Introduction and scope of the case note
This case note examines the arbitral award rendered in Gabriel Resources v. Romania Footnote 1 to explore potential normative tensions between the nomination and listing of properties under the World Heritage Convention (WHC)Footnote 2 and the protection of foreign investors’ rights, particularly under bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
In the late 1990s, Gabriel Jersey, a wholly owned subsidiary of Gabriel Canada (together, “Gabriel”), established the Roșia Montană Gold Corporation (RMGC) to develop a large-scale open-pit gold and silver mine in Romania’s Roșia Montană Valley, a site of historical and archaeological importance, home to one of the most extensive Roman underground gold mining systems (the “Project”).Footnote 3 In 1998, RMGC entered into the Roșia Montană License, which is a concession contract, with the state mining authority and a state-owned company. The following year, the Romanian government approved the license.Footnote 4 RMGC carried out an initial development phase, but additional permits were required to begin operations, notably an environmental permit, which, given the site’s sensitive characteristics, proved difficult to secure.Footnote 5
To facilitate the proceeding of the Project, the Romanian government proposed a special piece of legislation (the “Draft Law”). However, amid widespread protests over environmental and heritage concerns, leading political figures expressed their opposition on 9 September 2013. The Draft Law was subsequently rejected by the Senate.Footnote 6 The permitting process stagnated, and, in July 2015, Gabriel filed a request for arbitration under the ICSID Convention.Footnote 7
Gabriel’s principal claim alleged that Romania, through a series of acts and omissions culminating in the “political rejection” of the Draft Law, had unduly politicized the permitting process with the intent to terminate the Project, thereby committing an unlawful composite act in breach of Gabriel’s rights under the Canada–Romania and UK–Romania BITs,Footnote 8 including fair and equitable treatment (FET), full protection and security (FPS), “non-impairment by unreasonable and discriminatory measures,” “failure to observe obligations” and expropriation.Footnote 9 In a “first alternative claim,” Gabriel further submitted that Romania had breached the BITs “as of 9 September 2013” (para. 1170), even if there had been no such composite act.Footnote 10
The arbitral tribunal (the “Tribunal”)Footnote 11 rejected both claims, arguing that no cohesive pattern or intent on the part of Romania to politicize the permitting process, to terminate the Project, or to force Gabriel to abandon its investment had been proven.Footnote 12 Accordingly, it concluded that Romania committed no unlawful act, composite or otherwise.Footnote 13
This case note, however, focuses on the Tribunal’s assessment of Gabriel’s “second alternative claim,” which alleged that Romania’s nomination and inscription of the Roșia Montană Mining Landscape on the WHL evidenced its intention to terminate the Project and constituted a breach of the investors’ rights under the applicable BITs.Footnote 14 It further considers whether the Tribunal’s decision aligns with prior international investment case law involving the WHC and reflects on certain aspects of the Tribunal’s reasoning that may warrant closer scrutiny.
Factual background, the parties’ arguments, and the Tribunal’s decision
The nomination and inscription process of the Roșia Montană Mining Landscape on the World Heritage List and its relevance to the dispute
In November 2013, following the rejection of the Draft Law, the Romanian Senate recommended initiating a public debate on nominating the Roșia Montană site for inscription on the World Heritage List (WHL).Footnote 15 The government submitted the nomination in February 2016 – covering the entire Project footprint – placing the property on the Tentative List and thereby committing to protect it under the WHC.Footnote 16 In June 2018, Romania requested the World Heritage Committee (Committee) deferral of the WHL nomination pending the arbitration, which was accepted.Footnote 17 Two years later, the new government resumed the process, stating that the inscription would not change existing protections and that RMGC’s mining license remained valid but conditional upon further permits.Footnote 18 On 27 July 2021, the site was inscribed by the Committee on the WHL and simultaneously listed as World Heritage in Danger “due to threats posed by plans to resume mining which would damage a major part of the inscribed Mining Landscape” (para. 188).Footnote 19
Gabriel argued, first, that the decisions leading to the inscription of the Roșia Montană property in the WHL “were the result of” – and, thus, evidence for – its principal claim: that, by 9 September 2013, the Romanian government had already decided not to proceed with the Project (paras. 1204, 1282). Second, if the Tribunal found Gabriel’s investment had not already been “entirely frustrated” as of 9 September 2013, Romania’s nomination of the property to the WHL, “without any regard” to Gabriel’s interests, did frustrate such investment (para. 1205). According to Gabriel, such nomination made it “legally impossible as a matter of Romanian law” to carry out the Project.Footnote 20 Consequently, the nomination to the WHL “would itself be a de facto expropriation of [Gabriel’s investment] rights (without due process and without compensation) and a denial of fair and equitable treatment, in breach of the BITs.”Footnote 21 While Gabriel initially framed the nomination process as a standalone breach,Footnote 22 it later clarified that such breach occurred on 27 July 2021, with the listing of the property on the WHL.Footnote 23 By adding what Gabriel described as a “further layer of protection … fundamentally incompatible with RMGC’s mining license” (para. 1297), the listing and its legal effects under Romanian law, it argued, constituted an “effective taking of its Project rights,” in breach of the applicable BITs (para. 1206).
Romania argued that the actions and omissions being challenged as part of Gabriel’s principal claim were not intended to take control of the investment, and that, taken together as a composite act crystallizing in the political rejection of the Project around 9 September 2013, did not amount to a breach of the BITs.Footnote 24 In this context, the decisions that led to the listing of Roșia Montană in the WHL could not be seen as demonstrating any such wrongful act. Romania also argued that, while triggering a special regime for site protection and management under Romanian law,Footnote 25 the nomination process and the subsequent listing of the property could not possibly amount to a violation of the BITs, as they had neither affected the legislation designating the Roșia Montană site as a “historical monument” nor interfered with RMGC’s Project rights.Footnote 26 In fact, it was still open to and incumbent on RMGC to submit urban plans for the Project.Footnote 27 Moreover, Romania maintained that no causal link had been established between the alleged breaches and the alleged losses.Footnote 28
The reasoning and decision of the Tribunal
In connection with the principal claim, the Tribunal found, as mentioned, that no cohesive pattern or intent on the part of Romania to politicize the permitting process, to terminate the Project, or to force Gabriel to abandon its investment had been proven. Accordingly, it concluded that Romania had not committed a composite unlawful act in breach of the standards of protection under the applicable BITs, including FET, FPS, non-impairment, and expropriation.Footnote 29 These findings implied that the inscription of the Roșia Montană property on the WHL could not be regarded as the result of a political rejection of the Project.Footnote 30
Regarding the nomination process itself, the Tribunal noted that the documentary record indicated that the nomination aimed to secure funding and foster development in the area, particularly considering the scenario that Gabriel might not proceed with the Project.Footnote 31 Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the proposal was “not unreasonable” – that is, it had not been made mala fide to obstruct the Project – and found “nothing unlawful” with it (para. 1296).
Finally, the Tribunal assessed whether the legal effects arising from the listing of the property on the WHL were, as Gabriel contended, “fundamentally incompatible with RMGC’s mining licence.”Footnote 32
First, the Tribunal considered that the WHC only requires “reasonable endeavours” to state parties to “ensure that effective and active measures are taken for the protection, conservation and presentation of the cultural and natural heritage situated on [their] territory” (para. 1301). Accordingly, it held that “the UNESCO Convention itself does not create an obstacle to the Project” (ibid.). Second, the Tribunal noted that, pursuant to Romanian law,Footnote 33 “it seems clear, and Claimants do not argue otherwise, that … the UNESCO listing is not incompatible with the Roşia Montană License” (ibid.). In fact, the license had been renewed in 2019 for a further five years and remained valid at the time of the arbitration.Footnote 34 Third, Gabriel had not shown how the listing affected other permits necessary for the execution of the Project, such as the “construction permit”Footnote 35 or the “archaeological discharge certificates.”Footnote 36
In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal argued that there was no evidence to support Gabriel’s claim that the WHL listing had created impediments that “were fatal to the continuation of the Project” (para. 1302).
The Tribunal concluded that it could not “deduce from Romania’s request to put Roşia Montană on the [WHL] a politically motivated act to derail the Project” in breach of the applicable BITs (paras. 1303–1304, 1306–1307). This formulation is indeed peculiar, as it appears to privilege the absence of intent as a decisive factor in assessing the lawfulness of Romania’s decisions. While the existence of such intent may be relevant to how Gabriel framed its second alternative claim in relation to the principal claim (Romania’s political repudiation of the Project) or to the motivation behind the nomination of the Roșia Montană site to the WHL, it is unclear how it could influence an effects-based assessment of the listing itself, which, moreover, is ultimately decided by the Committee.Footnote 37
The Tribunal also emphasized that, in any event, Gabriel had failed to establish a causal link between Romania’s actions following the rejection of the Draft Law and any injury to its investment, “whether at the time the site was inscribed as a UNESCO protected area or otherwise” (para. 1315).
Overall, the Tribunal’s rejection of Gabriel’s second alternative claim appears well-founded. However, its assessment of the legal effects arising from the nomination and listing of the property on the WHL warrants closer scrutiny, particularly in light of the international investment case law involving the WHC.
Comment and assessment of the decision
A brief review of international investment case law involving the WHC
Gabriel Resources v. Romania is not the first case in which the inscription of a property on the WHL emerged as a point of contention in a dispute before an international investment tribunal.Footnote 38
In SPP v. Egypt, the tribunal’s majority held that the inscription of the Pyramids Plateau on the WHL did not justify the measures taken by the Egyptian authorities to cancel SPP’s tourism project, nor did it exclude the investor’s right to compensation.Footnote 39 Nevertheless, it considered that any claim for lucrum cessans beyond the date of the site’s inscription was inadmissible, since from that moment SPP’s activities would have conflicted with the WHC.Footnote 40
It has been argued that, to the extent that it rejects the possibility that states “set at naught the obligations they owe to investors by taking advantage of their ability to enter into subsequent, incompatible instruments,” this precedent excludes the application of lex posterior in resolving conflicts between investment and non-investment obligations.Footnote 41 Still, it is debatable whether the tribunal even considered this criterion, which is typically applied to conflicting treaties concluded by the same parties and addressing the same subject matter.Footnote 42 In this case there were not even two treaties involved, as there was no BIT applicable to the dispute.Footnote 43 Rather, the reasoning and tone of the award suggest that the WHC may have been treated as a lex specialis Footnote 44 – or even as some sort of “lex praevalens.”Footnote 45
A different approach was later adopted in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, where the host state’s argument that its international obligations regarding environmental protection and its intention to nominate the area for the WHL should influence the amount of compensation owed to the investor following expropriation was rejected by the arbitral tribunal.Footnote 46 The tribunal appears here to apply international investment law in isolation, denying the very possibility of conflict with norms aimed at protecting common interests, such as environmental and heritage preservation.Footnote 47
In Parkerings v. Lithuania Footnote 48 and Glamis Gold v. United States of America,Footnote 49 the arbitral tribunals defined the actual scope of the foreign investors’ rights under the applicable BITs, (also) by taking into account the obligations incumbent upon the host states under the WHC. This approach supported the view that, even if affecting the investment, the host states’ conduct did not conflict with the investors’ rights. Thus, differently from SPP, the tribunals did not identify a normative conflict to be resolved. Nor did they apply international investment law in isolation, as seen in Santa Elena. Instead, they arguably relied on the principle of “systemic integration,”Footnote 50 whereby “the BIT has to be construed in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part.”Footnote 51
More recently, in Gosling v. Mauritius, the tribunal upheld Mauritius’s argument that its conduct – issuing two noncontractual letters of intent encouraging the investors to submit documentation for the construction of a resort in the Le Morne area while nominating the site for inclusion in the WHL and later imposing a complete construction ban – was not contradictory.Footnote 52 The majority found that, in light of this conduct, the claimants – which were aware of Mauritius’s objective to nominate the property for listing –Footnote 53 could not have had any legitimate expectations protected under the UK–Mauritius BIT.Footnote 54
How does the decision in Gabriel Resources v. Romania fit within this line of case law?
In SPP, the project was formally terminated; in Santa Elena, the investment was expropriated; and in Gosling a total construction ban rendered the execution of the project impossible – all prior to the WHL listing. By contrast, in Gabriel, the Tribunal found, as said, that “the UNESCO Convention itself,” that is, the legal effects of the nomination and inscription of the Roșia Montană site on the WHL under the WHC, “does not create an obstacle to the Project.”Footnote 55
As Gabriel failed to demonstrate how the listing of the property affected its investment, no need arose for the Tribunal to interpret the applicable BITs in a manner accommodating Romania’s WHC obligations. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Tribunal implicitly resorted to systemic integration to rule out any breaches to the claimants’ rights, as seen in Parkerings and Glamis Gold.
Instead, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the listing of the property on the WHL was not incompatible with the Project stemmed from the “minimalist” interpretation – following, to some extent, Romania’s position –Footnote 56 that the Tribunal gave of the obligations arising under the WHC, according to which state parties:
“Are required to make “reasonable endeavours” and enjoy broad discretion in adopting measures for the protection and conservation of cultural heritage. No other specific obligations of cultural protection are required of States when cultural and natural heritage is inscribed on the World Heritage List” (para. 1301).Footnote 57
This narrow reading departs from previous decisions involving circumstances similar to the case at hand.Footnote 58 The Tribunal’s approach arguably downplays the actual scope of state parties’ obligations under the WHC, especially if one considers the Committee’s practice of monitoring compliance and promoting implementation, which tends to interpret such obligations rather strictly,Footnote 59 at least with respect to the properties inscribed in the Lists system.Footnote 60
In the present case, this interpretative approach implied that Romania could easily comply with the WHC while simultaneously respecting Gabriel’s rights under the applicable BITs. This conclusion is reinforced by the Tribunal’s reliance on the absence of “fatal impediments” to the development of Gabriel’s investment. This “standard” reflects an intent to maintain a high threshold for identifying a normative conflict between the investors’ rights and Romania’s obligations arising from the nomination and subsequent inscription of the Roșia Montană property on the WHL.
Both elements – the “minimalist” interpretation and the “fatal impediments” threshold – favour and reflect a reliance on the principle of harmonization, according to which “when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as giving rise to a single set of compatible obligations.”Footnote 61 Resorting to this principle arguably goes beyond defining the scope of one or more specific standards of protection under a BIT by taking into account other rules of international law. It entails a broader effort to adjust the scope of application of potentially conflicting obligations incumbent upon the host state so that they are compatible in practice.Footnote 62 Such recourse is not new in international investment case law involving the reconciliation of investment and non-investment obligations.Footnote 63
Final assessment
The obligations under the WHC are generally construed as obligations of due diligence.Footnote 64 It is for state parties to “endeavour, in so far as possible, and as appropriate” to take the domestic measures (legal, technical, administrative, etc.) necessary for the protection and conservation of their heritage of outstanding universal value (OUV).Footnote 65
In light of this, it was somewhat natural that Gabriel’s second alternative claim focused primarily on whether the nomination and inscription of the Roșia Montană property on the WHL were intended to trigger legal effects under Romanian law that would render the advancement of the Project impossible, rather than on the potentially inhibitive legal consequences arising directly from the WHC itself,Footnote 66 although some limited references to this can be inferred from its pleadings.Footnote 67
By shifting the analysis toward the compatibility between Romanian law and the investor’s international rights, this approach obscures the emergence of potential conflicts between international norms.
Apart from the brief considerations reported in the preceding section – where the Tribunal excluded that “the UNESCO Convention itself” represented an obstacle to the Project – the Tribunal adhered to Gabriel’s approach. This can be discerned in several passages, such as when it observed that “the UNESCO listing is not incompatible with the Roşia Montană License” (para. 1301), implying that the legal effects under consideration were those under Romanian law. Another example appears when the Tribunal, in support of its finding that Gabriel’s rights had not been violated, stressed that “Respondent submits, and Claimants do not attempt to rebut, that, under Romanian Law, Claimants’ rights under the Roşia Montană License would have to be taken into consideration prior to any approval of urban plans for the UNESCO site” (ibid.).
Nonetheless, while the legal effects of the listing of the Roşia Montană site on the WHL may, in principle, be compatible with the continuation of the Project under Romanian law, the same conclusion – contrary to the Tribunal’s (and Romania’s) “minimalist” reading – appears debatable in light of Romania’s international obligations under the WHC, particularly as interpreted by the Committee.
It is indeed no coincidence that, at the time of inscription, the Committee placed the site on the List of World Heritage in Danger.Footnote 68 Although inclusion on the In Danger List does not per se necessarily mean that Romania is in breach of its obligations under the WHC, it does imply that the property’s authenticity and/or integrity are under serious threat. The Committee recommended that Romania immediately halted all mining permits and adopt planning controls to prevent further mining at the site.Footnote 69 It also welcomed the potential positive impact of the Tribunal’s dismissal of Gabriel’s claim in this regard.Footnote 70
During the proceedings, Romania, to support the argument that, “as a matter of international law,” it was not bound to take “any specific measures that would interfere with RMGC’s mining rights,” pointed out that the Committee “does not have the power to impose any mandatory measures” and, therefore, that Romania was “not legally bound by [its] recommendations.”Footnote 71 Still, Romania is currently complying with the Committee’s recommendations in relation to the property, including by refraining from renewing RMGC’s mining license.Footnote 72 This circumstance illustrates both the substantive scope and actual normative effect of the obligations arising under the WHC as implemented by the Committee, as well as the difficulty of reconciling those obligations with the pursuit of a high-impact project such as Gabriel’s. It also highlights potential inconsistencies between the Romanian law implementing the WHC and the WHC obligations as interpreted by the Committee, in the sense that, at least in the circumstances, the level and scope of protection offered by the former do not seem to align with what is required by the latter. This had been hinted at by the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), which operates as an advisory body to the Committee, in its evaluation of the nomination of the Roşia Montană site with regard to the existence of “reserved rights” held by mining license holders in relation to the property.Footnote 73
Such tensions and potential inconsistencies are far from uncommon, as evidenced by the numerous instances in which state parties to the WHC clashed with the Committee over concerns that their economic activities – carried out in accordance with their domestic legislation, including that implementing WHC obligations – could harm the authenticity or integrity of sites included in the Lists system.Footnote 74 All three cases of deletion from the WHL (Arabian Oryx Sanctuary, Dresden Elbe Valley, Liverpool Maritime Mercantile City) involved the pursuit of economic activities conducted in accordance with the domestic regulations of the respective state parties.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing does not imply that the nomination and inscription of the Roșia Montană Mining Landscape on the WHL constituted a violation of Gabriel’s rights. Indeed, even accepting Gabriel’s argument that the “further layer of protection” deriving from the site’s listing represented the “final legal nail in the coffin” for the advancement of the Project,Footnote 75 Gabriel still failed to explain how the resulting non-implementation of the Project would violate its rights under the applicable BITs.Footnote 76 Accordingly, the Tribunal’s conclusion that, in this case, “the environmental, social, cultural and economic challenges facing a massive mining project ha[d] proven … to be insurmountable in circumstances where blame cannot be fairly attributed to any one party or any one cause” (para. 1320), would arguably nonetheless stand.Footnote 77
In conclusion, while the award represents a victory for Romania, the Tribunal’s minimalist interpretation of the state parties’ obligations under the WHC – at least with respect to properties inscribed in the Lists system – is not entirely convincing. Somewhat paradoxically, it may also contribute to the protection of the host states’ heritage of OUV when threatened by the activities of foreign investors, insofar as it prevents the nomination and listing of a property on the WHL at the center of an investment from being treated as conflicting with the investors’ rights, at least under international law.
This ambiguity stresses the need for international investment agreements to include explicit limitations or exceptions to foreign investors’ rights in order to safeguard the heritage of the host states.Footnote 78