4.1.1 A Top-Down Bureaucracy: The Junxian System

The core of the institutional genes of the Chinese imperial system, the top-down bureaucracy, was created through centuries of evolution. Before the establishment of such a system, the foundation of governance during the Zhou dynasty, especially the Western Zhou (c. 1100–771 bce), was a political alliance formed by the monarchs and the feudal nobility. The political alliance was derived from land ownership, which, in turn, produced economic, political, and military power. The power of the feudal nobility arose from their land ownership.

With the establishment of the Qin Empire, governance transformed into a highly centralized top-down bureaucratic system, that is, the junxian system. In this system, all officials, including the highest ranking officials second only to the emperor, were appointed by the emperor from top to bottom. Officials lacked an independent basis for their power and did not own land from which to derive power (except for the land used to support their families). The hierarchical bureaucratic system thereby replaced the political alliances of the feudal era.

However, limited by the technological conditions of the time, such as communication and transport, it would have been practically impossible to operate if every operational detail depended on concrete orders from the imperial court. The junxian system guaranteed the consolidation of political power control of imperial officials so that no individual across the empire possessed the requisite political power or resources to contest the imperial authority. Having political and personnel power fully controlled, the imperial court delegated other administrative powers to the local authorities.

The junxian system is characterized by a devolved administration within a centralized bureaucracy. This fundamentally differs from a truly decentralized federal system, despite occasional conflations of the two in political science and economics literature. In a federal system, chief executives at the local level are locally generated, thus possessing a local power base. However, in the junxian system, local leaders are centrally appointed and lack a local power base.

Federalism emerged in Central and Western Europe during the Middle Ages, evolving from the feudal system. For instance, the power base of the medieval Holy Roman Empire (HRE) was embedded in various strata of the landed aristocracy. Each tier held its own power base, making these nobles fundamentally distinct from top-down appointed bureaucrats who lacked an independent power base. Moreover, the HRE emperors were elected by the nobility at all levels and were leaders of the noble ruling coalition.

Contrarily, the Chinese imperial system, since its inception in 221 bce, stripped the nobility of independent power and mandated the inhabitants of the land to submit unconditionally to the imperial authority. The system tirelessly endeavored to eliminate the economic and political foundations for any prospective emergence of independent power. The institutional genes of the Chinese imperial system are so deeply ingrained within society that, under traditional Chinese culture, people take this for granted. Thus, they mistakenly assume a top-down imperial bureaucracy to be part of the sole legitimate model of governance.

In essence, the junxian system eradicated all independent forces in society. The so-called nobles were solely nominal, with life and death hinging on the emperor’s whims, a stark contrast to the independent European nobles who could amass armies for their own interests. This system guaranteed the emperor’s ultimate control, free from any political provocations and threats. However, the longevity of the junxian system relied on other components of the trinity of institutional genes.

4.1.2 Economic and Legal Foundation of the Bureaucracy: Imperial Control of Land

The bureaucracy was the cornerstone of imperial rule. However, the bureaucracy itself required a foundation to ensure its stability and longevity. Despite the emperor’s omnipotence and top-down control over the bureaucracy, it was essential to make certain that no individual ever possessed the capability to challenge imperial authority. By eliminating the aristocratic power base derived from land ownership, the imperial land control system facilitated the continuance of the junxian system and imperial power. This system also molded the concept of property and land rights and determined the development and evolution of China’s legal system since ancient times. Therefore, the imperial system of land control is a critical component of the institutional genes of the Chinese imperial system.

The imperial junxian bureaucracy and the imperial land system are complementary components of the Chinese imperial institutions. The former eliminated the political basis for independent social forces within the empire and the latter eradicated the economic basis for such forces to re-emerge. Without ultimate control rights over their land, princes, nobles, leading gentry, and merchants could only rely on imperial authority to uphold their wealth and status (see Chapter 3).

4.1.3 Personnel and Ideological Foundation of the Bureaucracy: The Keju System

Historical lessons time and again show that the imperial land control system alone was insufficient to ensure the long-term stability of the junxian system. This is because while the empire’s senior officials were devoid of land-derived powers, they could still amass and develop power through inheritance. Accumulated power, transferred from father to son to grandson, could gradually establish a de facto aristocratic power to challenge the imperial authority. Indeed, the widespread presence of such powerful de facto local vassals was the cause of the collapse of the Han dynasty. The empire had been fragmented for nearly four centuries. Taking lessons, the subsequently reunited empire, the Sui dynasty (581–618), established the keju, a formal imperial examination system, cutting off the path of inheriting power from senior officials to their descendants and fundamentally eliminating the emergence of de facto aristocracies. At the same time, the essential content of the examination was designed by court literati to directly interpret Confucianism for the governance of the empire and thus to determine and control its ideology.

The subject matter, budget, and operations of the imperial examination were directly controlled by the court, with the emperor presiding over the court examinations as the chief examiner. From then on, the keju system significantly influenced imperial politics and personnel appointments, serving as an integral part of the imperial system that complemented the junxian system. Particularly since the Song dynasty (960–1279), when the keju system was refined into a permanent fixture, the imperial institution reached its zenith of stability, despite undergoing dynastic changes and foreign invasions.

As an institutional gene, the imperial examination system (keju) was not only a pillar of the empire but it also profoundly influenced the mindset of the Chinese, especially intellectuals. Within the framework of the imperial system, gaining social recognition was primarily achieved through success on the keju examinations. This effectively eliminated the societal and intellectual foundations necessary for the emergence of independent intellectuals. The ambitions of scholars were largely confined to advancing through this particular system. Consequently, there were limited opportunities for society to produce elite intellectuals who were independent of the imperial power or who held views or perspectives divergent from Confucian orthodoxy. The intricacies of the keju system are further discussed in Chapter 5.

4.2.1 The Emergence and Decline of the Feudal System

As the first Chinese dynasty with a systematic written record, by the Shang dynasty (1600–1046 bce, roughly concurrent with the drafting and compilation of the Old Testament), the term “fengjian” (封建), meaning “granting feudal statehood” (preface to Chang, Reference Chang1987) had already appeared.

The subsequent Zhou dynasty left a more comprehensive historical record. According to these documents, the system of the Zhou dynasty, particularly during the Western Zhou period (1046–771 bce), bore many similarities to the feudalism of medieval Europe. The “Son of Heaven” in the Western Zhou dynasty can be likened to a medieval European king, while the vassal princes of the Western Zhou mirrored Europe’s dukes.

The governance structure of the Western Zhou dynasty was such that the “Son of Heaven” enfeoffed the princes, who, in turn, granted fiefdoms to their “Great Officers” (nobles at the ministerial level). Due to these similarities, the ancient Chinese term “fengjian” was adopted by the Japanese as a translation in the nineteenth century or earlier for the Western term “feudalism.”²

The key difference between the Chinese feudal system, which was based on blood and clan ties (Chang, Reference Chang1983), and the European feudal system lies in the distinction between the aristocracy and the ruling class. In the European system, the monarchy and vassals generally did not share blood ties. The clan-based system in China, as an institutional gene, limited the ability of the nobility to form political alliances across different bloodlines during the feudal period. This significantly impacted the way in which the Chinese landed aristocracy was eradicated during the dismantlement of the feudal system and how the evolution of the imperial monopoly on power unfolded afterwards.

From the end of the Western Zhou to the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period (770–481 bce), the authority of the Son of Heaven steadily declined. With the collapse of the political order and the relocation of the capital, the old order of vassal obedience to the Zhou was no longer in place. They were pitted against each other in a struggle for territory and, concurrently, a primary form of the junxian system began to take shape. At the heart of the junxian system was a bureaucracy that eroded the structure of the feudal aristocracy. As the state fought over land and the old order disintegrated, a new unit of territorial administration, the xian (county), emerged, providing that the previous landowners – the princes and nobles – had to be replaced or eliminated. Counties were administered by appointed officials rather than the traditional nobility, allowing the new rulers to directly control the military power of the region and collect taxes (Zhou and Li, Reference Zhou and Li2009). Dozens of such counties were established in the border areas of Jin and Chu around 532 bce (Gu and Zhu, Reference Gu and Zhu2003). The key institutional change was that all bureaucrats were appointed by the central authority, with hereditary privileges no longer playing a role.

As warfare between the vassals intensified, the era known as the Warring States period (5th century to 221 bce) began. Through conflict and annexation, what once were dozens of relatively small vassal states (more than a hundred existed during the Spring and Autumn period) gradually consolidated into seven large states. Concurrent with this warfare was a competition to change the system. Most notably, the already established junxian system evolved into a basic institutional arrangement.

The junxian system precipitated a decline in the power of the aristocracy, while the decrease in aristocratic power, in turn, reinforced the junxian system. These shifts laid the groundwork for the system that would later form a grand unified empire (Miyazaki, Reference Miyazaki1980).

The decline of the aristocracy during the Warring States period also had close ties with the development of iron technology (Bai, Reference Bai2005). With the increasing use of iron tools, the adoption of oxen for ploughing, and the promotion of rice cultivation, agricultural yields improved. Under the deteriorating order of the Western Zhou dynasty, the rule prohibiting land transactions was gradually relaxed. The commonality of land sales began to erode the land-based aristocratic system (Huang, Reference Huang1996).

Many states undertook reforms, bypassing the aristocracy to directly levy taxes on farmland. This not only led to a decline in the status of the aristocracy but also saw some nobles relinquishing their lands. In some traditional areas that remained untouched by war, rulers directly appointed bureaucrats to govern the region (Hou, Reference Hou2005). These developments facilitated reforms that weakened the aristocracy and laid the groundwork for the emergence of the imperial system.

4.2.2 The Emergence of the Imperial Legal Principle: Legalism

In addition to the previously mentioned political, military, and economic changes during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, especially the development and expansion of the junxian system, the emergence of so-called Legalist reforms in some states was another significant factor contributing to the creation of the institutional genes of the Chinese imperial order. Legalism (Fajia 法家), which emerged in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (with some claims suggesting Legalist origins dating back to the Xia and Shang dynasties, although evidence is scant), advocated for the consolidation of all power into the hands of the monarch, eschewing power-sharing or checks and balances.³ Over several centuries, Legalists played a crucial role in efforts to diminish the power of the aristocracy and to pave the way for the creation of the imperial system.

Guan Zhong (719–645 bce), one of the founders of Legalism, advocated for the monarch to use law as a tool to suppress and reduce the aristocracy to a subservient position. He asserted that the law was created by the monarch, enforced by ministers and officials, and adhered to by the people. According to him, everyone, from the ruler and his ministers to the nobles and commoners, was subject to the law. This he referred to as Great Governance.⁴ Guan’s ideas were gradually implemented in the centuries following him.

It is important to note that the modern Chinese term for law, falü (法律), was borrowed from the ancient terms fa (法) and lü (律), which were derived from the Legalists’ term in the process of translating the Western term “law.” However, fa or lü, as terms in Legalism, were about a code of conduct or an executive order, coupled with some elements of criminal and administrative law. Falü differed significantly in terms of its definition, content, and function from the Western notion of “law.” To avoid conflating Legalists’ law with modern legal concepts, English literature on Chinese history and philosophy sometimes translates the Legalist law as “fa,” and with annotations to underscore the difference.

The first large-scale implementation of Legalism, which systematically shook the declining feudal institutions, was launched by Li Kui (455–395 bce), the Chancellor of Wei during the Warring States period. His reforms were aimed at weakening and eliminating the nobility by abolishing the well-field (jingtian 井田) system,⁵ which served as the institutional foundation of the Zhou aristocracy. Moreover, using Legalist methods, he systematically suppressed the nobility and other forces that could counter monarchic authority.

Li Kui gathered the achievements of Legalists from all states and compiled the Fajing (The Legalist Classics). Over the next two centuries, this work was disseminated and implemented by his followers in different states. The Fajing profoundly influenced the politics and legislation of the first Chinese imperial dynasty, the Qin dynasty. The essence of this book, as a component of the institutional genes, was handed down and evolved from that point forward.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the Fajing served as the prototype for the first laws of the Chinese imperial system. Traces of it can be found in Qinlü – the statutes of the Qin Empire – and in archaeological discoveries from the bamboo slips during the Qin dynasty (Yang, Reference Yang1997, p. 194).

The most famous reformer of the Warring States period, and the one with the most direct impact on the creation of the Chinese imperial system, was Shang Yang (395–338 bce) of the State of Qin, the successor to Li Kui. The essence of Shang Yang’s reforms was to implement Li Kui’s Fajing, systematically eliminating the aristocracy and fully instituting the centralized junxian system. Shang Yang asserted that only by fully weakening the power of the people could the goal of centralization be achieved. He posited, “A weak people means a strong state and a strong state means a weak people. Therefore, a country, which has the right way, is concerned with weakening the people.”⁶ The principle of finding the way to weaken the people has remained a fundamental tenet of governance in China to this day.

Shang Yang’s reform greatly bolstered the junxian system in the state of Qin and further centralized power. Ultimately, the highly centralized state of Qin conquered all of the other six states,⁷ creating the Grand Empire. Following this, Qin Shi Huang adopted the proposal of his Legalist advisor Li Si to institute “rule by the king alone under heaven.” He abolished enfeoffment, eliminated the nobility, and established a centralized junxian system throughout the entire empire. This marked the beginning of over 2,000 years of imperial rule in China.

4.2.3 Institutional Genes of Feudal Systems: China versus Western Europe

Why did the feudal system of the Chinese Zhou evolve into a long-lasting empire with highly monopolized powers, whereas that of Western Europe produced institutional genes supporting constitutionalism?⁸ A full analysis to address this question is beyond the scope of this book, yet I will highlight the most critical points. One such point is land rights and the political power derived from such rights.

A common feature among all feudal systems in Western Europe and Chinese Zhou was that the monarch and the nobility each had land as their power base. Rulership relied on alliances formed between these relatively separate powers. In contrast to the Chinese Zhou, in Western Europe the nobility’s land ownership and political power derived from it were secure and evolved to become even more so over time, making it impossible for the monarch to undermine them. In contrast, in the Chinese Zhou, the evolution trajectory of these rights and the power derived from them was the opposite.

How land rights and the related political power evolved in Medieval Western Europe is closely tied to the emergence and evolution of the feudal system there. The European feudal system emerged after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Although the Roman Empire had a concentrated power structure backed by vast state-owned land, the key point is that its predecessor, the Roman Republic, was a state collectively ruled by land-owning citizens based on private land rights. The institutional genes of private property rights were deeply rooted. As the Republic expanded, the conquered land occupied by military forces became separated from the land ownership of Roman citizens, resulting in “state-owned land.” As state-owned land continuously expanded and significantly surpassed the aggregate of privately owned land held by citizens, it formed the institutional bedrock for the creation of the Roman Empire. Even though political power remained highly decentralized during the imperial period, the institutional genes of private property rights, along with their corresponding legal and ideological principles, persevered. This enduring legal tradition of private property rights is exemplified by Roman law as codified in the Code of Justinian.

Furthermore, during the Roman Republic, there existed a systematic legal framework and the concept of independent justice premised on private property rights. Even though this framework was somewhat weakened during the empire, the institutional genes persisted. The tradition of a relatively independent judicial system laid the groundwork for the protection of private property rights and political power, which were relatively fragmented.

The feudal system emerged after the collapse of the Roman Empire. In this system, a ruling alliance between the monarch and the nobles was fundamental to power. The relatively dispersed private property rights and political power were underpinned by institutional genes tracing back to the ancient Greek and Roman Republic or even earlier. Under such a consensus, no lord, regardless of his military might, had legitimate power to conquer all the feudal economies and impose a centralized imperial rule.

The governance of the HRE exemplifies this point. Despite its name, the HRE was in fact a federation of many feudal states led by princes and dukes. The power of the nobles was hereditary, not derived from bureaucrats appointed by the emperor. For instance, in the HRE, the emperor was elected by the rulers of the empire’s constituent polities. The relatively independent and stable power of the feudal nobility eventually resulted in mutual checks on the sovereign’s power. This regional division of powers laid part of the foundation for the subsequent evolution towards constitutional government. Early forms of constitutionalism protected powers that could challenge the ruling authority through decentralization, thereby solidifying the pluralism of the political and economic landscape.

Lastly, the influence and power of Christianity and the Church weakened the king’s monopoly on power and aided the nobility’s counterbalancing role against the king. In contrast, in China’s clan-based feudal society, the importance of family and kinship made it difficult to form a systematic, stable, political, economic, and legal system to support the relatively scattered property and political power that once existed. Against this backdrop, over the few hundred years of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the aristocracy’s land ownership and political power were fundamentally eroded and eventually completely eradicated from the system.

4.3.1 Growing Institutional Genes of the Chinese Empire: The Qin and Han Dynasties

The governance of the Zhou dynasty was inherently confederation-like by nature. In size and structure, its closest counterpart in European history was probably the Holy Roman Empire of medieval Europe – a loose confederation of polities, famously characterized by Voltaire as neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. However, these resemblances are superficial. Critical distinctions between the Zhou dynasty and the HRE shaped their divergent trajectories in institutional evolution.

In the HRE, the relative decentralization of property rights and political power limited the authority of the ruler’s family or clan. Substantive power was relatively dispersed, with any concentration of power necessitating alliances among the feudal aristocrats of each constituent state. Even within these states, rulers relied on alliances with local nobility for governance. Some kings were elected by local nobility and did not inherit their positions. This was particularly true at the top level of the HRE, where the emperors were elected by participant states, similar to the EU today. Indeed, today’s EU recognizes Charlemagne, who laid the foundation for the creation of the HRE, as a precursor.

The landed aristocracy and the ecclesiastical authority deeply embedded within European society – frequently superseding secular power – both thwarted the establishment of a highly centralized authority within the HRE. From the perspective of institutional evolution, the relative decentralization of property rights and political power formed the institutional genes that ultimately facilitated Europe’s transition towards a constitutional system.

In contrast, the Zhou dynasty’s feudal system was clan-based. In the Zhou dynasty, the family of the Son of Heaven (i.e., the king of kings) ruled over the “whole world,” which consisted of numerous states, each governed by its own royal family. The affairs of the royal family and the affairs of the state were one and the same. This clan system, which prevented the formation of political alliances across bloodlines, allowed the most powerful clans to gradually eliminate all other clans, one by one. Thus, a clan-based ruling arrangement was a fundamental institutional gene that gave rise to the later highly centralized, grand unified imperial system.

After establishing the empire, Qin abolished the feudal system. The power of the various kingdoms and royal households, rooted in their own clans, was gradually eliminated as a political force and their ruling positions were successively lost. However, the principle of clan-based rule endured. The federation of multiple household-kingdoms was transformed into a grand unified household-empire, where power was concentrated within one empire and one royal household. The institutional gene of clan-based rule evolved from a system governed by multiple clans to one where all power was controlled by a single clan. In this ultra-centralized system, only the emperorship was hereditary and the emperor’s household held ultimate political power. No other clan was permitted to challenge the bureaucracy ruled by the emperor. All other political power outside the imperial household depended on the bureaucratic status conferred by appointment. This system laid the foundation for the centralization of power over the next 2,000 years.

The Han dynasty also laid the foundation for the administrative system of the Chinese Empire. Since then, there were only incremental changes in the administrative aspect of the empire until its collapse in 1911. During this period, the Chancellor was the highest administrator, assisted by several ministers each of whom was responsible for a specific bureaucratic area. The Chancellor, the Grand Commandant, and the Imperial Secretary, collectively known as the Three Councilors (san gong), represented the most prestigious state offices. The central government was administered by Nine Ministers (jiu qing), a term originating from the royal household stewards who managed various domestic affairs within the royal household.¹¹ The managerial and executive authority of each councilor and minister, including that of the Chancellor, rested on appointment by the emperor. No individual in the high office had an independent power base.

The prototype of a centralized administrative bureaucracy, which laid the foundation for establishing a complete junxian system for an entire empire, was fully established in the Han dynasty. Later the central bureaucratic system evolved into the Three Departments (san sheng 三省) and Six Ministries (liu bu 六部) structure. The so-called Three Departments referred to the Zhongshu sheng (Palace Secretariat), the Menxia sheng (Chancellery), and the Shangshu sheng (Department of State). The Palace Secretariat, originating during the Han dynasty, managed palace affairs. The Chancellery, arising from the office of palace attendants during the Qin and Han periods, functioned as the emperor’s advisory or staff department. This office developed into the Chancellery during the Sui–Tang period. In certain dynasties, there were multiple Chancellors, leading the Chancellery to become the office of one of the Chancellors. The Six Ministries were each assigned specific functions, which included managing bureaucratic personnel (Ministry of Personnel), overseeing taxation and finance (Ministry of Revenue), conducting imperial examinations (Ministry of Rites), administering military affairs (Ministry of War), handling judicial affairs (Ministry of Penalties), and supervising construction and manufacturing projects (Ministry of Works). These are summarized in Figure 4.1. The bureaucratic framework that emanated from the system of the Three Departments and Six Ministries was a fundamental institutional element of the imperial administrative system, with its direct influence enduring up until the final days of the empire. The underlying principles and traditions established by this system continue to impact China today.

Figure 4.1 Institutional genes of China’s junxian bureaucracy since the era of the Sui and Tang dynasties.

The most critical element of the junxian system was to maintain control at the local level. The tug-of-war between central and local authorities within the bureaucracy in contemporary China has been a significant issue since the Han dynasty. Although local officials were appointed by the emperor and nominally accountable to him, implementation faced serious incentive problems due to a high degree of information asymmetry. To prevent local bureaucrats from deceiving the imperial court, the Han dynasty implemented a systematic inspection and auditing system, requiring local authorities to submit their financial and statistical records to the central government annually. To prevent data fabrication, the central government deployed inspectors to regularly patrol the country, which was divided into thirteen investigative districts. Despite their low official ranking, these inspectors, as the eyes and ears of the government, held significant power.

4.3.2 The Imperial Institutional Genes: Disintegration verses Unification

The institutional genes of old systems rarely vanish immediately following the collapse of the old system. This was certainly true for the Zhou feudal system. It was not until the tenth century, with the establishment of the Song dynasty, that the remaining feudal institutions potentially leading to the formation of local vassals (including de facto vassals) were completely eradicated. Thus, from that point forward, the institutional genes of the Zhou feudal system were entirely eliminated.

Shortly after the death of Qin Shi Huang, the Qin dynasty was overthrown by power struggles and armed rebellions. The subsequent Han dynasty largely inherited the imperial system of the Qin dynasty, while partially restoring the pre-Qin aristocratic feudal system. This restoration was compelled by incentive reasons which dictated the survival of the regime. The emperor of Han directly controlled the most important parts of the country through the junxian system, while also granting kingdoms and princedoms to meritorious officials who founded the empire. It was a measure adopted to stabilize rule when the old institutional genes were still strong. In order to prevent local vassals from accumulating power and challenging imperial authority, the central government of the Han dynasty always limited the power of these feudal kings and princes, especially their hereditary power. As a result, most feudal rulers lost their domains after three or four generations (Twitchett and Loewe, Reference Twitchett and Loewe1986).

Nevertheless, the institutional genes of the feudal system remained prevalent. In the late Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 ce), de facto vassal kings re-emerged. As rebellions spread across the country and power struggles within the central government proliferated, the Han Empire eventually collapsed and split into competing kingdoms. China then went through a lengthy period of fragmentation and strife, often referred to as the Period of Disunity or the Six Dynasties period, which lasted for nearly four centuries. This era was characterized by a series of rival dynasties vying for control.

The transition from the Zhou’s feudal federation to the imperial regime of the Qin and Han dynasties resulted in an extremely centralized Grand Empire. This sharply contrasts with post-Roman medieval Western and Central Europe, where power was dispersed and interregional and interstate competition was the norm. Even though the collapse of the Qin and Han dynasties was attributed to the emergence of de facto vassals within the imperial system and the imperial system was dismantled, the feudal system seemed to have been restored in some countries at various times in the Central Plains region and the success or failure of the imperial and feudal systems depended on which institutional genes prevailed.

If the feudal institutional genes gained dominance, the nobility could collectively resist an imperial system that infringed on their foundational powers. A feudal governance structure, based on an alliance between the monarch and the nobility, would have prevented the creation of a grand empire. Conversely, if the imperial institutional genes proved dominant, the centralized and absolutist nature of the system would result in any ambitious individual eventually being ruled, dominated, or killed. The same logic applies to interstate relations. The empire had to expand until it either conquered or destroyed all rivals within its reach or it was conquered by them.

The reinforced imperial institutional genes and the weakened feudal institutional genes dictated that greater social forces supporting violent expansion through plundering of the land and self-proclaimed kingship were dominant. Therefore, throughout history, ambitious aggressors repeatedly chose to risk their lives in pursuit of a grand empire as their equilibrium point in the game.

Although the Qin and Han dynasties ceased to exist and their Grand Empire disintegrated, the imperial institutional genes they passed down persisted. The Jin dynasty (265–420) and the subsequent dynasties all inherited the critical institutional gene from the Qin and Han, the junxian bureaucracy. The Jin also inherited a significant portion of the Han dynasty’s test-based meritocratic recommendation system. Similar to the Han era, these systems constantly produced de facto nobility due to the remaining feudal institutional genes. However, the inherited institutions from Qin and Han dictated that the de facto nobility did not have the legitimacy to establish a stable ruling alliance and restore the feudal system. The constant creation of de facto nobility in such a flawed imperial system destabilized the Jin dynasty. Subsequent kingdoms and dynasties suffered similar short-lived existences for identical reasons. The same deficiencies in the institutional genes of the imperial system repeated across centuries of history.

The Northern Wei (386–534), which had a significant direct influence on the subsequent imperial system, carried out reforms to centralize powers in the later part of its reign under Emperor Xiaowen. In many respects, these reforms echoed those implemented by Shang Yang during the Warring States period. Besides the inherited junxian system, the Northern Wei undertook additional steps to undermine, and even eradicate, the nobility. For instance, in order to weaken the nobility, the Northern Wei introduced the equal fields system, under which farming households were spun off from their wealthy overlords and registered as national taxpayers.

As discussed in Chapter 3, this measure further weakened the nobles in economic and personnel terms. The Western Wei dynasty (535–556), which followed the Northern Wei, was the direct precursor of the Sui dynasty; it fully inherited the junxian system of the late Eastern Han dynasty. In 556, on the eve of the creation of the Sui dynasty, it was announced that the old laws of the Qin and Han dynasties would be restored, with the central government holding full power over local officials’ appointments. Concerning the economic system, the Western Wei not only inherited the equal fields system of the Northern Wei but also expanded the extent of military cantonments, which fell under the purview of the imperial court.

The fact that the Northern Wei and Western Wei dynasties perpetuated the Qin-Han imperial system is not coincidental. Although the emergence of de facto vassals under the imperial system precipitated the empire’s disintegration at the end of the Eastern Han dynasty, subsequent dynasties essentially upheld the institutions of the Qin-Han period. Granting lands and titles proved to be an effective strategy for motivating military commanders as kingdoms and regimes grappled with one another. But as long as the regime was relatively stable, even if it was not a unified empire, the states defaulted to the centralized structure of the junxian bureaucracy and imperial control of the land to diminish the role of the nobility. That is, the institutional genes of the Qin and Han were transmitted across generations for several centuries, even in the absence of a grand empire.

The coexistence of the institutional genes of the imperial and feudal systems in Chinese history ensured that the nobility did not have secure power in the states that were at war with each other. Therefore, a balance of power, which would arise only from a pluralistic power structure, could not occur. The equilibrium structure of the power struggle was an ultra-centralized one, in which the ruler overwhelmed all others and deprived them of their power. In this structure, contenders for the throne had to compete fiercely until a winner emerged and all rivals were vanquished. The power structure, created by this institutional gene, also made it difficult to form alliances between states and eventually reach a balanced equilibrium. Consequently, a strong state would eventually annex all others and form a unified empire.

In contrast, even within the most autocratic and absolutist monarchies of Europe, nobles retained substantial power, as did the Church. Absolute monarchs still needed a coronation by the Church and they partially relied on fraught alliances with the nobility. Therefore, alliances formed between the plurality of forces were the basis there for achieving a balanced power structure, both domestically and between states. The difference in institutional genes that developed in Chinese and Western history not only determined the difference in domestic power structures but also determined two different equilibrium states: China’s imperial monopoly structure, which overlaps with the institutional features of totalitarianism, and Europe’s coexistence of multiple competing forces, powers, and states.

4.3.3 Imperial Institutional Genes Reached Their Peak: Sui–Tang and Afterwards

Just as the Qin unified their world, the Sui dynasty (581–619) brought an end to nearly four centuries of division, reinstating China’s Grand Empire. Drawing from the disintegration of the empire in the past, the Sui introduced a series of reforms to bolster and refine the Qin system, fundamentally fortifying the imperial order. The refined institutional genes, which prevented the empire from undergoing any sustained fragmentation later, have been transmitted to successive dynasties up to the present day.

The Qin Empire laid the foundations for two fundamental parts of the Chinese imperial institutional genes’ trinity, meaning, the junxian bureaucracy and imperial control of land. The Han Empire solidified and improved these institutional genes and fostered the imperial examination system which evolved into the keju system. This keju system became a fundamental component of the institutional genes of the Chinese imperial system from the Sui dynasty onwards. Consequently, the complete trinity of imperial institutional genes took shape during the Sui and Tang dynasties.

The key to maintaining the longevity of the imperial system was to prevent internal challenges to imperial authority, ensuring the bureaucracy did not degenerate into an institution of aristocratic rule while still functioning effectively. One of the critical factors here was the selection and control of bureaucrats. In the centuries since the Han dynasty, it was clear that as long as there was no well-established personnel system in place, bureaucrats originally appointed by the court, with power and resources under their control, developed and accumulated over generations, often evolving into de facto nobles or vassals. Once conditions were favorable, these emergent vassals would challenge imperial authority, destabilize the imperial system, and eventually fragment the empire.

To address personnel issues in the bureaucracy, the Western Jin dynasty (265–316) introduced the nine-grade system of ranks. Over the several hundred years of the Wei, Jin, Northern, and Southern dynasties, this system was continuously replicated and evolved, becoming an integral part of the institutional genes of the imperial system. The principle of the system was to select and promote officials based on merit and family background. While it initially worked well in the early years of a new dynasty, it gradually became dysfunctional over time, giving rise to new nobility and shaking the imperial system.

When the Sui dynasty re-established the Grand Empire after nearly four centuries of disintegration, it wished to prolong imperial rule and address lessons learned over centuries due to the recurrent rise of internal aristocrats challenging imperial power. To this end, the Sui instituted a comprehensive formal imperial examination system, the keju, supplanting the existing nine-grade system. Anyone aspiring to hold a position in the imperial bureaucracy had to pass the keju test. This eliminated the pathway for the offspring of high-ranking officials to automatically secure positions within the upper echelons of government. By making the keju the primary determinant of bureaucratic staffing, this system effectively eradicated the production of de facto nobility. Thus, it became a fundamental part of imperial politics and a pillar for the consolidation and longevity of the imperial system. Later, once the system was more established, the emperor acted as the examiner, personally overseeing examinations at the palace. Those who passed the palace examinations were automatically classified as students of the emperor.

Further improved by the Tang and Song dynasties, the keju system was fully institutionalized from the Song dynasty onwards, simultaneously forming a complete bureaucratic system based on merit. From the Song dynasty to the collapse of the Chinese Empire, the system never again experienced disintegration due to the emergence of nobility. Chapter 5 delves into the keju system.

The Sui dynasty also refined the institutional genes of the junxian bureaucracy in many ways, primarily by optimizing the administrative system and establishing comprehensive administrative and criminal laws. It formally instituted the broad-reaching system of Five Departments and Six Ministries at the central level, replacing the central bureaucratic structures that had been in place since the Qin and Han dynasties. Moreover, it substituted the Han’s province-prefecture-county structure of regional control with a prefecture-county system, further consolidating control by the central government and diminishing the power of local authorities.

From the Sui dynasty, the Department of State, the highest central executive body, had six subordinate ministries, as shown in Figure 4.1. From then on, this governance structure remained largely unaltered for more than a thousand years, through dynastic changes including two periods of foreign domination, until the fall of the Qing dynasty. In a sense, today’s State Council in China is roughly equivalent to the Department of State of that era. In a highly centralized system, even though the Department of State was the highest executive body, its function was primarily to execute assigned tasks and implement policies; it had limited authority to interfere with the most crucial decisions.

Of the Six Ministries under the Department of State, the Ministry of Personnel, responsible for bureaucracy personnel matters, was the most important. This is a pattern common to all highly centralized systems. In contemporary China, the Organization Department under the direct control of the CCP Central Committee, holds a position of comparable importance. Yet, even more important, perhaps, is the arrangement of bureaucratic administrative functions at both the central and local levels in the junxian system. Within the central institutions of the imperial court, the Court Supervisor Office (dutang) was bordered on the left by the offices of the Ministries of Personnel, Revenue, and Rites, and on the right by the offices of the Ministries of War, Justice, and Works. This arrangement was mirrored in the administrative units at all levels of local government, from the capital city to the prefecture and county governments.

Although each local government had all the functional offices, these local functions were not directly accountable to those of the ministries, as the real executive power was vested in the local governors. At each level down to the county, the final decision on administrative matters rested in the hands of the local chief executives. A county magistrate oversaw all administrative matters within his county and a minister of the imperial court would not intervene in the county’s affairs without going through the magistrate. This governance structure persisted until the collapse of the Chinese Empire in the early twentieth century. Moreover, the RADT system, established during the GLF, institutionally revived this governance structure (see Chapters 12 and 13).

With the refinement of the imperial system and the evolution of the bureaucratic system towards centralizing power, the unification of administrative regulations became paramount. In response to this need, the Sui dynasty emerged as the pioneer in Chinese imperial history in formulating comprehensive administrative and criminal laws. In 583, Emperor Wen of Sui (r. 581–604) promulgated the Kaihuang Code (开皇律), drawing on regulations, customs, and criminal laws developed over centuries and tracing back as far as the Qin and Han dynasties. This Code profoundly influenced the evolution of the imperial system. It comprised twelve sections, encompassing administrative statutes and criminal law. The first section addressed general criminal law; the second focused on safeguarding the emperor’s personal safety, sovereignty, and borders; the third concerned the establishment, appointment, and duties of officials, along with punitive measures for infringements. The fourth section centered on household registration and land management, intrinsically linked to land and taxes. The fifth section regulated state-owned livestock, while the sixth section focused on military matters. The remaining sections primarily dealt with criminal law.

In 653, based on the foundational Kaihuang Code, the Tang Code was promulgated. This legal document had an enormous influence on subsequent dynasties and various East Asian countries. After its establishment, the structure of imperial governance remained largely stable with relatively few significant changes. The legal codes of the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties were, to a great extent, derived from and heavily influenced by the Tang Code.

The significance and influence of the Kaihuang Code in the Chinese imperial system are largely equivalent to that of the Justinian Code (promulgated under the Byzantine Empire in 529) in Roman Law. Both were systematic collections of laws accumulated over several centuries. The Tang Code had an influence beyond the empire itself, somewhat akin to the Napoleonic Code (a subsequent variant of Roman law). Until Western influence entered East Asia, the Tang Code profoundly impacted the legal codes of East Asian countries. For instance, Japan’s Taihō Code of 701, Korea’s Goryeo Law of 958 (Zhang, Reference Zhang2016), and Vietnam’s 1483 Hò̂ng Đức Legal Code all originated and were localized from the Tang Code.

However, it is important to note that the Chinese imperial legal code primarily constituted a collection of administrative regulations and criminal laws. It never culminated in a modern conception of private law based on private property rights, nor its counterpart public law within which constitutional law resides. Therefore, any comparison with Roman legal codes is only superficial, limited to a comparison of historical influences and regional impacts. While the Roman legal tradition has shaped the legal frameworks of Western countries, contributing to concepts of property rights, contracts, and civil law, the Chinese legal tradition primarily focused on maintaining imperial control, regulating administrative functions, and prescribing criminal penalties.

In a system characterized by the high centralization of property and political power, rulers naturally aspire to further concentrate power as a means to maintain their authority. Their already consolidated power base allows them to persistently strive to increase the centralization of power. In such a system, the law exists primarily to serve the emperor’s interests. Thus, when an emperor perceives that the existing institutions and codes hinder his power, he possesses the discretion to override institutional regulations and laws as he sees fit.

Starting with the Sui dynasty and continuing through subsequent dynasties, there was a constant process of power centralization in the hands of the emperor. By the later periods of the Ming and Qing dynasties, emperors began to circumvent the bureaucratic system, instead governing directly through their immediate circles. This practice resulted in an unprecedented concentration of power.

The practice of governing the empire through court eunuchs during the Ming or via the Military-Political-Affairs Office (Junji chu 军机处) during the Qing illustrates this point. Once the emperor’s power was sufficiently consolidated within a centralized system, he had the authority to revoke those laws and regulations that had served his predecessors for generations.

A key initial step in centralizing power during the Song dynasty involved weakening the authority of the Chancellor (zaixiang 宰相). In the preceding Tang dynasty, edicts were promulgated by the Chancellor with the emperor’s approval. In contrast, during the Song dynasty, not only was the Chancellor deprived of this power to issue decrees but the control of fiscal matters was also transferred to three special departments and the control over personnel was reverted back to the emperor. Essentially, the Chancellor was reduced to merely following orders. After the Song dynasty was overthrown by the Yuan dynasty, the Mongols preserved the main institutions of the Song for almost a century of rule, with the Chancellor assuming the role of the director of the Palace Secretariat.

At the beginning of the Ming dynasty, the Chancellor was still the Secretariat director. However, in a significant shift, Emperor Hongwu abolished the Chancellorship in 1380. From this point onwards, the position of Chancellor was permanently discarded from the annals of Chinese imperial history, signifying an irreversible trend towards power centralization. As Emperor Hongwu endeavored to dismantle ministerial offices with the aim of centralizing power, court eunuchs rose to become auxiliary forces for the emperor. This shift resulted in the marginalization of the once expansive imperial bureaucracy.

After conquering the Ming dynasty, the Manchu-led Qing dynasty inherited the highly centralized system, carrying forward the institutional genes of the Chinese imperial system much like the Mongol Yuan dynasty did from the Song dynasty. Building on the pre-existing centralization within the Chinese imperial system, the Manchu emperors intensified power centralization further. The Qing dynasty did not have Chancellors; power was concentrated to the greatest possible extent within the purview of the emperor, who personally attended to matters of all magnitudes, making every critical decision himself, which further diminished the roles of senior officers within the Six Ministries. However, in reality, the Manchu emperors were no more equipped to manage all affairs themselves than their Ming predecessors. During Emperor Yongzheng’s reign (r. 1722–1735), the Junji chu (Military-Political-Affairs Office) was established. Similar to the Ming court eunuchs, it assisted the emperor in issuing the most important decrees. As direct servants to the emperor, the Military-Political-Affairs Office could issue orders in the emperor’s name to the ministers of the Six Ministries and to the military and civil governors of the provinces.

The highest echelons of the CCP, in their quest for ever-greater centralization of power, have paralleled the actions of the late Ming and Qing emperors by undermining established institutions and statutory norms. The Central Leading Groups (lingdao xiaozu) established by Mao Zedong during the periods of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and later by Xi Jinping from 2013 onwards, bear functional similarities to the Military-Political-Affairs Office of the Qing dynasty. These groups exercise powers that traditionally fell within the purview of the party-state bureaucracy, thereby enabling the supreme leader to bypass the bureaucracy and its procedures to directly implement decisions. This striking similarity between the imperial and communist regimes underscores the enduring influence of the institutional genes of the Chinese imperial system within modern-day totalitarian China.

4.3.4 The Institutional Genes of Unconstrained Power

A fundamental attribute of the Chinese imperial system was the lack of a mechanism for checks and balances of power. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that during the Tang dynasty, there were mechanisms for balancing power, particularly between the sovereign and the Chancellor (e.g., Qian, Reference Qian2010). Some even label it as constitutionalism “with Chinese characteristics” and assert that the Tang dynasty’s Zhengshi tang (政事堂) (Hall of Government Affairs) functioned as a Chinese form of parliament. However, other scholars, based on historical evidence, contend that these claims fundamentally misunderstand the essence of checks and balances and constitutionalism. They argue that in reality, there was no genuine counterbalance to power at the top echelons of the Chinese imperial system (Wu, Reference Wu1984, pp. 556–562).

The historical reality at the core of this discussion is as follows: In the Tang dynasty, the emperor appointed three high-ranking bureaucrats to serve as Chancellors. These individuals respectively headed the Palace Secretariat (Zhongshu 中书), the Chancellery (Menxia 门下), and the Department of State Affairs (Shangshu 尚书). As holders of the highest offices in the empire, their primary role was to assist and support the emperor, not to act as a check on his power. The Palace Secretariat’s main task was to draft imperial edicts on behalf of the emperor. The Chancellery, in turn, reviewed these draft edicts. The Hall of Government Affairs served as a meeting place where the Chancellery and the Palace Secretariat convened joint sessions, which were attended by all three Chancellors. Orders passed during these meetings in the Hall of Government Affairs were sealed by both the Palace Secretariat and Chancellery, ratified by the emperor, and finally dispatched to the Department of State Affairs for execution.

It is an undisputed fact that all three Chancellors attending the Hall of Government Affairs were bureaucrats appointed by the emperor. Their task was to serve the emperor, not oversee him. As such, to claim that this system was a mechanism for checks and balances, a prototype constitutional mechanism, or even a parliament, is deeply misleading.

The term “checks and balances” refers to a system where multiple independent powers constrain each other. This prevents one side from monopolizing and encroaching upon the interests of others when conflicts of interest arise. The term “constitutionalism” refers to a governance system with institutionalized checks and balances, the core component of which is the existence of multiple independent powers.

The parliament, an independent legislative body, operates separately from the executive power, serving as one of the main checks on the executive power. In contrast, the Hall of Government Affairs and the offices of the Three Chancellors were all bureaucratic organizations established by the emperor. Their function was to assist him in formulating and implementing policies.

Their power originated exclusively from the emperor and, therefore, they were obliged to represent the emperor’s interests and authority. Any debates among them were limited to strategies for preserving and serving the emperor’s power. They could help the emperor achieve self-restraint for the long-term interests of imperial power.

However, if the imperial power infringed upon the interests of any social group or individual, these Chancellors were duty-bound to help devise and implement specific infringing policies. Appointed by the imperial court, they neither had the motive nor the power to restrain the emperor’s powers.

Another subject that confuses many is the admonishment system (jian-guan zhi 谏官制) of the Tang and Song dynasties. Some scholars interpret this system as a check on the emperor’s powers. In this system, the appointed admonishers (jian-guan) were assigned the role of admonition, with their primary duty being to criticize the emperor’s decisions and policies if they believed they were incorrect or harmful, regardless of whether this was favorable or unfavorable to the emperor. However, their role was merely to advise or guide the emperor from the perspective of the emperor’s and the court’s interests and the emperor had full discretion as to whether or not to heed their advice. As relatively low-ranking bureaucrats, admonishers had neither the intention nor the power to restrict the emperor. Historical accounts record instances of brave admonishers risking their lives to provide advice to emperors. However, without exception, all such advice served the interests of imperial power, if not solely for the personal enjoyment of the emperor himself.

In contrast, the systems that existed at that time in Europe, and today in all democracies, to check and balance monarchical powers are inextricably linked to mutually independent social forces. Only external forces can constrain a monarch. The existence of mutually independent powers within a society is the only way to form a system of mutual checks and balances. However, all institutional arrangements established by Chinese emperors were intended to serve imperial power. Therefore, they could not function as a constraint on imperial authority. Nor could they be transformed into credible institutions for self-restraint because any emperor unwilling to exercise self-restraint possessed all the power needed to break any rule, whether established by himself or his predecessors. Consequently, the effect of any self-restraint mechanism could be, at best, fleeting.

A classic anecdote about Empress Wu Zetian (r. 690–704) illustrates the impracticality of self-restraint for those on the throne. Chancellor Liu Weizhi implored Wu to adhere to the established procedures of the Tang dynasty, questioning, “How can it be an edict if it has not been passed before the Palace Secretariat and the Chancellery?” Despite acting in the interest of the empire and strictly following the rules, Liu was ordered to commit suicide.

Similarly, Emperor Zhongzong (r. 705–710) openly disregarded the rule that official posts should only be assigned following review by the two aforementioned departments. He purposely signed the official appointments in black rather than red and sealed the envelopes diagonally. This sent a clear message to all bureaucrats that he intended to break the rules, not out of negligence but deliberately, and he expected all bureaucrats to disregard the rule accordingly.

By the time of the Song dynasty, the superficial rules for the emperor’s self-restraint had completely disappeared and would not reappear, indicating that self-restraint rules incompatible with incentives not only break easily but also cannot endure in the long term.

In fact, the general evolutionary trend of the Chinese imperial system was one of continuous centralization of power. During the Han dynasty, a single Chancellor, who also headed the Censorate (Yushi tai 御史台), was responsible for monitoring and inspecting the conduct of state officials at both the central and local levels. To weaken the Chancellorship’s power, Tang emperors established a separate Censorate, creating a tri-Chancellor system, thus making it easier for the emperor to control and diminish the power of the Chancellors. This runs contrary to the claim that the Chancellor’s power was set up to constrain the sovereign’s power. Any connection between self-restraint on the emperor’s part and mutual restraint among the Chancellors had dissipated by the end of the Song dynasty. In the subsequent Ming and Qing dynasties, the convention of self-restraint became totally obsolete due to its incompatibility with the power incentives, leading to the permanent disappearance of the Chancellorship from the system.

After Emperor Hongwu of the Ming dynasty abolished the Chancellorship in 1380, the practice of ruling without a Chancellor was adopted by subsequent rulers, including the Manchu. That is to say, the office of the Chancellor completely disappeared from the Chinese imperial system for centuries to come. This demonstrates that the evolution of the imperial system was a process of continuous centralization of power by the emperor, with the aim of eliminating any potential alternative sources of power. Ultimately, even the Chancellorship, a role originally created to assist the emperor, had to be eradicated.