3.3.1 Realist Theories of Democracy

Historically, some ‘realist’ theories of democracy are based on the work of Joseph Schumpeter (see, for example, Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1950). These approaches often interpret democracy as a purely formal method of selecting preferred opinions and implementing decisions. Elections are at the heart of this model. Democracy in this approach means nothing more than free and fair elections. This mechanism is intended to ensure that everyone can potentially participate in decisions. This results in a thin and formal understanding of democracy. In some approaches, elites also play a special role in this process, especially in interpreting social reality and implementing political decisions.

In this approach, additional normative elements, such as an inherent orientation towards justice, are neglected. Indeed, such formal-realistic models of democracy usually refrain from normative statements, since they do not want to give preference to any value system: free elections ensure that the most plausible value system will prevail, which is then implemented politically. No predefined values precede the formal mechanisms of democracy.

Omitting normative elements is also one key reason why formal approaches, by definition, encounter fundamental problems in dealing with the consequences of political action for people who are not involved in these formal procedures: that is, elections. In view of the current ecological crisis, such a purely formal and normatively thin understanding of democracy is problematic. A democracy whose self-understanding is primarily (or even solely) based on elections will find it difficult to approach current problems, such as global conflicts or long-term ecological consequences, because it has no theoretical or practical foundation for dealing with something ‘new’ beyond the interests of living citizens who possess the right to vote.

Of course, representatives in democratic elections often promise to rule for the benefit of future generations. If they stuck to their promises, the electoral system would work. However, the entire process is skewed by vested interests favouring short-termism and other structural problems, such as short election cycles (Boston Reference Boston2016: 13, 65–66, 68). Formal interpretations of democracy have no basis for responding to a situation where elected representatives make promises to protect the interests of future generations or nature, then breach such promises. Realists refrain from making normative value assumptions and yet precisely produce those problems to which they should provide an answer as a form of political rule. They try to deal with ecological challenges only through the instrument of elections and, thus, aggravate the problem because long-term consequences will never receive sufficient attention through elections alone. Such a model is incapable of providing a normative grounding for new forms of representation as a response to the current ecological crises.

3.3.2 Liberal Theories of Democracy

Turning to liberal theories of democracy, we can observe that these approaches also tend to involve a formal model of democracy, but with a particular focus on freedom and rights. In terms of its theoretical basis, methodological individualism plays a key role within the liberal theory. Democracy is based on the freedom of the individual, which is interpreted as the supreme good (and one that must be protected). This focus on the individual distinguishes liberalism from realist approaches. In liberal theory, freedom and equality are the inescapable cornerstones of democracy. Democracy as a form of political order is based on the normative goal of ensuring equal freedom for all citizens. Thus, it is not only about the formal procedure of voting but also the freedom and equality that provide the normative framework which precedes them.

Politically, on this normative basis, liberal theories of democracy imply a strong focus on rights as a foundation for dealing with social challenges. Behind this idea is the demand for freedom and equality, combined with a methodical individualism. In their origin, liberal rights always focus on ways to enable and secure the individual’s ways of acting. In the tradition of John Rawls, who promoted liberalism theoretically from the 1970s, the principle of justice plays a key role in liberalism, alongside freedom and equality. Most often, the ethical question of justice is about the distribution of goods or personal rights and includes future persons.Footnote ⁶

In this context, models of intergenerational justice play a particularly significant role in this tradition. The theoretical justification of intergenerational justice always rests on an argument or assumption about how much individuals owe each other. In consequence, these duties are translated into rights of future generations.Footnote ⁷ However, ecological consequences also play a role in this tradition connected to the emphasis on rights. For example, the question of whether future generations can be interpreted as rights-holders or whether legal frameworks should be designed in such a way that long-term consequences can be considered, bearing in mind human beings’ reliance on well-functioning ecological – including climate – systems. Even if liberal theories often tend to focus on the present, there are important points of contact for the consideration of the interests of future generations in current democratic decisions.

3.3.3 Deliberative Theories of Democracy

Deliberative theories in the tradition of Jürgen Habermas play a prominent role in the current discourses on democracy. These theories have much in common with liberal approaches but shift the focus from strict methodological individualism to joint procedures of negotiation and discourse. The starting point for understanding deliberative democracy is the idea of conversation. For Habermas, democracy is a hypothetical conversation and democracies are all the better and more ethically legitimate: the more opinions they hear in these conversations, the more transparent their procedures for processing these conversations into political decisions and the more participation oriented their institutions. Political decisions are ethically justified when they potentially involve all concerned in the sense of ‘communicative reason’. ‘Communicative reason’ constitutes shared, transparent, and noncoercive discourse between participants and serves as the legitimating framework. Democracy aims at the political establishment of as many participatory procedures as possible to enable a broad involvement of citizens (understood as participants in discourse). The formal model of democracy is thus supplemented or extended by a deliberative model.

In its origins, this model of democracy focused on the living citizens who (can) participate in the procedures. In view of ecological crises, Habermas and representatives of this paradigm have already thought about extensions of the argumentation. In this theoretical model, future generations or other non-human living beings, for example, could be understood as discussion partners with whom a hypothetical agreement on important political decisions is to be reached, if it is ethically legitimate. A further extension of the theory involves the consideration of forms of proxy representation beyond the formal political system; for example, through social movements or certain discourses that might encapsulate the interests of future generations. Through these modifications, the deliberative model is rethought and reconfigured in the face of the ecological crisis (Dryzek & Pickering Reference Dryzek and Pickering2019).

3.3.4 Communitarian Theories of Democracy

Other theories of democracy argue that the political basis of democracy rests on the community rather than the individual (Sandel Reference Sandel1998; Taylor Reference Taylor1989; Walzer Reference Walzer1983, Reference Walzer1994). Different approaches to the community play a role – including republican, communitarian, and pragmatic perspectives. Many of these theories (for example, in the communitarian tradition) see themselves more as an alternative normative theory in contrast to a liberal theory of justice as developed by Rawls. Although these are not theories of democracy in a narrow sense, they, too, imply certain ideas of the political and democracy that are relevant to the considerations in this book. In all varieties of these theoretical paradigms, democracy is (closely) linked to the community and its normative self-understanding which is, in turn, implemented through democracy. Democratic processes are therefore understood less as a negotiation between citizens as individuals than as political processes that are an expression of the normative self-understanding of a community. In this tradition, the individual is always theoretically and practically subordinate to the community.

Ecological consequences are incorporated in this model insofar as they are integrated into the normative self-understanding of the community. This is less about forms of representation in the political system than the normative foundations of the community which, in turn, entail new narratives about who belongs to the community. These approaches can spur fresh narratives which incorporate future generations or understandings of the environment as part of the political community. Thus, De-Shalit (Reference De-Shalit1995: 15–16) extends the concept of community into the future to create the idea of a ‘transgenerational community’ which can provide a strong basis for ethical obligations towards future generations grounded in rational self-interest, given that one’s identity is necessarily linked to one’s past and continues into the future. A limitation of this approach, however, is that it only offers a rationale for obligations towards descendants of one’s own country and provides no basis for cutting climate emissions to benefit people living in poverty in other countries (Barry Reference Barry and Dobson1999: 99). This limitation can be overcome by linking communitarian theory to cosmopolitan theories of justice, which rest on the assumption that obligations are owed to other persons, regardless of where and when they happen to live (Lawrence Reference Lawrence2014: 55–57). While doubts have been raised as to whether there is a genuine justice community involving shared values and institutions at the international level, Vanderheiden (Reference Vanderheiden2008) has argued persuasively that there are elements of such a global community in place in the global climate regime. Moreover, in the climate change context, there is causal interdependence between people: nobody can opt out of cooperative schemes to mitigate emissions, if these schemes are to be effective (Vanderheiden Reference Vanderheiden2008: 98).

3.3.5 Post-structuralist Theories of Democracy

The last group of models consists of post-structuralist theories of democracy. Authors such as Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida belong to this school of theories, as do the so-called radical theories of democracy following Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Reference Laclau and Mouffe1985). These theories are based on a broad understanding of the political. When they think about the political field and democracy, these theorists focus less on elections, rights, and institutions. For them, all forms of social movements and political engagement within and beyond this formal political field play a key role. Further, they pay attention to the asymmetries of power and mechanisms of exclusion that, in their view, characterise every political field, including democracies.

In addition, these approaches focus less on democratic consensus and more on political conflict as the central part of democracy. From this perspective, liberal or deliberative theories are in danger of underexposing the need for the ongoing social struggle for political equality in favour of (economic) distributional issues. Post-structuralists reflect, for example, more on the material and discursive preconditions of justice which are always related to unequal power structures, thereby highlighting the concrete social situation of vulnerable lives to attain a more equal society. The normative focus is usually on precarious forms of life and vulnerability (Derrida Reference Derrida1992; Butler Reference Butler2004).

It is remarkable that these post-structural theories of democracy have, until now, given little thought to ecological challenges or future generations. On the one hand, this might be because they fundamentally pose the (philosophical) question of the foundations of political governance and that concrete questions of implementation play a subordinate role. On the other hand, these approaches appear well suited to address two aspects of these questions. First, the new materialist turn (which expands understandings of agency to include the ‘more-than-human’) helps to underpin an ecological understanding of democracy. Judith Butler (Reference Butler2020) follows this argumentation, interpreting Karl Marx as a relational thinker who emphasises the interconnectedness of humans and nature. Second, future generations would be potential forms of precarious life, neglected to date but deserving of attention. Such a focus could flow from a power analysis of current economic structures in terms of their implications for future generations. Again, Butler’s concepts of relationality and vulnerability might be helpful in integrating future generations in the critique of political mechanisms (Reder & Faets Reference Reder and Faets2024).

3.3.6 Pragmatist Theories of Democracy

Pragmatist philosophers, such as John Dewey, argue that democracy should always begin with an empirical observation of current problems. This method is founded on Dewey’s epistemological concept (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2), which views political knowledge as originating from the processing of experiences. Therefore, inquiry as an element of politics involves a multi-stage process. In his The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey identifies the steps that typically constitute this process: identifying a situation that is experienced as a problem; creating a hypothesis about the various aspects of the problem; developing practical solutions; and, finally, undertaking an evaluation aimed at proving the validity of the solution.

To realise such an experimental modus of democracy in political reality, pragmatist theories argue that democracies should recognise various social practices and their potential to deal with political problems practically. From an ethical point of view, the genesis and validity of democratic norms are always connected, which means that the validity of these norms can only be proved by reconstructing social practices and related norms embedded in these practices. Dewey’s (‘only’) guiding principle, which arises from the primacy ascribed to experience, is the recognition of the variety of experiences. Dewey calls this duplication of experiences ‘growth’, which means that those social, political, and economic practices should be promoted that enable the growth of individual and collective experiences in democracies.

Against this background, pragmatists argue that democracies should not focus on developing ideal institutions or democratic procedures, but on dealing experimentally with people’s experiences. Thus, democracies would recognise experiences as the fundamental starting point of democratic practice. As Dewey (Reference Dewey1937: 457) explains, ‘democracy is much broader than a special political form, a method of conducting government, of making laws and carrying on governmental administration by means of popular suffrage and elected officers’. Rather, it represents

The ideal of democracy arises from practices and not from theory. Therefore, democratic policy should be aware and reconstruct (individual and collective) actions that are most likely to enable the development and promotion of human experiences. Hence, the quality of democracy appears in whether, and to what extent, social behavioural patterns and political procedures contribute to the development of citizens and society as a whole – which also extends to citizens who will be born in the future. Again, the central attribute of democracy is its experimental character. Politics starts from concrete experiences and from the problems that arise from these experiences. Politics should analyse these problems thoroughly, formulate hypotheses to solve them, and evaluate the extent to which these hypotheses prove themselves in practice. This experimental structure is infinite in principle, which is why democracy is only conceivable as an open-ended process (Bohman Reference Bohman1999): ‘Democracy is not just one form of social life among other workable forms of social life; it is the precondition for the full application of intelligence to the solution of social problems’ (Putnam Reference Putnam1995: 217).

Such an understanding of democracy also leads to reforms of institutional structures of participation and representation in democracies, especially if they are to widen the demos to include the excluded and marginalised. For example, to consider the negative impacts of climate change on future generations, democracies need to develop mechanisms of representation through which the possible experiences (and interests) of future generations can be represented today. The debates about proxy representation within existing institutions, new election schemes, or radical counter-hegemonies demonstrate the need for democratic reform.

3.3.7 Comparison of Models of Democracy

The various paradigms of democratic theory illustrate that democracy, understood as the self-determination of the demos, can be conceptualised in many ways. Depending on its theoretical assumptions, democratic practice focuses on different mechanisms and political procedures as central features of democracy, advocating for their promotion and safeguarding.

In line with the pragmatic orientation of this book, we make two points about the diversity of democratic theories. First, pragmatism itself favours a particular understanding of democracy: one that does not envision an ideal or fixed institutional structure, but instead requires democratic practice to be continuously developed, evaluated, and improved, especially in times of crisis. This understanding provides a compelling basis for enhancing the consideration and representation of future generations, as there is currently no blueprint or fixed ideal for this evolution.

Second, this pragmatic model integrates many elements from other paradigms within a comprehensive framework. Rights and institutions (realist and liberal models) are acknowledged as integral to democracy, serving as part of the experimental improvement of democratic practice. Communicative deliberation, essential for reconciling diverse perspectives, is also crucial to pragmatism’s development of democracy (deliberative model). Additionally, this deliberation is never context-free but always embedded within a particular set of cultural practices and semantics, which can be utilised for this experimental democracy (communitarian model). Finally, the pragmatic approach, like post-structuralist theories, focuses on experiences of suffering and exclusion from democratic processes.

Thus, the pragmatist understanding of democracy does not contradict the other paradigms; rather, it seeks to bring their most compelling elements into an inclusive framework. In this sense, the pragmatist approach has an inclusive potential compared to other models, as it connects various democratic aspects. However, it also notes that other models tend to absolutise certain democratic aspects, thus missing the democratic essence in pragmatist terms: the open, evaluative, and experimental adaptation of democracy’s idea to the challenges of each era.

The inclusive nature will also become evident in the values embedded within democratic practices. While some democratic models focus primarily on one value or make it their normative centre (for example, liberal approaches focus on justice; radical democracies on vulnerability; and communitarian approaches on solidarity), the pragmatic approach does not play these values off against one another. Instead, pragmatic approaches illustrate how the interplay between these values can form an inclusive normative basis for addressing political crises, such as the question of how to consider future generations.

At the pragmatic intersection of different democratic theories, another central characteristic of democracy emerges that is crucial both theoretically and practically for the inclusion of future generations. In all models, there is an implicit negotiation of who belongs to the demos of democracy and, thus, who should be involved in democratic procedures (such as representation). From a narrowly cultural perspective, one might argue that a particular linguistic or cultural community defines the boundaries of the demos. However, while this view may have significance in the practice of nation-state democracy, it appears contingent and, on a theoretical level, weak in terms of legitimacy.

In contrast, a key theoretical characteristic of democracy is the principle of affectedness by decisions. The assumption behind this principle is that democratic decisions always have a particular scope. If people constitute the sovereign – the demos of democracy – then all decisions must be justified and legitimised with respect to this demos (the people). Conversely, this means that all those affected by democratic decisions should participate in them.

The inclusion of all affected parties, whether as rights-bearing subjects (liberal), discourse partners (deliberative), or participants in a political practice (pragmatist), thus becomes a central quality of democracy. This AAP is a fundamental principle of democratic self-determination. Some questions will arise throughout the book concerning the AAP: Is it necessary, from a democratic theory perspective, to include future generations in present political decisions as affected parties? As we shall see, this generates a strong legitimating argument for developing proxy representation for future generations (see Section 3.5.2).

One final concept must be addressed explicitly within this comparative analysis of democratic theories: the concept of interest. In some democratic theories, as we have already noted, the concept of interest plays a significant role, especially in formal and liberal conceptions. Generally speaking, interest refers to the concerns, calculated benefits, or advantages of a person or, in some theoretical frameworks, also of a group of people. Thus, interest is a perspectival concept, traditionally not focused on the common good but on individual calculations and objectives. In democratic theory, the reference to interests serves as a heuristic concept to relate and balance these various perspectives within the political context.

This book’s exploration of interest is rooted in both theory and practice, where it has become an influential conceptual framework. However, interest here is not used in a narrowly individualistic sense. Instead, interest always focuses on individual perspectives within relational networks of social and political connections, from which they cannot be isolated. Interest, therefore, does not mean setting individual concerns as absolutes. Moreover, interest should not be equated with rational calculation in the sense of the Homo Economicus model. While the emphasis on interest does follow its own ‘logic’, this does not mean that political balancing of interests should be understood as purely optimising rational preferences.

Instead, it seems meaningful to interpret interest in a broader sense. The considerations in this book draw on different formations of the concept of interest. When speaking of the interests of future generations, it is meant first to consider and integrate their perspective into the political process, especially because they are often inadequately represented. Second, the concept underscores the fact that there are other interests besides those of future generations, which may conflict with them; for instance, the interests of currently living impoverished populations in the Global South. Thus, we tie the discussion of proxy representation for future generations back to normative reflections on democracy. The values implicit in democratic practices provide a framework for making such judgements compellingly.

There is also a third way of using the term interest. It is in the interest of everyone – that is, the entire demos – to represent future generations appropriately. For example, a human rights perspective holds that the world community has an interest in upholding and protecting the rights of all people, including those yet to be born. When interests are discussed in the following chapters, all these meanings will be considered and interconnected.

3.4.1 Intergenerational Justice

The first and currently most powerful discourse, which draws primarily from the liberal and deliberative tradition of normative democratic theory, is intergenerational justice. This follows on from the key theories of justice in the twentieth century and involves extending them from a temporal perspective to incorporate future generations.

The current ethical discourse on intergenerational justice is characterised by a variety of partly controversial positions regarding the interpretation of normative demands of future generations; put differently, what ethical duties we owe towards future generations. The different conceptions can mostly be classified along the classical categories of ethical theorising and their critics, which originate from a range of traditions including: the discourse-theoretical (Ekardt Reference Ekardt2015; Ott Reference Ott and Rodi2007); contractarian (Gardiner et al. Reference Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson and Shue2009; Heyd Reference Heyd, Gosseries and Meyer2009; Rawls Reference Rawls1971); egalitarian (Gosseries Reference Gosseries2001; Scanlon Reference Scanlon, Nida-Rümelin and Thierse2005); responsibility (Jonas Reference Jonas1979); teleological (Thompson Reference Thompson2017); and utilitarian (Birnbacher Reference Birnbacher1988; Parfit Reference Parfit1984), amongst others.

A starting point of many of these theories is a specific concept of ‘future generations’. Before the normative claim of intergenerational justice can be substantiated, the question of the (temporal) framework of action and its actors must be clarified. It can be observed that many models of the current discourse transfer the action-theoretical context to a transtemporal framework. This means that generations are defined as actors who are sometimes at odds with each other. Thus, the origin of all questions of intergenerational justice lies in how to resolve conflicts between two or more distinct actors. The generations therefore become (individual) agents of action. Principles of fairness, justice, or distribution are then formulated in relation to these different actors (for different definitions of future generations, see Tremmel’s theory of intergenerational justice; Tremmel Reference Tremmel2009: 19–20).

However, whether and how future generations can be philosophically grasped and related to those who are alive now diverges strongly: while discourse theory as well as contractarianism develop their concept of a ‘generation’ in the tradition of a transgenerational interaction of rational communication partners, egalitarianism as well as sufficiency theory, following principles of harm, refer to different models of overlapping generational cohorts. Deontological approaches interpret duty and its fulfilment according to ethical standards as fundamental to judging whether an action is morally justified. When considering intergenerational justice, this principle is applied to determine duties owed by contemporaries to human beings born in the future.

Regardless of the differences between approaches to intergenerational justice, the issue of threshold plays a key role in all paradigms. For intergenerational justice, the question is not only to whom we owe something but also how much and of what. One answer is provided by the threshold or subsistence conception (Meyer Reference Meyer, Meyer, Paulson and Pogge2003; Gosseries & Meyer Reference Gosseries and Meyer2009), which defines a minimum of goods (in a broad concept of goods that also includes opportunities or rights) which must be protected to be able to live in a human way. This minimum is tied to the condition of being human. Normally, this means the provision of basic goods (such as food, water, and clothing). Social goods (such as access to the labour market, education, or political participation) can also play a key role, depending on the theory. This is clearly shown by the capability approach (Dijk Reference Dijk, Linehan and Lawrence2021). In addition, basic preconditions for human beings staying above the threshold – such as a functioning (or at least non-threatening) environment, including the climate system – are assumed to complement the threshold. According to this thesis, we act in an inter-generationally just manner if we act to ensure that this threshold remains in place in the future.

This understanding of justice is related to equality in two ways. First, it is about substantial equality regarding the provision of basic needs. The threshold concept implies the normative assumption that all people are entitled to a life in dignity, which means that they should be provided with at least the same basic form of life fulfilment. Second, it is also about equality under the law. Because this life above a threshold value is granted to all people equally as a legal entitlement, it is often formulated in the logic of human rights. Intergenerational justice as the fulfilment of a threshold value (whether formulated as needs or capabilities) is therefore linked to the understanding of equality.

One threshold theory of intergenerational justice is the theory of human rights. Climate change violates both the rights of persons alive and those in the future (Bell Reference Bell2011: 9). Reder and Köhler argue that the normative core of human rights rests on the principles of freedom, equality, solidarity, and participation which constitute a normative guideline for climate policy-making. They further argue that ‘a decent life for all humans is the centre of the normative foundation of human rights’ (Reder & Köhler Reference Reder, Köhler, Bos and Duwell2016: 132). Human rights thus form a well-defined threshold that must also be respected for future generations (Caney Reference Caney, Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson and Shue2010a).

Behind this extension of human rights to future generations lies a particular understanding of law. Rights are understood, in the sense of Habermas, as a dynamic system of claims. As the legal system evolves, people respond to new conflicts and problems. The enactment of new laws, up to and including constitutional changes, is based on this dynamic understanding of law. If future generations can claim human rights, this implies that they are potentially also legal subjects. This is controversial because the status of a legal subject traditionally presupposes existence. From a legal-philosophical perspective, however, the view has gained acceptance that future humans are potentially legal subjects, and that they acquire this status upon birth. After all, the legal system is based on the same idea: children do not need to apply for the status of a legal subject; rather, it is automatically granted to them at birth. This expansion of the understanding of law can also be applied generally to future generations.

In this book, we define intergenerational justice as requiring the observance of the human rights of future generations necessary for them to lead a decent life. This provides a justification for our responsibility towards future generations. In terms of the international legal framework of human rights, we interpret ‘necessary to lead a decent life’ as entailing a threshold which means, at the very least, a requirement on all states to meet the minimum essential level required of all human rights set out in the human rights covenants.Footnote ⁸ Threshold theories do not preclude us from doing more for future generations than the threshold dictates, but this is then not a question of justice but of altruism. Threshold theories do not focus on individual fates but set conditions of a liveable existence qua being human.

From a normative perspective, such threshold approaches do not intend to pitch individual human rights against others or to speak of ‘core’ human rights. Human rights can only be adequately understood in their multidimensionality. This means, for example, that individual freedoms or rights for the satisfaction of basic needs have the same status as social or cultural rights. It is only in the combination of these dimensions that human rights take on their normative significance. For instance, when the Inuit in Canada lose their physical, mental, and cultural foundation due to climate change and the melting of ice, this threat can only be captured in its multidimensionality. Human rights, in their various facets, are, however, an instrument capable of doing just that. The UN Human Rights Committee has made it clear that, at the very least, common minimum essential levels must be met by every state party to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in relation to each of the rights set out in the Covenant (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 1990: para 10).

3.4.2 Solidarity

In addition to the debate on intergenerational justice, the question of solidarity has played a key role for some years. This has implications both for the normative foundations of democracy in general and for its consideration of future generations. In the late 1990s, Kurt Bayertz elaborated an important theory of social and political solidarity (Bayertz Reference Bayertz and Bayertz1999; Scholz Reference Scholz2008). In the tradition of Durkheim, Bayertz’s concept of social solidarity is based on the observation that the rational voluntarism of liberal political theories is misleading. The image of the isolated, rationally willing citizen that underlies many democratic societies is inaccurate. Rather, human beings are always already involved and integrated in a complex and dynamic network of social relations and interactions, from which normative claims arise beyond rational-wilful consent. Solidarity means recognising that people live in relations from which normative claims arise. These moral demands refer to the fact that all parts of the relational network should be considered, that no one should fall out of the network, and that special attention should be paid to those whose lives are precarious. It flows from this view that solidarity entails not just help or assistance for the vulnerable, but also a fundamental change of economic structures to protect the vulnerable.

Relationality as the basis for climate ethics therefore emphasises that all people worldwide relate to each other in a dynamic network of relations. Political decisions or economic actions in one part of the world have massive effects on ecological conditions elsewhere and thus on the lives of people in other parts of the world. Solidarity understood as relationality thus means that normative claims go beyond the boundaries of one’s own community, culture, or nation. Solidarity always means global or transcultural solidarity, even if such global solidarity only exists in plurality (Gould Reference Gould2007; Reder & Heindl Reference Reder and Heindl2020). In terms of a pragmatist theory of solidarity, the demand for global solidarity implies, for example, that people at different nodes of the relational network feel solidarity with other people (or living beings) and thus bring their concerns into the (political) field of vision. Values (such as solidarity) arise from the interconnectedness of people.

Second, the theorem of relationality implies a fundamental critique of a purely anthropocentric approach for environmental ethics and does so within the framework of a new pattern of thinking: relationality as the social-theoretical basis of solidarity always means to be in connection with all other living beings, including ecosystems. What constitutes human experience or shapes human action is not only other people but also ecological conditions or other living beings, such as non-human animals. Of course, the objection has been made that reciprocal relationships cannot be conceptualised between all living beings, and certainly not between humans and non-human nature. However, this reciprocity only exists between many people who are in solidarity with each other hypothetically and not factually. Moreover, studies giving meaning to the idea of human beings having solidarity with non-human animals have emerged in recent years (Cojocaru Reference Cojocaru2021). In a similar direction, this study emphasises an obligation to solidarity with other animals arising from the interconnectedness between humans and nature.

Third, solidarity means that environmental ethics should not fall into a presentist thinking of the political, which is inherent in some liberal political theories (Tahmoudi et al. Reference Tahmoudi, Faets and Reder2020). Solidarity as recognition of relationality also means thinking about the lives of future generations. Thus, environmental ethics must be much more strongly considered as a temporal-diachronic frame of reflection when thinking about solidarity.

Conceiving of solidarity in a relational manner takes inspiration from Indigenous ontologies. According to Indigenous belief systems in Canada, Aotearoa-New Zealand, and Australia, for example, individuals have a responsibility to maintain a balance between the elements of nature in which they are a part: this duty exists in a context in which one’s identity is interconnected with the identities of one’s ancestors and future generations conceived within a circular, rather than a linear, concept of time (Abe et al. Reference Abe, Wenning and Fritsch2024; McGregor Reference McGregor2018; Winter Reference Winter2021).

Bayertz (Reference Bayertz and Bayertz1999) and Scholz (Reference Scholz2008) focus not only on social solidarity but also on political solidarity. This, too, contains important impulses for the debate on climate ethics. Historically, political solidarity has had two facets. On the one hand is the transfer of social relationality into the political institutions of the democratic constitutional state. From a historical point of view, the institutional protection against social risks – in short, the welfare state – can be viewed as an important expression of political solidarity. These institutions ensure that no one falls outside the relational net. For environmental ethics, this dimension of political solidarity means an increased focus on institutions and the law to safeguard these institutional arrangements, which provides a link to more liberal thinking about intergenerational justice (Reder et al. Reference Reder, Gösele, Köhler and Wallacher2018).

On the other hand, political solidarity has a second dimension that is grounded in, amongst other things, the labour movement and its militant demands. In this second respect, political solidarity pays particular attention to the crises of the time and seeks transformative solutions beyond existing legal and political institutions. It asks how political commitment can be reawakened and a militant commitment to a different world strengthened. Political solidarity entails a fundamental critique of existing political and economic conditions. It is not so much a matter of expanding existing meanings, but of developing fundamentally new frames of thought, starting from the political. The aim is to work transformatively towards a different society in the future (Reder & Stüber Reference Reder and Stüber2020). Again, the normative background of this critique is the theorem of relationality: political structures and processes are criticised when individual parts, people, living beings, and nature are ignored or even deliberately overlooked. It aims for structures based on solidarity which overcome these blind spots.

In this context, it is particularly important for researchers to understand which (new) forms of solidarity practice are developing in the wake of transnational social upheavals, how these can be theoretically interpreted, and what conclusions can be drawn from this for the understanding of society or the political. Empirically, many cultural and political practices are emerging that emphasise solidarity with future generations. From ‘Fridays for Future’ school strikes to religious communities and academic think-tanks, many practices advocate solidarity with future generations. These practices reflect a concern for intergenerational justice. Only if people feel connected in their concrete practices with people living in the future can moral and legal claims be justified within the framework of a theory of justice.

A further link between solidarity and intergenerational justice is that, for intergenerational solidarity to be meaningful, current generations must accept an ethical obligation to ensure that future generations meet a minimal, subsistence level above a certain threshold. This has striking parallels with the concept of social solidarity sketched earlier. Just as social solidarity can be interpreted as ensuring nobody falls below a minimum social welfare net, intergenerational solidarity can similarly be interpreted as ensuring that future generations do not fall below a threshold of minimal subsistence. In the climate change context, we have seen that such a threshold can be defined as meeting the requirements of human rights.

The language of solidarity is strongly reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s 2013 report, Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations (UNSG 2013) and 2021 report, Our Common Agenda, which argues for a new social contract to provide the basis for a rejuvenated multilateralism to solve pressing global problems (UNSG 2021: 22). The social contract is to extend to future generations (UNSG 2021: 38–39) which, on the face of it, is problematic, given the lack of reciprocity between contemporaries and future generations (Lawrence Reference Lawrence2022: 48–50). Nevertheless, solidarity allows an extension to future generations based on shared interests. The Secretary-General’s 2021 report defines solidarity as ‘a fundamental value by virtue which global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes costs and benefits fairly, in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice and ensures that those who suffer [the most] or benefit the least receive help from those who [suffer the least or] benefit the most (UNSG 2021: 14)’.Footnote ⁹

The Secretary-General’s 2021 report was the springboard for the development by the UN High-Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) – which brings together a number of UN agencies – of a set of common principles on future generations. These common principles aim to ensure agreement on a set of common values across the United Nations system for use in a range of contexts, including strategic planning, policy advice, and programming (United Nations 2023a: 2). ‘Global solidarity’ and ‘global responsibility’ are identified as key values to foster to ensure that the UN system responds to the global ecological crisis (United Nations 2023a: 4).

It has been pointed out that this definition is rather narrow in its focus on wealth distribution (Koroma Reference Koroma and Hestermeyer2012: 114), and a slightly broader definition finds support in UN instruments which adds two further elements: (i) ‘shared responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security’; and (ii) ‘respect for nature’ entailing prudence in the management of all living species as resources ‘in accordance with sustainable development’ to ensure that the ‘immeasurable riches provided to us by nature [are] preserved and passed on to our descendants’ (UNGA 2000: para 6). The Millennium Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000 proclaims that all three elements (wealth distribution, peace/security, and sustainability) are ‘fundamental values essential to international relations in the 21st century’.

An advantage of this framing based on solidarity is that it may avoid the possible divisiveness of rights-based language, which some countries perceive as manifesting a Western bias. A further advantage is that, by emphasising common threats, the language of solidarity underscores the need to cooperate, and the idea that ‘we are all in this together’. Solidarity is often linked to the notion that the ‘all’ encompasses the global community, rather than the nation-state. The recent resurgence of nationalism places this framing under strain.

One disadvantage of this framing is that the content of obligations which flow from solidarity remains vague. Arguably, then, a solidarity framing needs to be supplemented by obligations of intergenerational justice – particularly the principle of ‘intergenerational equity’ understood as a minimum, an obligation on contemporaries to ensure that future generations enjoy human rights necessary to lead a decent life (see Section 3.4.1), and an obligation to preserve the ecological integrity of the planet (Drysek & Pickering Reference Dryzek and Pickering2019: 89). Fleshing out such a concept in a treaty has not been done to date, but would arguably be a logical extension of the solidarity framing we argue for here (see Chapter 8).

Indeed, the principle of intergenerational equity has been argued to point in the direction of a trust-type relationship between human beings and resources, which is a type of proxy representation. The fact that human beings have inherited natural resources, and that no generation has a superior claim to these resources than any other, has been argued to give rise to the concept of the trust, whereby the current generation has a duty to conserve and maintain planetary resources for future beneficiaries (Shelton Reference Shelton, Wolfrum and Kojima2010: 143).

The element of solidarity involving shared responsibility for resources, mentioned earlier, finds expression in the special international legal regimes created for the deep seabed and the moon, both of which involve the idea of the ‘common heritage of humankind’: that is, a communal safeguarding of areas of resources which cannot be claimed by individual sovereign states, with this communal management being exercised as a trust for the benefit of future generations (Shelton Reference Shelton, Wolfrum and Kojima2010: 143). The International Seabed Authority (ISA), established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (UNCLOS 1982: art. 136) with the aim of regulating and controlling deep seabed mineral mining in areas outside national jurisdiction on behalf of humankind, acts ‘as a kind of trustee on behalf of mankind as a whole’ (Jaeckel et al. Reference Jaeckel2017: 150). As South Africa pointed out in the UN General Assembly in 2009, the ‘common heritage of humankind’ principle is not only about benefit sharing but also ‘about solidarity; solidarity and the preservation and conservation of the good we all share and therefore should protect’ (Jaeckel et al. Reference Jaeckel2017: 150). This regime is infused with both intra- and inter-generational equity-type elements, including the preservation of marine-protected areas for the benefit of future generations (Jaeckel et al. Reference Jaeckel2017: 155). However, creating trust-type mechanisms for the benefit of future generations and implementing them is not the same thing. The ISA regime has come under criticism for a lack of transparency in the operations of its Finance Committee and commercialisation, putting the regime at risk (Nyka Reference Nyka2021: 18).

3.4.3 Vulnerability

Finally, in addition to solidarity with future generations, the question of vulnerability as a normative-political framework for reflection on intergenerational issues currently plays an increasingly significant role in theory and practice. Vulnerability has recently emerged as a counter-concept to traditional normative-political framings. In the debates on climate change, discussions on vulnerability have long played a key role; for example, in relation to the IPCC (Edenhofer et al. Reference Edenhofer, Wallacher, Lotze-Campen, Reder, Knopf and Müller2012). Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also increasingly adopted a focus on vulnerability during the last decade. This focus on vulnerability accentuates issues that are often neglected by traditional theories and political practices.

The evolving debate shows that there are quite different forms of vulnerability, such as natural, social, economic, and cultural. Climate change impacts involve exposing particular groups to different forms of vulnerability. For example, heat waves, extreme weather events, and an increase in vector-borne diseases make increasing numbers of people vulnerable in terms of health impacts (IPCC 2023). Those most vulnerable include the elderly, the young, disabled persons, women, and people living in poverty. Climate change magnifies existing vulnerabilities and is now seen as a key factor in social development (UNDP 2020, 2022). Vulnerability can be understood as a basic dimension of all living things, for which it is necessary to develop a new critical sensitivity beyond established social security narratives and institutions, as Butler (Reference Butler, Butler, Gambetti and Sabsay2016) argues.

However, it is also evident that not all people are equally vulnerable (Goodin Reference Goodin1986). Rather, individuals and communities are vulnerable in different ways due to social, societal, or personal dispositions. The risks of being injured – as shown, for example, by studies in the context of capability research – are very unequally distributed, beginning with children, women, refugees and displaced persons, people from the countries of the Global South and, especially, future generations. At the same time, determining who is considered vulnerable and should therefore be given greater protection is always an expression of political power that must be problematised. Who is (most) vulnerable and who defines this is highly controversial in the current discourse. Ex negativo, the question is asked about those who are not perceived, who are discriminated against, or who are completely excluded from the social, political, or economic processes.

Vulnerability is also a counterfoil to justice, which is often strongly aligned with the economic model of distributive justice.Footnote ¹⁰ From this perspective, solidarity means primarily giving a voice to those who are currently not visible in such distributive calculations. In contrast, the discourse on vulnerability is understood as a critique of democratic orders that fail to adequately consider the vulnerability of future people. If democracies are normatively oriented towards the vulnerable, they must also pay special attention to them through their forms of representation as one basic form of democratic procedure.

There is also a strong link between vulnerability and intergenerational justice. If intergenerational justice in the climate context is equated with ensuring that future generations can enjoy the human rights necessary for a decent life, this finds further justification in the link to vulnerability. This is because meeting human rights requirements is a vehicle for ensuring that future generations are not vulnerable. Adopting legal rules and policies that ensure that future generations have sufficient food, subsistence, and shelter is clearly vital in terms of helping them to have the necessary resilience to withstand climate impacts. As discussed further in this book (Section 8.5), this framing has implications for the mandate of appropriate institutions to represent future generations, in that the requirement to address human rights that are vital to vulnerabilities should be central to such mandates. Given human beings’ reliance on functioning ecosystems, protection of these ecosystems also needs to be incorporated in the relevant mandates of proxy institutions.

The central question in this next step of our reflection is how current concepts of proxy representation can be further developed to respond appropriately to the current ecological crises, particularly the climate crisis. What impulses can emerge from democratic-theoretical and ethical considerations in this regard? The concluding reflections of this chapter address these questions.

3.5.1 Normative Impulses for the Discourse on Proxy Representation

The discourses on justice, solidarity, and vulnerability provide a normative basis for the transformation of representation both at the national and international levels. Whether and how this normative demand can be translated into political forms of proxy representation is a central concern of what follows in this section. In this context, our thesis is that the three discourses of justice, solidarity, and vulnerability are interconnected, even if they come into tension with each other – which they certainly do. From a pragmatist perspective, however, this tension does not pose a fundamental problem because pragmatists expect such contradictions. These tensions should be used productively to improve the respective political practice – in this case, the forms of representation – as a whole.

All three normative discourses form fundamental dimensions of the democratic ethos. Democracy depends on the solidarity of people, in the sense of a recognition of social connectedness, to be able to negotiate claims to justice in the first place. The focus on those who are excluded (or not included) clearly plays a significant role in all theories of democracy, particularly in relation to theories which conceive of democracy as being more than the formal act of elections. These criteria can easily be linked to other normative theories: thus, for example, to the extent that theories of intergenerational justice entail the fair distribution of goods between generations, these theories also imply a conception of vulnerability.

Future generations are particularly vulnerable because they are not involved in current decisions but will suffer from their consequences. Ensuring a minimum subsistence level of protection of the rights of future generations can help ensure that they are protected in relation to the vulnerabilities future individuals and groups face, considering the threat of climate change. Moreover, this action of recognising the vulnerable through proxy representation amounts to an important expression of solidarity: it ensures that intergenerational solidarity has meaningful content in the climate change context and is not merely an abstract slogan. Proxy representation can then be seen as a political mechanism aimed at giving a voice to the particularly vulnerable; its legal forms can also play a key role when the law shifts to the logic of protecting the particularly vulnerable.

The development of new forms of proxy representation of future generations grounded on these three normative discourses can help push us in the direction of long-term climate law- and policy-making, and, at the very least, make visible the long-term consequences of current short-term political decisions. By personalising these consequences and understanding future generations as part of a constantly forming and expanding demos, these consequences can be integrated into the logic, mechanisms, and procedures of political procedures. In this way, problems such as climate change can be dealt with politically, and vulnerable future people can be normatively considered.

From a meta-perspective, all three ethical discourses draw attention to two aspects that are important for a transformation of representation. First, democracies and their theoretical underpinnings currently tend to place too much emphasis on methodological individualism or the concept of community and thus pay too little attention to social relationality. Second, they still focus too much on the present. Democracy is primarily concerned with the present. Yet, human life is always temporal, connected to the past and the future. Democracy should therefore no longer be understood exclusively in the present, but diachronically, that is, across time. A concrete consequence of this could be to understand proxy representation of future generations not just as a corrective to existing theories of democracy, but also as a fundamental element of the theoretical foundations of democracy itself.

In addition, in a globalised world, the social and the political sphere can only be thought of in terms of a relationality that extends beyond traditional national borders. This means that normative claims do not stop at these borders but must extend to all people worldwide. If political action by states always has global effects, these must be considered normatively, and political mechanisms must be adapted accordingly. This applies equally to the diachronic character of social relationality. People are necessarily temporal beings, and their existence always necessarily spans many generations. This manifests itself in the discussion of intergenerational justice. Generations are not discrete actors opposed to one another but, rather, fluidly interwoven in interlocking relationships. For states and the global (legal) order to normatively reflect this reality, appropriate mechanisms must be developed to adequately account for this social diachronic relationality. This approach of relationality is a good normative basis for the development of new forms of representation.

Furthermore, the approach of relationality, through its focus on the reciprocal relationships between humans and the environment or nature, offers the basis of a rigorous critique of a strictly anthropocentric approach. These interrelationships give rise to normative claims not only for humans but also for non-human nature which need to be recognised. The development of new forms of proxy representation is therefore an imperative in relation to future generations of human beings, but also in relation to non-human nature. While we do not further develop the idea of representation of nature in this book, it is important to emphasise that this extension is logically required.

Let us conclude this first argument: to be able to integrate the concerns of future generations appropriately into political mechanisms, politics – both on the national and international levels – should pay greater attention to the diachronic relationality of the social than it has in the past. In this context, it becomes clear that democracy is not a timeless ideal, but a political practice that must be constantly readjusted in terms of its normative pillars in view of new challenges – such as climate change.

Proxy representation can then become an institutionalised critique accompanying all political processes on the operational level. Proxy representatives of future generations have the potential to examine and critique whether current political decisions have considered the interests of future generations adequately and implemented a convincing understanding of intergenerational justice. Such forms of self-criticism embodied in political procedures – aimed at questioning political decisions measured against the normative foundations of democracy – have always been a key characteristic of democracies. Proxy representation of future generations is one such institutionalised form of critique.

3.5.2 Future Generations as Part of the National and International Demos

In liberal, deliberative, republican, and communitarian traditions, the aim is to reflect critically on the determination of those who are to be represented. In the language of democratic theory: because representation is always founded on a concept defining who belongs to the demos, we must rethink the concept of demos. We must ask afresh: who should be involved in democratic decision-making and why?

Such a critical debate on the demos can also be found in post-structuralist approaches. These approaches share with liberal, deliberative, and communitarian traditions the intention that we should pay more attention to those who are excluded from current political decisions. From post-structuralist perspectives, however, it is not so much about broadening the demos (legal subjects, discourse partners, and so on). Some radical democratic theorists, for example, even argue that the demos could never be understood as an interaction between rational agents or an ethnic, cultural, and historical community; rather, the demos is the voice of the excluded (Rancière Reference Rancière2010). Political discussions therefore always revolve around the question of who receives too little (or no) attention and should therefore receive more attention as part of the demos. Democracy is thus ultimately a struggle about the question of who is excluded. This is also true from a temporal perspective, as future generations tend to be excluded in current political decisions.

This consideration is also critical at the international level. It is crucial to reflect upon and engage in political discussion about who should be included in political and legal mechanisms. If there are compelling arguments for an expansion of the demos of the democratic idea into the future, these arguments also apply at the international level. Here, too, it involves expanding the global community as a reference point for global political decisions into the future (Lawrence Reference Lawrence, Linehan and Lawrence2021b: 22–41).

Although the different traditions of theorising politics and democracy differ in terms of justification, they seem to agree that representation needs to be reformed with a view to better incorporating global and long-term consequences of political action and, thus, providing a rationale for proxy representation of the excluded. If democracies focus on those who do not have the power to be adequately represented in the political sphere, they will create new forms of representation for those who do not belong to the demos in the traditional understanding. This means that democracy must cope with its own paradoxical character; namely, it must give an account of those who are not part of democratic procedures.

From this perspective, it becomes clear that democracy – and representation as a fundamental political mechanism – are not (fixed) ideals. Rather, representation is a political mechanism that must always be developed while considering new challenges: the long-term consequences of political decisions are one such challenge today. Thus, political forms of representation should be reconfigured to meet this challenge with the underlying rationale of democracy in mind. In terms of representation, two possibilities arise. First, representatives could be bound to constitutional norms within the legal framework of the democratic nation-state. For example, future generations’ interests can be anchored in the constitution, requiring all representatives – at least in theory – to consider their interests and integrate them in political decisions (Dobson Reference Dobson1999). As mentioned earlier, at the international level there is no constitution, while the UN Charter fulfils some roles like a constitution (Cot Reference Cot and Wolfrum2011: para 63). Incorporating future generations’ interests in an international agreement is a further possibility (see Chapter 8). A second category of possibilities is more focused on the political level. The aim on this level would be to develop new political forms of proxy representation of future generations which purport to represent the distinctive interests of this group to better integrate their interests into national and international political processes. But what exactly does proxy representation mean? What are its different forms? And how can they be ethically and legally justified?

Thus, the central question is how the democratic idea of representation can be further developed in the face of ecological crises, not only at the national but also at the international level. Our thesis is that democratic representation – regardless of the theoretical tradition through which it understands itself – is best suited to respond to ecological crises in the sense of providing a powerful rationale for participation by all – including future generations, despite the various limitations previously outlined. For this purpose, it is important not to limit democracy to the nation-state. Democracy can provide a powerful ideal which justifies further development of new forms of proxy representation at both the national and international levels, while the particularities of the international system need to be considered in designing such mechanisms at this level. Thus, our concern is to ask how democratic representation at the national level can not only be further developed, and (where feasible) transferred to the global level. We focus our considerations on different forms of proxy representation.

A powerful rationale for the further development of democratic forms of proxy representation is found in the AAP (Bohman Reference Bohman2007; Fung Reference Fung, Smith and Nagel2013; Näsström Reference Näsström2011). This principle means that all people affected by a political decision should be ‘involved’ in them. In the current world, in which democracies – and, indeed, states generally – make many decisions that have a massive impact on people in other regions or in the future, the question is whether this principle remains valid and, if so, what this means for democracy and proxy representation of future generations. But what the AAP in general, and ‘involvement’ in particular, means is controversial. The term ‘involved’ could suggest direct participation, whereas some may argue that representation is sufficient. Moreover, in the recent period, ‘speaking for others’ has been suspected of entailing yet another form of ‘hegemonic paternalism’, suggesting that representation of those affected should be as direct as possible; in other words, that those affected should speak for themselves (Bernstorff Reference Bernstorff2021: 150). However, as has been pointed out, even if the most affected have the possibility to speak in international institutions, they are being heard ‘because they also claim to speak on behalf of other similarly affected persons’ (Bernstorff Reference Bernstorff2021: 150). The extent to which international NGOs provide a legitimate voice to those affected has recently been challenged on the grounds that they may lack internal accountability, democratic processes, and be dominated by the Global North. In response, at least 19 international institutions have constructed mechanisms to ensure those affected (or mostly affected) gain a voice (Bernstorff Reference Bernstorff2021: 148). An example of this is the Committee relating to the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 2006), where the procedural rules limit representation on the Committee to organisations with at least half of the members being persons with disabilities and being led by persons with disabilities (Bernstorff Reference Bernstorff2021: 48–49).

In addition, the question of representation is controversial, because it could mean the concrete representation of all people affected (for example, via elections) and the representation of future interests (Goodin Reference Goodin2007). Certainly, democracies would reach their limits if they were to involve all those concerned in representation in a formal or agency-based sense. Democracy would then always mean ‘world democracy’, in which (almost) all people worldwide could vote and thus authorise the representatives (Valentini Reference Valentini2014).

The AAP does not necessarily imply such a concept of representation and a world state. It does, however, require the interests of people living now (and in the future) be factored into decision-making action in relation to climate change, including the development of new forms of representation to ensure that this occurs. This means that, even if democracies cannot currently allow all people to vote equally, they should – using the AAP as an ideal or blueprint for reform – at least develop new forms of participation and representation, so that excluded groups are at least hypothetically considered or indirectly involved. Democracies must discuss what the demos means in our current circumstances – that involves making political decisions which entail wide-ranging global and long-term consequences for people who are not part of the ‘traditional demos’. At the international level, this means using the AAP as a blueprint for reform, which provides a powerful justification for exploring new forms of proxy representation in the international system.

A further justification for the expansion of the demos flows from the pragmatist method. If political action implies political consequences that contradict their own normative foundations (according to the central values of democracy), then institutions come into self-contradiction. So, for example, if a political community is committed to human rights and their protection as part of its normative self-understanding but at the same time does not respect the human rights of future generations with its climate policy decisions, this is a contradiction that must be resolved. Governance structures must expand the demos to avoid contradicting their own normative foundations. Again, how far this expansion goes is the subject of democratic negotiation. And, for this negotiation, vulnerability can again provide a framework: because it is primarily about the consideration and representation of those who are particularly vulnerable.

Let us demonstrate what the AAP means, for example, for the democratic understanding of deliberation. In many traditional theories, the circle of those included in deliberation refers to the demos limited to the nation-state. But how does this work in relation to the many decisions of democratic deliberation processes that affect people beyond this demos? Deliberative theories integrate this question with an extension of the understanding of deliberation. Future generations are then interpreted as equal ‘partners’ in hypothetical discourses. According to the ethical discourse principle, their opinions and interests must also be considered appropriately in the political process – especially in the form of representation (necessarily by proxy). Another form of discourse-ethical argumentation also speaks of the representation of discourses; for example, of long-term ecological discourses which embody the interests of future generations (Dryzek & Niemeyer Reference Dryzek and Niemeyer2012). This proposal circumvents the problem of conceptualising future generations as speaking beings in a reciprocal relationship to currently living ones. However, identifying who is entitled to decide which discourses count under this model remains challenging, if it is a group of experts who appoints them. In both directions, the reform of representation is about broadening the perspective of the discourse: whether it is about broadening the group that is (allowed to be) part of the discussion or the discourses about that group.

Republican or communitarian models of politics have responded to long-term problems by extending the political community in many ways that reflect the AAP by expanding the possibility for those affected by a decision to have a voice. These theories reflect on traditional concepts of the boundaries of the (democratic) community. In these models, future generations are interpreted less as rationally speaking citizens of a discourse community or rights holders than as part of the democratic community itself. To integrate future generations into political considerations and decisions, the concept of republican community that underlies these theories is extended in time. This extension is then accompanied by a legitimation of their concerns within republican procedures, usually also through proxy representation. The debate over whether younger children are already part of the political community and should therefore be more involved in political procedures is an example of such a broadening of the democratic community (Gutwald & Reder Reference Gutwald and Reder2023; Schweiger Reference Schweiger2022). In this theoretical tradition, the concept of representation is developed by reflecting on and broadening the understanding of the political community. The political community traditionally referred to the linguistically capable, reasonable citizens. This, for example, excluded both children and future generations because they were assumed to be irrational or not capable of speech at all.

Republican or communitarian traditions respond by developing a new narrative, rather than concrete (for example, rights-oriented) proposals for the further development of representation. Instead, these models argue that we need to redefine what constitutes the political community. As we argue in this book, community thus redefined includes not only currently living people but also children or people who are not yet alive.

At the same time, the idea here is also to expand the political community to the global level. In a highly interconnected world, political, economic, and ecological crises (such as climate change) are inextricably global problems that require global legal responses. If responding to these crises not only requires formal procedures but also a minimum of political community, then this community must increasingly be expanded beyond the national-societal framework. The debates in the social, cultural, and normative framework of the UN climate regime’s conference of parties (COPs) in the last decades demonstrate this: without a minimum of community in the sense of a willingness to solve the problem together, nothing moves forward politically. That is why these models argue for the construction of a global political community, for example, in the sense of thin morality, as Michael Walzer argues. If sovereignty-related concerns and self-interest – particularly on behalf of the wealthy countries – undermine this actual community, reflected in the rather weak global climate regime, does this undermine this argument? We would say that it does not because the fact that a minimum level of global community cooperation is a precondition for successfully addressing climate change is sufficient (Vanderheiden Reference Vanderheiden2008: 105).