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Committee Theories and Committee Votes: Internal Committee Behavior in the California Legislature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

James Coleman Battista
James Coleman Battista*
Affiliation:
University of North Texas
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Abstract

Previous tests of theories of legislative committee development have relied on floor behavior and votes, data which is one step removed from committee behavior itself. I test these prominent theories of committees by looking directly at legislative behavior in committee. I examine the patterns of committee votes in the 2000-01 sessions of the California Legislature to assess the distributive, informational, and partisan theories of committee development. I find some support for all three theories, leading me to conclude that committee behavior varies across time and issue.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , Summer 2006 , pp. 151 - 173
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

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