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Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2011

CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Sewanee: The University of the South, Sewanee, TN 37383USA
*
e-mail: cconn@sewanee.edu
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Abstract

In this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

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Articles
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Religious Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 61 - 82
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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