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The Politics of Preemption: Prospects for theStates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2005

Paul L. Posner
Paul L. Posner
Affiliation:
United States Government Accountability Office
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Extract

Woodrow Wilson told us that the federal-state relationship is thecardinal question of our system that is destined to be reformulatedfor each generation. His prophetic words aptly characterize thechallenges federal and state governments face in satisfying both therequisites of an increasingly global economy and nationalizedpolitical culture while at the same time reflecting the differentialvalues and interests of states. States need to retain theirdiversity and capacity to innovate and respond to different valuesand interests that may not get a hearing in Washington; conversely,Washington needs to be alert and reactive when states proveunresponsive to key values and interests or collectively incapableof solving national economic or social problems.

Information

Type
SYMPOSIUM
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , July 2005 , pp. 371 - 374
Copyright
© 2005 The American Political Science Association

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