Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-mwwwr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-09-09T16:46:16.699Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

PERSONS, SOCIAL AGENCY, AND CONSTITUTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2005

Robert A. Wilson
Robert A. Wilson
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Alberta
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The constitution view of persons, according to which a person is constituted by a body, has both interesting extensions as well as limitations. Here I shall leave discussion of the limitations for another time and concentrate on several extensions. The chief extensions of the constitution view that I shall explore here concern the implications of combining it with ontological pluralism, and applications of it (or something like it) to thinking about various forms of social agency.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , July 2005 , pp. 49 - 69
Copyright
© 2005 Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

A version of this paper was given in February 2004 to the philosophy colloquium at the University of Alberta; I thank my commentator, Bernard Linsky, and members of the audience for helpful feedback. I would also like to thank Lynne Rudder Baker and Gary Wedeking for their reactions to an earlier version of the paper, and the other contributors to this volume for their comments.