This paper explores the vertical integration of oil-producing countries. Attempts at vertical integration were prominent among oil-producing countries throughout most of the twentieth century, but particularly following the surge of resource nationalism in the 1970s. Vertical integration attempts have largely been regarded as a sideshow in the history of global oil. This article argues that vertical integration was a crucial aspect of producer country strategies into the 1970s and 1980s, and that it affected the organization of national oil industries in important ways. It does so by exploring the Norwegian case. The article demonstrates the importance of vertical integration to the long-term development of the Norwegian oil industry. It discusses the implications of these findings for the study of vertical integration in other oil-producing countries.

It is with great sadness that we announce the recent death of this journal’s founding editor, Will Hausman. Will was not only Enterprise & Society’s first editor, but he was also central to its foundation. Will, then editor of the Business History Conference (BHC) annual proceedings volume, Business and Economic History, was at the core of a small group of BHC officers and members, including but not limited to Pat Denault, Glenn Porter, Phil Scranton, and Roger Horowitz, who recognized the potential to establish “a new journal that was dedicated to expanding the interactions between traditional business history and fields that might have seemed peripheral, but which had much to offer the study of business and its wider relationships.”1 Will not only helped to shape a vision of what the new journal should be but, as first editor, for Volumes 1 through 4 did much of the very heavy lifting involved in getting a new journal off the ground and underway. In addition to his work with Enterprise & Society, Will undertook many other roles on behalf of the organization, not least as President from 2006 to 2007. Will was also a very fine scholar in his own right, publishing extensively, especially in the history and economics of electricity and other power utilities. We will carry a fuller appreciation of Will’s life and career in a future issue. For now we wish to extend our deepest sympathies to Will’s family and friends. He will be very much missed by many.

Via an investigation of the collaboration between banks and foreign offices, this article demonstrates that the restructuring of China’s state debt before and after the revolution of 1911 was not simply a part of Chinese globalisation undertaken under the benign stewardship of foreign banks. Rather, the contest for Chinese loans reflected a power struggle for regional hegemony between expansionist states that hinged on both competition and cooperation, as well as Chinese attempts to preserve their economic and territorial sovereignty. It further shows that the notion that financial institutions operated independently of the state does not reflect the clear record of close coordination between states and financial institutions during loan negotiations.

In the early post-Second World War period, Migros of Switzerland was the first European retail business to adopt the American supermarket model. Its success, however, has not only been a matter of technological and logistical innovation. Migros’ founder, Gottlieb Duttweiler, was convinced that consumer education was part and parcel of a new style of selling consumption. This conviction was at the basis of a strategy entering foreign markets and of exporting the Migros model abroad. Similar to post-World War II economic rehabilitation programs, Duttweiler pursued an indigenous modernization agenda, based on a new principle of “rational consumption”—he did not hesitate to label this as a genuine version of entrepreneurial development aid. Against the backdrop of the establishment of Migros’ activities in Turkey, this article discusses the participation of entrepreneurs in the international development policies after the Second World War. The history of Migros Türk sheds light not only on the entrepreneurial approach to modernization policy, which was often different to that adopted in government programs, but also on how this influenced critical consumerism inside and outside Switzerland over the long term.

As a result of the partial privatization and public listing of two large state-owned enterprises in 2001, the Norwegian state became the largest owner at the Oslo stock exchange. A new mode of corporate governance was developed, through which retainment of the corporate headquarters (HQ) of hybrid state-owned enterprises became the sole political goal of continued state ownership in these corporations. This article explores the perceived benefits to the national economy of these company HQ through an investigation of public documents and interviews with key stakeholders. The article argues that the main function of the goal of HQ retainment was to portray national interests and political goals as mere (positive) externalities of HQ location, and that this goal was formalized due to a perceived need to depoliticize the corporate governance of hybrid state-owned enterprises.

The construction sector has long been underrepresented in business historical studies and debates. While an application of the “historical alternatives to mass production” approach has provided a valuable conceptual framework, this paper offers a still-needed quantitative basis to assess actual long-term changes and continuities in the forms of business organization and entrepreneurship in construction. A database of c. 16,700 construction enterprises in Brussels between 1830 and 1970, drawn from trade directories and fiscal registers, uncovers evolutions in sectoral and subsectoral numbers of enterprises, firm sizes, and rates of company formation. Thus, the growing divergence at the core of the construction industry becomes clear. Industrialization and urbanization led to market concentration, firm growth, and incorporation with some capital-intensive enterprises, whereas the variability of the work on the construction site resulted, with many others, in the persistence of labor-intensive processes, and small-scale, flexible, and informal forms of business organization.

Investment banks collaborated with health care entrepreneurs and managers in the 1990s to add a costly layer of investor-owned corporations to the US medical delivery system. In capitalizing and consolidating physician practices, publicly traded Physician Practice Management Companies (PPMCs) incorporated elements of the broader capitalist economy. Companies such as PhyCor, MedPartners, and FPA Medical Management turned to the equity and debt markets to generate shareholder profits and capital for acquisitions. Contemporary theories of financial economics reinforced their activities. PPMCs collapsed after shareholder lawsuits accused them of reporting false figures to the SEC and banks withdrew their credit. Physicians were both accomplices and victims in the process that made the medical delivery system less equitable, less effective, and more expensive. Although this experiment in medical capitalism failed, it widened the door for Wall Street to build new ways to profit from health care.

Over the second half of the 20th century, Greek governments failed to tax business income in line with the country’s level of economic development. This paper uses the “slippery slope” model of tax compliance to explain why the reform of income and corporate taxation in the late 1950s met strong resistance in the business sector. We argue that the negative legacy of interwar reforms, the lack of sustained and credible investment in trust building in coincidence with the postwar reforms, and the intensification of coercive threats in tax enforcement led to an antagonistic tax climate and a degradation of enforced and voluntary compliance. Our qualitative analysis based on original primary sources shows that the arguments publicly voiced by entrepreneurs and their organizations reflected their persistent perception of tax power as unfair, arbitrary and extractive. Using aggregate tax returns data, our quantitative analysis finds evidence of systematic and increasing income underreporting both by unincorporated and incorporated businesses. This vicious circle of non-cooperation and mutual distrust explains why governments got trapped into a persistent low tax capacity equilibrium that still casts a shadow on the Greek economy.

The change in brand from British Railways to British Rail (BR) marked an important moment in the history of Britain’s railway. Running alongside BR’s modernization was a wider process of “professionalization” within the field of marketing. This paper explores how the wider professionalization of marketing impacted BR’s own marketing practices, showing that after 1965 BR opened its doors to new methods, means, and perhaps most importantly, specialists from outside the railway industry. Such marketing efforts helped to frame the railway in terms of individual travelers’ specific economic needs: by 1968 it had effectively segmented its passengers into demographic audiences, and by 1975, BR had a much better understanding of its markets. These individual economies were often highly gendered and saw only mixed success, but ultimately demonstrated an application of research, advertising, and promotion.

Turn-of-the-century America witnessed many forgotten risk-making experiments that probed the limits of insurability by stepping beyond the familiar fields of life, fire, and marine insurance. One attempted to underwrite firms’ lost profits during strikes.

The ensuing debates on strike insurance’s practicability revealed scientistic expectations of never-ending actuarial progress that united an otherwise-divided business community. Yet attempting to realize strike insurance quickly meant grappling with the limits of insurability. Labor strife’s fuzzy causality involving human agency forestalled the homogenous classification that underlay actuaries’ averaging. Thus, strike underwriters sidestepped actuarial ratemaking to offer uniform premiums to those deemed acceptable risks. This solution not only left them susceptible to adverse selection and moral hazard but also highlighted the limits of insurers’ ability to transform uncertainty into commoditized risk, more broadly.

Recognizing these limits has important historiographical implications. Based largely on studies of life insurance—the gold standard of insurability—the rise of financial risk management has claimed a central place in the history of American capitalism. This literature thus threatens to obscure the ongoing significance of unclassifiable, unquantifiable uncertainty. Uncovering forgotten risk-making projects like attempts to establish strike insurance, where Americans grappled with the limits of insurability, is thus a crucial corrective.

This paper examines the population of corporate directors of Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. Over the period 1881-1911 the corporate form became the most common mode of business organisation for large businesses. As their number increased, the population of directors expanded and reflected an increasingly diversified corporate landscape. Based on a large-scale dataset, this paper analyses the characteristics and networks of this wider population of directors. The study goes beyond previous work, which has mainly focused on elite directors or prominent companies, and shows three key findings. First, the population of directors was very connected into a large network, complete isolation from this network was rare. Second, over 1881-1911 director interlocks with banks became less important for most sectors, while interlocks with other financial institutions such as trusts became increasingly important. Insurance companies stood out as the most connected sector spanning smaller local companies and larger international ones. Third, during the period studied there was a shift from director clusters that were mainly based on proximity, to those that were connected through industries.

This paper explores American tariff politics and the embrace of protectionism within the Ohio Valley in the two decades following the War of 1812. During these years, residents of the western states navigated the emergence of steam transportation, a growing number of state-chartered banks, and intense population growth. This fueled an economic boom that went bust during the Panic of 1819. Western farmers, merchants, and manufacturers blamed harmful patterns of trade for this economic crisis, which bolstered a distinct regional identity that embraced a properly constructed restrictive tariff as a “western” measure. Consequently, the decade of the 1820s featured the most sustained period of conflict over the tariff issue in the antebellum era. This article examines western participation in conflicts over commerce and roots the political economy of trade policy in changing economic conditions that inspired distinct northern, southern, and western perspectives on trade and economic development. I conclude that both protectionist claims to economic nationalism and free trade embrace of international exchange overlook the individual assessments of local and regional markets that set the terms on which participants in the tariff debates of the early republic imagined future development.

Recently, women’s presence on top boards of directors has significantly increased, challenging the long standing of male-led corporate elites. In light of the still-developing literature, this article provides a century-long examination of women’s entry into the Spanish corporate elite, offering several original contributions. In addition to its pioneering input into the country’s historiography, the work uses a holistic model to introduce a comparative European approach. Moreover, it empirically examines the significant yet previously unexplored impact of elite training institutions on the advancement of female directors as well as their arrival through a national holding company and their presence in leading publicly traded companies. Findings showed four distinct stages in their trajectory: discriminatory exclusion, during the first third of the twentieth century; exceptional inclusion, with early positions in their family-owned firms; gradual incorporation, with increased political representation and expanded academic access in the latter decades of the last century; and promotion, supported by twenty-first-century political strategies, while still revealing the handicap of women’s delayed entry into the corporate network.

This article contributes an account of a key moment in the development of venture capital. I argue the US Small Business Administration’s Task Force on Venture and Equity Capital for Small Business, established in 1976 and headed by William J. Casey, had an outsized impact on the development of modern venture capital and its close associations with the high technology sector. The Task Force’s 1977 report was influential in establishing both the figure of the venture capitalist and the business model of institutionally supported, limited partnership venture capital in the minds of policymakers, businesspeople, and the general public. This article traces the influence of one part of the Report: a prominently featured schematic model, entitled “Life Cycle of a New Enterprise: Model of a Growing and Successful Company, 1975-1976 Financial Market Conditions.” I trace the influence of the LCM as it spread through the developing high technology sector, as shown by its appearances in business publications, governmental reports, and congressional testimonies offered by industry leaders. The LCM was genericized away from its original authors and intentions, becoming part of the economic imaginary of the technology and innovation sector.

How knowledge is created, accessed, stored and disseminated has become a major focus of study when assessing the success or failure of industrial clusters. Marshall (1890; 225) initiated this debate when he noted: ‘The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air’. In the edited collection by Wilson, Corker and Lane (2022), emphasis has been placed on the links between knowledge, knowledge flows and how innovation systems evolve and adapt. This paper builds on their work examining how tacit and codified knowledge is created and disseminated across a cluster. Bathelt et al (2004) have demonstrated how successful clusters build effective ‘global pipelines’ to access knowledge generated elsewhere, prompting us to think how a business history analysis can incorporate these concepts and how these processes have worked in practice. The paper analyses two English clusters and the processes involved in the formation of a common body of knowledge, a ‘knowledge-cum-industrial zeitgeist’ which explains the cluster’s performance. Specifically, it proposes a model that links internally-generated knowledge and ‘global pipelines’ that clusters develop to tap into externally-generated knowledge, which through effective feedback into the ‘local buzz’ results in further innovation and strengthens the cluster’s competitive advantage.

This article examines the role of the mass media in driving anticartel debates during a coal crisis in Germany in 1900. Threatening the fuel supplies of millions of people, the nationwide energy shortage marked the beginning of the anticartel movement, adding a decisive thrust to antimonopoly sentiment toward the cartelized Ruhr coal industry. While hitherto overlooked, this symbolic chapter of German antimonopoly history was profoundly shaped by daily newspapers, a medium that revolutionized public communication during this period. By cross-referencing newspaper articles with records of the coal industry, this paper investigates how newspapers raised public concern for the fuel shortage and thereby forged narratives blaming the coal industrialists as well as how the coal producers responded to the ever-intensifying public scrutiny. As such, this study would serve to identify the mass media as a key determinant in the broader history of cartels and cartel politics in the twentieth century.

The spinning mule was one of the most important innovations in the rise of the British cotton industry during the Industrial Revolution. First introduced in 1780, the mule’s diffusion overturned the traditional division of labor in spinning from women to men. This article produces new insights on this process by examining the business records of Samuel Oldknow, a pioneer of fine cotton manufacturing and an early adopter of the technology during the understudied transition period of the late 1780s and early 1790s, when the machine was still hand powered before the factory system. It demonstrates that strength was the most important factor in shaping the gendered division of labor in mule spinning. Although no direct gender-pay discrimination is evident, men’s earnings were higher because of the physical effort required to operate the larger mules that more easily produced the finest yarns that secured the highest piece rates. Crucially, this shift of the gender division of labor predated factory mule spinning.

In this article, we explore the impact of colliery closure programs across the nationalized British coal industry. We chart the regional disparities in these and the mobilization of community opposition to national protests, leading to the national miners’ strikes of 1972, 1974, and 1984–5. This article demonstrates how closures have changed the industrial politics of mining unions for miners, junior officials, and managers and have increasingly alienated NCB officials and mining communities. We demonstrate how this undermined the ideals of nationalization. This is examined through moral economic frameworks and within the context of changes to the UK’s energy mix, with implications for contemporary deliberations on public ownership, energy transitions, and regional development.

In 1936 Gianni Caproni, one of the biggest aircraft producers in Italy, bought one of the biggest engineering companies in Emilia Romagna, the Officine Meccaniche Reggiane, and started manufacturing and exporting some of the topmost fighters ever produced in Italy. Based on different archival sources this paper would like to shed light on why, despite a national technological obsolescence in the field a company, which focused on the production of railway material, was able to come up with the most technologically innovative fighters (the Re. 2000 and successive models) which soon conquered the Italian and foreign markets. The author would like to indicate the original characteristics which help explain its primacy: the unique features of the Reggiane, the role of the new owner, risk-taker and forward-looking entrepreneur Gianni Caproni and in particular the importance of the transmission of knowledge, which in those autarchic years and in this particular case was reached by attracting human capital from abroad. The general argumentation of the paper would like to show the importance of deeply excavating in the company’s history, managerial choices, risk-taking attitudes, and knowledge transfer in explaining an otherwise almost inexplicable international business success in a such a competitive sector. The approach is not purely descriptive: the paper analyses the facts and figures of the Officine Meccaniche Reggiane before and after the Caproni takeover, it evaluates the company’s innovative production strategy in the new field of aircraft production and offers new interpretations on its success story in this field.

Forecasts play a central role in the development of energy infrastructure. Since building energy infrastructure is long and costly, energy system planners try to anticipate future demand to avoid both shortages and overcapacity. But energy demand forecasts aren’t neutral: they represent a certain vision of the future that forecasters hope to bring into being. This article uses a historical case study to open the black box of forecasting and the world it contains. It studies electricity demand forecasts made by Hydro-Québec, one of the biggest industrial firms in North America, from the 1960s to the 1980s. Based on linear extrapolation models forecasting exponential demand and endless growth, the state-owned firm embarked on huge hydroelectric megaprojects with deep consequences on the environment and Indigenous lands. The energy crisis of the 1970s, by disturbing energy systems, led to criticism from the provincial government and civil society towards Hydro-Québec’s bullish forecasts that justified its expansionist agenda. This uncertain context favored other methods of predicting the future, like scenario analysis, and brought scrutiny towards the hydroelectric powerhouse’s business. At the crossroads of business history, energy history, and science and technology studies, the article argues that energy forecasts are used by actors like energy suppliers and governments to produce and project power relations onto the future. They become performative when powerful interests coalesce around their vision of the future to implement it.