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Is motivated submaximization good enough for God?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2019

KLAAS J. KRAAY
KLAAS J. KRAAY*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, M5B 2K3, Canada
*
e-mail: kraay@ryerson.ca
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Abstract

In a recent article (Kraay 2013), I argued that some prominent responses to two important arguments for atheism invoke divine satisficing – and that the coherence and propriety of this notion have not been established. Chris Tucker (2016) agrees with my evaluation of divine satisficing, but disagrees with my exegesis of these responses. He argues that they should be understood as invoking motivated submaximization instead. After reviewing the dialectical situation to date, I assess whether motivated submaximization can be deployed in such a way as to defeat these arguments for atheism. I argue that it's far from clear that it can.

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Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , September 2021 , pp. 403 - 417
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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