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The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

David Papineau
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Extract

When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If I don't get it first thing this morning, I won't have another chance for two weeks. But if I go to the barber down the road, he'll want to talk to me about philosophy. So I'd better go to the one in Camden Town. The tube will be very crowded, though. Still, it's a nice day. Why don't I just walk there? It will only take twenty minutes. So I'd better put on these shoes now, have breakfast straight away, and then set out for Camden.’

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Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 49 , March 2001 , pp. 145 - 178
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2001

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