Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-plnhv Total loading time: 0.001 Render date: 2025-08-23T03:05:12.921Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Religious fictionalism and the problem of evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2015

JON ROBSON
JON ROBSON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK e-mail: jonvrobson@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The problem of evil is typically presented as a problem – sometimes the problem – facing theistic realists. This article takes no stance on what effect (if any) the existence of evil has on the rationality of theistic belief. Instead, it explores the possibility of using the problem of evil to generate worries for some of those who reject theistic realism. Although this article focuses on the consequences for a particular kind of religious fictionalist, the lessons adduced are intended to have more general application.

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 51 , Special Issue 3: Religious Studies at 50 , September 2015 , pp. 353 - 360
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Adams, M. M. (1993) ‘The problem of hell: a problem of evil for Christians’, in Stump, E. (ed.) Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 301–327.Google Scholar
Bratman, M. E. (1992) ‘Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context’, Mind, 101, 1–16.Google Scholar
Draper, P. (1989) ‘Pain and pleasure: an evidential problem for theists’, Nous, 23, 331–350.Google Scholar
Harrison, V. S. (2010) ‘Philosophy of religion, fictionalism, and religious diversity’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 68, 43–58.Google Scholar
Jay, C. (2014) ‘The Kantian moral hazard argument for religious fictionalism’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 75, 207–232.Google Scholar
Kalderon, E. M. (ed.) (2005) Fictionalism in Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Le Poidevin, R. (1996) Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Le Poidevin, R. (2003) ‘Theistic discourse and fictional truth’, Revue internationale de philosophie, 3, 271–284.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1978) ‘Truth in fiction’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15, 37–46.Google Scholar
Miller, C. (2012) ‘Atheism and theistic belief’, in Kvanvig, J. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 99–127.Google Scholar
Norenzayan, A. & Shariff, A. F. (2008) ‘The origin and evolution of religious prosociality’, Science, 322, 58–62.Google Scholar
Pargament, K. I. (2002) ‘The bitter and the sweet: an evaluation of the costs and benefits of religiousness’, Psychological inquiry, 13, 168–181.Google Scholar
Pascal, B. (1995) ‘Pensées’ and Other Writings, Levi, Honor (tr.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Scott, M. (2000) ‘Wittgenstein and realism’, Faith and Philosophy, 17, 170–190.Google Scholar
Van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. (2008) The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Van Leeuwen, N. (2014) ‘Religious credence is not factual belief’, Cognition, 133, 698–715.Google Scholar
Whitney, B. L. (1993) Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the Problem of Evil, 1960–1990 (New York: Garland).Google Scholar