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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 May 2025
This article defines and defends three Rawlsian rationales for a cultural turn in education for democratic citizenship within digitized societies. Due to the importance of political culture for realizing deliberative democracy, it is misguided to hold that a primary or exclusive focus of such education should be on learning how to use digital tools for engaging in politics. Pace this technique- or skills-oriented focus, this article argues that the educational responses to the wide-ranging cultural developments of the digital political public sphere should not be a matter of “training” but of “cultivation.” Accordingly, democratic education for digital citizenship should pay attention to nurturing citizens’ political virtues so that, when they are dealing with fundamental political questions, they are willing to comply with the requirements of public reason and a corresponding duty of civility.
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60 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 29.
61 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13–14.
62 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 156.
63 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 91–92.
64 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 91–92.
65 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 91–92, 117.
66 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 91–92.
67 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 49. To nourish such citizenship, the education of future citizens “should encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society.” Justice as Fairness, 156.
68 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 56–57. This is due to what Rawls calls “the burdens of judgment.” These exist because persons who live through distinct experiences differ on which empirical information they deem relevant for practical judgment, and because persons must rely on interpretations of moral and political concepts. Political Liberalism, 54–58.
69 Comprehensive doctrines include controversial philosophical views about non-political (e.g., personal or familial) ethical values and controversial philosophical views about theoretical questions such as what exists and whether there is a life after death. Political Liberalism, xvi.
70 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 118. Here Rawls also recognizes that democratic citizenship is a cultural achievement: “The parties [in the original position] in effect try to fashion a certain kind of social world; they regard the social world not as given by history, but, at least in part, as up to them.”
71 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 117–18.
72 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 117–18.
73 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 443. I rely on Rawls’s exposition in this essay, in which public reason is more clearly and tightly limited than previously, because it represents the final view from 1997. By contrast, in Lecture VI of Political Liberalism, 225, from 1993, Rawls holds that public reason and a duty of civility also apply to “citizens when they engage in political advocacy in the public forum, in political campaigns for example.” An intermediate position is defended in his “Reply to Habermas” from 1995 which says that public reason applies also to “party leaders and others who work in their campaigns.” Political Liberalism, 382,
74 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 444–45.
75 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 216–22, 381–85, 441–45.
76 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 443, n. 13.
77 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 14.
78 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 382, n. 13.
79 Rawls fails to distinguish between the political public sphere and other public spheres. This might explain why he views the public sphere as equivalent to the background culture.
80 My argumentation is supported by the fact that Rawls does not state that the demands of public reason do not apply to the nonpublic political culture that is situated in between the public political forum and civil society. To the best of my knowledge, Rawls, Political Liberalism, 443, n. 13, mentions the nonpublic political culture once, in a footnote of “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” and does not elaborate on the moral or political demands that exist within this culture.
81 Cf. also Rawls, Political Liberalism, lix. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Penguin Random House, 2018), ch. 1, argue that political elites play an important gatekeeping role.
82 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 122.
83 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 118.
84 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 117–18.
85 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 117–18.
86 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 6.
87 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 117–18.
88 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217–18, emphasis added.
89 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 225.
90 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 443, n. 9.
91 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 445.
92 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 443, n. 9.
93 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 445. This argument assumes that voting is not a form of speech, although expressivist accounts of voting might hold that it is.
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