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Interlocking Directorates and the Corporate Revolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2016

William G. Roy
William G. Roy*
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Extract

Many social scientists have documented that the American corporate capitalist class is highly organized and cohesive, both in terms of formal structural characteristics (Domhoff, 1967; Useem, 1979; Scott, 1979) and informal social patterns (Baltzell, 1964; Domhoff, 1974; Mills, 1956). One of the major structural features integrating corporate capitalists is interlocking directorates, which have been shown to form a single, continuous, cohesive network (Sonquist and Koenig, 1975; Allen, 1974; Mariolis, 1975; Mizruchi, 1982; Pennings, 1980; Scott, 1979; Fennema and Schijf, 1978).

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Science History , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , Spring 1983 , pp. 143 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © Social Science History Association 1983 

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