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NAIVE SET THEORY AND NONTRANSITIVE LOGIC

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2015

DAVID RIPLEY
DAVID RIPLEY*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 101 MANCHESTER HALL 344 MANSFIELD RD UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT STORRS, CT 06269 USA E-mail:davewripley@gmail.com
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Abstract

In a recent series of papers, I and others have advanced new logical approaches to familiar paradoxes. The key to these approaches is to accept full classical logic, and to accept the principles that cause paradox, while preventing trouble by allowing a certain sort of nontransitivity. Earlier papers have treated paradoxes of truth and vagueness. The present paper will begin to extend the approach to deal with the familiar paradoxes arising in naive set theory, pointing out some of the promises and pitfalls of such an approach.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 553 - 571
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015 

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References

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