8.1.1 The Nature of Totalitarian Parties

In modern society, political parties serve as the vehicles for political competition. Max Weber’s definitive description of a political party is, “By definition a party can exist only within an organization, in order to influence its policy or gain control of it” (Weber, Reference Weber1978, p. 285). Weber’s definition presumes a degree of competition among parties but this definition or fundamental assumption is completely contravened by totalitarian parties. The Bolshevik Party, crafted by Lenin, was a political monopoly that did not tolerate political competition. Instead of merely participating within an organized system, it dominated every organization, infiltrated every societal sector, and dictated all significant decisions. It wielded control over all organizations and presided over all aspects of society. Most critically, the Bolsheviks disallowed the existence of any organization that functioned independently of the party within society – even non-political organizations were mandated to secure its approval and fell under its supervision.

Weber also defined a political party as an association that recruits members freely, a principle that Leninist parties categorically contradict. Indeed, the Bolsheviks’ split from the RSDLP in 1903 was primarily due to their opposition to the principle of free membership recruitment.

Every totalitarian party, modeled on Leninist principles and established anywhere globally, adheres to the Bolsheviks’ basic principles. Namely, these are not organizations that freely recruit members but rather they operate as secret associations of political elites under autocratic control. Leninist parties explicitly stipulate the dictatorship of the proletariat as the fundamental system in their party charters and constitutions.

These parties are the only political entities, exercising an almost complete monopoly over society’s numerous facets, encompassing politics, economy, military, media, and more. Totalitarian parties that have not yet seized power aim to do so through armed force, striving to establish a one-party dictatorship. Those who opt to join the governing totalitarian party willingly acquiesce to autocratic rule, seeking to ascend to the ranks of political elites via this pathway.

Modern political parties, as organizations vying for power openly, draw their institutional genes from earlier parliamentary caucuses and social organizations that represent diverse interests. These types of parliaments and organizations have existed for several centuries and, in some places, for two millennia in Europe.

By comparison, apart from the alien Marxist theory of the proletarian dictatorship, the institutional genes that gave rise to the Bolshevik Party were the absence of the parliamentary tradition and the secret political organization or the political terrorist organization that already existed in Russia. The nature of terrorist activities ensures that these organizations are hierarchical, autocratic, and clandestine.

To summarize, there are two fundamental differences between totalitarian parties and modern political parties. First, totalitarian parties are organizations that seek to monopolize power, not to compete for it. They are resolute in their intention to dismantle any organization that might compete with them, using violence or other means if necessary.

Second, members of totalitarian parties are selected to join a secretive organization that imposes strict, and sometimes lethal, discipline on them. This is in stark contrast to open organizations that permit free recruitment, exit, and debate.

8.1.2 Emergence of the Bolsheviks as a Secret Political Organization

The Bolsheviks evolved directly from the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, which itself spun off from the Land and Liberty movement and adopted the title and ideology of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP), a Marxist entity. The original ideology of Land and Liberty was Russian socialism proposed by Alexander Herzen and Nikolay Chernyshevsky. This particular ideology advocated for the transformation of ownership through dispossession to create a fully egalitarian society, culminating in the transfer of land to rural communes and factories to workers.

Within the ranks of the Land and Liberty revolutionaries, there was a considerable divergence in revolutionary strategies. While some foresaw the establishment of a highly centralized utopian socialism, others leaned towards anarchy, pushing for autonomy in rural communities and factories. However, apart from their shared socialist aim of abolishing private property, they typically upheld Russia’s tradition of violent revolution, championing the use of covert and violent means through either armed uprising or assassination.

What is of paramount significance is the broad and profound influence that Land and Liberty exerted in Russia. In the first All-Russian Constituent Assembly at the end of 1917 (two months after the October Revolution), parties that were either directly or indirectly linked to Land and Liberty won nearly 70 percent of the total votes. Parties advocating for various forms of dispossession of private property held a clear majority in the elections. This inherently suggests that even in the absence of the armed Bolshevik coup to overthrow the Provisional Government, or without the establishment of a totalitarian system, it would have been challenging for Russia to establish solid property rights and institute constitutionalism.

Despite sharing a common goal with these parties – to abolish private property rights – the Bolsheviks, following their armed seizure of power, moved swiftly and forcibly to suppress all these parties. They focused particularly on the largest party in Russia at the time, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and the Mensheviks, another faction of the Marxist movement.

Understanding the Bolsheviks requires an appreciation of the institutional genes they inherited from Land and Liberty. Founded by Alexander Herzen (the progenitor of Russian socialism) and Nikolay Chernyshevsky (a leading figure of Russian socialism), Land and Liberty was a secret organization. The group belonged to the broader school of thought known historically as the Populists. Most secret organizations at that time adhered to Chernyshevsky’s teachings, forming radical factions intent on violently dispossessing private property.

These entities were not political parties as defined by Weber. Instead, they were covert, violent groups that engaged in revolutionary propaganda, incited armed insurrection, and plotted assassinations. Taking a leaf from the Russian Decemberists’ playbook, they sought to instigate a violent coup d’état. In reality, since the mid-nineteenth century, most groups opposing the Tsarist regime in Russia had inherited the legacy of the Decemberists, transforming themselves into secret violent organizations. Of these, Land and Liberty was the largest and most enduring.

The People’s Party, a faction of Land and Liberty, declared in its political platform that its task was:

During the late nineteenth century, two crucial organizations arose from the radical wing of Land and Liberty, setting the stage for the emergence of the Bolsheviks. The first was the Emancipation of Labor, founded in 1883, which served as a precursor to the RSDLP and, by extension, the direct predecessor of the Bolsheviks. The second was the People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya), a terrorist organization established in 1879. While the Bolsheviks adopted influences from both organizations, their legacy from the People’s Will directly precipitated their split from the rest of the RSDLP, particularly the Mensheviks.

From the Program of the Executive Committee of the People’s Will, we are able to find key principles that were adopted later by the Bolsheviks. This Program stipulated that the People’s Will should:

The Program of the Terrorist Faction of the People’s Will, written from prison by Lenin’s brother, stated: “We are the terrorist faction of the Party … we undertake the task of waging a terror struggle against the government … Terrorist actions … force the government to make concessions … arouse the people’s revolutionary spirit, … act as a powerful propaganda for the masses.”³

The founders of the RSDLP, including Lenin, underwent a transformation of their ideology from Russian socialism to Marxism. Simultaneously, they inherited the tradition of secrecy and violence from the terrorist organizations within the Land and Freedom Society. One influential source of this transformation was Lenin’s elder brother, Aleksandr Ulyanov, who was executed for his involvement in a failed attempt to assassinate the Tsar. Lenin closely followed in his brother’s footsteps, diligently studying the theories of Land and Liberty and the People’s Will, absorbing their spirit. He also delved into Aleksandr’s favorite books, with Chernyshevsky’s writings being the most influential among them. Lenin said that before coming into contact with Marxism, Chernyshevsky’s thoughts had “deeply ploughed” his mind (Offord, Reference Offord1986, pp. 150–151).

During this period, a series of radical revolutionaries emerged from Land and Liberty, all of whom regarded Rakhmetov, a character depicted in Chernyshevsky’s novel What Is to Be Done? as a revolutionary figurehead. Lenin stated that he repeatedly read this novel throughout his life, considering Rakhmetov as his role model. Guided by this spirit, Lenin dedicated his life to violent revolution, with the objective of overthrowing the Tsarist regime and ultimately establishing a classless society.

Even after becoming a Marxist, Lenin deliberately distanced himself from the pioneer of Russian Marxism, Nikolai Fedoseyev, in order to uphold the deep-rooted tradition of the People’s Will that resonated within his heart (Trotsky, Reference Trotsky1972). However, Lenin recognized that the People’s Will alone could not achieve its goals through individual assassinations. Influenced by the radical revolutionaries Sergey Nechayev and Pyotr Tkachev from Land and Liberty, Lenin concluded that effective leadership capable of orchestrating comprehensive, large-scale terror was necessary to overthrow the government and seize power.

Nechayev and Tkachev were instrumental figures who actively worked on centralizing authority within secret violent revolutionary groups, planning large-scale terrorist activities, and inciting revolution. Their profound influence extended to both the People’s Will and the Bolsheviks. Many of the key elements that distinguish Leninism from Marxism in terms of party-building theory and revolutionary strategy can be attributed to Nechayev and Tkachev. Lenin regarded Nechayev as a revolutionary titan and required all communist revolutionaries to study his works (Mayer, Reference Mayer1993, pp. 249–263).

Lenin held Nechayev in high esteem for his exceptional organizational talent, his ability to devise new conspiratorial methods, and his remarkable skills in articulation (Parry, Reference Parry2006, pp. 135–136). During his student years, Nechayev drew inspiration from the Decemberists and actively participated in the radical revolutionary activities of Bakunin’s anarchist wing, at one point maintaining a close association with Bakunin himself. He also emulated the practices of Rakhmetov, the ascetic revolutionary character created by Chernyshevsky. Nechayev had a profound admiration for the Jacobins and Blanqui, which greatly influenced his ideology. He advocated for an uncompromising and ruthless strategy to achieve revolutionary goals, which ultimately became the spiritual foundation of Leninism, Bolshevism, and communism.

Nechayev possessed exceptional skills as an agitator and was adept at propagating the radical revolutionary ideas of the Jacobins, Blanqui, and Chernyshevsky with precision and power. Lenin deliberately learned these capabilities from him. Nechayev advocated that violent revolution was of paramount importance, considering humanity and morality as dispensable in the pursuit of revolution. He believed that revolution could and must employ any means necessary. All of these ideas had a significant influence on Lenin and, through him, on the fundamental spirit of the Bolsheviks.

In terms of shaping the party-building ideas of the Bolsheviks, Tkachev played a particularly significant role through his skilled methods and practices in establishing terrorist or conspiracy revolutionary organizations. Tkachev emphasized the pivotal role of leaders in shaping history and argued that major historical change could only be achieved through a radical shift from one historical order to another. To accomplish this shift, leaders were essential in motivating people to strive for excellence. Tkachev believed that a genuine revolution must commence with the seizure of power under the guidance of leaders. Subsequently, through the education of the masses and the implementation of a series of economic, political, and legal reforms, the revolutionary goals could be realized.

In preparing for a coup to seize power, revolutionaries had to establish strict discipline. Success could only be attained if they built an organization as tightly knit, solid, and disciplined as an army, characterized by high centralization. Tkachev’s principles of revolutionary organization, in a sense, synthesized Nechayev’s concept of conspiratorial organization. Furthermore, Tkachev drew inspiration from Jacobinism and Blanquism, recognizing the necessity of coercion within the revolutionary organization to pursue top-down centralization (Offord, Reference Offord1986, pp. 13–16).

8.1.3 The Early Period of the Totalitarian Party: The Bolsheviks

The Chernyshevsky–Nechayev–Tkachev trio exerted significant influence on socialist revolutionaries in Russia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, providing the ideological foundation for the emerging Bolshevik group. Nechayev’s works, including the Catechism of a Revolutionary, directly influenced Lenin’s theory of party-building and revolutionary strategy. It is worth noting that while Lenin is often credited with the principles of party-building for the Chinese Communist Party, which succeeded the Bolsheviks, the true origin can be traced back to this source.

Lenin introduced his principles for party-building at the Second Congress of the RSDLP in 1903. He emphasized the necessity of a highly centralized and disciplined party, comprising professional revolutionaries who were subservient to the party leader. However, there were opponents to Lenin’s proposals, including Martov, Trotsky, and Axelrod, who expressed concerns that his ultra-centralized structure would transform the party into a dictatorial organization led by an elite group of professional conspirators. They also objected to Lenin’s strategy of using ruthless internal coercion to establish party leadership and were apprehensive about the unethical attacks on dissenters within the party carried out by his followers (Getzler, Reference Getzler1967, p. 16).

In summary, Lenin’s party-building principles were not a personal invention from scratch but rooted in pre-existing institutional genes. The creation of a coercive totalitarian party depended on the presence of a group of fanatical revolutionaries who willingly obeyed the coercive rules, rather than solely relying on the imagination of a powerful individual. In fact, Georgy Plekhanov had proposed similar party-building principles eighteen years earlier, based on the same institutional genes (Le Blanc, Reference Le Blanc2015, p. 54), and his support for Lenin’s principles at the 1903 Congress was instrumental in forming Lenin’s Bolshevik faction (Bolshevik means “the majority”) within the RSDLP.

However, once the totalitarian party was established, the threats posed by its dictatorial rules became evident. In such a party, coercion takes precedence over revolutionary voluntariness and willingness. Georgy Plekhanov, one of the prominent Russian communist revolutionary leaders, had not anticipated these consequences when discussing the principles in an abstract manner. Nevertheless, he soon shifted his support to the Mensheviks, who were critical of the Bolsheviks’ approach. A decade later, Plekhanov firmly opposed the Bolsheviks’ October Revolution and eventually fled to Finland in order to escape the threat of violent repression.

In fact, Lenin published a pamphlet titled What Is to Be Done? one year before the birth of the Bolsheviks in 1903. This pamphlet brought together previously scattered principles and laid the foundation for the model of a totalitarian party, which paved the way for the practice of communist totalitarianism (Meyer, Reference Meyer1957, p. 19). At the core of this model was the deliberately misleading principle known as democratic centralism, which enabled the totalitarian leader to exert complete control over the party.

The essence of democratic centralism lies in its emphasis on centralism. It ensures that there are no checks and balances within the party structure. Obedience is the fundamental principle: subordinates obey superiors, the entire party obeys its central committee, and the central committee obeys the party leader. The term “democratic” is used misleadingly to introduce totalitarianism in a misguided manner. It was officially interpreted as a process of consultation and discussion before making decisions.

It is crucial to note that the concept of democratic centralism has created significant confusion in understanding democracy in China. Misguided by communist propaganda, a majority of the Chinese today still mistake “democratic centralism” for democracy, particularly with Chinese characteristics. However, it is important to recognize that all communist parties that have followed the Bolsheviks since its inception have lacked freedom of expression within the party and personal safety has been at great risk.

The Marxist leaders of the Second International, despite advocating the dictatorship of the proletariat, did not comprehend that the Leninist principles would be the only practical means to achieve such a total form of dictatorship. Ironically, they were the first to voice concerns about the dangers of the Leninist party. They observed that the extreme centralization within the Bolsheviks signaled the autocracy of the Central Committee and the dictatorship of its leader. Rosa Luxemburg criticized Lenin for reiterating the Jacobinism of the French Revolution and the Blanquism of the Paris Commune period (Luxemburg, Reference Luxemburg2006). Karl Kautsky pointed out that while the Bolsheviks may have had noble intentions, their dictatorial autocracy, which granted unlimited power to their supreme leadership, would inevitably transform them into a terrorist institution (Kautsky, Reference Kautsky1920). Kautsky depicted the Bolsheviks as a clandestine organization seeking power through a coup d’état and fostering a society dominated by bureaucracy, constructed on principles that enslaved and sacrificed people’s self-esteem (Kautsky, Reference Kautsky1946). However, they failed to realize that the one-party dictatorship and the internal dictatorship within Leninist parties were essentially the same as the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Indeed, when the RSDLP divided into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over principles of party-building, Martov, the leader of the Mensheviks, labeled Lenin’s principles as dictatorial. Lenin accepted this charge, asserting that dictatorship was the sole option during a revolution (Sebestyen, Reference Sebestyen2017, p. 149). It is important to note that, while Lenin played a significant role in establishing and developing the Bolsheviks, this could not have occurred without the enthusiasm of many fanatical “revolutionaries” for organizing violent revolutions through secret societies and for a dictatorial system, and their readiness to voluntarily submit to the rule of the dictator. Without these zealots, it would have been impossible for anyone to create something like a Bolshevik Party under his total dictatorial control.

By prohibiting other independent parties and organizations, a totalitarian party distinguishes itself from a conventional political party. In line with this principle, a totalitarian party strictly prohibits factions within its ranks. In essence, if the prohibition of outside parties is a fundamental proposition of totalitarianism, the prohibition of factions within the party is a corollary derived from that proposition. This proposition and corollary are crucial for understanding any communist party or movements launched by the party, as well as any communist totalitarian regime, including all major events in communist China in the past and present.

During the French Revolution, the Jacobins had already put this proposition and corollary into violent practice, resulting in the execution of numerous dissidents within their own ranks. However, it was with the Bolsheviks that the first fully institutionalized totalitarian party emerged. The formal ban on party factions was officially established at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) in 1921. (The Bolsheviks had changed their name to the Russian Communist Party in 1918 and later to the All-Union Communist Party at the end of 1925.) At that time, several factions existed within the party, including the joint faction of Trotsky and Bukharin, which advocated for greater independence and a more prominent role for trade unions; the Workers’ Opposition, which opposed bureaucratic tendencies; and the Democratic Centralists, who sought increased autonomy for the Soviets. Concurrently, the party leadership was divided between Leninists and Trotskyists.

After securing majority support, Lenin called for a complete prohibition on factions within the party. The Party Congress swiftly passed a resolution banning factions and stipulating expulsion from the party for anyone who organized or joined a faction. However, despite the official ban, factions within the party did not automatically disappear due to their own interests. Factions associated with workers’ organizations, such as Workers’ Truth and the Workers’ Group, continued to fight against the bureaucratization of the RCP and staged frequent strikes. Trotsky (Reference Trotsky1975) believed that the lack of internal democracy was at the root of the problem. Nevertheless, these factions were eventually suppressed. In the end, the totalitarian party leader had the power to suppress factions in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The winner takes all and prohibits all factions, which also determined the intensity of the factional fights, as for them it was a matter of life and death.

Stalin’s Great Purge was an application and refinement of the Leninist system. Leninist totalitarian parties, wherever they exist, have consistently relied on purges to suppress internal factions. The fundamental mechanisms and requirements of totalitarian systems shape the history and reality of totalitarianism. The principles outlined in Lenin’s blueprint for the totalitarian party met the demands of totalitarianism and made it feasible.

8.1.4 Characteristics of the Totalitarian Party: Personality Cult and Red Terror

Once established, totalitarian parties’ own institutional genes are developed through mutation and evolution based on their inherited institutional genes, giving them a life of their own and the ability to adapt to their needs. One such gene is the personality cult surrounding the leader, which encompasses culture, ideology, and institutions and is driven by the self-interest of those who promote it.

The personality cult is not unique to totalitarian parties; it has its roots in the institutional genes of the Christian Church. For centuries, the Church has promoted personality cults centered around Jesus Christ and Christian saints as a fundamental aspect of its development. The Protestant challenge to the Catholic Church, for example, criticized its institutionalization of personality cults through practices like canonization.

In Russia, the cult of personality around the Tsar was one of the pillars of imperial rule, fostered by the Orthodox Church, which had been under the control of the Tsar for centuries. This influence was so deep that Tsar Nicholas II genuinely believed in his divinely granted powers and was revered by the Russian people. Consequently, he vehemently opposed constitutionalism and disregarded domestic crises, opting instead for reckless mobilization for war.

After seizing power, the Bolsheviks began creating a personality cult around their supreme leaders. This was driven partly by the need to suppress opposition and control the population and partly by the desire to consolidate power within the party and triumph in leadership struggles. The inherited institutional genes of the Russian Orthodox Church played a significant role in the Bolsheviks’ ability to accomplish this.

Lenin, the founder of the first totalitarian political party, was known for his autocratic tendencies but relied on personal charisma, persuasive argumentation, and skillful agitation to suppress opposition and establish his own personality cult. While Lenin recognized the significance of a personality cult for maintaining his power, he also understood that those advocating for a religious-style personality cult were primarily motivated by their own pursuit of power. Consequently, when he had the authority to make important decisions, he imposed limitations on the development of religious-style personality cults within the party.

However, during a period of temporary incapacitation following an assassination attempt, the Bolsheviks began promoting an extensive religious-style personality cult around Lenin, disregarding his rejection of many of those practices upon his recovery (Sebestyen, Reference Sebestyen2017, pp. 419–420). This demonstrates that within a totalitarian regime, the cult of personality is often incentive-compatible with those seeking to consolidate power and control the party and the populace.

During Lenin’s later years, the leadership of the RCP, with Stalin at the helm, began to cultivate a personality cult around the party leader, adopting techniques reminiscent of the practices employed by the Russian Orthodox Church in promoting the Tsar and canonizing saints. This cult of personality reached an unprecedented level during Stalin’s rule, with the leader being elevated to a deified status, beyond question or criticism. The leader’s words were transformed into doctrine, immune to contradiction. Dissent was systematically eliminated, as the leader stood above the system itself. The personality cult created the conditions for the leader to exercise total control over the party and, in turn, for the party to exert total control over society. Stalin’s extreme personality cult, drawing upon the traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church, set a precedent for totalitarian parties worldwide.

On the third day after Lenin’s assassination attempt, Grigory Zinoviev used language reminiscent of the Orthodox Church to praise Lenin, referring to him as the “Jesus Christ” of the Communist cause. Zinoviev portrayed Lenin as a divine gift to the Russian revolution and hailed him as “the greatest leader mankind has never had before” (Sebestyen, Reference Sebestyen2017, pp. 419–420).

After Lenin’s death, the Central Committee of the Party, under Stalin’s control, established an Immortalization Commission with the aim of preserving Lenin’s body, thereby elevating the personality cult to its peak. Simultaneously, there was an effort to suppress Lenin’s last testament, which potentially contained unfavorable remarks towards Stalin. Stalin, who had received Orthodox training, and Dzerzhinsky, a former Catholic priest, ardently advocated for the permanent preservation of Lenin’s body, drawing comparisons to the veneration of religious saints. However, Trotsky opposed this practice, considering it a reflection of medieval religious worship.

Lenin’s widow published an article in Pravda opposing the permanent preservation of his body and the growth of the personality cult. Instead, she called for the circulation of Lenin’s last testament within the party. In response, she faced threats and suppression from Stalin’s regime (Sebestyen, Reference Sebestyen2017, pp. 503–509).

At the 13th Congress of the RCP after Lenin’s death, the primary slogans were: “Lenin’s banner, Lenin’s teachings, the direction guided by Lenin, the unity on the basis of Leninism.” A significant event during this time was the organization of thousands of Youth Pioneers who pledged loyalty to Lenin and his cause at Lenin’s tomb. Additionally, the city of Petrograd was renamed Leningrad in honor of Lenin.

During this period, Lenin was essentially canonized and Leninism became the orthodox doctrine and the foundation of legitimacy. Opposition to Lenin or anti-Leninism was considered the most severe crime, and Stalin’s clique utilized accusations of anti-Leninism to defeat their opponents in power struggles, including figures like Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and other opponents in power struggles (Gill, Reference Gill2010, pp. 180–197).

Personality cults and ruthless purges are two integral aspects of any ruling totalitarian party. This pattern is primarily determined by the inherent mechanisms of a totalitarian party, with party leaders also playing certain personal roles. During Lenin’s time, Trotskyists, despite being criticized as anti-Leninist, were still able to express their opinions. However, after Stalin came to power, he pushed the party to new extremes of totalitarianism, systematically eliminating communist dissidents and using terror to silence opposition within the party. The initial targets of Stalin’s crackdown were veteran members of the party who refused to submit unconditionally. Faced with Stalin’s repression, Lenin’s old friends, such as Kamenev and Zinoviev, along with Trotsky, formed the United Opposition. They called for freedom of expression within the party, limitations on bureaucratism, and an end to the New Economic Policy (NEP). They also criticized Stalin’s policy of promoting cooperation between the KMT and the CCP, arguing that it undermined the CCP.

Due to their significant influence among party members, workers, and the army, confronting these veteran party figures posed challenges. Stalin employed the Soviet secret police (the State Political Directorate, GPU) to conduct surveillance, create divisions, weaken their positions, and exert pressure on them. Eventually, the United Opposition was crushed, and its leading figures were expelled from the party. Trotsky was deported from the Soviet Union in 1929 and later assassinated by NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, predecessor of the KGB) agents at his home in Mexico in 1940 (Rubenstein, Reference Rubenstein2011). As a Soviet statesman, Trotsky enjoyed support and had numerous sympathizers and followers within the party and the global communist movement. However, during the Great Purge of the late 1930s, the vast majority of these individuals, whether they were Russians or Chinese operating in Russia or China, were almost invariably purged and a significant number of them were executed. The purge of Trotskyists in China lasted until the Cultural Revolution.

Totalitarian regimes have consistently relied on both terror and the personality cult of their revered leaders. Not only were counterrevolutionary movements brutally suppressed but dissenting comrades within the revolutionary ranks were also ruthlessly targeted. Invariably, where terror was present, a cult of personality would emerge. The personality cult surrounding Lenin, coupled with the established principles of Leninism, laid the groundwork for the further development of the personality cult within the Soviet Communist Party. With each wave of purges, the cult of personality grew stronger. In the late 1920s, during the purge of Trotsky, an extensive campaign was launched to promote the personality cult of Stalin. Stalin was depicted as the sole successor to Lenin, embodying the principles of Leninism and representing the will of the proletariat. Opposing Stalin was equated with opposing Lenin and the party itself. As an example of this cult, the city of Tsaritsyn, where Stalin had played a significant role during the Russian Civil War (1917–1922), was renamed Stalingrad in his honor, although he feigned ignorance about the decision.⁴ Stalin’s personality cult reached a fever pitch at the 16th and 17th congresses of the party, with delegates to the 17th Congress chanting “Long Live Comrade Stalin!” and singing songs praying for him to enjoy a long life (Gill, Reference Gill2010, pp. 242–246).

Trotsky concluded that the bloodshed of the Stalinist era distinguished Stalin from Lenin. Stalinism was established on the foundation of the Great Purge, a sweeping campaign against virtually all the veterans of the party. The catalyst for the Great Purge was the so-called Sergei Kirov affair. On December 1, 1934, Sergei Kirov, a member of the Politburo and first secretary of the party’s Leningrad Regional Committee, was assassinated. A few months earlier, at the Central Committee elections, Kirov had shown significantly higher standing within the party than Stalin. Both Khrushchev (Khrushchev, Reference Khrushchev2005, vol. 1, p. 60) and many historians suspected that Stalin orchestrated Kirov’s assassination, though direct evidence remains elusive to this day. Stalin promptly attributed the murder to the Trotsky-led opposition and arrested most of the party’s veterans.

Seizing the opportunity, Stalin swiftly eliminated his main rivals within the party. In the three Moscow Trials held between 1936 and 1938, prominent figures who had been close to Lenin and veterans of the party, including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and others, were subjected to torture to extract public confessions before being executed. The scale of the purge was immense, with 78 percent of Central Committee members being arrested and executed and 56 percent of the delegates who participated in the 1934 Central Committee elections facing charges of counterrevolution. By 1934, 81 percent of the party’s elite had joined the party before 1921 but, after the Great Purge, this figure dropped to 19 percent by 1939.

The Great Purge extended beyond the political sphere to the military. More senior officers of the Red Army were executed during this period than were killed in the Second World War. Among the five marshals of the Red Army, three were executed and a majority of senior and middle-ranking officers also faced the same fate. According to the KGB archives, by the end of the 1930s, over 3.59 million people had been arrested by the NKVD and approximately 1.36 million of them were held in concentration camps. Throughout the 1930s, it is estimated that between 10 and 11 million people were executed or died due to starvation as a result of the purge (Suny, Reference Suny2010, pp. 282–289).

During the late 1930s, alongside the height of terror, the cult of personality surrounding Stalin reached its peak. He was depicted as not only the successor to Lenin but as someone who had surpassed him. Anastas Mikoyan famously proclaimed, “Lenin was a gifted man, but Stalin is a genius.” The party press and party congresses propagated the image of Stalin as the greatest leader, teacher, genius, and thinker in human development, even going as far as referring to him as the “golden sun” that “illuminated the entire world” (Gill, Reference Gill2010, pp. 291–293). Many of these practices and expressions were later adopted by Chinese communist leaders, who had been trained in Russia, to create a personality cult around Mao during China’s Cultural Revolution three decades later.

The key to creating a personality cult is to manufacture miracles and to deify the leader. This was achieved by creating mythology as well as by revising and fabricating the histories of the October Revolution and the RCP. Unlike the miracles of Christian saints, which were compiled and adjudicated posthumously, the “miracles” of the RCP and Stalin were all personally orchestrated by Stalin himself. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course written under Stalin’s direction was published in 1938 (Stalin, Reference Stalin1975). This work, considered as the most significant text disseminated by the Soviet Communist Party and the Comintern, was dubbed the “Communist Bible.” The book set a precedent for the construction of totalitarian parties, instructing them on how to create a cult of personality by manufacturing terror and miracles, thereby controlling both the party and society.

Mao and his followers closely studied and learned from Stalin in these practices. Mao personally directed that Stalin’s Short Course should be the central textbook during the Yan’an Rectification Campaign (Chapter 10). He stated: “it is the best synthesis and summary of the worldwide communist movement in the past hundred years; a model of the integration of theory and practice, and so far the only comprehensive model in the whole world” (Mao, Reference Mao1965).

The essence of totalitarianism lies within the unique nature of the totalitarian party. This type of party is designed to establish and maintain a dictatorship, whether it is called the dictatorship of the proletariat or the people’s democratic dictatorship. Its organizational structure follows a strict top-down dictatorial system, where subordinates unquestioningly submit to their superiors, the entire party submits to its central committee, and the central committee submits to the party leader without question. Any dissent or disagreement, even among senior party leaders, is met with severe punishment or even elimination, as seen with figures like Trotsky, Bukharin, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang, to be discussed in Chapters 12 and 13.

The totalitarian party serves as the core for seizing and holding onto power, as well as the creator, disseminator, and regulator of ideology. During the revolutionary period in Russia, when the first totalitarian party was formed, Leninism argued for the necessity of such a party to achieve victory in the revolution. Many of the founding revolutionary figures had strong religious undertones and were willing to sacrifice themselves as martyrs in pursuit of their utopian ideals. Those who embraced Leninism willingly gave up their personal freedoms and unconditionally submitted to the party, its superiors, and its leader. It was through their sacrifice of personal freedom that the institutional genes of the totalitarian party were established. Once these institutional genes took root, the powers of dictatorship, privilege, and propaganda became the mechanisms driving the party’s development and expansion, rendering voluntary martyrdom unnecessary.

Not all societies have the capacity to produce totalitarian parties and even in those that do, they may not thrive or exert significant influence. The emergence, growth, and development of a totalitarian party in any society, as well as its ability to influence that society, depend on the existing institutional genes present in that society. In the case of Russia, the institutional genes embedded in the ruling Tsarist imperial system, Russian Orthodoxy, and the traditions of secret societies laid the foundation for the creation of a totalitarian party.

Specifically, through the analysis of historical narratives, we have observed the evolution of the Russian Marxist movement and the Labor Emancipation League (later known as the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, the RSDLP), which originated from the Land and Liberty organization. Furthermore, we have seen how the Bolsheviks emerged from the RSDLP, heavily influenced by the People’s Will party. Conversely, when applying the same line of reasoning, one can understand why Leninism had relatively few followers in countries such as Britain, the United States, Germany, and France.

8.2.1 A Provisional Government with No Constitutional Foundation

An important historical fact to note is that not only the pro-Tsarist conservative forces but also all the Russian left-wing parties resisted constitutional reform. With the exception of Trotsky, the leader of the Mensheviks who played a critical role in organizing strikes and establishing Soviets that disrupted the functioning of the constitutional parliament, most of the leaders of the Russian left-wing parties, including the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and the left-wing of the SR, were abroad when the constitutional revolution broke out in 1905. Furthermore, they boycotted the first Duma election and resisted the newly established constitutional rule. Even when they later participated in the Duma elections, their primary objective was to use the Duma as a platform to fight against constitutional rule and they had limited seats and minimal impact on society and the Duma. The influence of the Bolsheviks was particularly weak during this time, as their leaders were either exiled abroad or to Siberia. They even did not have much influence in the Soviets, which were organized by the Mensheviks.

Since the third Duma in 1907, each subsequent Duma managed to complete a term of five years. Russia’s constitutional monarchy appeared to be on track and the economy experienced rapid growth. Many historians and politicians of the time believed that if Russia had continued along that path peacefully for about a decade, the Russian constitutional monarchy might have succeeded. One prominent figure of that era, Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, was assassinated by an anti-Tsarist terrorist group in 1911. Before his death, he left a testament stating that given twenty years, Russia would catch up with the developed countries of Western Europe. He further advised the Tsar to allow Russia a chance for peaceful transformation and to avoid starting a war (McMeekin, 2017).

However, due to the absence of a counterbalancing power in the Tsarist imperial system, the Tsar had both the motivation and the ability to obstruct constitutional rule, which was intended to limit his power. This set the stage for significant historical events to unfold. In 1907, the Tsar made changes to the electoral law, resulting in the loss of the representativeness of the Duma, as it became more symbolic of the right-wing and center-right social elites. Despite this compromised situation, if the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Octobrists, and the Zemstvo Congress had been able to find common ground with the Tsar’s representatives on important social issues and reforms, an imperfect constitutional system could have gradually evolved and improved. Even relatively weak checks and balances could have helped prevent many of the major mistakes made by the Tsarist government.

The deeper problem lies in the fact that checks and balances and constitutional reforms are never achieved through a dictator’s rational reasoning or benevolence. They can only be achieved through substantial forces within society that are capable of checking and balancing power for their own interests. Rulers, driven by self-interest, will always resist any attempts to restrain or limit their power, as it is seen as a matter of life and death for the dictator and his followers.

The establishment of the world’s first constitutional monarchy, such as the one achieved through the Magna Carta, required four centuries of negotiations and the gradual erosion of the monarch’s power, along with the emergence of institutional genes conducive to constitutionalism. Even with such solid social foundations, the success of the Glorious Revolution was ultimately achieved by forcing King James II, who refused compromise, into exile, allowing for the creation of a new king who could accept a constitutional settlement.

In the case of the Tsarist imperial system in Russia, the absence of countervailing forces and the preservation of the Tsar’s unconstrained power prevented the development of checks and balances and the possibility of a constitutional settlement. The main body of the Constitutional Democrats and the Octobrists consisted of intellectuals, lacking significant social influence. Additionally, the newly formed Zemstvo Congress had not developed substantial power and the Tsarist government intended to keep it that way. Without a countervailing force, the Tsar had no need to compromise with any party or coalition in the Duma. Since the promulgation of the October Manifesto and Fundamental Laws, the Tsar consistently undermined the role of the Duma as a check on power, including dissolving it and placing various obstacles in its path. As the Tsar repeatedly emphasized, he had the right to convene and dissolve the Duma. The institutional genes of the Tsarist system supported the Tsar’s resistance to any attempts to limit his power, ultimately extinguishing the chance for the monarchy to survive and evolve in Russia.

Several tsars, particularly Catherine the Great, held a deep admiration for French traditions. However, the institutional genes in France proved to be detrimental to constitutional reform. The opposition to constitutional rule from both radical revolutionaries and King Louis XVI ignited a turbulent revolution. Under the strain of an entrenched absolute monarchy, the revolution eventually culminated in Napoleon’s coup d’état, which restored the monarchy.

In comparison to France, the institutional genes of Tsarist Russia presented an even greater obstacle to constitutional reform. Tsar Nicholas II firmly believed in the concept of the divine autocrat, considering himself immune to any form of restriction. In the absence of compelling countervailing forces, Nicholas remained unconvinced about accepting constraints from a parliament that held no real power. He regretted signing the October Manifesto, a preliminary constitution drafted by his prime minister, Sergei Witte. He also regretted establishing the Duma, which he had initially intended as a temporary measure.

Nevertheless, at the dawn of the twentieth century, when almost all states in Western Europe were under constitutional rule, Russia’s political elite widely believed that the prevailing trend in Europe was towards constitutionalism. In order to avoid a republic, it was in their vested interest to preserve the monarchy in any feasible form. Even staunch royalists advocated for a constitutional monarchy as the best means of ensuring the monarchy’s survival. However, the subsequent implementation of the constitution rendered the Duma ineffective in terms of both checks and balances and policy formulation. Essentially, Tsarist Russia failed to transition into a constitutional monarchy. Nicholas II retained his extensive power but became increasingly isolated, assuming the role of a solitary figure. His isolation, coupled with the rising tide of nationalism, led him to make a series of fatal misguided decisions.

Eager to enhance Russia’s prestige in the Balkans as the pan-Slavic savior, Nicholas acted contrary to the advice in Stolypin’s will, initiating national war mobilization. This decision significantly contributed to the outbreak of the Great War and Russia’s full-fledged involvement in the conflict. Voluntarily joining the war exacerbated the empire’s existing challenges, pushing it further into a comprehensive sociopolitical-economic crisis. The Tsar’s series of “mistakes” ultimately sealed the fate of the Tsarist regime, paving the way for the Bolsheviks to seize power, much to the regret of historians.⁵

At the onset of the Great War, nationalism surged within Russia, with the Duma and the public overwhelmingly supporting the war mobilization. The anti-war sentiment propagated by Lenin’s Bolsheviks was not only insignificant but was also vehemently opposed by nearly all left-wing parties. With public opinion and the Tsar aligning closely on the war issue, the Tsar could have used this chance to leverage the Duma as a conduit between the Tsarist government and society, aiding national mobilization and social stabilization. However, the Tsar misinterpreted the public’s support for the war as proof of the Tsar’s greatness and the grandeur of the empire, which further spurred him to reject the involvement of the Duma and the public in major imperial decisions.

Subsequently, as the war situation deteriorated, the country faced severe problems with food, fuel, and so on. Using the war as a pretext, the Tsar poured all national resources into the conflict, plunging an already fraught society into crisis. Society quickly became unstable. Under these circumstances, the Tsar ignored the advice of his most loyal nobles and even disregarded a secret police report at the end of 1916, which revealed widespread public hatred for the government.

As the possibility of urban riots loomed and the Tsar failed to respond to a situation on the brink of chaos, all social elites and factions, regardless of political affiliation, blamed the Tsar and his government for the problems.

With the Tsar’s inaction in response to the chaotic situation caused by potential urban riots, all social elites and factions began to view the Tsar and his government as the root of the problems. Fearing the outbreak of a revolution and the loss of public support, even the conservative Constitutional Democratic Party, which held dominant force within the Duma and traditionally emphasized law and order, adopted a radical policy. They directly engaged with the masses and promoted general elections. Moreover, they publicly accused the incumbent prime minister, Boris Stürmer, of treason, despite lacking evidence. Supported by the Tsar, Stürmer remained unfazed and threatened to dissolve the Duma, the source of these groundless allegations.

However, recognizing the gravity of the crisis facing Russian society and the significance of the Duma, the United Nobility, a right-wing group that had long been a staunch supporter of the Tsar, publicly endorsed the Duma’s proposal to dismiss Stürmer and reorganize the government. The United Nobility had been one of the key pillars in the defense of Tsarist autocracy since the establishment of the constitution in 1905. Their stance compelled the Tsar to sacrifice Stürmer, who was innocent, and accept the Duma’s demand for a cabinet reshuffling. As a result, the Tsar lost support from all parties (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 250–258).

Calls for the Tsar’s abdication grew louder. The left wing insisted that the Tsar must be overthrown and the Tsarist system must be dismantled before socialism could be established. Amidst the crises, loyal royalists, the upper echelons of the Tsarist bureaucracy, and right-wing forces all were particularly averse to the Tsar’s continued reliance on Orthodox priest Grigori Rasputin. They believed that both the Tsar and the Empress had fallen under his wicked influence. Therefore, they concluded that the only way to save the monarchy was to force Nicholas to abdicate. They began plotting a palace coup at the end of 1916, planning to force Nicholas II to abdicate and transfer power to his brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. The plot was well organized; the only issue was finding the right time to execute it.

Arguably, the workers’ organizations in Petrograd and Moscow were the primary driving force that directly triggered the collapse of the Russian Empire. One key organization, the Petrograd Central Workers’ Group (predecessor of the Petrograd Soviet),⁶ was established in 1915 by the Mensheviks. This civilian organization played a crucial role in maintaining social order in Petrograd and emerged as a rival to the Duma at the time. While initially holding a nationalistic stance and supporting the government and military during the Great War, it also advocated for the immediate abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a democratic interim government.

In January 1917, the Petrograd Central Workers’ Group announced a plan to mobilize thousands of workers for a general strike during the Duma congress scheduled for February 1917. Their intention was to hold demonstrations in front of the venue of the Duma congress to advance their demands. However, the day after the announcement was published, all leaders of this group were arrested by the secret police. Simultaneously, the Tsar ordered the dissolution of the Duma, declaring that new Duma elections would be held in December 1917.

Despite the cancellation of the general strike on February 14 due to government pressure, 90,000 people spontaneously staged a peaceful demonstration on that day (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 259–271). A few days later, on International Women’s Day (February 23 in the old Russian calendar), even more Petrograd workers took to the streets to protest for bread and fuel. What began as a peaceful demonstration soon turned into anti-war and anti-autocratic protests that quickly escalated. On February 24, the number of protestors reached 200,000, with demands for the Tsar’s abdication. Almost all factories were closed the next day (Curtiss, Reference Curtiss1957, pp. 1, 30). Nicholas issued a telegraph order demanding that the army firmly suppress the protestors. After dozens of demonstrators were shot and killed by the army on February 26, a mass mutiny occurred the next day. The rebelling soldiers joined the demonstrations, along with workers and citizens, attacking armories and seizing a large amount of ammunition. This left the Tsarist government in the capital with no military power and a complete loss of control (Figes, Reference Figes2017, pp. 307–323).

As the bulk of the forces loyal to the Tsar were on the front lines of the Great War, the mutinies in Petrograd and Moscow meant that the situation there was completely uncontrollable. Under these circumstances, despite the Tsar’s order dissolving the Duma just a few days prior, the Duma convened on February 27, establishing the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. The Committee announced the establishment of the Provisional Government, whose members were predominantly center-leftists. The most important cabinet members included the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Pavel Milyukov, the leader of the October Party, Alexander Guchkov, and an SR member, Alexander Kerensky. The prime minister was Prince Geogii Lvov, president of the Zemgor, a union of zemstvos and municipal councils (a zemstvo was an elected local government institution established by Alexander II).

A few days after the establishment of the Provisional Government, the Tsar, left with no other options, appointed Lvov as prime minister. At this point, the monarchists began to execute the long-planned “palace coup” and under their pressure, the Tsar announced his abdication, giving way to his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail. However, recognizing that the legitimacy of succession to the throne could be challenged, the Grand Duke decided to renounce the throne. He stated that he would only accept the throne under conditions where an elected Constituent Assembly deemed him monarch (Browder and Kerensky, Reference Browder and Kerensky1961, vol. 1, p. 116). He urged the Russian people to obey the leadership of the Provisional Government, reiterating that he might consider becoming a constitutional monarch if a Constituent Assembly decided on a constitutional monarchy (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 319–320). From then on, executive power was transferred to the Provisional Government. This major event in Russian history is known as the February Revolution (modeled after the Glorious Revolution in England). However, the opposition of most left-wing parties and their Soviets, which dominated the streets and social order, made it impossible for the Provisional Government to establish a constitutional order. Most notably, the Bolsheviks and other left-wing parties aimed to overthrow the Provisional Government through armed means.

The Provisional Government, being a temporary organization, lacked full legitimacy and control over the cities, countryside, and even the army. In reality, the Soviets exerted control over the cities and some segments of the military. Consequently, the Provisional Government was eager to negotiate with the Soviets in order to stabilize the situation. The interests of the Soviets and those represented by the Provisional Government were starkly different. Moreover, dominated by the SR and the Mensheviks, the Soviets were opposed to many basic constitutional principles, such as private property rights. However, they reached a consensus to quickly convene a Constituent Assembly and hold a nationwide general election to elect the political leaders and legislators representing the voters and to decide Russia’s political system.

However, to prevent any progress towards constitutionalism before the Constituent Assembly could be convened, the Bolsheviks urgently launched an armed coup in the name of the Soviets, that is, the October Revolution. This further led to the outlawing of all other parties and organizations. As a result, the century-long effort towards constitutionalism in Russia was completely reversed. The Tsarist system, which was based on autocracy, transformed into a totalitarian system based on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The core of this modern system is the communist totalitarian party.

8.2.2 Seizing Power in the Name of the Soviets

Only by seizing power could the Bolsheviks establish a totalitarian system with total control over all aspects of ideology, politics, the economy, and society, and could turn themselves into a true totalitarian party. Otherwise, they would have remained only a secret political organization of totalitarian ideology. Since the establishment of the Bolsheviks, Lenin’s objective was to establish one-party rule through an armed coup. Constitutionalism was always his biggest enemy throughout, by definition and by practice. During the Great War, he urged the proletarian parties in the belligerent countries to oppose their governments and seize power, turning the Great War into civil wars in those countries. His position was in direct conflict with the nationalism that prevailed during the war and he was isolated from the international communist movement because of this. However, he was always looking for opportunities to seize power through armed force.

The sudden outbreak of the February Revolution opened Lenin’s eyes to the arrival of a major opportunity. Lenin had been in Zurich since the start of the Great War and was not very familiar with developments in Russian society. He misjudged almost all the major international and domestic events that took place during the war (Sebestyen, Reference Sebestyen2017). Thus, the sudden collapse of the Tsarist government, the sudden rise to power of the Provisional Government, and the latter’s announcement of convening a national Constituent Assembly were all shocks to Lenin. Trotsky once described the then Lenin as a cornered beast, eager to return to Russia and seize power. Largely unaware of Russia’s internal situation, Lenin sent a telegram to the Petrograd Bolsheviks on March 19, 1917, demanding that the Bolsheviks must not trust the Provisional Government, especially not Kerensky. He demanded the arming of the proletariat, the immediate election of the Petrograd Duma (surprisingly, even then, he still did not realize that the Soviets could be a tool to be used), and never to cooperate with any other party. But after a long exile, Lenin’s leadership within the Bolsheviks was precarious. His urgent instructions from abroad had no effect on the Bolsheviks at home.

Before Lenin issued his directives, the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party (the largest committee) had already decided to cooperate with the SR and the Mensheviks in support of a Russian victory in the Great War. Stalin played a key role in this. Upon receiving Lenin’s telegram, the Petrograd Committee ignored it and instead announced an intention to merge with the Mensheviks to seize power. Subsequently, the All-Russian Bolshevik Congress, held in Petrograd, approved Stalin’s motion to unite with other progressive forces (i.e., the Mensheviks and the SR), control the Provisional Government, and prepare to seize power (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 386–389).

From its inception, the Provisional Government found allies in Britain, France, and America, who viewed it as an institution of constitutional democracy and promptly recognized and supported it. Conversely, the German government suspected that the Provisional Government was the result of a coup orchestrated by British agents in Russia. Seeking to destabilize Russia, the German government saw value in Lenin’s opposition to the Russian government and the potentially disruptive role that the Bolsheviks could play from within. They entered into a secret agreement with Lenin, offering substantial financial support to him and the Bolsheviks, with the condition that they would destabilize the Provisional Government and hinder its mobilization for war. A special train was arranged to secretly transport Lenin and several dozen revolutionary cadres back to Russia (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 390–392). According to German archives, the German government provided Lenin with a total of 50 million gold marks, equivalent to over 1 billion US dollars today (McMeekin, 2017, p. 134).

On the last day of the All-Russian Bolshevik Congress, Lenin arrived in Petrograd and immediately gave a speech against the war and called for a revolution to seize power. He advocated for the overthrow of the bourgeois Provisional Government, transferring all power to the Soviets, an immediate ceasefire, the launch of a socialist revolution, nationalization of land, and more. But the party resisted these calls, which Lenin then released as his April Theses. The newly established Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party immediately passed a resolution opposing Lenin’s April Theses. The party newspaper, Pravda, initially refused to publish the April Theses and when it had to yield under pressure from Lenin, it included an editorial comment stating that the April Theses were unrelated to the party’s stance. Yet, a German spy promptly reported to Berlin that “Lenin has successfully entered Russia. He is working exactly as we hoped” (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, p. 394).

Although the Provisional Government had assumed control of Russia, the country remained a constitutional monarchy in name only. Without a national parliamentary election and parliamentary approval for the reorganization of the government, there was neither a legitimate monarch nor a legitimate government. In contrast, the Soviets, the largest civil organizations in Russian cities, held real power. The public, which had previously challenged the Tsarist regime, now had the ability to equally challenge the Provisional Government. The directives of the Provisional Government could only be effectively implemented with the assistance of the Soviets among the workers, soldiers, and citizens. This led to de facto joint rule by the Provisional Government and the Soviets. However, at that time, there was no all-Russian Soviet. The only group that realistically had the ability to influence the national situation was the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet (Ispolkom), which represented the capital’s million workers and soldiers.

When the establishment of the Provisional Government was being deliberated in the Duma, Kerensky, leader of the SR, proposed liaison with the Petrograd Soviet to secure practical control over society. His proposal was rejected by other Duma members, leaving the Provisional Government without formal communication channels with the protesters and the Soviets. Nonetheless, a few days after the establishment of the Provisional Government, every city in the country followed the example of the Petrograd Soviet and established their own Soviets. These local Soviets explicitly demanded that the directives issued by the Provisional Government meet the Soviets’ demands, otherwise they would resist. Importantly, the defected soldiers and lower-level officers also organized or joined the Soviets. The main body of the Ispolkom, the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee, was composed of Mensheviks and SR members. The only one capable of bridging the gap between the Provisional Government and the Soviets was Kerensky, the leader of the SR Party, who soon became the prime minister of the Provisional Government (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 286–307).

Given the influence of the Soviets in Russian society, whoever controlled the Soviets controlled Russian society. At that time, the Soviets were primarily led by the SR and the Mensheviks. The first All-Russian Soviet Congress was convened in Petrograd in June. The SR was the largest party in the Soviet and had 285 representatives; the Mensheviks had 245 representatives; and the Bolsheviks had only 105 representatives (Riasanovsky and Steinberg, Reference Riasanovsky and Steinberg2011, p. 468).

The primary reason the Bolsheviks lagged behind other left-wing parties in the Soviet was their revolutionary elite ideology. Their approach centered around the elite seizing ruling power, imposing the dictatorship of the proletariat on the population. Lenin’s strategy, as outlined in his April Theses, aimed to incite the public and create chaos as a means to create favorable conditions for seizing power. However, this approach faced resistance from the leadership of other radical left-wing parties, including the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. Lenin’s ideas held little appeal among intellectuals and the Soviet leadership, positioning him on the losing side in terms of inciting a revolution.

Nevertheless, the radical revolution that Lenin advocated for had a strong allure for the masses of workers, soldiers, and peasants. Also, the Bolsheviks were greatly aided by secret funding from the German government, which facilitated their ability to produce and distribute propaganda materials.⁷ In July alone, the Bolsheviks printed 320,000 newspaper publications and 350,000 pamphlets, with a significant portion specifically targeting military personnel (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, p. 410). This military-focused propaganda played a crucial role in laying the groundwork for future mutinies. By controlling the propaganda narrative and actively inciting the masses, Lenin not only successfully influenced the population but also regained the leadership of the Bolsheviks.

The propaganda war led and orchestrated by Lenin had the explicit goal of inciting widespread violence and chaos. It focused on fueling class hatred and revolutionary fervor, employing grandiose promises without providing concrete actions or specific guidance. The Bolsheviks carefully crafted their radical propaganda agitations and slogans, deliberately borrowing popular slogans from the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 and the February Revolution of 1917, such as “fight for freedom,” “fight for democracy,” “fight for land,” and more. These slogans had already been ingrained in the masses by the radical left-wing parties, particularly the influential SR Party, and proved highly effective in propaganda and agitation. As a result, the Bolsheviks rapidly gained popularity among the masses.

Furthermore, during the war, especially after the establishment of the Provisional Government, most left-wing parties shifted towards nationalism, prioritizing the fight for national interests over revolution, making them indistinguishable from the Provisional Government, at least in terms of the war efforts. This left the Bolsheviks as the sole party advocating for revolution during wartime. In a period marked by growing war weariness and social instability, this granted the Bolsheviks a distinct advantage. On the one hand, they continued to employ the familiar slogans of democracy, freedom, land, and socialism to stir up basic emotions among the masses. On the other hand, they introduced new slogans criticizing the war and the Provisional Government, calling for “All Power to the Soviets,” directly inciting the masses to initiate “spontaneous” revolutions and fueling social chaos.

Bolshevik propaganda and agitation had a widespread and significant impact on soldiers and workers. They successfully incited several large-scale “spontaneous” demonstrations against the Provisional Government in cities like Petrograd and Moscow, which involved armed conflicts and resulted in significant bloodshed. Witnessing the bloody demonstrations instigated by the Bolsheviks, Lenin’s old friend Maxim Gorky expressed concern, stating: “Lenin will soon lead us all into civil war. He is a completely isolated man. But he is very popular among the uneducated workers and some soldiers” (Figes, Reference Figes2017, p. 404). Gorky’s concerns became a reality within a few weeks.

As Russian society descended into chaos under the Provisional Government, the French government intercepted and deciphered some of Lenin’s secret telegrams to the German government, which it shared with the Provisional Government. Independently, the Provisional Government also gathered intelligence revealing that Lenin was receiving ongoing funding from the German government and that the Bolsheviks had infiltrated parts of the military. In response, the Provisional Government issued orders for the arrest and prosecution of Bolshevik leaders on charges of treason. It also disbanded the First Machine Gun Regiment, which had fallen under Bolshevik control. Learning of these developments, most Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin, fled to Finland.

Meanwhile, Trotsky, who was then leading the Mensheviks, swiftly established a Provisional Revolutionary Committee on behalf of the Bolsheviks and secretly convened meetings with the leaders of the Machine Gun Regiment. Additional units joined their mutiny plan. On July 3, 1917, a large-scale mutiny erupted in Petrograd, with thousands of soldiers and workers taking to the streets. Numerous witnesses documented the brutal acts committed by the armed mob during the unrest. The following day, in the face of the armed masses, Trotsky declared, “The representatives of the workers’ and soldiers’ Soviets have already seized power.” Under these circumstances, Lenin secretly returned to Russia, preparing for the next step in his takeover (McMeekin, 2017, pp. 166–172).

When the armed coup seemed to be successful, the Provisional Government publicized evidence of Lenin’s collusion with Germany. It called back troops from the front lines to suppress the mutiny, citing the need to combat treason. In response, Lenin fled abroad once again and hundreds of Bolshevik leaders were arrested. This marked the failure of the first armed coup staged by the Bolsheviks, known in history as the July Days. Some historians speculate that if the Provisional Government had continued to prosecute and try the Bolsheviks for treason, they might have been completely eradicated.

However, the subsequent Kornilov Affair introduced a dramatic twist to the historical narrative. Duke Lvov resigned as prime minister of the Provisional Government shortly after the July Days. Kerensky, the leader of the SR Party, took over as prime minister. He appointed General Lavr Kornilov, a former Tsarist general, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Provisional Government’s armed forces. However, Kerensky soon became suspicious of Kornilov’s intentions and believed that he aimed to become a military dictator. Coincidentally, based on false intelligence, Kornilov mobilized troops towards Petrograd at the end of August, under the belief that a Bolshevik uprising was imminent. When the troops discovered the misinformation and did not enter the city, Kerensky accused Kornilov of rebellion and had him dismissed and imprisoned.

The Mensheviks and other left-wing parties used the Kornilov rebellion as a pretext to pass a motion in the Duma, calling for the creation of a “Committee for the People’s Struggle Against Counterrevolution.” In alliance with the Bolsheviks, they proposed arming the masses. Seeing Kornilov as their most significant threat, Kerensky reversed the charges against the Bolsheviks, issuing a pardon to all who had been arrested following the July Days coup (McMeekin, 2017, pp. 182–191).

As a result of the Kornilov Affair, the Provisional Government lost the trust of the army and of its ability to mobilize troops effectively. This created a crucial condition for the success of the next Bolshevik coup. In the aftermath of the July Days, generals with Tsarist military backgrounds became increasingly concerned about the possibility of a Bolshevik mutiny. To prevent such a mutiny, they initiated a widespread purge of the Bolsheviks within the military. However, this cleansing process faced significant challenges due to the deep infiltration by various extreme leftist factions, beyond just the Bolsheviks, into the military over an extended period.

Unexpectedly, Kerensky abruptly reversed the charges against the Bolsheviks, thereby assisting them in regaining strength and accelerating their infiltration into the military. In military units like the Fifth Army, the Bolsheviks had already gained control over communication and command departments at the military level. By the time the German army was approaching Petrograd, the Bolsheviks had virtually completed their infiltration of the military in the Baltic region. German spies monitoring the Russian military forces excitedly reported back to Berlin that the Russian army in that region was entirely pro-German (McMeekin, 2017, pp. 193–196).

What Kerensky did was not a random mistake but rather driven by his SR stance, which regarded the Bolsheviks as their revolutionary comrades while viewing Tsarist generals like General Kornilov as untrustworthy. Therefore, the Kornilov Affair was a reflection of overall Russian society at that time, with the socialist parties exerting overwhelming influence in the Provisional Government and society. In line with this perspective, in September Kerensky released not only Trotsky but also other Bolsheviks and disbanded the intelligence agency investigating Bolshevik treason. Additionally, on September 12, the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee issued a resolution demanding protection for Lenin and Zinoviev.

At this critical moment, the Provisional Government’s Counterintelligence Department discovered significant new evidence of a planned Bolshevik mutiny. However, considering the Bolsheviks as the only force he could rely on, Kerensky disbanded the Department and authorized the re-arming of the Bolsheviks, who acquired over 40,000 firearms from the arsenal (McMeekin, 2017, pp. 197–198). The Kornilov Affair not only enabled the Bolsheviks to further infiltrate and control the military but also broadly enhanced the Bolsheviks’ prestige, helping them to gain control of the Soviets in some cities. On September 19, the Bolsheviks obtained a majority of seats for the first time in the Moscow Soviet. On September 25, they gained a majority in the Ispolkom in Petrograd, and Trotsky, now Bolshevik leader, was elected chairman. The Bolshevik Military Organization also claimed to be authorized by the Petrograd Soviet Military Committee (Milrevkom). In the past, when the Soviets were controlled by the Mensheviks, calls for revolution were only abstract. With Trotsky as the Chairman of the Ispolkom representing the Bolsheviks, they could take concrete actions and promote the slogan “All Power to the Soviets” to prepare for the Bolsheviks to seize power. On October 3, during the Ispolkom meeting, Trotsky proposed the arrest of not only Kornilov’s supporters but also of members of the Provisional Government (McMeekin, 2017, pp. 199–202).

On September 1, Kerensky and the Minister of Justice jointly declared that Russia’s political system would be a republic and the state would be called the Russian Republic. However, the State Duma Committee and the Petrograd Soviet had previously stipulated that the Provisional Government could not unilaterally decide the political system of Russia before the convening of the Constituent Assembly. Under this constraint, the Provisional Government announced that the formal confirmation of changing Russia to a republic would be left to the decision of the Constituent Assembly in November (Browder and Kerensky, Reference Browder and Kerensky1961, pp. 1657–1658).

This announcement sparked a strong reaction from Lenin, who was in exile in Finland at the time. He wrote to the Bolshevik Central Committee, stating that waiting for the Constituent Assembly would be detrimental to the Bolsheviks. He argued that the recent Bolshevik victories in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets indicated that an uprising in the cities could succeed immediately. Lenin emphasized the urgency, stating: “We must not be deceived by the voting numbers; elections do not prove anything … If we cannot seize political power now, history will not forgive us” (Figes, Reference Figes2017, p. 469).

Soon after he had secretly returned to Russia, Lenin declared that “the decisive moment is fast approaching” and urged for an immediate armed uprising during a meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee on October 10. During the same meeting, Kamenev and Zinoviev expressed concerns that an uprising before the all-Russian Constituent Assembly election, scheduled for November by the Duma and the Provisional Government, would harm the popularity of the Bolsheviks. Lenin countered their objections by arguing that as long as the peasants had the right to vote, the Bolsheviks could never win national elections, thus necessitating the immediate seizure of power. Faced with the practical challenge of insufficient strength and a limited popular base, Trotsky proposed using the Soviets as a façade to gain popular support, while actual power would be monopolized by the Bolsheviks. Eventually, the Bolshevik Central Committee approved Trotsky’s concrete plan: on October 25, during the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, an uprising would be launched under the slogan “All Power to the Soviets,” with the aim of seizing power from the Provisional Government and establishing a Bolshevik regime under the guise of the Soviets (McMeekin, 2017, p. 203).

The armed uprising of the Bolsheviks commenced on the morning of October 25. By noon on that day, Kerensky, aided by the US embassy, fled Petrograd, hoping to replicate the events of July by amassing heavy troops and easily suppressing the Bolsheviks upon his return. However, his recent arrest of Kornilov and other generals had shattered their trust, leading to a complete loss of support. The inability to mobilize the army paralyzed the Provisional Government, rendering its efforts to quell the rebellion utterly futile. The unpreparedness of the Provisional Government, coupled with its inability to deploy troops to Petrograd, facilitated the swift capture of the city. During the evening assault on the Winter Palace, the cruiser Aurora fired only blanks, resulting in minimal casualties. The overall casualties during the entire uprising numbered fewer than ten, fewer even than those incurred during the subsequent filming of the attack on the Winter Palace by the Soviet Communist Party (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, p. 496).

In the early morning of the uprising, Lenin, acting on behalf of the Military Revolutionary Committee, impatiently announced that the Provisional Government had been overthrown. The Military Revolutionary Committee assumed power on behalf of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison, ushering in the era of a totalitarian system.

8.2.3 A Regime in the Name of the Soviets

Marx, in Critique of the Gotha Program, and Lenin, in State and Revolution, among others, had long-designed plans for a communist totalitarian utopia under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Just as the construction of a totalitarian regime in practice began with the overthrow of the Provisional Government by the Bolsheviks in the name of the Soviets, the establishment of totalitarian rule was again in the name of the Soviets.

The blueprint for a communist totalitarian system had been meticulously prepared, with the main challenge lying in its realization. In reality, the Bolsheviks held limited influence over the entire Russian army, and their capacity to mobilize troops for a mutiny was quite small. Despite this, Lenin relentlessly advocated for an immediate Bolshevik coup as early as September 1917. However, lacking the necessary strength and popular support, the Bolsheviks faced significant obstacles in successfully carrying out an armed uprising on their own.

Even if they managed to seize control of Petrograd and Moscow by capitalizing on the absence of the main Russian forces at the front lines during the war, their control over the entire nation would still be far from certain. Russia’s wartime allies – Britain, France, and the United States – all had troops present in Russia and strongly opposed the Bolsheviks, offering unwavering support to the Provisional Government. It seemed, therefore, that overthrowing the regime established by the Bolshevik coup would not be a relatively easy task and the Bolsheviks appeared destined for failure.

However, the Bolsheviks employed a combination of violent suppression against opposition forces and propaganda tactics to sow divisions among their adversaries. While the Provisional Government, anti-Bolshevik factions, and foreign governments appeared formidable, their underestimation of the seemingly vulnerable Bolsheviks led to a grave misjudgment of the overall situation.

The Bolsheviks faced their own set of challenges. Without sufficient support, launching an armed uprising would be impossible. As a clandestine organization, they lacked substantial public backing, even among the working class. To address this issue, Trotsky proposed seizing power under the guise of the Soviets, with the aim of attracting workers, citizens, and soldiers and encouraging their spontaneous participation. However, the Bolsheviks did not have control over the Soviets themselves. In order to conceal their true intentions, Trotsky orchestrated the inclusion of two representatives from the SR Party (alongside three Bolshevik representatives) in the top management of the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), the revolutionary command organ. Trotsky later explained that this move was crucial in presenting the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power as a Soviet endeavor (Figes, Reference Figes2017, p. 480).

As planned by the Bolsheviks, the uprising was scheduled to coincide with the Second All-Russian Soviet Congress. On the evening of October 25, the Congress convened at the Smolny Palace in Petrograd, marking a pivotal moment in the Bolshevik seizure of power under the guise of the Soviets. The Bolsheviks made special preparations to ensure a maximum number of Bolshevik delegates in attendance, while many other political parties and organizations refused to participate. Among the delegates from other parties, the majority consisted of SRs and Mensheviks. There was widespread support among the delegates for the slogan “All Power to the Soviets” and the establishment of a Soviet government. Consequently, the primary objective for all the delegates was the formation of a Soviet government. Menshevik leader Martov proposed the formation of a democratic coalition government based on the existing distribution of seats among the Soviet parties and his proposal passed through a secret ballot. If implemented, this arrangement would have prevented the Bolsheviks from monopolizing the government (Figes, Reference Figes2017, pp. 489–490).

The Congress then moved on to debate the Bolsheviks’ armed coup carried out under the name of the Soviets. The Menshevik and SR delegates strongly criticized the Bolsheviks’ actions, denouncing the coup as a “criminal venture” that would lead to civil war. The Mensheviks issued a formal statement accusing the Bolsheviks of launching an armed coup in the name of the Soviets without the consent of other parties, thereby sabotaging the Soviets. In response, the Bolshevik delegates vehemently countered their arguments. Eventually, delegates from the other parties decided to withdraw from the Congress in protest and to distance themselves from the Bolsheviks (Figes, Reference Figes2017, pp. 489–490). This was precisely what the Bolsheviks desired, as it allowed them to gain control over the Soviets and operate under their name. Trotsky disparaged the departing delegates as pitiful creatures destined for history’s dustbin, whilst other Bolshevik delegates encouraged the departure of other delegates with jeers (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, p. 498).

Following the other parties’ delegates’ withdrawal, Lenin arrived the next day at the Bolshevik-dominated All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The Congress established a new Provisional Government known as the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC or Sovnarkom). All the significant positions in this Bolshevik-organized Sovnarkom were controlled by the Bolsheviks: Lenin was Chairman, Trotsky was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stalin was Commissar for Nationalities, and Lunacharsky oversaw propaganda, amongst other things (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 499–501).

Furthermore, the Congress approved Lenin’s “Decree on Peace,” which called for an immediate end to the war, and the “Decree on Land,” endorsing the SR’s land policy of protecting private land rights of small farmers and expropriating large landholdings without compensation. Notably, considering the imminent national Constituent Assembly elections, the Bolsheviks delayed their plans for comprehensive nationalization of land to secure the votes of the peasantry. Similarly, until 1918, the Bolsheviks continued to promise that they would adhere to the results of a popular vote in the Constituent Assembly. However, both were merely stopgap measures.

Only through a successful armed seizure of power could the totalitarian party establish itself as the core of a totalitarian system. This section of the narrative explains how the institutional genes inherited from the Tsarist imperial system not only hindered the progress of constitutional reform in Russia but also created favorable conditions for the Bolsheviks’ armed takeover. Some scholars argue that the October Revolution was a historical accident dependent on specific circumstances. For example, had the Provisional Government managed to establish a stable republic, the Bolsheviks would not have had an opportunity to establish a totalitarian regime. Similarly, if Lenin had been assassinated on his way to the Smolny Palace for the Soviet Congress following the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks may have lost their chance to control the Soviets. History is replete with contingencies, and no theory of historical determinism can precisely predict the individuals, timing, or locations involved in successful revolutions. However, a robust theory can identify the conditions conducive to successful reforms or revolutions, with institutional genes, which are relatively stable, playing a crucial role. Recognizing the presence of institutional genes within a society and understanding their relationship with the relevant events can offer insights into the overall trajectory of history.

The institutional genes of Tsarist imperial Russia were the most fundamental factor that determined the failure of the constitutional reforms. As institutional genes cannot change rapidly, the Provisional Government had neither the social foundation for establishing a constitutional government nor any real power to control or influence society. Instead, under the influence of the inherited institutional genes of the Tsarist imperial system, the Orthodox Church, and secret political organizations, it was the Soviets of workers and citizens that had real influence on Russian society at that time. Based on these institutional genes, all the parties that influenced the Soviets, composed of a social class with no property, including the SRs and the Mensheviks, opposed private property rights. Therefore, regardless of how historical contingencies unfolded, even if the Soviets had not been hijacked by the Bolsheviks as tools for their seizure and consolidation of power, they still represented the basic social force undermining constitutional rule. Indeed, it was the characteristics of the Soviets, rooted in the institutional genes of Russian society, that provided the opportunity for the Bolsheviks.

Lastly, it must be noted that the October Revolution was not led by a single leader, Lenin, but by a group of Bolshevik leaders who, under the guise of “All Power to the Soviets,” orchestrated a coup to seize power from the Provisional Government. Thus, with or without Lenin, the specific policies of the totalitarian party might have been somewhat different but the fundamental nature would have remained the same. Trotsky and Stalin’s totalitarianism could have differed from Lenin’s in detail but they all represented proletarian dictatorships and their underlying nature was the same.

8.3.1 The Proletarian Dictatorship: Suppressing Opposition

After the Bolsheviks established the first proletarian dictatorship regime, they further developed it into a totalitarian system whereby the party had control over every aspect of society. In theory, Marx claimed that his most significant contribution was the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat for achieving socialism.⁸ Therefore, adherence to the idea of the proletarian dictatorship is the fundamental principle that distinguishes Marxist parties from other socialist parties. However, the reality is that the dictatorship of the proletariat has remained merely a nominal concept. In practice, a party that claims to be a dictatorship must exercise dictatorial power, both internally and externally. The actual dictatorship that exists in a one-party system is, in essence, the dictatorship of the party’s leader, including control over other leaders within the party who may not be submissive. Therefore, the distribution of power and power struggles become crucial aspects of a communist totalitarian system. Although the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat does not accurately represent historical reality, it is used for ease of explanation in the following discussions.

Seizing power through a coup in the name of the Soviets may have been achieved by luck but consolidating their power posed significant challenges for the Bolsheviks. First, the idea of determining a political system through popular vote and adhering to constitutional principles had been the shared goal of all non-Bolshevik parties in Russia for decades. While the Bolsheviks were a relatively young offshoot of the RSDLP with a history of just over a dozen years, parties like the SR had deep roots dating back several decades. Despite the Bolsheviks’ use of violence to seize power, they held far less influence in Russia compared to the SR and Mensheviks.

The Soviets were originally self-governing councils promoted by and founded with the help of the SR and the Mensheviks. Not only were the Bolsheviks not the founder but they also did not hold general leadership in the Soviets. “All Power to the Soviets” was merely a pretext for the Bolsheviks to launch the October Revolution. Subsequently, taking advantage of other parties’ absence, the Bolsheviks monopolized the Soviets, thus monopolizing power. However, these actions were not able to establish legitimacy neither nationally nor within the Soviets. The Bolsheviks failed to sufficiently convince workers, peasants, and soldiers to follow them, let alone to silence other parties. After the seizure of power, the evasion of the restrictions and promises made by Lenin as a “revolutionary strategy,” which would have weakened the power of the Bolsheviks, was key to the establishment of the world’s first one-party dictatorship. Since power was seized through violence, it was also possible to repudiate any provisions or promises recently announced by Lenin through violence.

To make their incentive-incompatible totalitarian goals executable, the Bolsheviks employed a strategy of breaking them down into short-term, incentive-compatible pieces or deceptions. In practice, they used deception as a means to buy time and seize opportunities to consolidate their power.

When the CPC was established on November 8, 1917, the Bolsheviks issued a decree declaring it as a provisional government. They stated that the final political system and legitimate government would be determined by representatives elected in a national election at the Constitutional Assembly, scheduled to take place a month later. However, this posed a challenge for the Bolsheviks as they were a minority at that time. How could they gain a mandate through elections when they lacked broad support?

Furthermore, in order to gain approval from the Soviet Congress, the resolution of the Second All-Russian Soviet Congress, which was drafted by Lenin himself, stipulated that the CPC would be accountable to and under the control of the Congress and its Central Executive Committee (CEC). However, the CPC was fully controlled by the Bolsheviks. How could they possibly gain recognition from the Soviets in such a situation?

Fearing a Bolshevik monopoly on Soviet power, the first to resist the Bolsheviks was the Union of Railway Workers (URE). On November 11, the URE formally demanded that all socialist parties must be included in the CEC and threatened to launch a national strike to paralyze all railway transport if their demands were not met. Over the past decade, nationwide URE strikes had played a major role in several major political changes in Russia. At that time, with Kerensky rallying forces to suppress the Bolshevik coup, the Bolsheviks desperately needed the unimpeded operation of the railways. Therefore, the Bolshevik Central Committee accepted the Union’s demand, agreeing to share power with other parties. The Union then canceled the strike.

Later, as the threat of civil war lessened, the Bolsheviks learned their lesson and changed their strategy. They abandoned their blatant immediate monopoly on power and promised to share it with all socialist parties. However, this so-called “sharing” essentially meant sharing with the controllable Left SR, a strategy similar to what they did with the Military Revolutionary Committee prior to the coup. Even so, the fully Bolshevik-controlled CPC continued to bypass the CEC to issue decrees. Moreover, after the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power, they openly labeled parties opposed to their orders as counterrevolutionary and restricted the freedom of expression of all political parties.

In order to overcome challenges from the Soviet Congress and CEC, the Bolsheviks took steps to establish the legislative authority of the CPC, effectively limiting the power of the CEC to repeal existing laws. However, this move faced opposition from the Left SRs and even some Bolsheviks within the CEC itself. They demanded explanations from Lenin and Trotsky regarding this initiative. Despite their responses, the majority of the CEC remained unconvinced.

To sway the decision of the CEC, Lenin and Trotsky, who were not members of the CEC, insisted on participating in the vote. With their two votes, Lenin’s proposal was eventually adopted by the CEC. As a result, the legislative functions of the CEC and the Soviet Congress were diminished, relegating them to advisory roles, while the CPC became the primary legislative body. This significant change allowed the Bolsheviks’ decrees to hold sway over the Soviets and Russia, marking a new era (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 516–525).

Simon Liberman, a former member of the CPC, recalled that in practice, everything was under the control of the Bolsheviks. Even within the Council, decisions were not subject to discussion; the focus was solely on implementing the decrees signed by Lenin (Liberman, Reference Liberman1945, p. 13).

Despite the Bolsheviks’ efforts and the institutional genes of the old regime, it was not straightforward to establish a one-party totalitarian regime as Russia had already spent decades striving for a constitutional government to replace the Tsarist regime. All parties, as well as the Soviets and non-governmental organizations, believed that the issuer of commands needed social recognition for them to be implemented at the grassroots level. The legitimacy issue of the Bolsheviks could not be solved by simply amending the charter through deception and autocracy.

Indeed, from the very outset, the Bolsheviks were prepared to address these challenges through the use of force. On the next day of the October Revolution, the Military Revolutionary Committee took action by shutting down several newspapers under the pretext of countering counterrevolutionary activities. The CPC also passed a decree on censorship in publishing (Lenin, Reference Lenin1972a, pp. 283–284).

However, various parties in the Duma, including the Mensheviks and the SRs, jointly established the Committee to Save the Homeland and the Revolution (Komitet Spaseniia Rodiny i Revoliutsii). Their aim was to resist the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in the October Revolution. Teaming up with the Union of Government Employees, they initiated a large-scale strike, demanding that the Bolsheviks relinquish their power. This strike gained momentum when, a week later, the All-Russian Union of Postal and Telegraph Employees joined. Moreover, various organizations such as the state banks, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to acknowledge the authority of the Bolsheviks and joined the strike, creating significant challenges for the Bolsheviks.

In response, the CPC issued an order requiring banks to cooperate and accept government cheques, warning that bank managers would face arrest if they failed to comply. When this approach proved insufficient, soldiers were dispatched to banks to forcibly obtain money. Similar situations unfolded in various government departments. When Trotsky, serving as the new minister, attempted to assume control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he faced ridicule from the staff. In mid-November, Lenin ordered troops to enter all government departments to enforce compliance (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 526–533).

However, the greatest challenge to the establishment of a one-party dictatorship was the promise made by the Bolsheviks to hold an All-Russian Constituent Assembly on November 25. The Bolsheviks had previously vowed to respect the decisions of the Provisional Government and the Duma, as universal suffrage and constitutional governance were long-standing aspirations of the people, shaped by decades of constitutional movements. The Soviets themselves had emerged from this background. The All-Russian Constituent Assembly represented the first truly representative constitutional assembly in Russian history and was eagerly anticipated by all political parties.

Before the October Revolution, in their quest for legitimacy to seize power, the Bolsheviks strongly criticized the Provisional Government for deliberately delaying the convening of the Constituent Assembly. They argued that only the Soviets could ensure the timely elections for the Constituent Assembly. After seizing power in the name of the Soviets, when they desperately needed popular support, Lenin presented a document to the Second Congress of Soviets, declaring that the Soviet government would “guarantee the timely convening of the Constituent Assembly.” He emphasized that only the national Constituent Assembly could resolve the land issue and the newly established Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government would only manage the state until the Constituent Assembly was convened (Lenin, Reference Lenin2017, vol. 33, pp. 5, 18, 22). He vowed that if the Bolsheviks failed in the Constituent Assembly elections, they would abide by the choice of the masses (Schapiro, Reference Schapiro1987, p. 80).

The challenge faced by the Bolsheviks was that the Constituent Assembly elections implied multiparty competition, which contradicted their goal of establishing a one-party totalitarian rule. Additionally, the Bolsheviks were not the largest party in Russia and had no chance of winning a majority in the general elections. However, if the Bolsheviks canceled the Constituent Assembly elections, their coup d’état in the name of the Soviets would lose all legitimacy and they would face intense resistance from all parties and the people of Russia, including the Soviets.

Therefore, the general elections for the Constituent Assembly proceeded as planned. At the beginning of the election, when the Bolsheviks were doing well in Petrograd, Lenin not only acknowledged the results of the ballot count but also stated that the Constituent Assembly was the most perfect way to express public opinion (Lenin, Reference Lenin1965). However, in the end, the SR defeated the Bolsheviks with over 40 percent of the votes. The socialist parties shared nearly 69 percent of the total votes, fully reflecting Russia’s highly left-leaning public sentiment at that time (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, p. 542).

Given the unfavorable outcome of the Constituent Assembly elections, the CPC, in order to maintain the Bolsheviks’ monopoly on political power, made the decision to indefinitely postpone the opening of the Constituent Assembly. Simultaneously, it instructed local Soviets to rerun the elections citing irregularities in the previous ballot, while mobilizing armed sailors supportive of the Bolsheviks to Petrograd, and prepared for potential violent suppression. The Council, aiming to replace the Constituent Assembly, scheduled the Third All-Russian Soviet Congress for January. However, all socialist parties strongly opposed the decision to delay the Constituent Assembly. They formed an interparty coalition to defend the Constituent Assembly and organized a large demonstration in Petersburg under the slogan “All Power to the Constituent Assembly.” Unfortunately, the demonstration was forcefully suppressed by soldiers armed with live ammunition.

The Bolsheviks adopted a piecemeal approach to suppress other parties. They reassured the socialist parties, which held significant influence in the Soviets while suppressing the non-socialist Constitutional Democratic Party by labeling it an enemy of the people and arresting its leaders.⁹ Lenin declared that the slogan “All Power to the Constituent Assembly” was counterrevolutionary. He said that if the Constituent Assembly runs counter to the Soviet regime, it is destined to perish politically (Yao, Reference Yao2009, p. 200). Lenin described the Soviets as a higher form of democracy, as the elected deputies of the Constituent Assembly did not genuinely represent public opinion.¹⁰

In this context, the remaining legitimate left-wing political parties, including the SR, made the decision to organize a large-scale peaceful demonstration on January 5, 1918, in an attempt to salvage the Constituent Assembly and establish a coalition government of socialist parties. They rallied behind the slogan “All Power to the Constituent Assembly.” To ensure a peaceful demonstration, they insisted that all participating military personnel be unarmed. However, the Bolsheviks, citing the need to counter a supposed counterrevolutionary plot by Kerensky, deployed troops a few days prior and declared a state of emergency in Petrograd. During the demonstration on January 5, the troops mobilized by the Bolsheviks opened fire. Following the crackdown, the Constituent Assembly convened under the military control of the Bolsheviks (Smirnov, Reference Smirnov1997). Despite this, the deputies of the Constituent Assembly rejected the proposal to recognize the Soviet government through a majority vote and the leader of the SR was elected as the chairman of the Assembly by a significant margin. The following day, the Bolsheviks announced the permanent dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and used military force to seal off the Tauride Palace, where the Assembly was located. Lenin’s old friend Gorky was deeply shocked by the brutality of the Bolshevik troops firing on the demonstrators, stating that it was no different from the Tsarist government’s suppression of constitutionalist demonstrations in previous years (Gorky, Reference Gorky1918).

Three days after the Bolsheviks dissolved the Constituent Assembly, they convened the Third Soviet Congress and established the country’s official name. They abandoned all the temporary terms used a few months prior and officially designated the country as the Federation of Soviet Republics. Thus, the Soviet Union was born and the Congress of Soviets formally became its legislative body (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 550–555).

Despite the relentless and violent repression by the Bolsheviks, the socialist parties, trade unions, and various civil organizations still held out fanciful hopes and still saw the Bolsheviks as socialist comrades with dissenting views. They urged workers and soldiers not to adopt the methods used against the Tsar in previous years, that is to say, no strikes and demonstrations and no large-scale public confrontations with the authorities. This gave the Bolsheviks an opportunity to undermine, divide, subvert, suppress, and eventually destroy all these parties and associations one by one.

Facing the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolshevik monopoly of power, scarcity of food and fuel, as well as the Bolshevik’s humiliating armistice agreement with Germany, an increasing number of workers in major cities like Petrograd became increasingly discontented with the Bolsheviks. This dissatisfaction was particularly strong among workers who had initially voted for other parties and those who had been elected as deputies to the Constituent Assembly. To protect their rights, these workers established the Council of Workers’ Plenipotentiaries in Petrograd in May, aiming to organize large-scale worker movements in the capital, Moscow, and other cities. All these efforts were subject to the scrutiny and suppression of the Cheka (officially called the Extraordinary Commission for Fighting Counterrevolution and Sabotage), the core institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Cheka arrested sixty-six leaders involved in the plenipotentiary movement and confiscated their printed materials. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks urgently announced the convening of the Fifth Soviet Congress two weeks later, with delegate elections restricted to the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs. From then on, the Mensheviks, the SR, and other parties officially lost their right to run independently in elections. On the day the election results for the Fifth Soviet Congress were announced, the Council of Workers’ Plenipotentiaries organized a general strike. However, the remaining Mensheviks and the SRs still dissuaded the workers from striking, stating that their differences with the Bolsheviks were mere disagreements among socialist comrades. Shortly thereafter, the Cheka sealed off the Council of Workers’ Plenipotentiaries and arrested anyone daring to take the lead (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 558–565). From that point, the independent Russian workers’ movement ceased to exist, and the Soviets became entirely a tool of Bolshevik one-party rule.

8.3.2 The Proletarian Dictatorship: Red Terror

Marx argued that the key to socialism was the dictatorship of the proletariat, the theory of which demanded the complete physical and intellectual annihilation of the bourgeoisie as a prerequisite for establishing socialism (Marx, Reference Marx1964; 1938; Lenin, Reference Lenin2021). Both Marx and Lenin asserted that violent means such as war and terror were necessary to eliminate the bourgeoisie. Marx, Lenin, and their followers all characterized constitutional democracy as a bourgeois constitutional system, branding parties and individuals advocating constitutional democracy as bourgeois. Both in theory and in practice, totalitarian regimes are built upon institutionalized terror.

In practice, the Bolsheviks established a system of Red Terror from the very first day they seized power by force, with the Cheka playing a central role. They arrested and assassinated leaders of the constitutional democratic parties. As the Bolsheviks’ power grew and they faced increasing resistance, their rule became increasingly reliant on terror. They disbanded the Constituent Assembly and employed violence against protesting citizens. Whenever the Bolsheviks faced opposition in Soviet elections, they deployed the Red Army and the Red Guards to suppress it. The concept and tactics of Red Terror were originally used by the Jacobin regime during the French Revolution but it was the Bolsheviks who institutionalized the Red Terror as a permanent system and spread it globally. Lenin and Trotsky often referred to the French Revolution as a model for institutionalizing the Red Terror and employing terror as a strategy. They were also influenced by Marx’s belief that the failure of the Paris Commune was due to its lack of decisive implementation of the Red Terror and delay in establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. The scale of the Red Terror carried out by the Bolsheviks far exceeded that of the Jacobin regime, thanks in part to the institutional genes inherited from Tsarist Russia, which laid the foundations for the Bolsheviks’ implementation of the Red Terror. Whether it was the Jacobin elite of the French Revolution, the founding elites of the Bolshevik revolution, or the elites behind communist revolutions in China and elsewhere, they all firmly believed that their goals could only be achieved through the ruthless suppression of a few enemies.

But once the system of tyranny and terror is established, it takes on a powerful life of its own. It possesses a relentless drive to expand and overpower all forms of reason, following its own twisted logic that can be turned against anyone. Those who hold power in a dictatorship can wield terror as a weapon against anyone they choose, including their own dissident comrades. Dictatorship and terror know no boundaries; they transcend borders and infiltrate every aspect of society. The concept of a proletarian dictatorship is, in reality, the dictatorship of a totalitarian party. In its most extreme form, totalitarianism becomes the dictatorship of the party leaders themselves. The totalitarian system and its dictatorial terror are inseparable, relying on one another for mutual support.

Dictatorship and terror have been present throughout human history, but it is in totalitarian systems where dictatorial terror reaches its most horrifying heights. In such systems, every aspect of society is under complete control, making it impossible for anyone to escape the reach of terror. The scale of terror and the depths of cruelty witnessed in totalitarian regimes are unparalleled in human history. The very nature of these regimes, with their omnipotent and invincible weapons of dictatorship, drives them to expand and intensify their tyranny without limit. The extreme forms of dictatorship seen in totalitarianism have surpassed the visions of Marx and the imaginations of intellectuals who debated the concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat and communism. Whether it be the sixteenth-century Münster, the twentieth-century Soviet Union, Red China, Red Khmer, or the twenty-first-century North Korea, the totalitarian regimes experienced by a significant portion of the world’s population across numerous countries have all shared a similar logic of Red Terror. This underscores the intrinsic connection between totalitarian governance and the reign of terror.

The Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, passed at the Fifth Soviet Congress on July 10, 1918, marked a milestone in the creation of a totalitarian regime. It was a deliberately crafted law that used a constitutional vocabulary to undermine the principles of constitutionalism. This constitution served as the starting point for all subsequent totalitarian constitutions. The 1936 Soviet Constitution, which was modeled after it, became the blueprint for the constitutions of socialist countries worldwide.

The first part of the 1918 Constitution was the “Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People,” drafted by Lenin, which disguisedly mimicked the “Bill of Rights” in the US Constitution. While the “Bill of Rights” aims to protect the inherent and inalienable fundamental rights of all individuals, the aim of this Declaration was to codify the dictatorship of the proletariat. It categorized people into classes and stipulated the deprivation of human rights for those labeled as exploiters, as arbitrarily defined by the party.

It was the first constitution in the world that comprehensively denied private property rights in the form of a constitution, blatantly deprived part of the population of their fundamental rights, and constitutionally mandated a dictatorship (called the dictatorship of the proletariat). It also stipulated that Russia was a Soviet Republic, represented by workers, soldiers, and peasants, with all power vested in the Soviets, and that practiced the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was diametrically opposed to the constitutional principle of checks and balances. Of course, the Soviets were entirely controlled by the Bolsheviks, so “All power to the Soviets” was actually a smokescreen for “All Power to the Bolsheviks.” This fact became explicit only in later Soviet Constitutions.

One-party dictatorship and full nationalization are the foundations of the totalitarian system. Full nationalization eliminated private property rights, meaning that the property rights of any person or institution other than the Bolshevik-controlled Soviet were deprived. And one-party rule meant that no other organ of power was allowed to exist, let alone checks and balances of power. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, where there are no checks and balances and no private property, anyone can be classified as a member of the exploiting class and be stripped of their basic rights. The rights and freedoms stipulated by the Soviet Constitution, such as the rights and freedoms of workers to belief, speech, assembly, association, and free education, all contradict the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the history of totalitarianism, some of the top leaders of the dictatorial parties, including Trotsky, Bukharin, and Zinoviev of the Bolsheviks, Liu Shaoqi, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang of the CCP, were purged for their dissident political views.

The KGB was arguably the most notorious agency of Soviet dictatorial rule, tracing its direct origins to the Cheka, whose institutional genes came from the Tsarist secret police system. The Cheka, an institution foundational to the one-party dictatorship, established by the CPC, was initially led by Felix Dzerzhinsky. The power and responsibilities of the Cheka were kept secret from the public and even from the majority of senior Bolsheviks until the relevant documents were declassified in 1958 (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, p. 800). In its early days, the Cheka’s primary target was resistance from the white-collar class. However, it quickly expanded to target all dissenters. Lenin explicitly instructed, “All able-bodied men and women in the bourgeoisie should be enlisted in labor corps and put to work. Resistors should be shot on the spot, and all the other enemies of the Soviet government, such as speculators, saboteurs, and counterrevolutionary agitators, should be summarily executed” (Lenin, Reference Lenin1972d). The Cheka was the executor of Lenin’s principles and thus held the power to arrest and even execute without trial. By the time of Stalin, the Cheka had become a weapon for purging dissent among high-ranking Bolsheviks.

The forced dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks in early 1918 led to widespread resistance from all parties in Russian society. Right-wing parties organized so-called White Army armed uprisings in various regions. Some left-wing SRs resumed their past assassination tactics used against the Tsarist authorities, including collective actions planned by the Combat Group of the SR Party and individual assassinations. Lenin was targeted in an SR assassination attempt on August 30, 1918. Following his injury, Lenin instructed, “We must prepare ourselves to carry out a mass terror against them” (Lenin, Reference Lenin1972d; Andrew and Mitrokhin, Reference Andrew and Mitrokhin2000).

Amidst widespread Bolshevik propaganda promoting terror, the CEC issued the “Red Terror” decree on September 5. The decree advocated creating a climate of Red Terror through mass arrests and executions, claiming this was an extreme necessity to ensure the stability of the home front. The Cheka, inheriting the complex secret police system established during the Tsarist era, became the key enforcer of the Red Terror. However, the scale of its operations was much larger, and its methods of suppression were more brutal. Within weeks of the decree, the number of people executed by the Cheka exceeded two to three times the total number executed by the Tsarist regime over nearly a century.

Simultaneously with the Red Terror Decree, the Decree on Hostages was released, mandating public mass executions to instill an atmosphere of terror. It demanded the arrest of all right-wing SRs and any suspects using pseudonyms. It allowed for mass arrests of hostages and, if Bolshevik personnel or activities were attacked, for mass executions to create an atmosphere of terror in society. It also stipulated that those who hesitated to enforce this decree were considered counterrevolutionaries. The decree stated, “When using large-scale terror tactics, there must be not the slightest hesitation, not the slightest indecision.” Additionally, the Cheka was granted greater powers of arrest and execution. Cheka Order No. 47 stipulated, “In matters of search, arrest, and execution, the Cheka is a fully independent agency accountable to the Council of People’s Commissars and the Central Executive Committee” (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 817–821).

Dzerzhinsky argued that enemies lurk in almost every institution. Therefore, they must employ entirely different methods of struggle. On these grounds, the Cheka was granted the authority to independently arrest anyone suspected of counterrevolutionary activities, speculation, or other crimes. It had the power to enter any government and public offices, enterprises, schools, hospitals, residences, theaters, and transportation stations. By 1920, the Cheka oversaw all party and governmental institutions, from dissenters to businesses, becoming a super-institution overseeing everything from politics to daily life. It decided on the life and death of all people, including party and government officials (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, pp. 829–831).

From 1917 to 1922, the number of individuals executed by the Soviet totalitarian regime was thousands of times that of the Jacobin regime. The executed encompassed individuals from all social strata, including the nobility and the entire family of former Tsar Nicholas II. The information on the execution of the Tsar’s family remained classified until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The era of Red Terror also led to the establishment of the concentration camp system. Within a few years, by 1923, there were 315 concentration camps detaining over 70,000 people (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, p. 836).

Due to the arbitrary nature of punishments during the Red Terror, it was difficult to accurately record statistics, leading to debates among historians regarding the number of victims. Declassified archives have suggested estimates of around 120,000 deaths resulting from the Red Terror between 1918 and 1922 (Leggett, Reference Leggett1987, p. 359), while others have put the figure in the hundreds of thousands (Gellately, Reference Gellately2007, p. 72). Additionally, another estimate places the number of people who died directly as a result of the Red Terror between 1917 and 1922 at 750,000 (Rummel, Reference Rummel1990, p. 47).

The sheer scale of the fatalities inflicted by the Red Terror shocked many moderate Marxist revolutionary leaders. Karl Kautsky, a leader of the Second International, described Lenin’s rule as a reign of terror (Kautsky, Reference Kautsky1919). Georgi Plekhanov, a founder of the RSDLP, branded Lenin a new Robespierre after the progenitor of the first Red Terror.

The dictatorship of the proletariat theory proposed by Marx and his commentary on the failure of the Paris Commune underscored violence and terror as indispensable elements of socialism. When Lenin was planning to seize and consolidate power, he frequently used the phrases “shoot dead” and “execute.” He even casually suggested execution when discussing basic administrative efficiency issues (Sebestyen, Reference Sebestyen2017). The Bolsheviks, with their ruthless and unscrupulous tactics in seizing power, inevitably resorted to brutal methods to maintain it. Dzerzhinsky claimed that the Cheka saved the revolution (Pipes, Reference Pipes1991, p. 838). More accurately, the Red Terror and the Cheka went far beyond saving the revolution, beyond consolidating the totalitarian regime, it became a fundamental pillar of the regime itself. Furthermore, it was expanded to be an indispensable instrument in internal power struggles as well.

A regime founded on violence can only be sustained through further violence, often becoming increasingly reliant on such means. The NKVD, which originated from the Cheka and later transformed into the KGB, served as the central apparatus for controlling the party and society. Notably, in both Russia and China, those who held positions of power within these institutions often found themselves becoming targets of purges orchestrated by the very machinery they once commanded. These purges and their implications will be explored further in this chapter, as well as in Chapters 10–13. Targets of purges ranged from other parties to dissenting party members, intellectuals, rich peasants (kulaks), and clergy. The number of executions during Stalin’s purges from 1930 to 1953 was 1,600 times the total number of death sentences during the most brutal thirty years of the Tsarist era.

During Stalin’s Great Purge, almost all academic leaders were labeled “smugglers of hostile thoughts.” The director of the Leningrad Agricultural Institute and the heads of research institutions in cotton, animal husbandry, agricultural chemistry, and plant protection were successively executed. Twenty percent of astronomers were arrested. Almost all researchers at the Central Institute of Gas and Fluid Mechanics of the USSR and all academic backbones of aviation science were imprisoned. The Ministry of Internal Affairs established special prisons to ensure the continuity of warplane research and development during the purges.

Statistics based on extensive historical records reveal that forced agricultural collectivization from 1929 to 1933 resulted in the deaths of 11.44 million individuals; the Great Purge from 1936 to 1938 directly killed 4.34 million; and repression from 1945 to 1953 of the late Stalin era claimed over 15 million lives (Rummel, Reference Rummel1990, p. v). The establishment of the Red Terror and the implementation of purges are not isolated occurrences attributed solely to the personalities of individual leaders such as Lenin and Stalin, nor are they limited to specific circumstances within Soviet Russia. Rather, they are intrinsic elements of totalitarian regimes. Countries that adopted communist totalitarian systems have invariably established their own variations of the Cheka as a means of governance. For instance, China’s Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries in the early 1950s and the CR in the 1960s were large-scale political purges that were no less brutal than Stalin’s purges. The Khmer Rouge, heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist Party during the CR, perpetrated a Red Terror that resulted in the mass slaughter of a quarter of Cambodia’s population. The communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe were likewise marked by such practices, underscoring the pervasiveness of these methods across different contexts. Those executed included Traicho Kostov, General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Imre Nagy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, and Rudolf Slánský, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Others, such as Władysław Gomułka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP), and János Kádár, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, were arrested and detained. The Mongolian People’s Republic also carried out large-scale political purges within the country.

8.3.3 Total State Ownership: The Foundation of Totalitarianism

The primary aim of the communist revolution is to establish comprehensive state ownership by confiscating private properties and replacing private ownership with state ownership (Marx, Reference Marx1938). Comprehensive state ownership is a pillar of a totalitarian regime as it fundamentally eradicates citizens’ rights and their power to protect their rights, thereby disrupting the balance of power within society. The Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat is essentially a blueprint for totalitarianism, which establishes and maintains state ownership. A totalitarian system is not fully established until the party has gained complete control over all properties. However, the total expropriation of private property directly conflicts with the interests of the property owners, thus violence is inevitable. As previously mentioned, all left-wing parties in Russia opposed capitalism and generally advocated for the abolition of private ownership. Similarly, socialist parties of the Second International also aimed to eliminate private property rights and establish communism. However, it was only the Bolsheviks who put these ideas into practice. Through violent seizure of power, the establishment of a dictatorship, and the use of dictatorial methods to eliminate private property rights, a fully state-owned economy was established.

In the process of establishing the first totalitarian regime in the world, the Soviet Union underwent the Cultural Revolution (in the late 1920s), the Great Purges, the “great leap forward” (without emphasizing this term), and the NEP. China later mimicked all of them. Particularly, China’s “Reform and Opening” policy was essentially a duplication of the Leninist NEP (see Chapter 13). Comparing China’s institution-building processes with those of the Soviet Union, it is evident that almost every principal element in China’s decades-long construction of a totalitarian system was invented by the RCP. While there were variations in specific details and timing, the fundamental principles of the two were almost identical.

The basic principles for establishing a complete communist totalitarian system were designed by Lenin even before the founding of the Bolsheviks. However, many of the specific decisions regarding practical implementation were determined by specific conditions or opportunities. Some were driven by necessity, while others were originally intended as temporary measures. But once put into practice, the majority of these decisions became institutionalized.

To ensure full control of the economy, the Bolsheviks established the Supreme Board of the National Economy in 1917, right after seizing power. Bolshevik statesman Alexei Rykov first headed it, but after his promotion to Prime Minister, the head of the Cheka (which was then renamed the Joint State Political Directorate, known as the OGPU), Dzerzhinsky, took over in a part-time capacity. Ironically, under the totalitarian system, the secret police were in charge of the national economy, creating the conditions for recruiting economic experts, as otherwise, no one else would dare consult those experts. This resolved the problem of the survival of the Bolshevik regime at a time when it was in its infancy and particularly vulnerable (Liberman, Reference Liberman1945, pp. 194–196).

After seizing power, one of the fundamental tasks in building a functioning communist totalitarian regime is to establish a planned economy with comprehensive state ownership. In 1920, the All-Russian Communist Party established key institutions for a centrally planned economy: the Council of Labor and Defense and its subordinate, the State Planning Committee (known as Gosplan). The objective was to create a system where planning and the market could coexist, enabling the regime to leverage Western technology in building the economic foundation. It was during this period that Lenin proposed his famous slogan, “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” To achieve this goal, the State Commission for Electrification of Russia was established.

But the attempts to create a centrally planned economy faced significant challenges as the Bolsheviks encountered widespread resistance from peasants due to their mass expropriation of private land and deprivation of property rights. Given that 80 percent of Russia’s population resided in rural areas at the time, armed uprisings erupted in certain regions, posing a threat to the survival of the fledgling Soviet regime. In the face of this formidable challenge, Lenin made a major concession in March 1921 by introducing the NEP. The NEP aimed to tighten political control while temporarily loosening economic restrictions. Politically, the Bolsheviks strengthened their control by banning all other parties and prohibiting factionalism within the party. Economically, limited private enterprise was permitted, including private retailing, with prices determined by the market. Efforts were made to attract foreign capital and direct foreign investments, leading to significant investments from figures such as Armand Hammer and Averell Harriman (Suny, Reference Suny2010, pp. 153–155). This shrewd Leninist policy was emulated by the Chinese communists six decades later. During the early stages of China’s reform, Deng Xiaoping explicitly stated that the direction of reform and opening-up drew inspiration from Lenin’s NEP. Deng’s discussions on this matter have been widely documented.¹¹

The establishment of the central planning apparatus was a result of brutal internal power struggles, followed by widespread coercive actions against the population. After Lenin’s death, Trotsky strongly advocated for ending the NEP and initiating the construction of a socialist economy. However, Stalin, in alliance with Bukharin, who supported the continuation of the NEP, managed to overthrow Trotsky. Soon after defeating Trotsky within the party, Stalin adopted a similar party line and fully abandoned the NEP, instead embracing radical nationalization and collectivization. The First Five-Year Plan, implemented from 1928 to 1932, marked the beginning of the movement towards nationalization, industrialization, and large-scale agricultural collectivization, establishing the world’s first planned economy based on state ownership. During this period, the 16th Party Congress was held in 1930, when the party declared it a congress of “socialism … eliminating the Kulak class and achieving comprehensive collectivization.” The so-called “elimination of the Kulak class” involved the physical extermination of millions of Kulaks. Thus, the tripartite totalitarian system consisting of a planned economy, state ownership, and the dictatorship of the proletariat was fully established.

The cornerstone of a planned economy is complete state ownership of the means of production, which is under the absolute control of the party. The implementation of complete state ownership involves not only violent and forced expropriation but also the suppression of dissent. While some economists may argue that the choice of property rights and the choice between central planning and market mechanisms are purely economic matters unrelated to politics, the deprivation of property rights cannot be separated from the deprivation of other fundamental rights. Nikolai Bukharin, a Bolshevik leader who opposed the elimination of the Kulaks and the collectivization of agriculture, which led to a devastating famine, was executed as a traitor. The communist totalitarian institutions have repeatedly resulted in similar outcomes throughout history in different nations. Several decades later, China’s Marshal Peng Dehuai suffered a similar fate to that of Bukharin, being purged resulting in his death.

The process of establishing a planned economy in the Soviet Union began in 1927 when the state assumed control over price determination, thus replacing the market. However, this action precipitated grain shortages as farmers were hesitant to sell their crops at the state’s low set prices. Stalin attributed this crisis to the Kulaks’ sabotage and their grain hoarding. In December 1927, he advocated for the establishment of “collective farms” while simultaneously aiming for the “elimination of the Kulaks,” associated with the confiscation of Kulak properties and their subsequent expulsion from their land.

Despite increasing pressure, peasants remained unwilling to join collective farms, with only 1.7 percent of households having joined by the end of 1928. It became evident that more drastic measures were needed for the success of collectivization. Stalin then declared that those who resisted collectivization were enemies of the people, socialism, and allies of the kulaks and other exploiters (Stalin, Reference Stalin1954b, vol. 7, pp. 135–154).

Subsequently, the 16th Party Congress decided to forcefully promote collectivization. Under harsh conditions, farmers were coerced into joining the collectives through threats and intimidation. During this process, approximately 6–8 percent of all peasants were classified as Kulaks and subjected to various punishments, including direct execution, labor camp imprisonment, and exile to Siberia. Many of them perished due to extreme cold and hunger.

Through these harsh coercive measures, by the end of 1933, the majority of households had been forcibly integrated into collective farms, effectively achieving the official goal of agricultural collectivization. However, the success of collectivization came at a devastating human cost, a pattern initiated by Soviet Russia. Grain output in 1932 dropped to less than 81 percent of the 1913 levels, totaling only 69.6 million metric tons. It was not until 1937 that it rebounded to 97.4 million metric tons. This substantial decline in agriculture was largely because collectivization violated the basic interests of the peasants. Many of them responded by slaughtering livestock, burning grain, and damaging tools before they could be dispossessed.

In 1933, the total number of livestock in the Soviet Union had decreased by nearly 50 percent (Moss, Reference Moss2010). Between 1932 and 1934, the total agricultural output declined by 23 percent (Engerman, Reference Engerman2000), leading to a severe famine in which tens of millions perished. Approximately 6 to 10 million people were affected in regions including Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Volga region, Kazakhstan, and Siberia. The Great Famine in Ukraine was particularly severe, affecting 2.5 to 5 million people (Engerman, Reference Engerman2000). Amidst these brutal conditions, the government reinstated serf-like regulations reminiscent of the Tsarist era, prohibiting peasants from residing in towns (Mathias and Pollard, Reference Mathias and Pollard1989). In addition, rural uprisings were suppressed by military force (Shen, Reference Shen1994).

Through the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan, the first central planning strategy in human history, a comprehensive totalitarian system was initially established. This represented a significant step in accelerating the Soviet Union’s economic development and industrialization, securing both the survival of the communist regime and its legitimacy to rule. As Stalin emphasized, “those who lag behind get beaten.” This sentiment was later echoed by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, each in his own way, seemingly presenting the idea as his own. However, the origin of this sentiment can be traced back to Lenin.

In 1931, during the early stages of the First Five-Year Plan, Stalin stated, “On the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin said: ‘Either perish or catch up and surpass all advanced capitalist countries.’ We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed” (Stalin, Reference Stalin1945, p. 356). Stalin’s ambition to cover a century’s gap in just ten years and to catch up with developed countries as rapidly as possible significantly influenced Soviet economic development.

This ideology also shaped China’s Great Leap Forward decades later, which aimed to catch up with the UK within fifteen years and the US within fifty years. Despite the different contexts and timelines, these efforts yielded similar outcomes, largely due to the shared institution and ideology that underpinned them.

The Soviet Union, through the forceful execution of the First Five-Year Plan, became the progenitor of the first command economy in human history. Within this system, industry was given top priority and adhered strictly to planning directives issued by the party-state. Meanwhile, agriculture was collectivized to facilitate compulsory government acquisition, effectively raising agricultural taxes and providing funding for early industrialization. This model was later replicated by China and other communist totalitarian regimes.

The focus of the Soviet Union’s Second Five-Year Plan was the large-scale development of heavy industry. In the first ten years of implementing the plan, the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 18 percent. The Third Five-Year Plan prioritized development of the military industry, culminating in the Soviet Union becoming a heavy industry and military powerhouse by the conclusion of the Third Five-Year Plan in 1941.

At the core of a fully nationalized economy is the party’s total control over the economic landscape. This is one of the fundamental cornerstones of a communist totalitarian system. Establishing such a system necessitates the deprivation of private property rights and transferring them to the complete control of the party. Once the party seizes control over all the means of production in society, the foundations for independent social forces and potential bases for their emergence are eradicated.

Before long, such total control over property rights by the party-state evolves into the institutional genes of totalitarianism. Masquerading as the representative of the entire working class, the party-state controls all property and resources in society. As a result, by controlling the party-state, the party leader essentially controls the resources, rights, capacities, and freedoms of all people and institutions within society. This, in turn, further strengthens the leader’s control over the party and the party’s control over society. This vicious cycle forms the mechanism of the institutional genes of the totalitarian system.

As long as the comprehensive deprivation of individual rights, including property rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of association, is implemented – no matter how lofty the justifications, be they communism, socialism, social equality, or human freedom – the outcome will invariably stand in stark contrast to these lofty ideals. It was these utopian promises, incited by demagoguery, that fueled the violent communist revolution and subsequently gave birth to communist totalitarianism.

8.3.4 The Comintern: The Missionary Organization

The key to totalitarianism is the entirety and total control, not only over every aspect of a single nation’s society but also over the entire world. In this respect, it functions like a secular religion. However, rather than advocating for peaceful evangelism, it pursues violent revolutions across the globe. The famous slogan of the communist movement, “Workers of the World, Unite!” encompasses both an ideology and a revolutionary movement with global coverage. Communist totalitarian ideology is an ideology about the whole world. And it is to be a universal value through propaganda and domination by force. In order to gain control over the entire world, the communist totalitarian party must establish branches of that party in every corner of the globe.

The relationship among the early Marxist parties is reminiscent of that of the Christian churches before the establishment of Christianity as the state religion in the Roman Empire, when all Christian churches were loosely connected by both alliances and rivalries. The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels, Reference Marx and Engels1998) was initially drafted by Marx for the clandestine Communist League. The basic principle of the communist movement, largely inherited from Babeuf (Chapter 6), posits that only when the proletarian revolution has gained power globally can communism be established and victory achieved.

From the inception of Marxism to the Bolshevik seizure of power, the focus of the communist movement’s debate over several decades centered around strategies for seizing global power and identifying which country should be the first to establish a communist system. In 1914, when the Russian Revolution was yet to emerge, Lenin had already begun planning a new international communist organization to replace the Second International. The ultimate goal was to launch a global revolution and seize power comprehensively in every country.

Compared to the loose alliances of past communist movements, the Leninist totalitarian party is more akin to the Catholic Church, with Moscow as its Rome. Indeed, Moscow’s rise to prominence as a great city in history began when it was referred to as the “Third Rome” during the Middle Ages. Historical coincidences aside, what matters are the institutional genes.

According to his historical materialist theory, Marx predicted that the proletarian revolution should first take place in Germany, leading to a comprehensive victory for the proletariat globally. Lenin, partly drawing from Russian Socialist ideas, on the other hand, hoped that the Russian Revolution would spark a German revolution, realizing Marx’s dream. Thus, to those who followed Marx and Lenin at that time, Germany was the crux of the world revolution.

At the end of the First World War in late 1918, having been defeated, Germany and Austria collapsed. A mutiny occurred in Germany, riots broke out in cities like Berlin, and the power vacuum signified the advent of a revolutionary opportunity. However, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the largest Marxist party in the world during Marx’s era, had abandoned the principle of violent seizure of power since 1914. A revolution similar to Russia’s February Revolution occurred in Germany, leading to the establishment of a German Soviet but not under Communist control. Within this Soviet, the SDP (similar to the Mensheviks but even more moderate) was likely to become the largest party and take power.

In a bid to seize power there, Lenin urgently dispatched Karl Radek, accompanied by Nikolai Bukharin, to Germany to control the newly established German Communist Party and attempt to reverse the situation. They aimed to adopt the methods used by the Bolsheviks in the Russian October Revolution, targeting an armed seizure of power on the eve of a national vote. Unlike the Mensheviks in Russia, the SDP invited military intervention and quelled the German communist uprising. Radek was arrested. Subsequently, the SDP won 38 percent of the votes, becoming the largest party in the National Assembly. It formed a coalition government with other parties. However, Lenin persisted in spreading communism there, dispatching envoys to instigate armed uprisings in several German cities. The goal was to seize banks and land and incite the public to join the uprising. However, reverence for private property rights was strong in Germany. Support for such a revolution was weak and all the uprisings failed (Pipes, Reference Pipes1995b, pp. 167–170). Although the fate of the violent revolution in Germany was sealed, the mission of the global revolution of communist totalitarianism had just officially begun, marking the starting point of the communist totalitarian revolution in China.

In March 1919, the Communist International (Comintern, also known as the Third International), was established in Moscow, and its first congress was convened. It proclaimed this to be the “greatest event in world history.” Two years later, Grigory Zinoviev, then head of the Comintern, declared that communism would triumph worldwide (Pipes, Reference Pipes1995b, pp. 174–175). The aim of the Comintern was to create Leninist parties all over the world under the command of Moscow to promote a Bolshevik-style world revolution. It was to be the center of command, propaganda, general staff, and logistics of the world revolution. A year later, Lenin announced the Twenty-One Conditions for Comintern membership, among which the most important was to be a Leninist party. Any Marxist, communist, or socialist party that did not comply with the Leninist principles of party organization not only could not join the Comintern but also had to clearly distinguish itself from it. National branches that joined the Comintern at its inception were essentially members of the Second International (officially named the Socialist International). Having witnessed the victory of the proletarian party (the Bolsheviks) seizing power for the first time in human history, many international delegates were eager to follow the same path (Suny, Reference Suny2010).

The Comintern was designed to be a unified global communist totalitarian party, and totalitarian rule had to be first applied to all party branches in every nation. Lenin made these points clear at the Second Congress of the Comintern. First, a Communist Party had to be established in all countries as soon as possible. At the same time, the Second International had to be dismantled completely, from its organization to its principles. The Communist Party had to submit to iron discipline and obey Moscow unconditionally. Second, the Communist International was a unified party with only one center, not an alliance of parties. Parties of each country had to obey the Executive Committee of the Comintern (Comintern Executive), which was a department of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party. The necessary condition for joining the Comintern was obedience to Moscow, and anyone who did not obey would be expelled. The immediate task of the communist parties in each country was to infiltrate workers’ organizations and other progressive organizations and seize control of them. Based on this, they prepared to establish a Soviet Republic led by Moscow worldwide (Pipes, Reference Pipes1995b, pp. 183–185).

Upon its establishment, the Comintern, under the actual leadership of Lenin and Trotsky (the official leader was Zinoviev during the period from 1919 to 1926), immediately promoted violent seizure of power or instigated civil war in various countries. Béla Kun, who served in the Red Army of Russia, returned to his homeland and established the Communist Party of Hungary. A few months later, he established the Hungarian Socialist Republic by allying with the Hungarian Social Democratic Party and seized power. Under Lenin’s guidance, by purging the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party monopolized power. During the first few months after the establishment of this regime, the Hungarian Communists replicated all the practices of the Bolsheviks: purging the Social Democratic Party and dissenters, confiscating private property, and establishing collective farms. All of these led most of the public, including workers and peasants, to oppose the Hungarian Communist Party (Pipes, Reference Pipes1995b, pp. 170–172). After the fall of the Hungarian Socialist Republic, Kun fled to Moscow. But eventually, he fell victim to the communist Red Terror and was executed during the Great Purge after being accused of being a Trotskyist (Borsanyi, Reference Borsanyi1993).

Lenin harbored high expectations that the Comintern could swiftly orchestrate successful international communist revolutions. In a 1920 telegram to Stalin, Lenin conveyed that he, along with Zinoviev and Bukharin, believed that with the Comintern’s support imminent revolutions in Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania would be victorious, thus hastening the establishment of Soviet systems (Pipes, Reference Pipes1995b, p. 177). The Comintern also saw substantial developments in the UK, Germany, France, Bulgaria, and Poland, yet all these endeavors ultimately failed (Pipes, Reference Pipes1995b, pp. 194–197).

In 1921, the Comintern dispatched Béla Kun, who had fled Hungary to Moscow, to Germany to incite an armed uprising known as the March Action, but it was unsuccessful. Again in 1923, the Comintern organized armed riots in various locations, with the Soviet Union’s Red Army even prepared to dispatch troops to Germany. However, all these uprisings failed (Broue, Reference Broue2006). The Comintern also exerted efforts in numerous European countries, such as Italy, the UK, and Estonia (Courtois et al., Reference Courtois, Werth, Panné J.-L., Paczkowski, Bartošek, Margolin and Kramer1999).

Despite all the failed attempts to seize power in Europe, the Comintern achieved significant success in China by establishing the Chinese Communist Party. This triumph contradicted the Marxist theory of historical stages, given China’s socioeconomic status was even more backward than Russia’s, which startled communist revolutionaries. To adapt to China’s circumstances, the Comintern primarily propagated Lenin’s theories of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, thus becoming an essential part of the CCP’s ideology from the outset. Influenced by John Hobson’s theory of imperialism (Hobson, Reference Hobson1902), Lenin asserted that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism and that colonies were the lifeline of capitalism. By integrating the national liberation movement of colonial countries into the world proletarian revolution, although contradicting the logic of Marxist theory, Leninism and the Comintern substantially expanded the scope of the communist movement.

Just as Western missionaries introduced Christianity and the Church to China, the Comintern brought communist ideologies and the framework of the Communist Party to China. In the same vein that the Chinese Catholic Church operated as a branch of the Roman Church, the Chinese Communist Party functioned as an extension of the Comintern. It was not until the dissolution of the Comintern during the Second World War that the CCP became fully independent. Beyond establishing the CCP, the Comintern also forged a close alliance with Sun Yat-sen and restructured the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, or KMT) to mirror a Bolshevik-style revolutionary party. This will be explored further in Chapters 9 and 10. Interestingly, Sun Yat-sen demonstrated his enthusiasm to participate in the international socialist movement as early as 1905. He even visited the Second International headquarters in Brussels, proposing that his Revive China Society become a part of it (Duan, Reference Duan2009, p. 257).

The death of Lenin in 1924 marked the beginning of a significant period: the complete defeat of the Comintern in Europe, the ascendancy of Stalin, and a shift in revolutionary internationalism. Stalin reinterpreted this concept to focus on defending the Soviet Union, as he considered it the foundation of the world revolution (Stalin, Reference Stalin1954a). Consequently, the Comintern shifted its strategy to command various countries’ communist parties to protect the Soviet Union. Understanding this aspect is crucial when evaluating the Comintern’s directives to China.

Post the purges of Zinoviev and Bukharin within the Comintern, a large-scale purge of Trotskyists occurred globally, including in China. The Yan’an Rectification Movement within the CCP practically mirrored Stalin’s Great Purge, serving as a continuation of the purge against Trotskyists (see Chapter 10). From the early 1930s until its dissolution during the Second World War, the Comintern was under the leadership of Georgi Dimitrov.

Creating a full-fledged totalitarian system is a continuous process of seizing power across all domains. After overthrowing the Provisional Government and taking state power, the Bolsheviks suppressed other parties, which eventually resulted in the formation of a one-party ruling system. Eliminating other parties and organizations was not only an end in itself for totalitarianism but was also necessary to ensure its illegitimate rule went unchallenged. However, potential challenges to totalitarianism were ubiquitous, stemming from public dissatisfaction and differing opinions within the party. The Red Terror and purges, which were initially required for the survival of the totalitarian regime, evolved into the regime’s basic institutions. While the abstract concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat comes from Marx’s theory, the practice of the Red Terror was inherited from the People’s Will and the Jacobins.

The socioeconomic foundation of totalitarianism was initially established through the nationalization and collectivization imposed by the violent dictatorship of the proletariat. All resources were controlled through power and power, in turn, was reinforced by control over society’s resources, culminating in a totalitarian system that was comprehensive and holistic. The totality of totalitarian ideology is not restricted to total control over a single country but rather extends to total control over the entire world.

Indeed, the proletarian revolution (a term used by the Bolsheviks, despite questions from many scholars, including devout Marxists like Kautsky and Luxemburg, as to whether Leninist despotism was a proletarian revolution) triumphed in Russia, which was just the starting point of the communist movement. As Marx and Engels claimed, “the proletariat cannot attain its emancipation … [without] emancipating society at large” (Marx and Engels, Reference Marx and Engels1998).

According to Marxist-Leninist theory, achieving a comprehensive victory worldwide is not just the goal of the proletarian revolution but also a necessary condition for a single country’s proletarian revolution to survive and evolve. Therefore, following the victory of the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks immediately established the Comintern, a missionary institution to export revolution to all the world’s countries. It was from the Comintern that the Chinese communist revolution stemmed.

Once totalitarianism is born, it generates its own institutional genes and consequently follows its unique evolutionary path. In this system, no institution or individual can survive without the party’s endorsement. In this system, there is no economy separate from politics, nor is politics separate from the economy. The Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat posits that dictatorship is a requisite means for transitioning to communism. However, this theory mistakenly presumes that institutions can be arbitrarily created as tools without comprehending the inherent regularities of the institutions. Any sustainable institutionalized system, including the dictatorship of the proletariat, once established, generates a potent incentive mechanism and possesses its own expansive vitality and power. When the unchecked power granted by dictatorship allows a dictator to decide everything of significance, including the life and death of all, power itself becomes the end goal. Those in power seek to maintain it, while those aspiring to power strive to seize it. During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, Vice-Chairman of the CCP, candidly expressed the understanding of power by the leaders of totalitarian political parties. He stated, “Political power is the power to repress … With political power, … you have everything. Without political power, you lose everything” (Lin, B., 1966).