In The Ideological Foundations of Qing Taxation: Belief Systems, Politics, and Institutions, Taisu Zhang offers an ideology-based explanation for Qing China’s remarkably light taxation regime, particularly the stagnation of its agricultural taxes. Zhang notes that from 1730 to 1900, agricultural taxes—the dominant source of state revenue before the mid-nineteenth century—remained stagnant in absolute terms and declined as a share of gross agricultural production. Nonagricultural taxes, in contrast, exhibited a more flexible pattern, although their overall importance to state revenue was limited before the mid-nineteenth century. Not only was the Qing taxation regime unusually light compared to other early modern states in Europe and Asia, its steadfast refusal to increase agricultural taxes, even amid significant economic growth and severe fiscal crises, sharply contrasted with the policies of previous Chinese dynasties. This fiscal weakness constrained the Qing administration’s capabilities and had lasting consequences for China’s economic and political development.

Zhang highlights the shortcomings of existing “rationalist explanations” in fully accounting for the unique characteristics of the Qing taxation regime, particularly the state’s unwillingness—rather than inability—to raise agricultural taxes. The missing element, he argues, is the ideological belief system that shaped Qing fiscal policies. However, this is not simply an argument for the enduring influence of Confucian morality in opposing heavy taxation. As Zhang compellingly demonstrates through a vast array of political treatises and memorials, the Qing era saw a significant intellectual and political shift away from moral argumentation toward a more pragmatic and consequentialist mode of analysis. The “ideological” foundation of Qing taxation, he contends, was rooted not so much in a Confucian moral aversion to taxation but in a widely held empirical belief among Qing statesmen: that agricultural taxes had already reached a fiscal “red line,” beyond which tax increases would threaten rural subsistence and provoke immediate social unrest.

This Malthusian outlook took hold as early Qing intellectuals coalesced around the belief that the over-taxation of a fragile rural economy had been the primary cause of the Ming collapse. Given its limited arable land and swollen population, the Qing economy was seen as even less capable of sustaining higher taxation than that of the late Ming. This belief became the foundation of Qing fiscal conservatism and was gradually institutionalized over the eighteenth century, as the state entrenched fixed “quota-ism” and abandoned systematic land surveys—measures that might have revealed a more optimistic picture of increasing arable land and productivity, thus justifying fiscal expansion. Indeed, Zhang’s concept of “ideology” closely resembles Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a “paradigm.” The Ming collapse established a paradigm of fiscal conservatism rooted in Malthusian anxieties, which persisted for over two centuries by shaping how new information was processed and interpreted. This paradigm was only overturned by the end of the nineteenth century through a revolutionary “paradigm shift,” as Chinese political elites—now exposed to Western experiences—began to embrace fiscal expansion, statism, and the possibility of unlimited economic growth.

I find Zhang’s overall argument convincing—Malthusian anxieties played a significant role in entrenching Qing fiscal conservatism, and the commitment to fixed quotas deprived the state of potential revenue increases from an expanding tax base driven by rural revival and prosperity, particularly during the eighteenth century. However, at times, one wonders whether the author’s depiction of an extremely rigid, ideology-driven agricultural tax regime—contrasted with a more rationalistic and flexible approach to commercial taxes—is somewhat overstated. Between 1740 and 1850, the contrast between stagnant agricultural taxes and growing commercial taxes was not the result of more proactive policies in one area than the other but was largely a function of their differing collection methods that had already been in place. Agricultural taxes remained stagnant due to the lack of updated land surveys, while customs duties, levied on commodities in transit, naturally kept pace with the expanding market economy. In the wake of the Taiping crisis in the 1850s, while commercial taxes surged dramatically with the introduction of lijin, agricultural taxes also underwent swift and significant adjustments (as detailed on pp. 283–93). Although the total amount of agricultural taxes did not increase—a predictable outcome given the widespread devastation of the country’s most productive farmlands—these adjustments challenge the notion of a rigid agricultural tax regime irresponsive to fiscal crises. It seems to me that only in the three decades between 1870—when post-Taiping recovery could be considered complete—and 1900 can one genuinely contrast active fiscal expansion in commerce with continued conservatism in agricultural taxation.

One might also add that while there may have been a mismatch between High Qing officials’ Malthusian pessimism and the reality of a booming economy, by the late nineteenth century, significant parts of the country were indeed approaching a genuine Malthusian crisis. Revenue extraction from the agricultural sector expanded significantly from the 1900s through the Republican period, which the author portrays as a belated correction to the Qing misperception. However, if one were to channel the voices of early Qing intellectuals reflecting on the lessons of the Ming collapse, one might ask: Didn’t the over-taxation of a fragile agricultural economy in the first four decades of the twentieth century—much like the over-taxation of the early seventeenth century—once again lead to widespread peasant rebellion (this time led by the Communists) and, ultimately, regime collapse? I’m not seriously making this argument but rather highlighting that the Qing beliefs may not have been as out of touch with reality as they are often portrayed in the book. In fact, their Malthusian concerns about the fragility of the agricultural economy were grounded in the long-term consequences that ultimately unfolded in the organic economy, which was only overturned by the Green Revolution—a development they had no reason to foresee.

Overall, The Ideological Foundations of Qing Taxation offers a compelling and nuanced exploration of the ideological and institutional forces that shaped Qing fiscal policy. Zhang’s integration of ideology with economic and political history provides a fresh perspective on Qing taxation, revising traditional interpretations and shedding light on the long-lasting implications of fiscal conservatism. His meticulous analysis of the Qing state’s reluctance to raise agricultural taxes, despite economic growth and fiscal needs, reveals a complex interplay between belief systems and political realities. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in fiscal history, political economy, and intellectual history, as it not only deepens our understanding of Qing China but also offers important insights into the broader dynamics of statecraft and economic governance.