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A way out of the Euthyphro dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 February 2011

NICK ZANGWILL
NICK ZANGWILL*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, 50 Old Elvet, Durham University, Durham DH1 3HN
*
e-mail: nick.zangwill@dur.ac.uk
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Abstract

I defend the view that morality depends on God against the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing that the reasons that God has for determining the moral–natural dependencies might be personal reasons that have non-moral content. I deflect the ‘arbitrary whim’ worry, but I concede that the account cannot extend to the goodness of God and His will. However, human moral–natural dependencies can be explained by God's will. So a slightly restricted version of divine commandment theory is defensible.

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Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 7 - 13
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

Kierkegaard, Søren (1944) Either/Or, Volume 1 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
Maimonides, Moses (1958) Guide for the Perplexed (London: Dover Press).Google Scholar
Plato, (1997) ‘Euthyphro’, in Plato's Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett).Google Scholar