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Filling the Void: The European Union’s Unique Position to Lead Climate Mobility Financing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2025

Janka Deli*
Affiliation:
Miller Empirical Fellow, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley, California, United States.
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Abstract

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Type
Essay
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
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© The Author(s) 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press for The American Society of International Law

Introduction

Amidst growing climate displacement globally and shifting political realities, the European Union is uniquely well-positioned to take a leadership role in addressing climate mobility. As climate impacts intensify worldwide, there is growing recognition that our world needs more systematic, comprehensive, and equitable approaches to fund both immediate and long-term climate mobility needs.

Recent changes in United States policy have dramatically altered the funding landscape. With obligations for the 2025 fiscal year 84 percent lower than 2024,Footnote 1 a sizable gap has emerged in climate mobility financing. Simultaneously, growing national security concerns, particularly the war in Ukraine, have prompted several European countries to reallocate funds toward defense spending,Footnote 2 often at the expense of development and climate initiatives.Footnote 3

These political shifts and the resulting competing funding goals coincide with structural constraints on EU member states, which must operate within strict limits on public debt and government deficit. As individual countries face increasing financial pressures, development aid generally and climate mobility financing specifically suffers. The EU as an institution, however, is not subject to these same borrowing constraints, allowing it greater flexibility than its member states.

Given this newly emerged funding gap and growing financial pressures on many traditional donor countries, a more cohesive, strategic, and coordinated response to climate mobility has become imperative. This essay argues that the EU—distinct from its individual member states—is uniquely well-positioned to lead such an effort through its proven commitment to climate action, existing legal mandate, substantial resources, institutional coordination capacity, and technical implementation capabilities. Combined with its coalition-building experience, the EU is positioned to lead the way in developing a cohesive and impactful strategy to climate-induced mobility challenges.

The EU’s Track Record in Financing Climate Mobility

The EU has demonstrated substantial financial commitment to a green future, including climate mobility programming. It has pledged to mobilize at least €1 trillion in sustainable investments over the next decade,Footnote 4 while allocating 30 percent of its current multi-annual budget and 37 percent of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) instrument specifically to green investments.Footnote 5 The EU’s climate finance contributions have grown dramatically, nearly tripling in a decade. Together with its twenty-seven member states, the EU stands as the world’s largest provider of climate and development finance.Footnote 6 The EU’s public funding to help developing countries combat and adapt to climate change rose from €9.6 billion in 2013 to €28.5 billion in 2022, maintaining this level with €28.6 billion in 2023.Footnote 7 Since many contributions are integrated into larger climate or development packages, the first part of the analysis reviews both EU-spearheaded initiatives and its recent contributions to funds specifically related to climate mobility.Footnote 8

Contributions to Prevent or Minimize Climate-Induced Displacement

Development aid and infrastructure financing both play crucial roles in reducing exposure to climate impacts and preventing displacement.Footnote 9 The EU approaches this challenge through a two-pronged approach: direct EU-led initiatives and strategic contributions to multilateral funds.

In 2021, the EU launched its flagship Global Gateway initiative, an investment strategy that explicitly incorporates climate mobility considerations into infrastructure development.Footnote 10 As an institution, the EU ranks third among the Development Assistance Committee providers of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).Footnote 11 This EU-led program coordinates resources from the Union, its member states, and their financial institutions to mobilize up to €300 billion in investments by 2027.Footnote 12 The partnership program of Global Gateway aims to support the design and implementation of sustainable projects that may deliver lasting social and economic benefits to local communities while avoiding unsustainable levels of debt.Footnote 13

Beyond its direct initiatives, the EU contributes substantively to multilateral initiatives in the migration-development nexus. Collectively, the twenty-seven EU countries provide 55 percent of global development assistance,Footnote 14 and nearly half of all the World Bank’s International Development Association funding.Footnote 15 The EU also supports specialized programs such as the Horn of Africa Umbrella Program and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.Footnote 16 While only a small percentage of these contributions fund climate mobility efforts, they are nonetheless noteworthy.

The Green Climate Fund has received significant EU support since its 2010 establishment.Footnote 17 The EU alone pledged nearly half of the Fund’s initial $10.3 billion capitalization, with member states contributing an additional $4.7 billion. During the 2019 replenishment, primarily EU countries committed $9.78 billion over four years, with the EU disbursing $5.5 billion by May 2022.Footnote 18 Importantly for climate mobility, the Fund has developed specific investment criteria for mobility-related projects, now integrated into its broader climate finance mechanism.Footnote 19

Climate adaptation financing serves as another critical strategy for reducing migratory pressures.Footnote 20 EU countries have been providing outsized proportions of annual voluntary pledges to the Adaptation Fund,Footnote 21 which the European Commission bolstered at COP26 in 2021 with a significant €100 million commitment.Footnote 22 This overwhelming support for adaptation funding demonstrates the EU’s commitment to addressing climate mobility through prevention rather than solely through post-displacement responses.

Contributions to Address Climate-Induced Displacement

In addition to efforts to prevent and minimize climate-induced displacement, the EU has also developed significant capacity to respond to such displacement after movement has happened. A landmark achievement in this area came with the establishment and operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP28 in 2023. The EU and its member states have since contributed more than €400 million, representing over two-thirds of initial funding pledges.Footnote 23 The Loss and Damage Fund breaks new ground by explicitly including displacement, planned relocation, and migration within its scope—the first climate fund to specifically designate human mobility as a thematic area.Footnote 24

The EU complements its structural financing efforts with targeted humanitarian support for climate-affected populations.Footnote 25 In Turkey alone, the EU has allocated €3.48 billion in humanitarian funding since 2012, including €78.2 million specifically for earthquake response—demonstrating the EU’s capacity to mobilize rapid funding for climate and disaster displacement.Footnote 26 A key partnership in the EU’s humanitarian strategy is with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).Footnote 27 The European Commission has consistently ranked among the UNHCR’s top three global donors.Footnote 28 The Commission’s support covers the full displacement cycle—from emergency response to integration and return programs—though its tightly earmarked contributions currently prioritize conflict-affected communities rather than climate displacement specifically.Footnote 29

The EU’s Unique Position to Take the Lead on Climate Mobility Financing

While several EU member states have distinguished themselves in making climate finance commitments—with Luxembourg, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark each surpassing the United Nations’ 0.7 percent target for development assistance in 2023Footnote 30 and Germany,Footnote 31 France,Footnote 32 and SwedenFootnote 33 standing out in real-term contributions—individual country efforts face mounting constraints.

Economic headwinds are intensifying these challenges. Despite the EU’s groundbreaking NGEU program,Footnote 34 post-pandemic economic recovery remains sluggish across the continent, with stagnation or contraction in several economies.Footnote 35 Compounding these difficulties are looming U.S.-imposed tariffs on European exportsFootnote 36 and newly emerged security concerns prompting increased defense spending that often comes at the expense of foreign aid allocations.Footnote 37 Most critically, member states must operate within strict public debt and government deficit limits under the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, curtailing their financial flexibility.Footnote 38

The EU, however, is uniquely well-positioned to fill this emerging leadership gap in climate mobility financing. It possesses four crucial advantages that its individual member states lack.

First, unlike its member states, the EU is not subject to the same borrowing constraints and has recently demonstrated greater flexibility in fiscal rules in response to multiple crises.Footnote 39 Importantly, the EU can leverage its collective borrowing capacity through novel joint debt instruments such as Eurobonds,Footnote 40 potentially mobilizing significant new funding streams—estimated at up to $800 billion annuallyFootnote 41 —to offset decreasing state-level contributions.Footnote 42 Second, the EU possesses the legal mandate to lead on climate mobility financing through its shared competence with member states on climate action.Footnote 43

Third, as illustrated in the previous section, while the EU has made substantial contributions across multiple climate mobility initiatives, current inefficiencies due to insufficient donor coordinationFootnote 44 and incoherence of initiatives and frameworksFootnote 45 are becoming increasingly problematic amid funding cuts. The EU has demonstrated the institutional capacity to organize coordinated, streamlined frameworks,Footnote 46 as evidenced by its pioneering regulation in privacy and digital technologies and dominance in antitrust.Footnote 47 Finally, the EU’s proven coalition-building abilities in international climate negotiations position it ideally to develop the multilateral cooperation essential for addressing current and future challenges.

Conclusion

Recent political shifts in traditional donor countries have created uncertainties in the global climate finance landscape. As traditional funding sources contract and member states face increasing constraints, the EU’s institutional role in financing climate mobility becomes increasingly vital. The EU has demonstrated both the commitment and capability to lead in this space. With its unique advantages of fiscal flexibility, legal mandate, institutional coordination abilities, and coalition-building experience, the EU is positioned to develop the cohesive, strategic response that climate mobility financing urgently requires. As climate impacts intensify and displacement pressures grow, the EU’s leadership will become essential for developing sustainable solutions to climate-induced mobility challenges that protect the most vulnerable communities worldwide.

References

1 This means a decline from $56 billion in 2024 to $8.9 billion in 2025. See aggregate and agency-specific data at U.S. Government, US Foreign Aid (2025). See also, generally, U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Implementing the President’s Executive Order on Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid (Jan. 26, 2025).

2 See, e.g., Paul Kirby, Germany’s Merz Promises to Do “Whatever It Takes” on Defence, BBC (Mar. 4, 2025).

3 See Iris Goldner Lang & Maroje Lang, Challenges to EU Climate Finance Under Shifting Priorities, 119 AJIL Unbound 95 (2025).

4 See European Commission, Finance and the Green Deal.

5 See Elena Kempf & Katerina Linos, An Ever-Stronger Union: Introduction to the Symposium, 118 AJIL Unbound 139 (2024) [hereinafter Kempf & Linos 2024a]; Elena Kempf & Katerina Linos, NGEU: A New Marshall Plan for Europe and a Template for Global Finance, 118 AJIL Unbound 151 (2024) [hereinafter Kempf & Linos 2024b].

6 See Council of the European Union, Europe’s Contribution to Climate Finance (in €bn), Consilium.

7 In addition to the €28.6 billion from public sources in 2023, Europe mobilized €7.2 billion in private finance. Id.

8 The analysis recognizes that such financing often intersects with other categories, such as climate adaptation, disaster prevention and response, and development aid.

9 See Lawrence Huang, Ravenna Sohst & Camille Le Coz, Financing Responses to Climate Migration: The Unique Role of Multilateral Development Banks, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Nov. 2022).

10 See European Commission, Global Gateway Overview .

11 OECD, Official Development Assistance; see also Beata Cichocka & Ian Mitchell, Maximising the Impact of EU Climate Finance, Ctr. Glob. Dev. (Sept. 9, 2024).

12 This includes up to €135 billion in investments by the EU and €145 billion of planned investment volumes by European financial and development finance institutions, complemented by grant financing. OECD, supra note 11; Cichocka & Mitchell, supra note 11.

13 Among other forms of support, this includes helping partner countries develop and scale up their markets for green bonds. OECD, supra note 5; Cichocka & Mitchell, supra note 5. However, Global Gateway is not merely a vehicle for green and clean investments. It is a key tool for fostering the EU’s economic and geopolitical interests abroad in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. See Mikaela Gavas & Laura Granito, What the Global Gateway Flagship Projects Tell Us About the EU’s Priorities, Ctr. Glob. Dev. (Dec. 18, 2024).

14 OECD, supra note 11.

15 In 2024, it raised $100 billion in financing for the world’s poorest countries, including contributions from the EU. See World Bank, Europe and the World Bank Group.

16 In terms of other World Bank initiatives, EU countries contribute almost one-third of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shares and more than two-thirds of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Trust Fund. Id.

17 See generally Green Climate Fund.

18 See European Commission, International Climate Finance .

19 Since the 2010s, the Green Climate Fund has incorporated climate mobility considerations into its funding priorities, particularly for small island developing states and vulnerable coastal regions. Nevertheless, there has been a push for existing funds like the Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, and Global Environmental Facility to allocate more resources towards human mobility-related proposals. See Ileana Sînziana Puşcaş & Lorenzo Guadagno, Money Changes Everything: Leveraging Climate Finance for Human Mobility, Forced Migration Rev. (Nov. 2024).

20 See Sarah Bermeo, Climate Migration and Climate Finance: Lessons from Central America, Brookings (Nov. 19, 2021).

21 See Adaptation Fund Administration, Contributors . The Adaptation Fund was established to finance adaptation projects and programs in particularly vulnerable developing countries. See Adaptation Fund Administration, Governance.

22 European Commission, supra note 18.

23 As of January 23, 2025, a total of $741 million has been pledged to the Loss and Damage Fund by twenty-seven contributors, including the EU and sixteen of EU member states. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Pledges to the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage ; Puşcaş & Guadagno, supra note 19.

24 Puşcaş & Guadagno, supra note 19. COP29 was expected to set a new climate finance target exceeding the $100 billion per year in climate finance until 2025, potentially redefining how finance for loss and damage links to adaptation and mitigation finance. The New Collective Quantified Goal calls for developed countries, including EU member states, to raise at least $300 billion annually by 2035 to support developing countries. See Council of the European Union, Climate Finance: Council Approves Conclusions Ahead of COP29, Consilium (Oct. 8, 2024); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP29 UN Climate Conference Agrees to Triple Finance to Developing Countries, Protecting Lives and Livelihoods (Nov. 24, 2024).

25 Huang, Sohst & Le Coz, supra note 9.

26 See European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - Türkiye ; Betsy Reed, Still in Ruins: The 2023 Turkish Earthquake – Then and Now, Guardian (Feb. 2, 2024).

27 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, European Union.

28 The EU’s contributions to UNHCR are considerably humbler compared to those by the United States—$270.6 and $261.45 million versus $1,902 and $2,052 billion in 2023 and 2024, respectively. See UNHCR, Donor Profiles, Glob. Focus.

29 Id.; see also Elena Chachko & Katerina Linos, Sharing Responsibility for Ukrainian Refugees: An Unprecedented Response, Lawfare (Mar. 5, 2022). See also Katerina Linos, Financing Climate Mobility – From Duty to Investment, 119 AJIL Unbound 107 (2025). For an explanation, see Goldner Lang & Lang, supra note 3. Nonetheless, from 2019 to 2023 the EU contributed $2,718.4 million to the International Organization for Migration. International Organization for Migration, European Union.

30 See OECD, Official Development Assistance.

31 In 2023, Germany allocated €5.7 billion from its state budget to support climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, largely funded by its Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. However, recent budget constraints complicate Germany’s path toward reaching its future targets for climate finance. See Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Climate Finance: Germany Remains a Reliable Partner. See also Julian Wettengel, Germany to Struggle Reaching International Climate Finance Target – Govt Officials, Clean Energy Wire (Sept. 27, 2024); Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany Again Contributes Fair Share of Climate Finance for Emerging Economies and Developing Countries (Sept. 27, 2024).

32 France’s climate finance contributions to developing countries reached €7.2 billion in 2023, in climate finance for developing countries, with €2.8 billion specifically dedicated to climate change adaptation. In doing so, for the third year running, France far exceeded its €6-billion annual target over the period 2021–2025 set by President Macron in 2020. See Maxime Ledez & Hadrian Hainaut, Landscape of Climate Finance in France, Inst. Climate Econ. (Dec. 15, 2021); see also Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France Continues Its Commitment to Climate Finance for Developing Countries in 2023, France Diplomacy (Nov. 8, 2024).

33 Swedish climate aid grew to SEK 9.4 billion in 2023, marking a year-on-year increase of over SEK 800 million. Beyond this direct climate aid, Sweden provides approximately SEK 100 million annually to the Nordic Development Fund and contributed around SEK 670 million to the Global Environment Facility in 2024. See Ministry of Climate and Enterprise & Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden’s COP29 Financial Package, Regeringskansliet (Nov. 18, 2024); see also Ministry of Climate and Enterprise & Ministry for Foreign Affairs, SEK 8 Billion to UN Green Climate Fund, Regeringskansliet (Nov. 14, 2024).

34 See Kempf & Linos 2024a, supra note 5; Kempf & Linos 2024b, supra note 5.

35 See Statista, Real GDP Growth Europe 2024 (2024); Marek Rozkrut & Maciej Stefański, EY European Economic Outlook – January 2025.

36 See Faarea Masud, US Tariffs Could Extend Germany’s Recession, Says Bundesbank Chief, BBC (Mar. 13, 2025).

37 See, e.g., Netherlands Hikes Defence Spending to Face New Threats, Reuters (Sept. 5, 2024); Joshua Nevett, Sam Francis & Jonathan Beale, Keir Starmer Cuts Aid to Fund Increase in Defence Spending, BBC (Feb. 25, 2025).

38 See Eurostat, Stability and Growth Pact; see also Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics (2024).

39 See Kempf & Linos 2024a, supra note 5; Kempf & Linos 2024b, supra note 5; Jennifer Rankin, “Watershed Moment”: EU Leaders Agree Plan for Huge Rise in Defence Spending, Guardian (Mar. 6, 2025).

40 See Andreas Becker, Eurobonds: EU Plans Debt Revolution to Finance Defense, dw.com (Mar. 12, 2025).

41 Potentially amounting to $800 billion of new spending a year. See Draghi Says EU Itself at Risk Without More Funds and Joint Debt, Bloomberg (Sept. 9, 2024).

42 See Elena Kempf & Katerina Linos, Towards Shared European Finances, Verfassungsblog (2024). The idea of borrowing at the EU-level has been highly contested however. See, e.g., Päivi Leino-Sandberg & Peter Lindseth, How Cohesion Became the EU’s Vehicle for Economic Policy, Verfassungsblog (2023).

43 According to Articles 11 and 191–193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU is competent to act in all areas of environmental policy, including climate change. Both the EU and its member states may adopt legally binding acts, the latter doing so only where the EU has not exercised its competence or has explicitly ceased to do so.

44 See Melissa Johns, Reaching Refugees with Climate Adaptation and Disaster Response: What Multilateral Development Banks Can Do , 119 AJIL Unbound 113 (2025).

45 See Lindsay Jenkins, Climate Impacts on Human Mobility: Innovative Approaches to Finance the Response, 119 AJIL Unbound 118 (2025).

46 On the proven capacity of the Brussels bureaucracy to build good templates for multilateral cooperation, see, for example Anu Bradford, Stavros Gadinis & Katerina Linos, Unintended Agency Problems: How International Bureaucracies Are Built and Empowered, 57 Va. J. Int’l L. 159 (2017); Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton & Katerina Linos, The Gravity of Legal Diffusion Borders and Boundaries, 2023 U. Chi. Legal F. 35 (2023).

47 See, e.g., Anu Bradford et al., The Global Dominance of European Competition Law over American Antitrust Law, 16 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 731 (2019); Anu Bradford, Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology (2023).