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Faut-il s'échanger des informations sur les flux de capitauxdans un système de taxation à la résidence?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau
Emmanuelle Taugourdeau*
Affiliation:
EUREQua, Université de Paris 1**
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Résumé

Nous développons un modèle dans lequel les gouvernements peuvent s'échangerdes informations sur les investissements effectués sur leur territoire parles agents étrangers. Sans cette information, les gouvernements ne sont pasen mesure de taxer leurs résidents sur les investissements étrangers ce quipermet à ces derniers de profiter de l'évasion fiscale. Nous montrons qu'àl'équilibre non coopératif, un échange partiel d'informations constitue unéquilibre de Nash soutenable. Nous montrons également qu'il existe deséquilibres asymétriques dans lesquels un des gouvernments envoie le maximumd'informations alors que l'autre gouvernement n'envoie qu'une informationpartielle.

Summary

Summary

This article develops a model in which governments can exchange informationabout foreign capital invested in their country by foreigners. Without thisinformation, governments are not able to tax foreign investments of theirresidents which allows them to take advantage of tax evasion. Then, apartial exchange of information constitutes a sustainable symmetric Nashequilibrium. There also exists asymmetric equilibrium characterized by amaximum flow of information for one country and partial exchange ofinformation for the other one.

Keywords

Politique fiscaleÉchanges d'informationsJeux non-coopératifsF4H2fiscal policyexchange of informationnon-cooperative gamesF4H2

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 68 , Issue 4 , 2002 , pp. 429 - 455
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2002 

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Footnotes

*

Je remercie Delphine Béraud, Hubert Kempf et Étienne Lehmann ainsi que les deux rapporteurs anonymes pour leurs remarques constructives. Je reste néanmoins seule responsable des erreurs qui peuvent subsister.

**

106-112 Bd de I'Hôpital-75647 PARIS Cedex. Tel: 01-44-07-82-19 Fax: 01-44-07-82-31. E-Mail: Taugour@univ-Paris1.fr

References

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