed the setting of an overly restrictive legal bar to the interpretation of gravity that would hamper the deterrent role of the Court. It has also observed that the role of persons or groups may vary considerably depending on the circumstances of the case and therefore should not be exclusively assessed or predetermined on excessively formulistic grounds.Footnote 124
21. The Court has read the detailed submissions from the prosecution and refers to selected relevant information within its assessment below.
Assessment
22. The assessment of gravity must be done from both a quantitative and a qualitative viewpoint. The factors that guide the prosecution’s assessment include the scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes, and their impact.Footnote 125 These factors are helpful in reaching this decision and will be used together with the Request’s classification of three groups allegedly responsible for the crimes, namely: the Taliban and affiliated forces; the Afghan National Security Forces and others (ANSF); and US forces and the CIA. The persons or groups of persons identified in accordance with Regulation 49(2)(c) include persons with levels of responsibility in directing, ordering, facilitating, or otherwise contributing to the commission of alleged crimes. The persons or groups of persons so identified include those who devised, authorised, or bore oversight responsibility for the implementation of the incidents, including persons with levels of responsibility for interrogating detainees within a given facility or region, and developing, authorising, directing, supervising, and implementing the commission of alleged crimes.
What Is the Scale, Nature, and Manner of Commission of the Crimes and Their Impact?
Scale
23. What is ‘scale’ and how is it assessed? In line with past practice of this Court, factors to consider include:
(i) the number of direct and indirect victims;
(ii) the extent of the damage caused by the crimes, in particular the bodily or psychological harm caused to the victims and their families;
(iii) or their geographical or temporal spread (high intensity of the crimes over a brief period or low intensity of crimes over an extended period).Footnote 126
24. The prosecution provides extensive information regarding the background to the series of armed conflicts and instability within Afghanistan for decades. It recalls that since 1 May 2003 – when the Rome Statute entered into force for Afghanistan – conflict intensified, as an armed insurgency waged a widespread guerrilla-style war against the government, as well as international forces supporting it. The prosecution submits that, according to statistical data collected since 2009, many thousands of civilians, including many women, have been victims of continuous acts of serious violence, potentially constituting crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.Footnote 127
Nature
25. The nature of the crimes refers to the specific elements of each offence such as:
(i) killings;
(ii) rapes and other crimes involving sexual or gender violence;
(iii) crimes committed against children;
(iv) persecution, or the imposition of conditions of life on a group calculated to bring about its destruction.Footnote 128
Manner
26. The manner of commission of the crimes may be assessed by considering:
(i) the means employed to execute the crime;
(ii) the degree of participation and intent of the perpetrator (if discernible at this stage);
(iii) the extent to which the crimes were systematic or result from a plan or organised policy or otherwise resulted from the abuse of power or official capacity;
(iv) elements of particular cruelty, including the vulnerability of the victims;
(v) any motives involving discrimination, or the use of rape and sexual violence as a means of destroying groups.
Impact
27. The impact of crimes may be assessed through looking at:
(i) the suffering endured by the victims and their increased vulnerability;
(ii) the terror subsequently instilled;
(iii) or the social, economic, and environmental damage inflicted on the affected communities.
Allegations against the Taliban and Affiliated Groups
Scale
28. Since mid-2003, remnants of the Taliban, formerly in power, and other armed anti-government groups, clashed with Afghan forces and those international forces supporting it. The civilian population suffered greatly as the anti-government groups attacked civilians including those perceived or believed to be associated with the Afghan government or related to the international community.
29. Annex 2A to the Request provides a non-exhaustive list and detailed description of several of the most serious incidents, which are said to have taken place in as many as twenty-five provinces of Afghanistan. An extensive catalogue of crimes, including statistics, were alleged to have been committed by them as part of a widespread and systematic attack; these include many and varied incidents on an extensive scale, as further described below in relation to the nature of the acts.
30. Over the period 2009–2016, the prosecution states that 50,802 civilian casualties (17,770 deaths and 33,032 injuries) were attributed to anti-government armed groups, mostly from their use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as suicide and complex attacks. The information available suggests that much of the alleged conduct was committed with particular cruelty or in order to instil terror and fear among the local civilian population.Footnote 129 The prosecution mainly relies on the findings of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). For example, UNAMA documented 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 deaths and 7,457 injured) in 2015 alone, exceeding the previous record levels of civilian casualties that occurred in 2014. These figures show an overall increase of 4 per cent during 2015 in total civilian casualties from the previous year. UNAMA began its systematic documentation of civilian casualties in 2009. Ground engagements between parties to the conflict caused the highest number of total civilian casualties (fatalities and injuries), followed by IEDs and suicide and complex attacks. Ground engagements caused the most fatalities amongst civilians, followed by targeted and deliberate killings.
31. The prosecution alleges that the Taliban and other anti-government groups can be held responsible for these incidents. While making some submissions on the structure of the Taliban and other anti-government armed groups in Afghanistan, the prosecution underlines that information available at this stage does not lead to any conclusive determination as to which specific groups, or association of groups, may have carried out the alleged crimes.
Nature
32. The Request’s list of Taliban acts consists of a variety of incidents including, without limitation, the following: attacks by gunmen, bombers, and suicide bombers resulting in numerous murders and injuries of civilians gathered in public and private places – among them mosques, hospitals, and schools – as well as foreigners regarded as supportive of the Afghan government; executions of alleged collaborators and spies of the government and foreign entities, sometimes followed by the gruesome display of mutilated bodies to which written messages threatening the population were attached; abductions of civilians; attacks against civil servants, police officers, judges and other officials of judicial authorities, governors, members of parliament and of district and provincial councils, religious, tribal, and other local community leaders, teachers, healthcare providers, journalists, farmers, and workers on de-mining or road construction sites; schoolgirls and female officials. Other incidents involving the multiple commission of prohibited acts and furthering an organisational policy leading to a high number of direct and indirect victims, including widespread attacks on humanitarian aid workers.
33. The prosecution alleges that the Taliban and other anti-government groups can be held responsible for attacks on United Nations, NGO, and humanitarian workers; suicide attacks resulting in the killing or wounding of members of Afghan forces and of soldiers of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established by the UN Security Council; and the use of child soldiers, in some cases in connection with suicide bombings.Footnote 130
Manner
34. This orchestrated, systematic, cultural structure of violence based on ideologies of hate, inequality, and terror appeared to permeate the country, contributing to intentional cruelty, including rape and sexual violence, potentially as a means to destroy certain groups.
35. This structural order could instil a notion of recurring harms simply expected in women’s lives, with access to resources virtually impossible and violence against women and girls a reflection of wider unequal power relationships between men and women in society.Footnote 131 Thought-provoking research on suffering indicates there is a body of work that gives voice to the physical and emotional pain of people battling with chronic poverty, social marginalisation, and routinised violence. It focuses on disruption and regulation: how ordinary social life ‘hurts’ and how this hurt becomes part of the social experience.Footnote 132 In this regard, there is much evidence of Taliban attacks or threats towards the education sector undermining the rights of girls and women to education without discrimination under international law. Attacks occurred not only in schools, but in places of worship and against civilians, all contrary to international law. These alleged crimes were committed in a manner inflicting maximum harm and injury on the largest number of victims, through suicide bombings in crowded public gatherings, including against humanitarian workers. The information available suggests that much of the alleged conduct was committed with particular cruelty, or intended to instil terror and fear among the local civilian population. Victims were deliberately targeted on a discriminatory basis based on their actual or perceived political allegiance or on gender grounds, with attacks particularly directed to civic and community leaders. For example, in 2015, UNAMA documented a 37 per cent increase in female casualties and a 14 per cent increase in child casualties.
36. UNAMA indicates that women continue to suffer greatly from the armed conflict. In 2018, women comprised 10 per cent of conflict-related civilian casualties, and 12 per cent in 2017. UNAMA documented 1,152 women casualties from the armed conflict (350 deaths and 802 injured), a 6 per cent decrease from 2017. Together with the direct impact on women, they are also disproportionately affected by the broader effects of the armed conflict. This exacerbates their vulnerability to marginalisation, poverty, discrimination, and violence. Further, internally displaced women and children face particular risks of abuse of their basic rights, in particular access to adequate shelter, food, and health services. Women suffer harm from the loss of male family members, critical to the socio-economic survival and security of the nuclear and extended family unit. Women’s access to health services is severely impeded in locations of active hostilities as service providers either flee the fighting or cannot provide services due to ongoing insecurity. UNAMA noted that incidents of armed attacks, ground fighting, and IED detonations contributed to a heightened sense of fear amongst women for their physical safety and that of their family. Women thus remained within their homes and villages with their families, restricting their freedoms on a day-to-day basis, eliminating women’s visibility from public life and their right to make contributions without fear of repercussions on them directly or on their families. The National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security to protect women and girls from violence – in law, policy, and practice – needs to be taken into account in this regard to ensure underlying structural discrimination policies are eliminated at source, in the design of governmental policies, and provide full redress for failures to do so.
37. The public nature of ‘executions’, and displaying mutilated bodies, has been noted in the context of genocide as destroying communities and having cultural significance.Footnote 133 This example is from Rwanda and awareness of cultural understandings of suffering and death are often specific. In the context of Rwanda, and in certain religious understandings, ‘suffering a bad death’,Footnote 134 including the separation of the head from the rest of the body, can have further spiritual resonance. It is clear this constitutes significant cruelty, including towards vulnerable victims.
38. The Request submits that such conduct qualifies as crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Statute and, specifically, as the crimes of murder, imprisonment, or other severe deprivation of physical liberty and persecution on political and gender grounds, committed since 1 May 2003 as part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians. The Request further submits that these acts qualify as war crimes in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character under Article 8 of the Statute and, specifically, as the crimes of murder; intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, humanitarian personnel, and protected objects; conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen or using them to participate actively in hostilities; and killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary.
Impact
39. The Chamber specifically highlights the devastating and unfinished systemic consequences on the lives of innocent people of the brutal violence inflicted over a prolonged period; the gruesome public display of violence aimed at instilling fear and inspiring subjugation in the population as well as the recurrent targeting of women, including very young and vulnerable civilians. The widespread use of such tactics placed the civilian population at increased risk of attack from governmental and international forces, contributing to increased civilian casualties.Footnote 135
40. The daily endurance and duration of these crimes has had a severe social and psychological impact on the population. The campaign of targeted killings of politicians, government workers, tribal and community leaders, teachers, and religious scholars has deprived local communities of functioning institutions. In many parts of the country, the population has been denied access to humanitarian assistance and basic government services, including healthcare, because of the insurgent strategy of targeting government and aid workers, including medical staff and de-miners. Areas have become effectively out of bounds to humanitarian assistance workers, while continued attacks against foreigners have forced many international aid organisations to cease their operations, making the effective delivery of essential aid or development programmes more difficult.
41. The alleged crimes have had a particularly broad and severe impact on women and girls. Not only have they suffered conflict-related sexual violence; girls’ education has come under sustained attack, thereby depriving thousands of girls of their fundamental human right to education.Footnote 136 UNAMA evidence shows that the armed conflict took a heavy toll on education in 2018. Between 1 January and 31 December, UNAMA recorded 191 incidents affecting education, including attacks targeting or incidentally damaging schools; the killing, injury, and abduction of educational personnel; and threats against education facilities and personnel. Women who were left as sole income-providers for their households after the death or injury of their husbands have experienced long-lasting social and economic consequences, with poverty forcing many women to give their daughters in marriage in exchange for debts or to take their children out of school, often to work, with potentially long-lasting negative impact on the lives of women and girls and wider society.Footnote 137
42. Such allegations are of an extremely grave nature. If proven, they demonstrate the structural nature of violence against a population, particularly discriminatory, abusive, and violent towards women and girls, and indicate that an investigation into gender-based crimes is required.
Allegations against the ANSF and Other Forces
Scale
43. Alleged crimes are said to have been committed institutionally in certain facilities on a large scale with high percentages of detainees reportedly subjected to torture or cruel treatment. For example, UNAMA evidence that in 2016 alone, ANSF caused 1,663 civilian casualties (457 deaths and 1,206 injured) during ground engagements, a 41 per cent increase compared to 2015. This figure does not include 103 civilian casualties (18 deaths and 85 injured) attributed to pro-government armed groups or 7 civilian deaths attributed to international military forces. In 2015, UNAMA attributed 1,177 civilian casualties (321 deaths and 856 injured) from ground engagements to ANSF (not including 81 civilian casualties – 19 deaths and 62 injured attributed to pro-government armed groups).
Nature
44. With regard to the ANSF and other forces, and the US forces and CIA, the alleged crimes include killings, torture, and crimes of a sexual nature, as detailed below.
Manner
45. The prosecution submits that, since 1 May 2003, members of the ANSF and others committed crimes against persons removed from combat by detention, or civilians who were not taking active part in the hostilities and were detained for security reasons related to the ongoing armed conflict. Evidence was produced that torture was widely practised to force confessions, obtain information, or punish. The Request details cases of infliction of severe physical and mental pain or suffering to detainees, some of which are particularly brutal, cruel, and hurtful and some resulting in the victim’s death; cases of humiliating and degrading treatment, or other inhumane treatment violating victims’ dignity, including by depriving them of fundamental material and spiritual needs, such as sleep, food, and water, and praying; as well as cases of acts of sexual violence, at times resulting in the permanent impairment of the victims’ sexual integrity. In 2016, UNAMA verified eleven cases of conflict-related sexual violence against women, girls, and boys committed by parties to the conflict including the Afghan National Border Police and the Afghan Local Police (as well as the Taliban). Of these cases, just two perpetrators (members of the Afghan National Border Police) were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. The eleven incidents include four documented cases of ‘bachah bazi’, involving the sexual abuse and enslavement of boys by men in positions of power, many of whom are linked to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. Efforts led by the AIHRC to criminalise this practice resulted in draft legislation in March 2016.Footnote 138 A report by an independent government watchdog listed 5,753 cases of what it describes as gross human rights abuses by Afghan forces. Many of those abuses involve routine enslavement and sexual abuse of underage boys by Afghan commanders.Footnote 139 The limited presence of women in the Afghan National Police (1.8 per cent) contributes to the continuing underreporting of sexual violence. The prosecution submits that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, since 1 May 2003, the war crimes of torture and cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and sexual violence have been committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict against persons so detained.
46. The ‘special gravity’ of torture is noted. Senior officials have admitted that detainees were subjected to cruel treatment in the relevant facilities under their authority.Footnote 140 Torture’s prohibition represents a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).Footnote 141 It ‘is absolute and non-derogable in any circumstances’, ‘applies at all times’, ‘no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State Party to justify acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction’, with no exceptions including ‘a state of war or threat thereof, internal political instability or any other public emergency’, or ‘any threat of terrorist acts or violent crime as well as armed conflict, international or non-international’. This prohibition is ‘grounded in a widespread international practice and on the opinio juris of States … appears in numerous international instruments of universal application … has been introduced into the domestic law of almost all States’.Footnote 142 It is therefore clear that where torture is allegedly involved, the matter of gravity is made out.
Impact
47. Detainees were forced to give false confessions, with threat of further punishment, resulting in potentially innocent detainees incarcerated for longer periods with further deprivation of their, and their families’, rights.Footnote 143
48. The alleged crimes had severe short-term and long-term impacts on detainees’ physical and mental health, including permanent physical injuries. Often the pain during interrogation caused lost consciousness. Some detainees are described as ‘broken husks’ after abuse, suffering insomnia, chronic pain, and forgetfulness.Footnote 144
49. Families of victims were often left in a state of uncertainty about the fate of loved ones; their communities came under suspicion of harbouring loyalties to the Taliban, or Al Qaeda, or were tainted by such accusations. The information available suggests that victims were deeply traumatised by their treatment in custody.
Allegations against US Forces and the CIA
Scale
50. The alleged crimes appear to have been inflicted on a small percentage of all persons detained by US armed forces over a limited time period, after which the use of such techniques by US armed forces worldwide was formally rescinded and the US Army Field Manual restored the Geneva Conventions in its detainee treatment and interrogation. The acts allegedly committed were serious both in their number and in their effect and, although implemented pursuant to authorised interrogation policies adopted locally rather than at headquarters level, they implicated personal responsibility within the command structure.
Nature
51. With regard to US armed forces and the CIA, the alleged crimes include killings, torture, and crimes of a sexual nature.
Manner
52. The prosecution argue that the treatment of CIA detainees appears to have been particularly grave on a qualitative assessment. The alleged crimes appear to have been committed with particular cruelty, involving the infliction of serious physical and psychological injury, over prolonged periods, and including acts committed in a manner calculated to offend cultural and religious values, and leaving victims deeply traumatised. Detainees who were subjected to ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioural issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. A specific section of the Request is devoted to the alleged policies of US armed forces and the CIA for interrogating detainees. The specific incidents included inflicting severe physical and mental pain or suffering to hors de combat detainees or to other persons not taking active part in the hostilities in the non-international armed conflict, some of which are extremely cruel, brutal, and gruesome; cases of humiliating, degrading, or inhumane treatment violating the victims’ dignity, among which the deprivation of fundamental material and spiritual needs (including sleep, food and water, and praying); acts implying offence, distress, and shame, including acts of a sexual nature, invading intimate, private dignity, bodily, and psychological integrity, all fully protected under international law. Socio-cultural norms and religious factors particular to Afghan society, known for its social conservativism especially regarding sexual matters,Footnote 145 may have caused incidents of detainee abuse to be under-reported, especially in cases of sexual violence such as forced nudity and sexual humiliation. These victims may experience shame, guilt, and fear of being stigmatised by their communities. The prosecution received information that victims are afraid to report the abuse because of threats to harm their families or fear of retaliation and reprisals. Some who did speak publicly were threatened, harassed, or attacked after doing so. There has been no reporting mechanism in place attempting to collect accounts from witnesses and survivors located in remote and insecure areas of Afghanistan or that has been available to victims who have been willing to come forward with their testimonies.Footnote 146
53. According to the prosecution, there is a reasonable basis to believe that, since May 2003, members of the US armed forces and the CIA have committed the war crimes of torture and cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape and other forms of sexual violence pursuant to a policy approved by the US authorities.Footnote 147
54. The prosecution further indicates there may be other crimes committed by members of the other international forces deployed in Afghanistan.Footnote 148 A determination on these has not yet been reached due to currently insufficient information or analysis. Several victims’ representations refer to incidents in which individuals not participating in hostilities as well as non-military buildings, including of a protected nature, were indiscriminately or deliberately attacked by air strikes and drones by US and other international forces, despite lacking a military target, and that such attacks resulted in civilian deaths. Although the prosecution is not requesting authorisation to investigate these yet, it notes that these allegations ‘can be subjected to proper investigation and analysis if an investigation of the Situation is authorised’. Further, it states ‘should an investigation be opened, these and other alleged crimes that may occur after the commencement of the investigation … could be assessed within the scope of the authorised situation’.Footnote 149
55. These alleged crimes appear to have been committed with particular cruelty, involving the infliction of serious physical and psychological injury, over prolonged periods, including acts committed in a manner calculated to offend cultural and religious taboos, leaving victims deeply traumatised. Detainees so subjected exhibited psychological and behavioural issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.Footnote 150
56. The treatment of CIA detainees appears to have been particularly grave on a qualitative assessment, with interrogations being ‘brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others’. The CIA applied its ‘enhanced interrogation’ techniques ‘with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time’, with techniques ‘used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation’.Footnote 151 Further details can be found in the US Senate Report regarding the horrors of ‘waterboarding’ and the particularly harsh conditions of confinement for CIA detainees allegedly forming an integral part of the interrogation process. Information available is, however, limited by the clandestine nature of the detention and interrogation programme; efforts to conceal the number and identity of victims; denying access to national and international reporting mechanisms mandated to monitor and report these detentions, together with the destruction of CIA videotapes of this behaviour.Footnote 152
Impact
57. The prosecution point out the psychological impact on CIA detainees who were told they would not leave custody alive.Footnote 153 Threats to harm children or sexually abuse mothers of detainees are detailed. Psychological and behavioural issues were identified, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. It is noted that ‘[m]ultiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems’.Footnote 154 Being carried out by a democratic country seen by many to be the ‘land of the free’ and ‘leaders of the free world’ with developed standards of integrity, accountability, and transparency, such behaviour is especially hypocritical. This has corresponding effects on any understanding of trust in liberal democracies. Further, women are involved as alleged perpetrators of torture and other crimes. All these issues can undermine support for substantive gender equality, instead being used to substantiate arguments supporting the negative influence of westernising feminism on Afghan society, in general, and Afghan women, in particular.
58. Previous international criminal case law has secured convictions for sexual violence and raised the profile of the global phenomenon of conflict-related sexual violence and the cultural, religious, and societal consequences of such crimes that must be considered in any assessment of gravity. As noted by Brammertz and Jarvis, former lead prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), ‘we must engage in an honest dialogue about why conflict-related sexual violence presents such an accountability challenge and how we can improve the situation. We cannot simply rest on the successes we managed to secure in the past – we must continue to insist on more effective strategies for the future’.Footnote 155 As part of that, this Court needs to acknowledge the structural gender disadvantages suffered by women in Afghan society during the time in question in this decision.
Conclusions on Gravity
59. All these allegations meet the gravity threshold set out in Article 17(1)(d) in respect of all the ‘categories’ of crimes for which the prosecution requests authorisation to investigate committed by the Taliban, members of the ANSF and others, US armed forces and members of the CIA. There appear to be multiple failures from all sides.
60. In relation to the crimes allegedly committed by the ANSF, US forces and the CIA, the Chamber notes the gravity per se of the crime of torture, which is banned by international law, and that the conduct was allegedly committed by public officials in their functions, the high number of victims, the nature of the crimes, the manner of the conduct and its impact on the victims.
61. As my decision draws to a close, I would like to refer to the risks and tensions of feminist perspectives in legal decisions and judgments such as this. Feminism in law depends on paradoxes – to acknowledge the power of discourses, such as international criminal law, that reinforce the existing status quo yet require the transforming potential for resistance. In this regard, we need to challenge the notion of violent acts that can be prosecuted and addressed whilst also accounting for their enabling structures and ideologies, to expand and pluralise our vocabularies of justice and redress, but to do this without reinscribing narratives that reinforce patriarchal norms.Footnote 156 This is ‘not so much a space of resistance but an entirely different geometry through which we can think power, knowledge, space and identity in critical and, hopefully, liberatory ways’.Footnote 157 It is hoped that this short decision contributes fruitfully to such a future of transformative international criminal justice.
Judge Jill Marshall
16.4 The Complementarity Test in the Afghanistan Investigation
In 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber II concluded that the complementarity test had not been met by belligerent parties in prosecuting alleged crimes committed in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from 1 March 2003. Therefore, the potential cases arising from the Afghanistan situation appeared admissible to the ICC.Footnote 158
In this rewritten decision, Kathryn Gooding confirms this finding. In doing so, Gooding applies a feminist lens to several aspects of complementarity including the ‘substantially the same conduct’ test as well as the framing of ‘unwilling’, ‘unable’, and ‘genuine’, noting how domestic cases against the Taliban forces, Afghan National Security Forces, US armed forces, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) failed to be conducted in a gender-sensitive manner. This is demonstrated through the absence of language around sexual violence in Afghan law, and the discriminatory requirements for proof in the matter of rape. Gooding also engages with the prosecution for Afghan National Security Forces, US armed forces, and the CIA in the treatment of male sexual assault survivors and how social and cultural understanding of male sexual assault acts as a barrier to effective prosecution.
Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan No.: ICC-02/17
Date: 12 April 2019
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II(B)
Before: Judge Kathryn GOODING
SITUATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
Determination by the Chamber on the Issues on Admissibility
[…]
Introduction
70. As per Article 53(1)(b), the Chamber is required at this stage to assess whether prospective cases, which could arise out of an investigation by the Prosecutor, would be admissible before the Court pursuant to Article 17 of the Statute. This assessment is conducted by reference to the conduct identified by the Prosecutor in her Request,Footnote 159 which could constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. This is, however, without prejudice to further cases that may subsequently be identified by the Prosecutor. The admissibility assessment contained within Article 17 is three-fold; Article 17(1)(a)–(d) sets out the two-stage complementarity assessmentFootnote 160 and gravity assessment that the Chamber must carry out. Firstly, the Chamber must consider whether there are, or have been, any domestic investigations or prosecutions of cases that could arise from any authorised investigation into the situation in Afghanistan. And if this is answered in the affirmative, whether these cases relate to the same case that may be the subject of proceedings before the Court, and whether a decision has been made not to prosecute the individuals concerned.
71. Secondly, the Chamber must assess whether the state with jurisdiction is genuinely willing and able to carry out the relevant investigations or prosecutions identified at stage 1 and whether a decision not to prosecute any individual concerned arose out of any unwillingness or inability of the state to genuinely prosecute.
72. The Chamber must finally consider whether the relevant cases identified are of sufficient gravity to justify investigation by the Court.
Complementarity
73. The Pre-Trial Chamber has provided guidance as to the requirements contained within Article 17(1)(a). The Court is required to conduct a judicial assessment of whether the case that the state is investigating sufficiently mirrors the one that the Prosecutor is investigating.Footnote 161 The focus must be on the nature of the conduct, not its legal characterisation in the national legal system.Footnote 162 The Pre-Trial Chamber has found that the unwillingness and inability tests are disjunctive;Footnote 163 therefore, if either one is satisfied, the case is admissible before the Court. Article 17(2) and (3) sets out a number of factors which may indicate unwillingness or inability on the part of the investigating and/or prosecuting state, including national proceedings not being conducted independently or impartially. Inability must be assessed in the context of the relevant national system and proceduresFootnote 164 to determine whether the national authorities are capable of investigating or prosecuting the accused.
74. The Trial Chamber has found that the statutory definition of ‘unwillingness’ contained within Article 17(2) is not exhaustive.Footnote 165 The Chamber therefore considers that the definition can be extended to encompass gender-sensitive considerations to assess the extent to which Afghanistan and the United States can be considered willing or able to investigate or prosecute the cases contained within the Prosecutor’s Request.
75. In relation to national proceedings carried out in Afghanistan against members of the Taliban and affiliated armed groups, the Prosecutor submits that members of such groups have been accused predominantly of committing crimes against the state.Footnote 166 Articles 173–253 of Afghanistan’s 1976 Penal Code set out crimes against the external and internal security of the state. These offences encompass efforts to change the constitution or form of the state by force, or to impair the independence or territorial integrity of Afghanistan. The Chamber considers that these offences do not cover substantially the same conduct as the conduct alleged by the Prosecutor to constitute the crime of persecution on political and gender grounds contrary to Article 7(1)(h). The Chamber notes that the national proceedings, focusing on conduct considered to weaken the state, emanate from the ideologically competing, yet similarly patriarchal, visions of statehood of the Western-backed government and the Taliban.
76. In contrast, the crime of persecution on gender grounds, as identified by the ICC Prosecutor, reflects in this case the individual harms suffered by women and girls, targeted simply for being women. The national proceedings in no way capture the extent of the harm, or the discriminatory rationale, nature, and effect of the offences committed against Afghan women and girls. The Chamber is therefore satisfied that potential cases against members of the Taliban and affiliated armed groups would be admissible under Article 17 because the first limb of the test is not satisfied (that is, the Afghan authorities are not investigating or prosecuting the same conduct that is of interest to the ICC).
77. In addition, even if there was a greater degree of overlap between the national and ICC proceedings, these cases would still be admissible to the ICC under the second limb of the test. That is, the Chamber considers that Afghanistan is unwilling to investigate or prosecute the potential cases arising from the Request, as a result of the inadequacies of the Afghan legal system in its treatment of sexual and gender-based violence. Although equality between men and women is enshrined in Article 22 of the Afghan Constitution, it is the observation of the Chamber that this is not the case in practice. The Afghan legal system is defined by legal pluralism, with Islamic Hanafi jurisprudence dictating the punishments for hudud (crimes committed against the public interest) and qisas (crimes against the bodily integrity of a person).Footnote 167 The hudud offence of zina, contrary to Article 429 of the 1976 Penal Code, prohibits adultery, fornication, and rape, although rape is neither mentioned nor defined. This ambiguity has reinforced the blurring between consensual and non-consensual sexual relations and has led to the widespread incarceration of female rape victims on charges of adultery.Footnote 168 Furthermore, discriminatory procedural requirements obstruct investigations into and convictions for rape. In support of her complaint, a female complainant must obtain the testimony of four trustworthy male Muslims, each of whom were present at the time of the offence, and each of whom saw the actual act of penetration.Footnote 169
78. The Chamber notes that of relevance is paragraph 41 of the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, which states that the absence of genuine national proceedings being undertaken can be demonstrated by discriminatory attitudes and gender stereotypes evident in the substantive law of the country under investigation, and procedural rules that limit access to justice for victims of sexual and gender-based crimes.Footnote 170 The Chamber is therefore satisfied at this stage that potential cases arising from crimes committed by members of the Taliban would be admissible under the second limb of the test, as a result of the unwillingness of the Afghan authorities to genuinely investigate or prosecute conduct constituting the crime of prosecution on political and gender grounds contrary to Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute.
79. With regard to the alleged crimes committed by Afghan National Security Forces, US armed forces, and the CIA, the Prosecutor’s Request details a number of acts constituting sexual violence contrary to Article 8(2)(e)(vi), carried out against predominantly male conflict-related detainees. The acts alleged in the Request include deliberate injuries and electric shocks to the genitals, penetration of the anal openings of detainees in circumstances of sexual humiliation, forced nudity, and sexual molestation. The Chamber notes that the Prosecutor’s Request refers to a number of investigations conducted by Afghan authorities for torture and cruel treatment, and by US authorities for assault and murder. This characterisation of the acts detailed in the Request by the relevant authorities fails to reflect the sexual and gender dimensions of the crimes – specifically that the crimes were likely carried out for the purposes of punishment, humiliation, and degradation of the detainee against the backdrop of cultural and religious taboos against homosexuality prevalent in Afghanistan.Footnote 171
80. It is the opinion of the Chamber that the sexual and gender dimensions of these alleged acts go to the very nature of the conduct, such that the investigations by Afghan and US authorities into acts of torture, cruel treatment, assault, and murder do not sufficiently mirror the cases detailed by the Prosecutor in her Request. The Chamber further notes the importance of correctly characterising sexual and gender-based violence, to undermine the dichotomy of female/victim and male/perpetrator, and the idea that a male survivor is emasculated and weak, due to sexual violence casting aspersions of homosexuality. The Chamber concludes that the Afghan and US authorities are not investigating or prosecuting cases constituting the same conduct as that contained within the Prosecutor’s Request, and therefore such cases are admissible under Article 17.
81. The Chamber observes that the first limb of the test for complementarity has been met in relation to investigations and prosecutions conducted by Afghan and US authorities; however, these cases would nevertheless be admissible under the second limb. The Chamber notes with concern the significant lack of protections for male survivors of sexual violence in Afghanistan. Sodomy and sexual acts between men that do not result in penetration, tafkhez, are offences contrary to Articles 646, 647, and 649 of the 2017 Penal Code.Footnote 172 It has been reported that men and boys who report rape and other sexual violence to the relevant authorities are branded as homosexual and are incarcerated for these offences.Footnote 173 It is the conclusion of the Chamber that the structural discrimination evident in the Afghan legal system precludes any impartial proceedings and demonstrates Afghanistan’s unwillingness to conduct genuine proceedings that reflect the sexual and gender dimensions of the crimes contained within the Request.
82. Furthermore, the Chamber also notes its concern regarding the approach of the US authorities in conducting predominantly non-judicial and administrative proceedingsFootnote 174 in relation to offences perpetrated by members of the US armed forces and the CIA, which demonstrates the unwillingness of the US authorities to genuinely carry out prosecutions of individuals for cases contained within the Prosecutor’s Request. The Chamber notes with interest paragraph 41 of the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, which states that the absence of genuine national proceedings can be indicated by the lack of political will, including official attitudes of trivialisation and minimisation or denial of the crimes contained within the Prosecutor’s Request, and manifestly insufficient steps in the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes.Footnote 175
83. The Church Report found that as of September 2004, twenty-seven investigations had been initiated following allegations of detainee abuse by US personnel in Afghanistan, involving sixty-five service members and between twenty-five and fifty detainees. The twenty-seven investigations concluded that the allegations were either unsubstantiated or led to administrative action including a letter of reprimand or suspension from operations involving detainees.Footnote 176 The Chamber concludes that the non-judicial and administrative proceedings conducted by US authorities serve to perpetuate impunity for sexual and gender-based violence against male conflict-related detainees, and appear to reflect the attitude of US authorities to investigating and prosecuting such crimes, which appears to be one of trivialisation and minimisation. For the foregoing reasons, the Chamber deems the potential cases arising from crimes committed by members of US armed forces, the CIA, and the Afghan National Security Forces admissible under both limbs of the test in Article 17.
Conclusion
84. The Chamber concludes that the national proceedings conducted by Afghan and US authorities do not cover the same conduct that is subject to proceedings before the Court, as the national cases do not adequately capture the gendered basis of the crimes contained within the Prosecutor’s Request. The Chamber notes that even if there is a degree of overlap between some of the domestic cases and the cases detailed in the Prosecutor’s Request, there are gendered deficiencies in national law, particularly in Afghan law, and lack of political will on the part of the US and Afghan authorities to prosecute sexual and gender-based crimes, which mean that both states are unwilling or unable to genuinely conduct these proceedings. Although not made explicit by the text of Article 17 of the Statute, the Chamber observes that gender analysis is relevant to both limbs of the complementarity test.
85. The Chamber is therefore satisfied at this stage that potential cases arising from crimes committed by members of the Taliban, Afghan National Security Forces, US armed forces, and the CIA would be admissible under Article 17 of the Statute.
Judge Kathryn Gooding
16.5 The Interests of Justice Test in the Afghanistan Investigation
In 2017, after a decade-long preliminary examination into the conflict in Afghanistan, Prosecutor Bensouda concluded that the criteria for opening an investigation were satisfied, there being a reasonable basis to believe that Rome Statute crimes had been committed by the Taliban and Afghan National Security Forces within Afghanistan.
Implicating a Western power for the first time in the ICC’s history, she also found there was a reasonable basis to believe that Rome Statute crimes had been committed by members of the US armed forces and US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan and in secret facilities in Eastern Europe where suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda members were detained.Footnote 177
In 2019, the Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed the Prosecutor’s request to open this investigation, on the basis that the investigation would not serve the ‘interests of justice’.Footnote 178 In 2020, the Appeals Chamber reversed that decision, finding that the Pre-Trial Chamber was not empowered to adjudicate the ‘interests of justice’ question.Footnote 179 In her reimagined version of that 2020 appeal decision, Souheir Edelbi comes to that same conclusion but, in doing so, provides an original, victim-centred analysis of the ‘interests of justice’. She further finds that the Pre-Trial Chamber abused its discretion by failing to consider the views expressed by the victims who had participated in the proceedings.
Judgment on the appeal against the decision on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan No.: ICC-02/17
Date: 5 March 2020
Original: English
Appeals Chamber
Before: Judge Souheir EDELBI
SITUATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
1. The present appeal by the Prosecutor concerns the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the outcome of the Prosecutor’s request for authorisation of an investigation by Pre-Trial Chamber II. On 12 April 2019, the Pre-Trial Chamber unanimously held, pursuant to Article 53(1)(c), that a criminal investigation into allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity would not serve the interests of justice and on this basis declined to authorise the Prosecutor’s request for an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan (Impugned Decision). It did so having found that there is a reasonable basis to believe the incidents underlying the Prosecutor’s request occurred and may have constituted crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and that the relevant requirements for admissibility had been met.Footnote 180
2. The Prosecutor appeals the Impugned Decision on the grounds that the Pre-Trial Chamber abused its discretion when assessing the scope of the ‘interests of justice’ (first ground of appeal) and erred in law by assessing the Prosecutor’s determination of the interests of justice (second ground of appeal). These issues bring into question the concept and scope of the interests of justice as formulated in Article 53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute. Therefore, the present appeal will focus on these issues as relevant to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to decline to authorise the investigation into the situation in Afghanistan.
First Ground of Appeal: Did the Pre-Trial Chamber Abuse Its Discretion When Assessing the Scope of the ‘Interests of Justice’?
The Concept of ‘Interests of Justice’
3. The Prosecutor argues that the Pre-Trial Chamber abused its discretion when determining that the initiation of an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan was not in the interests of justice. The Prosecutor argues that the Pre-Trial Chamber misapprehended factors that it took into account, that it took into consideration factors that it should not have taken into account, and that it failed to take sufficient account of relevant factors.
4. The ‘interests of justice’ is of great significance to the Rome Statute’s legal framework for initiating an investigation. This is because Article 53(1)(c) of the Statute is an ‘access to justice’ provision and, consequently, triggers questions of importance for victims who are unable to secure a measure of accountability in domestic criminal jurisdictions.Footnote 181 It is an issue that the Prosecutor is obliged to consider when assessing whether to initiate an investigation. For this reason, the Appeals Chamber outlines some observations regarding the Pre-Trial Chamber’s approach to the concept.
5. First, the Appeals Chamber underlines that one of the strengths of the Court lies in creating a source of legal redress for victims where domestic avenues of justice are either limited or unavailable. This particular strength, however, is tempered by the fact that the Rome Statute is limited by design to a narrow sense of ‘justice’ in the form of criminal trials, which is intended to provide only a certain measure of individualised accountability for crimes that fall under the Statute. As one academic acknowledges, criminal trials ‘are not appropriate fora to deal with the greater context or root causes of a conflict or repressive regime’, nor are the procedural and evidential modalities of criminal law necessarily victim-friendly.Footnote 182
6. In this regard, tensions may arise between the interests of victims and the criminal law nature of the Court’s inherent functions. Judges are called upon to observe the limits of the text, purpose, and context of the Rome Statute and to apply caution to judicial reasoning to avoid stretching judicial interpretation beyond the actual text of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber acknowledges these limits in order to avoid unnecessarily inflating the expectations of victims. Victims are not served well by a discourse of ‘justice’ that ignores the inherent limits in which the Court and the Rome Statute operate. To be clear, Article 53(1)(c) is not directly concerned with substantive outcomes or broader forms of justice such as truth and reconciliation, peace agreements, or redistributive justice, which very often form part of victims’ submissions before this Court. In this regard, it is simply not designed to cater to more substantial visions of justice.
7. Instead, Article 53(1)(c) of the Statute is more narrowly concerned with the procedure for initiating an investigation. Questions of procedure, however, need not be reduced to an abstract and mechanical method of interpretation, removed from the interests of victims and their specific context and lived experiences. Such abstract reasoning would lead to unnecessary judicial detachment from those whom the law should most serve and create a false impression of objectivity that is hardly suited to the task of assessing the interests of justice under Article 53(1)(c). This is because this particular provision tilts heavily towards the interests of victims and the presumption that securing these interests requires the opening of an investigation. In this regard, the plain wording of Article 53(1)(c) supports the need for the Prosecutor to conduct a contextual assessment of the interests of justice by considering the gravity of the crimes and the interests of victims within the context of the particular situation.
8. In assessing the interests of justice, the Pre-Trial Chamber placed emphasis on the feasibility of an effective investigation in light of difficulties highlighted by the Prosecutor in securing cooperation from relevant authorities during the preliminary examination. It argued that ‘[a]n investigation can hardly be said to be in the interests of justice if the relevant circumstances are such as to make such investigation not feasible and inevitably doomed to failure’.Footnote 183 The Pre-Trial Chamber drew a distinction between the preliminary examination stage of proceedings and the investigation stage in the context of ‘timing, type of activities or resources’.Footnote 184 Having done so, it pointed to the limited resources available to carry out a complex investigation and also questioned the availability of evidence for historical crimes.Footnote 185 Of considerable note was the Pre-Trial Chamber’s finding that the protracted nature of the preliminary examination and the likely difficulties in obtaining cooperation from state authorities at the investigation stage.Footnote 186 According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the changing ‘political landscape’ in Afghanistan and ‘key states (both parties and non-parties to the Statute)’ – the latter presumably referring to the United States – was likely to hamper a successful investigation.Footnote 187 As a result of these challenges, it found that an investigation was likely to be contrary to the interests of victims and was also likely to undermine the Court’s legitimacy.Footnote 188
9. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoning reflects the inherent tension between the broader interests of justice and the interests of victims. There may be situations where there are significant gravity issues or substantial reasons to believe that a criminal investigation would not serve the interests of justice in a particular situation. The interests of justice analysis must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, noting that where the alleged crime is grave and serious, the Prosecutor is not required under Article 53(1)(c) to balance the interests of victims against any other criterion or factors. As such, the broad wording of Article 53(1)(c) tilts the provision towards the interests of victims. This is made clearer when Article 53(1)(c) is read in conjunction with the Statute’s criminal justice imperative located in Article 17 of the Statute establishing the principle of complementarity. Complementarity is not only a core structuring principle that governs the Court’s operations, but it also embeds a criminal justice imperative in the Rome Statute which guides the application and scope of the interests of justice. The wording of the interests of justice in Article 53(1)(c) together with the complementarity principle dictates that the Prosecutor must presume that an investigation is in the interests of justice unless there are substantial reasons to suggest otherwise.
10. However, it should not be presumed that the constraining factors identified by the Pre-Trial Chamber (such as difficulty securing cooperation, complex nature of an investigation, limited resources) necessarily always undermine or contradict the interests of victims. Indeed, they may reflect the diverse and divergent interests of victims. For example, some victims may demand a more substantial form of accountability than what carceral justice can offer. Some victims may wish to avoid criminal justice altogether due to fears of retaliation. As noted by the Registry, a group of victims within the victims’ representations expressed the view that they did not wish the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorise an investigation because of ‘security concerns’ and ‘doubts as to the likelihood that the Prosecutor’s investigation would result in the perpetrators being brought to justice’.Footnote 189
11. Although Article 53(1)(c) operates to frame criminal justice as inherently positive for victims, caution must be exercised in relation to this assumption. This may not bear out for all victims within a situation. Victims may articulate competing and complex views or express their interests, contrary to the broad assumption that international criminal justice is an inherent good. Indeed, victims may regard the highly structured rules and procedures of criminal justice as antithetical to their own conceptions of justice and lived realities as victims. Therefore, where criminal justice remains an inherently limited form of accountability for dealing with complex injustices, substantive or transformative change, where available, in societies impacted by conflict and atrocity should be encouraged at an early stage of proceedings.Footnote 190 In these circumstances, the Prosecutor may choose to exercise discretion by refraining from opening an investigation in the context of a referral or by declining to seek authorisation to open an investigation proprio motu, thereby indirectly lending support to the substantive interests of victims who seek to pursue structural change.
Victims’ Representations
12. In the present situation before the Appeals Chamber, however, the express views of the victims were almost uniform in calling for a criminal investigation.Footnote 191 Of the 699 victim applications received by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 680 welcomed an investigation.Footnote 192 In addition, a separate group of victims ‘LVR 1’, ‘LVR 2’, and ‘LVR 3’, representing eighty-two victims, six victims, and an individual victim respectively, filed notices of appeal against the Impugned Decision in favour of authorising a criminal investigation.Footnote 193 There is no indication that the Pre-Trial Chamber took the views of the victims as expressed in the victims’ representations into account when assessing the Prosecutor’s request, nor did the Pre-Trial Chamber invite the victims to address whether an investigation would be in the interests of justice.Footnote 194
13. The Appeals Chamber notes that prior to reaching its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecutor to provide additional information in relation to ‘allegations attributed to special forces of a number of international forces operating in Afghanistan’ and ‘the structure, organisation and conduct of the Afghan Forces, the structure, organisation of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan, and the structure and interrogation policies of the United States of America for specific time periods’. In response, the Prosecutor provided 806 items of supporting material, amounting to 20,157 pages.Footnote 195 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber assessed the materials in relation to the effectiveness of an investigation rather than the interests of justice. It drew negative inferences regarding the prospects of a successful investigation including the availability of resources to carry out a complex investigation contrary to the interests of the victims. For example, as stated in the Impugned Decision, ‘[i]f the judicial authorisation is granted, the Prosecutor is required to investigate thoroughly and expeditiously; this may prove critically difficult in a complex situation like the one under scrutiny’.Footnote 196 The Pre-Trial Chamber further stated that:
[I]n light of the nature of the crimes and the context where they are alleged to have occurred, pursuing an investigation would inevitably require a significant amount of resources … this will go to the detriment of other scenarios (be it preliminary examinations, investigations or cases) which appear to have more realistic prospects to lead to trials and thus effectively foster the interests of justice, possibly compromising their chances for success.Footnote 197
14. Despite the possible complexities in an investigation of this kind involving many years of examination and several states parties and non-party states to the Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber should have given proper and adequate weight to the interests of victims as articulated by them. The failure to listen to the victims while deferring to pressure from the United States – a non-party state – proved detrimental to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s assessment of the Prosecutor’s request. As the victims themselves argued:
[T]he broader background to this filing outside the Court and its judicial proceedings cannot be ignored. Blatant attacks on the Court and those contributing to its work have been made at the highest levels, particularly by representatives of the United States government in reaction to the Prosecutor’s Request. Such actions cannot but constitute an interference with the independence of the Court and the Prosecution. More troubling still is the apparent suggestion in the Decision (para. 94) that far from resisting such attacks, the Court has allowed itself to be cowed by them.Footnote 198
15. In relation to questions of legitimacy, the Appeals Chamber notes that as a matter of law general concerns regarding the impact of an unsuccessful investigation upon the Court’s credibility are immaterial to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s determination of whether or not to authorise an investigation under Article 15(4) of the Statute. Ironically, the Impugned Decision had the effect of undermining the Court’s legitimacy by deferring to political pressure from the United States.Footnote 199 Not only did the focus on the effectiveness of an investigation lead to speculation on the victims’ interests, contrary to their express views, but it also denied the victims a right to be heard and to have their views taken into account in determining whether to authorise the investigation.
16. Institutional legitimacy does not take precedence over the actual interests of victims as expressed by the victims themselves in relation to whether or not to authorise an investigation. In the context of victims in Afghanistan, ‘international law makes sense only in the context of the lived history of the peoples of the Third World’, meaning that it is by evaluating legal rules and procedures and prioritising the lived experience of victims rather than the protection of the Court’s legitimacy that this Court may thereby embody and promote global justice effectively.Footnote 200
Gravity of Alleged Crimes in Light of the Interests of Victims
17. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Impugned Decision also fails to consider the interests of victims based on the gravity of the alleged crimes. Since 11 September 2001, Afghanistan has been the subject of military attacks and foreign intervention from the United States in response to terrorism attacks on Washington and New York.Footnote 201 Furthermore, the grave and serious allegations of crimes that form the basis of the Prosecutor’s request to authorise an investigation form part of the intensification and perpetuation of anti-Muslim violence carried out on a global scale in the wake of the ‘war on terror’. Racialised stereotypes of the ‘Muslim terrorist’ and state policies, practices, and legislation depicting Muslims and their religion through a propensity towards violence have shaped how the war on terror has been carried out by states along intersecting lines of geography, race, ethnicity, religion, and gender.Footnote 202 Attacks on civilians, cruel treatment and torture, and humiliating and degrading treatment of detainees in and from Muslim-majority countries are by now are a well-known phenomenon.Footnote 203 These harms are not only part of a racialised stereotype of Muslims but also intersect with gender and the effects of prolonged war on women and children.
18. Thus, considering the particular gravity of the alleged crimes, the Appeals Chamber notes that the materials provided by the Prosecutor supported two outcomes: either the authorisation of an investigation or a request for further additional information from the Prosecutor under Rule 50(4) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Given the Pre-Trial Chamber’s particular concern regarding the length of the examination, it could have sought additional information to further clarify the scope and conduct of any potential investigation into cross-border victims of aerial bombardment who are named in the proceedings. For example, cross-border victims made submissions to the Appeals Chamber that they had presented the Prosecutor with information about civilians impacted by drone strikes launched from Afghanistan into Pakistan.Footnote 204 They argued that the Prosecutor ignored the submissions in the request, with the result that the position of the cross-border victims as to whether the Prosecutor intended to pursue an investigation into their complaints was unclear.Footnote 205
19. Further, it would have been appropriate to seek additional information regarding the position of women in any future investigation. As was highlighted by the Registry, of 165 individual representations where it was in a position to identify relevant data regarding the gender and age of victims, it found that only 10 representations were introduced by or on behalf of women despite indications that women had clearly suffered harm.Footnote 206 In some cases, women were not listed as victims by representatives acting on behalf of women. Several factors may explain this, including the location of women in conflict areas, the predominant role of men in traditional justice resolution practices, and the underreporting of sexual and gender-based violence in Afghanistan.Footnote 207 Accordingly, it would have been appropriate to seek clarification on how an investigation would incorporate sexual and gender-based crimes against women given the limited representations by or on behalf of women and the dominant role played by organisations and men in the representation of the victims.
20. Based on the above, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Pre-Trial Chamber plainly abused its discretion when giving priority to factors which it should not have taken into account in the first place while giving insufficient weight to factors that it should have taken into account, such as the interests of victims. Further, it failed to exercise its discretion in an appropriate manner by requesting further information from the Prosecutor in order to determine whether to authorise the investigation.
Second Ground of Appeal: Did the Pre-Trial Chamber Err in Law by Assessing the Prosecutor’s Determination of the Interests of Justice?
21. Contrary to the Impugned Decision, there are several factors such as the text of Article 53(1) that dictate that an investigation should have been opened in the present situation. Starting with the text of Article 53(1)(C), the Prosecutor is required to consider the following factors when deciding whether to initiate an investigation:
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed;
(b) The case is or would be admissible under Article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.
22. Firstly, in contrast to the first and second criteria, the plain text of the third criterion makes plain that there is no requirement for the Prosecutor to make a positive determination to the effect that an investigation is in the interests of justice when deciding whether to initiate an investigation. The text of Article 53(1)(c) is deliberately formulated in the negative (‘would not serve’), meaning that the assessment of the interests of justice generally does not arise unless there are substantial reasons or facts and circumstances to the contrary. Unlike the first and second criteria, which require the application of exacting legal standards, the Prosecutor’s evaluation of whether the opening of an investigation would not serve the interests of justice is predicated on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.Footnote 208 As the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Kenya situation correctly identified: Unlike sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), which require an affirmative finding, sub-paragraph (c) does not require the Prosecutor to establish that an investigation is actually in the interests of justice. Indeed, the Prosecutor does not have to present reasons or supporting material in this respect.Footnote 209
23. Secondly, Article 53(1)(c) operates presumptively in favour of a criminal investigation, which is deemed in the interests of justice as a matter of law. This is reflected in the high threshold that the Prosecutor must satisfy to justify a waiver of a criminal investigation. Article 53(1)(c) creates an expectation that the Prosecutor will proceed to an investigation, while limiting the scope of the discretion to waive an investigation.Footnote 210 There can be reasons not to proceed with an investigation, but it is only when there are ‘substantial reasons to believe’ that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice that this narrow exception prevails. This is because the function of Article 53(1)(c) is to further the imperative of criminal justice as found in the complementarity principle under Article 17 of the Statute. It must be remembered that the text of Article 53(1)(c) is designed to limit the Prosecutor’s ability to waive a criminal investigation and therefore the criminal law nature of the Statute guides the meaning and scope of the interests of justice.
24. Thirdly, the Pre-Trial Chamber is not called on under Article 15(4) of the Statute to review the Prosecutor’s assessment under Article 53(1)(a)–(c) of the Statute. Under the text of Article 15(4), the Pre-Trial Chamber’s function is confined to an assessment of questions of fact and jurisdiction when it is determining whether to authorise an investigation, that is: (1) is there a ‘reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation’ in the sense of whether crimes have been committed and (2) does the situation or case appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court? If both questions are answered in the affirmative, then the Pre-Trial Chamber must authorise the investigation. Prior to making its decision, it remains open to the Pre-Trial Chamber to request further information to determine whether the factual or jurisdictional requirements of a situation have been satisfied in accordance with Article 15(4) of the Statute. Having found that these requirements were met in the present situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber should have authorised the investigation.
25. Fourthly, to the extent that judicial review is available regarding the Prosecutor’s assessment of the interests of justice, then the sole basis for such review lies with Article 53(3)(b) of the Statute. In contrast to Article 53(3)(a), which refers to the referral provisions of the Statute specifically, Article 53(3)(b) is broadly worded and nothing in the wording of this provision suggests it is limited to referrals. Under Article 53(3)(b), and consistent with the imperative of criminal justice under the complementarity principle, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s review powers are triggered only when the Prosecutor decides not to proceed with an investigation based solely on the interests of justice in Article 53(1)(c).
26. If a Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed based solely on Article 53(1)(c), then they must notify the Pre-Trial Chamber of their decision. In these circumstances, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own motion, conduct a review of the decision by invoking Article 53(3)(b) of the Statute. Its judicial review, however, moves in only one direction, towards confirming the Prosecutor’s discretion to waive a criminal investigation. The Pre-Trial Chamber has no power to review a decision by the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation and cannot compel the Prosecutor to start a criminal investigation. The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider the decision not to initiate an investigation pursuant to Article 53(4) based on new facts or information.
27. The Appeals Chamber finds that a plain reading of Article 53, in conjunction with Article 15(4) of the Statute, shows that the Pre-Trial Chamber is only required to assess the information contained in the Prosecutor’s request in relation to two matters: whether there is a factual basis to proceed where crimes have been committed and whether the alleged crimes fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. In this regard, a decision by the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation is not reviewable by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Judicial review is available only when the Prosecutor decides that a criminal investigation would not serve the interests of justice. In these circumstances, there is only a narrow scope for judicial review and the Pre-Trial Chamber can only confirm the Prosecutor’s decision to waive a criminal investigation. Based on the foregoing, the Pre-Trial Chamber plainly erred when assessing the Prosecutor’s determination of the interests of justice.
Determination on the Merits of the Appeal
28. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Pre-Trial Chamber plainly exercised its discretion incorrectly due to taking into account factors it should not have taken into account while ignoring factors it should have taken into account and failing to exercise its discretion by requesting further information. It thereby abused its discretion when determining whether to authorise an investigation.
29. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Pre-Trial Chamber had no role in assessing the Prosecutor’s determination regarding the interests of justice in this situation. In reaching this conclusion, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Pre-Trial Chamber should have limited its assessment to the factual and jurisdictional basis of the request which required it to authorise the investigation. Instead, it sought to block the investigation by choosing to exercise its discretion in a manner that was contrary to the express views of the victims and the plain text of Articles 15(4) and 53(1)(c) of the Statute. As a result, victims were denied the right to be properly heard and to have their interests reflected in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision regarding the authorisation of an investigation. Had it exercised its discretion correctly, then it is likely the Pre-Trial Chamber would have reached a different outcome.
Conclusion on Appropriate Relief
30. In sum, the Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate to amend the Impugned Decision to the effect that the Prosecutor is authorised to commence an investigation into allegations of crimes set out in the Prosecutor’s request. The Appeals Chamber also considers it appropriate for the Prosecutor to clarify the scope of any potential investigation in response to the cross-border victims of aerial bombardment. Finally, it considers it appropriate for the Prosecutor to clarify the position of women within the scope of any future investigation and how the Prosecutor intends to incorporate the interests of victims of sexual and gender-based violence where there are insufficient contributions by or on behalf of women in the victims’ representation.
Judge Souheir Edelbi
16.6 Gender-Based Persecution in the Afghanistan Investigation Authorisation
In 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber II deniedFootnote 211 the Prosecutor’s request to authorise an investigation into crimes allegedly committed on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since 1 March 2003.Footnote 212 While the Pre-Trial Chamber agreed that the jurisdiction, complementarity, and gravity tests were met, ultimately the Chamber decided an investigation would not be in the interests of justice.
In this rewritten decision, Susana SáCouto focuses on the allegations concerning gender-based persecution by the Taliban and other armed groups and closely analyses the Rome Statute’s definition of ‘gender’ per Article 7(3) and the definition of ‘persecution’ per Articles 7(1)(h) and 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute. Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as well as the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s 2014 Policy Paper on Gender-based Crimes, SáCouto concludes that gender-based persecution includes persecutory acts that are motivated by the perpetrators’ beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions regarding appropriate social behaviour based on gender. Her decision stresses that without this understanding of gender, the Court would not be able to recognise the full scope of gender-based harms committed against women and girls in Afghanistan, including the attacks by the Taliban and affiliated armed groups aimed at preventing women and girls from studying, teaching, working, or participating in public affairs. Moreover, Judge SáCouto addresses whether and how gender-based persecution intersects with other grounds of persecution, and finds that characterising the persecution against Afghan female politicians, public servants, and students as having been based on intersecting gender and political grounds more accurately captures the basis of the discrimination underlying this crime and the aggravated nature of the harms resulting from it.
Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan No.: ICC-02/17
Date: 12 April 2019
Original: English
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II(B)
Before: Judge Susana SÁCOUTOFootnote 213
SITUATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II (the Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (the Court) issues this Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute (the Statute) on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan).
Procedural History
1. By a letter of 30 October 2017, the Prosecutor notified the President of the Court, in accordance with Regulation 45 of the Regulations, of her intention to submit a request for authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Statute.Footnote 214
2. On 20 November 2017, the Prosecutor submitted the Request for Authorisation of an Investigation pursuant to Article 15 (Prosecutor’s Request), together with 14 annexes, in which the Pre-Trial Chamber is requested ‘to authorise the commencement of an investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in relation to alleged crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan in the period since 1 May 2003, as well as other alleged crimes that have a nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan and are sufficiently linked to the situation and were committed on the territory of other States Parties in the period since 1 July 2002’.Footnote 215
3. Throughout the period 20 November 2017 to 31 January 2018, the Court received the representations of victims, which were transmitted to Pre-Trial Chamber III on a rolling basis, together with reports containing a preliminary assessment of the representations.Footnote 216
4. On 20 February 2018, the Registry submitted a final consolidated report summarising the process of collecting the victims’ representations and the victims’ views on whether or not they wish an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan to be authorised.Footnote 217
5. On 16 March 2018, the Presidency recomposed the Chambers of this Court and assigned the situation in Afghanistan to this Chamber.Footnote 218
Prosecutor’s Submissions
6. The Prosecutor’s submission asserts that the people of Afghanistan have suffered acts of serious violence and other violations of their fundamental rights over the past four decades as waves of armed conflict and security crises have plagued the country.Footnote 219 The Prosecutor submits that some of these acts constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, namely crimes against humanity under Article 7 and war crimes under Article 8 of the Statute, and seeks authorisation to open a formal investigation into such crimes.
7. The Request lists the groups allegedly responsible for the crimes for which authorisation to investigate is sought as follows: (1) the Taliban and other armed groups; (2) the Afghan National Security Forces, including the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, the Afghan Local Police, the Afghan National Border Police, and the National Directorate for Security); and (3) US armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. The prosecution alleges that each of these groups is responsible for war crimes in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character under Article 8 of the Statute. Further, the prosecution asserts that the first category, the Taliban and other armed groups, are also responsible for crimes against humanity under Article 7, including persecution on the ground of ‘gender’ under Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute.
Victims’ Representations
8. Overall, the Court has received a total of 794 representations in Dari and Pashto, as well as Arabic, English, and German of which 699 were transmitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber on behalf of the following victims: 668 representations on behalf of 6,220 individuals; 17 representations on behalf of 1,690 families; 13 representations on behalf of several millions of victims, including 26 villages; and 1 representation on behalf of an institution.
9. Notably, the report received from the Registry on Victims’ Representations pursuant to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Order ICC-02/17-6 of 9 November 2017 indicates that one of the representations it received ‘called on the Prosecutor to investigate all crimes perpetrated against women’ and that ‘a number of representations requested the persecution against certain specific groups … be investigated’.Footnote 220
10. Further, the Registry found that ‘victims overwhelmingly support an investigation into all crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Afghanistan since 1 May 2003’.Footnote 221
Determination by the Chamber on the Existence of a Reasonable Basis to Proceed
Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae
11. Although at the Article 15 stage, the Appeals Chamber has stated that ‘[o]ften no individual suspects will have been identified at this stage, nor will the exact conduct nor its legal classification be clear’,Footnote 222 the facts presented in the Prosecutor’s submissions and victims’ representations suggest that there is a reasonable basis to believe that a number of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC have been committed.
12. The Chamber will first consider the allegation that the Taliban and other armed groups are responsible for the crime against humanity of gender-based persecution.
Gender-Based Persecution by the Taliban and Other Armed Groups
13. According to the Prosecutor’s Request, since mid-2003 civilians have suffered greatly as anti-government forces, aligned with the Taliban and other armed groups, attacked civilians perceived or believed to be associated with or supportive of the Afghan government, related to or working with the international community, and/or perceived to oppose Taliban rule and ideology, including women and girls who worked, took part in public affairs, and attended school past the age of puberty.Footnote 223 Attacks were also directed at civilian property and objects related to the targeted civilians, and carried out in public places, including schools, hospitals, and mosques, and in private.Footnote 224 The prosecution submits that the nature of the attacks varied, and included killings, severe deprivation of physical liberty, and other fundamental human rights.Footnote 225 The prosecution submits that conduct underlying some of these attacks qualifies as the crime against humanity of persecution on the ground of gender under Article 7(1)(h) of the Statute,Footnote 226 which defines the crime as follows:
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
14. The term ‘persecution’ is defined in paragraph 7(2)(g) as ‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’. In its Request, the prosecution submits that the Taliban and other armed groups targeted civilians and deprived them of their fundamental rights on the basis of their gender and political opinion.
Interpretation of the Law
Definition of Gender under the Rome Statute
15. Paragraph 7(3), which is referenced in Article 7(1)(h), defines gender as follows: ‘For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.’
16. In interpreting the Rome Statute, this Court has routinely applied the Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties (VCLT).Footnote 227 Article 31(1) of the VCLT states that: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’Footnote 228
17. The phrase ‘the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society’ suggests that the definition includes societal perceptions and experiences of what it means to be ‘male’ and ‘female’. Although this phrase could be read to define gender merely as a biological category, doing so would ignore the second part of the phrase, ‘within the context of society’, and would, thus, be inconsistent with a good-faith reading of the phrase.
18. Moreover, the drafting history of Article 7(3) – which is relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLTFootnote 229 – affirms that the definition of gender encompasses more than a biological category.Footnote 230 The Chamber will briefly detail that history here in order to shed light on the meaning of the Article 7 definition of ‘gender’, and thereby the crime of gender-based persecution under the Statute.
19. The inclusion of gender-based persecution as a crime against humanity in the Statute was novel. ‘Gender’ as a ground for persecution had not previously been enumerated or defined either in statute or international criminal jurisprudence. The Court’s twentieth-century antecedents, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), created by the UN Security Council, had jurisdiction over persecution as a crime against humanity, but only on political, racial, and religious grounds.Footnote 231 Gender-based persecution therefore required delineation in the Statute. Defining the ‘gender’ part of the crime proved contentious in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Rome Statute.Footnote 232
20. A majority of states favoured a definition that was consistent with the way in which the term had been used in the UN and other international fora: ‘gender’ refers to a social construction of what it means to be male or female in a given time and place.Footnote 233 In this understanding, these social constructs dictate and moderate norms of behaviour and appearance for all individuals, as well as power relations between people of different genders and their respective access to opportunities and resources.Footnote 234
21. On the opposing side was a small minority of states that insisted on a narrow definition that confined ‘gender’ to a description of only two biological sexes, namely female and male.Footnote 235 In their view, there are only two ‘genders’ which are not mutable, and which are wholly biologically determined.Footnote 236
22. As is the way in treaty negotiations, compromises were made. A definition of ‘gender’ was included in Article 7(3) that appears to attempt to balance the two opposing views as to the correct meaning of ‘gender’. The definition has been described as ‘intentionally opaque’Footnote 237 and ‘constructively ambiguous’.Footnote 238
23. In the ICC’s ‘Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes’ (the SGBC Policy Paper) adopted in 2014,Footnote 239 the ICC Prosecutor interprets the definition of gender as follows: ‘“Gender”, in accordance with article 7(3) of the Rome Statute … refers to males and females, within the context of society. This definition acknowledges the social construction of gender, and the accompanying roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes assigned to women and men, and to girls and boys.’Footnote 240
24. Notably, the SGBC Policy Paper distinguishes ‘gender’ from ‘sex’. Therefore, it defines ‘sex’ for the purpose of the policy as: ‘“Sex” refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women.’Footnote 241
25. The SGBC Policy Paper’s approach is not only consistent with a good-faith reading of Article 7(3) and the Statute’s drafting history of this article, but also with international human rights law and practice,Footnote 242 as required by Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.Footnote 243
26. Indeed, twenty-four UN experts who provided comments on the definition of gender contemplated by the International Law Commission in its consideration of a new draft treaty on crimes against humanity observed that ‘[i]nternational human rights law recognizes gender as the social attributes associated with being male and female’, and that twenty-five years of practice has demonstrated ‘wide recognition of gender as a social construct that permeates the context in which human rights abuses take place’.Footnote 244
27. Thus, this Chamber understands ‘gender’ to mean not only biological differences between males and females, but also societal beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and experiences of what it means to be ‘male’ and ‘female’.
28. Moreover, in the context of Article 7(1)(h) and in line with the ICC Elements of Crimes,Footnote 245 the term ‘gender’ describes the grounds on which a group is victimised, meaning persecution on the grounds of gender includes persecution that takes place on the grounds of socially constructed ideas about what it means to be male or female, rather than solely because the members of the group are male or female. Thus, gender-based persecution includes persecutory acts that are motivated by the beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions of the perpetrators regarding appropriate social behaviour for males and females.
29. This Chamber considers it important to make clear, as other tribunals have, that as long as the acts constitute a severe deprivation of victims’ fundamental rights under international law, it is legally irrelevant whether local laws, religion, or customs permit the behaviour that resulted in those violations.Footnote 246 Thus, even in societies where the idea of equality among certain groups is contentious, or where discrimination on the basis of gender is the norm, severe violations of fundamental rights contrary to international law can amount to persecution. Indeed, such violations may constitute persecution regardless of whether they are accepted, tolerated, or formally legalised in a given community.
30. Finally, this Chamber recognises that groups may be targeted, or have different experiences of crimes, because of intersecting and inextricably linked identity factors, which may include gender but also political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or other grounds. As such, it will take an intersectional approach to the crime of persecution, meaning the Chamber will assess not only whether harms were inflicted on victims on the grounds of gender but also whether and how gender-based persecution intersected with other grounds of persecution, and the impact of persecution on the basis of these intersecting grounds on the targeted group.Footnote 247 The Chamber considers that this approach most accurately captures the lived experiences of those who are targeted for persecution.
Intentional and Severe Deprivation of Fundamental Rights Contrary to International Law
31. The Chamber considers that, as this Court has previously found, for the purpose of identifying those rights the intentional and severe deprivation of which may constitute persecution, it should look to international standards on human rights such as those laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the two United Nations Covenants on Human Rights, and other international instruments on international human rights.Footnote 248 Drawing upon various provisions of these texts, the Chamber considers that it is possible to identify a set of fundamental rights pertaining to any human being, the gross infringement of which may amount to persecution. For instance, the deprivation of rights infringed by the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes – such as the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, and the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, or to rape and sexual slavery, or to arbitrary arrest, detention, exile, or imprisonment – certainly amount to persecution.Footnote 249
32. However, as other tribunals have found, ‘there is no comprehensive list of what acts can’ amount to violations of fundamental rights contrary to international law.Footnote 250 Indeed, they may also include discriminatory acts not enumerated in the court’s statute, such as those involving ‘physical or mental harm or infringements upon individual freedom’.Footnote 251 For instance, as the ICTY has noted:
The Judgment of the [International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg] included in the notion of persecution a variety of acts which, at present, may not fall under the Statute of the International Tribunal, such as the passing of discriminatory laws, the exclusion of members of an ethnic or religious group from aspects of social, political, and economic life, the imposition of a collective fine on them, the restriction of their movement and their seclusion in ghettos, and the requirement that they mark themselves out by wearing a yellow star. Moreover, and as mentioned above, several individual defendants were convicted of persecution in the form of discriminatory economic acts.Footnote 252
33. Moreover, the Justice case, prosecuted by the United States after World War II, recognised the use of ‘judicial process as a powerful weapon for the persecution and extermination of all opponents of the Nazi regime’.Footnote 253 This case recognised that acts of persecution could include the ‘passing of a decree by which Jews were excluded from the legal profession; the prohibition of intermarriage between Jews and persons of German blood and the severe punishment of sexual intercourse between these groups; and decrees expelling Jews from public services, educational institutions, and from many business enterprises’.Footnote 254
34. Thus, acts such as: other forms of sexual violence; harassment, humiliation, and psychological abuse; destruction of means of subsistence; restrictions on the types of professions and on family life; and other attacks on political, social, or economic rightsFootnote 255 can also amount to persecution, as long those acts were committed ‘in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’.Footnote 256
35. As this Court has previously held, the determination as to which acts will result in the severe deprivation of one or more individuals’ fundamental rights must be made on a case-by-case basis.Footnote 257 Further, it is this Chamber’s view that all acts must be examined in context and cumulatively because although certain acts may not on their own amount to a violation of fundamental rights (and therefore persecution), they may do so when considered in light of other acts and the context in which they occur.Footnote 258 When assessing the severity of deprivations of fundamental rights, this Chamber considers it important to conduct a detailed analysis not only of the harms but also the impact of the discriminatory acts on the targeted group.
Legal Findings: Gender-Based Persecution by the Taliban
36. Although this is not this Court’s first opportunity to address the crime of gender-based persecution,Footnote 259 in the one case where it was considered at the confirmation of charges stage, persecution was not confirmed and gender-based persecution was ultimately not discussed in the confirmation of charges decision.Footnote 260 The Chamber considers that – in light of enduring misconceptions about ‘gender-based crimes’, such as the notion that such crimes are limited to rape and other forms of sexual violenceFootnote 261 – it is particularly important for this Chamber to address the scope and contours of gender-based persecution in the context of the Afghanistan situation. Indeed, this Chamber finds it critical to examine both individual and cumulative harms, in particular non-sexual gendered harms, experienced by victims of persecution and to explore the breadth of fundamental rights the deprivation of which are implicated by this crime and which rarely have been made visible.
37. In this regard, the Chamber finds it particularly noteworthy that one of the organisations consulted during the Registry’s review of victims’ views on the opening of this investigation stressed that ‘most “traditional justice resolution” practices (“jirgas”) are male-only affairs, with crimes against women almost entirely unrepresented in these fora, unless as a matter of family “honour”’. The organisation ‘concluded that the obstacles to women using a “formal” justice system are enormous’.Footnote 262
Deprivation of Fundamental Rights
38. The Prosecutor’s allegations of gender-based persecution include crimes committed by the Taliban and affiliated armed groups against female politicians, public servants, and students in Afghanistan.Footnote 263 The Prosecutor alleges that: ‘Pursuant to the ideology and rules of the Taliban, women and girls have been deliberately attacked by the Taliban and affiliated armed groups to prevent them from studying, teaching, working or participating in public affairs, through intimidation, death threats, abductions and killings.’Footnote 264
39. Specifically, the Prosecutor’s allegations and supporting documents indicate that the Taliban destroyed girls’ schools and directed threats and acts of violence at teachers, administrators, and students ‘who refused to abide by the Taliban’s rules’.Footnote 265 These attacks deprived ‘thousands of girls of their right to education’.Footnote 266
40. Moreover, the Taliban threatened and/or killed female politicians, female police officers, and women at or on their way to work.Footnote 267 As the prosecution notes, the ‘efforts to prevent women from participating in the workforce, education, and governance and politics, have resulted in major disruption to the ability of women to exercise many of their fundamental rights’.Footnote 268
41. In other words, women and girls were deprived of their fundamental rights to education, to work, to participate in public life, to physical and bodily integrity, to liberty and freedom of movement, to expression, to assemble, and to be free from arbitrary deprivations of life, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and discrimination on the basis of sex, all of which they enjoyed pursuant to international law.Footnote 269
42. Moreover, these deprivations had far-reaching consequences, with long-lasting impacts on the lives of the victims, their families, and their communities. For instance, the attacks against schools, as well as the threats and violence directed at female students who refused to abide by the Taliban’s rules by attending school, not only resulted in the violation of the girls’ physical and bodily integrity – some of whom were burned, blinded, and disfigured through acid attacksFootnote 270 – but also reduced or eliminated their prospects of continuing their education, disrupting and/or limiting their future ability to work or participate in public life. As the Prosecutor’s Request indicates, these restrictions ‘led to severe economic hardship due to loss of employment and income’.Footnote 271
43. Importantly, these consequences affected not only those who actually opposed or were perceived to oppose Taliban rule and ideology, but also those who complied with the restrictions in order to avoid punishments or reprisals. As the Prosecutor’s Request and supporting documentation demonstrate, as a result of the attacks, ‘countless other women and girls have reportedly stopped going to school or working due to the attendant climate of fear’.Footnote 272 Given the high rate of male casualties during the conflicts in Afghanistan, many women were the primary or only breadwinners in the family. The systematic deprivation of the right to education and to work meant increased levels of impoverishment for women, girls, and their families, ‘with poverty forcing many women to give their daughters in marriage in exchange for debts or to take their children out of school often to work’.Footnote 273
44. Some of these acts – such as the killings and acid attacks – violate rights infringed by other Rome Statute crimes, such as murder and inhumane acts, and thus clearly amount to persecutory acts if committed on the basis of one of the grounds within Article 7(1)(h). This Chamber finds it important to stress, however, that other acts – such as preventing women and girls from participating in aspects of social, political, and economic life – also deprive victims of fundamental rights and constitute persecutory acts when committed on the basis of one of the protected grounds.Footnote 274
45. Further, this Chamber finds that when viewed in context and cumulatively, these acts constitute a severe deprivation of victims’ fundamental rights. Having examined not only direct harms to the women and girls targeted by the Taliban, but also the long-lasting adverse impacts of these acts on the ability of victims and their families to subsist and on women’s and girl’s access to critical services and support, this Chamber finds that women and girls in Afghanistan were severely deprived of their fundamental rights.
46. In addition, this Chamber finds that these acts were committed ‘in connection with’ other ICC crimes, as required per Articles 7(1)(h) and 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statue. As the Prosecutor’s Request and supporting documents indicate, the Taliban had a policy ‘to attack the civilian population in order to seize power from the Government of Afghanistan by lethal force’ and pursued this policy by deliberately targeting civilians perceived or believed to be associated with or supportive of the Afghan government, related to or working with the international community, and/or perceived to oppose Taliban rule and ideology, ‘including women and girls who worked, took part in public affairs, and attended school past the age of puberty’.Footnote 275 Thus, the persecutory acts against women and girls were committed in connection with the other crimes against humanity in furtherance of this policy, including murder and deprivations of physical liberty.
On the Grounds of Gender
47. As discussed earlier, persecution on the grounds of gender includes persecution that takes place on the grounds of the perpetrators’ socially constructed ideas about what it means to be male or female, rather than solely because the members of the group are biologically male or female. Thus, gender-based persecution includes persecutory acts that are motivated by the perpetrators’ beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions regarding appropriate social behaviour for males and females. Significantly, without this understanding of gender, this Chamber would not be able to recognise the full scope of gender-based harms committed against women and girls in Afghanistan, including the attacks by the Taliban and affiliated armed groups aimed at preventing them from studying, teaching, working, or participating in public affairs.
48. The sources supporting the Prosecutor’s Request indicate that the Taliban’s attacks against women and girls were animated by their interpretation of Islam and beliefs about the proper role of women and girls in society. For instance, credible sources cited by the prosecution demonstrate that the Taliban and affiliated armed groups ‘believe that girls should stop attending school past puberty’.Footnote 276 These and other sources likewise show that the Taliban and affiliated groups believe that women should not teach, work, or participate in public affairs.Footnote 277 For example, the prosecution cites sources indicating that the Taliban had a practice of distributing ‘night letters’ to ‘induce compliance with social norms favored by the Taliban’,Footnote 278 and that one of these letters addressed to an Afghan woman stated: ‘We Taliban warn you to stop working otherwise we will take your life away. We will kill you in such a harsh way that no woman has so far been killed in that manner. This will be a good lesson for those women like you who are working. The money you receive is haram [prohibited under Islam] and coming from the infidels.’Footnote 279
49. Thus, it is clear that the deprivation of fundamental human rights was inflicted on women and girls because of the Taliban’s beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions regarding appropriate social behaviour for females.
50. This Chamber recognises that the definition of gender under Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute, in particular the phrase ‘within the context of society’ – even if interpreted to include societal perceptions and attitudes about what it means to be ‘male’ and ‘female’ – could be read as referring to perceptions and attitudes about the proper role and behaviour of males and females within the context of Afghan society. Notably, historians and social scientists who have written about Afghanistan have indicated that gender-discriminatory attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions were prevalent within Afghan society during the period under review here.Footnote 280
51. This Chamber notes, however, that even those sources acknowledge that such discriminatory beliefs were ‘largely attributed to the patriarchal social structure’ in Afghanistan, where ‘[m]en [we]re still largely in control of the means of production, religious educational institutions and decision-making bodies inside and outside … state [institutions], and other social and cultural institutions’.Footnote 281 This suggests that while these beliefs might have been shared by a segment of the population, they likely did not reflect all or even a majority of Afghans’ views. In fact, during debates surrounding the drafting of a new Afghan constitution in 2003 and 2004, ‘a number of women delegates … spoke against societal injustice and violation of human and women[’s] rights by the Islamic warriors’.Footnote 282
52. More importantly, even if these beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions had been prevalent within the context of Afghan society, as discussed above, if they resulted in conduct that constitutes a severe violation of victims’ fundamental rights under international law, it is legally irrelevant whether local laws, religion, or customs permit the behaviour that resulted in those violations.Footnote 283 Thus, the severe deprivation of fundamental rights of individuals who act contrary to prescribed gender roles, even if accepted or tolerated in a particular society, amounts to persecution on the grounds of gender.
On Intersecting Grounds of Gender and Political Opinion
53. As mentioned earlier, this Chamber recognises that groups may be targeted, or have different experiences of crimes, because of intersecting and inextricably linked identity factors. Thus, the Chamber will assess not only whether harms were inflicted on victims on the grounds of gender but also whether and how gender-based persecution intersected with other grounds of persecution, and the impact of persecution on the basis of these intersecting grounds on the targeted group.
54. The Prosecutor’s Request notes that ‘it appears that female politicians, public servants and students were also killed based on their political affiliation or beliefs’.Footnote 284 The Prosecutor’s allegations and supporting documents note, for instance, that the Taliban killed two female heads of a provincial Department of Women’s Affairs (DWA), one of whom was a ‘prominent politician who had for years been a leading advocate for the fair treatment of women’.Footnote 285 Although the prosecution uses this as an example of gender-based persecution, the Taliban appears to have targeted these women both because they acted contrary to the gender norms espoused by the Taliban and because of their political opinions and activities. In fact, as the Prosecutor’s Request makes clear, the second victim, who was Acting Head of the DWA, was killed on her way to work.Footnote 286 Moreover, other DWA staff members were also subject to threats.Footnote 287
55. Importantly, recognising the intersectional grounds animating the Taliban’s conduct makes clear both the enhanced vulnerability of the victims to the Taliban’s attacks and the aggravated harms flowing from their conduct. Indeed, the killings not only deprived the victims of their lives and the victims’ families of their loved ones, but also resulted in reduced advocacy for and availability of services and support for women and girls in their community. As the Prosecutor’s allegations and supporting sources show, ‘by targeting … two prominent female figures … the Taliban terrorised and effectively prevented women and girls from approaching an important social institution where they could seek protection and file complaints in efforts to improve the living conditions of Afghan women and girls’.Footnote 288
56. Thus, this Chamber finds that characterising the persecution against female politicians, public servants, and students as having been based on intersecting gender and political grounds more accurately captures the basis of the discrimination underlying this crime and the aggravated nature of the harms resulting from it.
Chapeau Elements
57. The Chamber finds that the persecution on intersecting gender and political grounds was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. It further finds that the perpetrators knew that such persecution was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population.
Conclusion
58. Having considered the Prosecutor’s Request and the evidence adduced in support of it, the Chamber is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the crime against humanity of persecution on intersecting gender and political grounds has been committed.
For These Reasons, the Chamber Hereby:
DECIDES to authorise an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan and, accordingly, APPROVES THE REQUEST;
ORDERS the Victims’ Participation and Reparations Section of the Registry to notify the present Decision to the victims who have made representations to the Chamber in relation to the situation in Afghanistan.
Judge Susana SáCouto
As noted in Chapter 2, the selection of situations and cases that authors have reimagined in this collection was shaped by several constraints. One of the most significant was the constraint of being limited to those situations and cases that have actually commenced in the ICC, thereby providing judicial decisions to rewrite.Footnote 1 As editors and contributors, we struggled with this limitation in the feminist judgment method because it meant that the selection of cases and situations in this collection necessarily replicated the gaps and silences in ICC jurisprudence.
Allegations of selectivity have long shrouded the search for international criminal justice, and the ICC has been a lightning rod for criticisms on this front, from concerns about its preliminary examinations and investigations, to concerns about case selection and prioritisation and the selection of charges. Myriad factors – legal and political – determine which situations, cases, and persons ultimately come before the court. In this way, any reimagining of law is limited in its ability to examine the road not taken – ‘the situations that never were’, so to speak.
At the time of writing in 2023, one of the many gaps in the ICC’s quest for accountability and justice concerns the Palestine/Israel conflict. In 2009, the Palestinian National Authority lodged a declaration to the ICC, accepting the Court’s jurisdiction for potential crimes committed on Palestinian territory since the Rome Statute’s entry into force in 2002. Had that declaration been valid, the ICC Prosecutor could theoretically open an investigation, after obtaining authorisation of the Pre-Trial Chamber. However, in 2012 Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo concluded that no such progress was possible because Palestine was, at that stage, an ‘observer entity’ rather than a state in the UN, with the result that its ICC declaration was not legally valid.Footnote 2
Subsequently, Palestine became a UN ‘observer state’, enabling it to become a state party to the Rome Statute in 2015. In 2018, Palestine referred the situation to the (then) ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, who in 2021 opened an investigation into potential Rome Statute crimes committed since 2014 in Palestine, including in Gaza and the West Bank, or by Palestinian nationals in Israel.Footnote 3 This enabled the investigation of possible crimes by both Hamas and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Bensouda’s successor, prosecutor Karim Khan, has committed additional resources to the Palestine investigation, stating that ‘the Palestine investigation has always been, and remains, a very important investigation in the ICC. It’s one that cannot be forgotten, and it is one that is being conducted as effectively as we can’.Footnote 4 When we designed this book project, there were yet to be any cases on the public record from this situation.Footnote 5
To address this concern, we commissioned a poetic intervention to acknowledge the silence rendered in such instances of ‘absent jurisprudence’.
Sara Saleh’s The Checkpoint is a thoughtful and evocative meditation on the daily realities of life in Palestine, drawing links with other colonised, indigenous, and subjugated peoples elsewhere in the world. Saleh’s attention to the routine yet extraordinary hardships experienced by women, children, older people, and many others in Palestine are cleverly woven through with references to the international legal architecture designed to protect them and facilitate justice, but which has so manifestly failed to do so. In this context, the narrator of the poem reflects, ‘words are the sharpest weapon I wield’.
The editors are acutely aware that the complex context of the Palestine/Israel conflict, as in all conflicts, cannot be fully captured in a single intervention, or by a single voice. Accountability for the crimes committed against people on all sides of this conflict must be pursued with urgency.
Although Saleh’s poem responds specifically to the ICC’s limited response to war crimes in Palestine, we intend for it to provoke broader reflections about the many situations and cases that, for legal and political reasons, are yet to progress in the ICC. In this way, the poem also speaks to the strictures of the feminist judgment method, and gestures towards an even more radical and inclusive reimagination of the ICC’s case load.
[Editors’ Note: In May 2024, the ICC Prosecutor sought arrest warrants against certain leaders of Hamas and Israel. The Pre-Trial Chamber issued warrants for Hamas’s highest military commander and Israel’s Prime Minister and (then) Defence Minister in November 2024.]
Prelude
Hey. Psst.
Ya zalameh? Psst.
Did you hear about the pregnant woman?
The one who gave birth to a stillborn right here?
They say it took the ambulance four hours – four hours – to drive two kilometres.
Ya zalameh? Psst.
Can you hear me? I’m talking to you.
*
Stillborn or not … You don’t say a thing.
You don’t want to talk to the other Palestinian man in line because hopefully at least one of you will make it out.
Or hopefully, he won’t drag you down if he doesn’t.
*
YOU! AT THE BACK. WITH THE BIG MOUTH. QUIET!
DID I TELL YOU YOU CAN TALK?
SHUT UP!
STAND OVER THERE. DON’T MOVE.
DON’T EVEN BREATHE.
*
How long have you been waiting?
I just got here.
How long have you been waiting?
A few hours.
How long have you been waiting?
All night.
How long have you been waiting?
Since the day I was born.
*
YOU. STOP. YOU’RE NOT ALLOWED.
EVEN YOUR SHADOW WILL NOT PASS THROUGH.
NO, I’M NOT INTERESTED IN WHAT YOU HAVE TO SAY.
STOP. YOU WANNA GET SMART WITH ME? I WILL SHOOT YOU.
COME BACK TOMORROW. TODAY IS NOT YOUR DAY.
*
You breathe when they tell you to breathe. And you calmly nod and smile.
That right there is resistance. It is survival.
Reading Darwish at Qalandia
A woman is standing too close behind me in this
swollen crowd, her breath foggy on my neck.
I thumb the pages of my book
and sigh loudly. She sighs back.
And I can feel all the ghosts through
the towers of barbed wire and cameras:
The baba holding his clothes up like a flag
at the guards behind the tinted glass.
The student eager to make it to the final exam,
her messy bun in place with pencils.
The Teta, ready since the rooster sang sunrise in,
with her long-awaited permit to begin chemotherapy.
The devoted husband on his wedding day, he doesn’t know
his body will be a bargaining chip held hostage by authorities.
The young man with autism who was chased
and shot on the spot by police. Investigation pending.
And I think of Cassius Turvey, fifteen-year-old Indigenous boy
who was punched and stabbed simply for being Black.
Palestinians know about going to school
and not making it back.
Palestinians know about bulldozers demolishing villages
and settlers torching trees, homes, and shops.
No resolution, no report, no textbook has
been able to stop the violence or remedy the wrongs.
No amount of objections and condemnations have saved
the twelve-year-old boy from the military court system.
The official explanations will state that this twelve-year-old
boy is undoubtedly the assailant in this story.
And I think about how he will be blindfolded,
thrown in solitary confinement without food or water,
tried as an adult for a traffic offence,
convicted in a language not his own.
The evidence – REDACTED
His rights – REDACTED
His childhood – REDACTED
At Qalandia, the soldier cradles his Uzi unrelentingly,
like an instrument he is performing,
the olive branch insignia on his uniform glimmers
in the haze of lights and multilingual
Ramadan greetings signs behind him.
I think of Article 7 of the Rome Statute:
the crime of apartheid,
and all the other rules, customs, and conventions
that missed the irony.
We find ways to survive this daily exercise
in humiliation, to numb infinite time. Each
moment any of us remains alive is a miracle.
The soldier turns to his comrade just starting a shift
and smiles hello, revealing teeth that match their belts
of ammo. They talk about the settlements that are expanding.
‘Thank God for cheap social housing’,
but no God gave them this land,
and no God made us the cattle in this allegory.
Just law and policy. The neat and natural geometry,
the architected ‘safety’, all this freedom is illusory.
The very things keeping us out, keep you in.
I think of peace talks and frameworks and negotiations,
contradictory definitions and competing legal and political interpretations.
Of terms like ‘conflict’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘casualty’
that have sanctioned seventy-five years of this.
Of whole cities/towns/villages/valleys split in bantustans and quarters.
We grow oranges in our backyards and guerrillas on our balconies.
Power constructs borders, the faultlines of global empires.
I think of Jerusalem, al-Quds.
Of the boot soles on necks young and old in Sheikh Jarrah,
of the mobs with bats chanting ‘death to Arabs’,
of the occupying forces besieging al-Aqsa mosque,
prayers and bullets ricocheting off its ancient walls.
I think of Gaza, the forty-five-kilometre-long strip by the sea.
Of another aerial bombardment disrupting medical supplies and electricity.
Of schools, hospitals, highways, and media organisations flattened to ‘collateral damage’.
Where the water is contaminated and the food rots and the people consume it anyway.
I think of Akka and Haifa and An-Nasira.
Of the Palestinian residents called ‘second-class citizens’
who must pay taxes but still face an environmental crisis,
piles of used needles, plastic bags, and garbage spilling on their streets.
Where ‘democracy’ means no accountability for war crimes,
and the same fascist government is voted in for a fifth time
and no one seems to mind the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction.
The people march against ‘right wing’ and corruption
with little thought for the millions living under occupation.
I think of Ramallah, the so-called capital of a ‘future state’.
Of children selling lemonade in sweltering afternoon traffic,
of peeling yellow taxis and the rolling fruit and vegetable carts that feed families.
Of the ugly concrete wall looming twenty years after the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion,
Of whole neighbourhoods fractured and farms confiscated and social services isolated and somehow our subjugation is still up for debate.
How do we not dissolve under this unbearable weight?
Then I think of the ruptures. ‘The reservoirs of hope.’
The refusals. Those who keep rising from the rubble.
The ratification of the First Additional Protocol
recognised my people and all people fighting against
colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes.
We need more than stock photos of refugees from Balata to Jenin.
We need more than another fundraiser,
than another NGO worker,
than another journalist,
we need more than another poem.
Still, I frantically flip through the pages of
my book. Reading Darwish at Qalandia
is a provocation and words are
the sharpest weapon I wield.
I confront the bare iron grids,
they are bone waiting for skin,
the toothed bars not wide enough
to squeeze a single orange in.
And I think of the generations of Palestinian women
who march in our name, banners and fists raised.
Who won’t accept a piecemeal or a truncation
Who fight on every front for our self-determination. Who birth revolutions.
Who are building with other women from Turtle Island to so-called Australia.
Who are questioning, deconstructing, scratching off old laws,
breaking this apart so they can put it together …
finally, justice for us all.