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Measuring the Mission: A New Defense of Profit Maximization
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 July 2025
Abstract
Institutional actors should aim to increase the long-term market value of their firms. This claim implies that firms should adopt a profit-maximizing mission. Business ethicists have been too quick to dismiss moral defenses of profit maximization. Even though there are limits to the moral benefits of profit maximization, a profit-maximizing approach is still morally better than alternative approaches to defining an institutional mission.
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- © 2025 Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation. Printed in the USA
References
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