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Checks, Balances, and Thresholds: State RegulatoryRe-enforcement and Federal Preemption

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2005

Paul Teske
Paul Teske
Affiliation:
University of Colorado, Denver
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Extract

In the last two decades, many cases of actual or attempted federalpreemption of state regulation have followed an intriguing newinteractive pattern. While this pattern is not comprehensive enoughto define a new theory of federalism (see Zimmerman 2004), it now occurs regularly enough to meritclose attention and an attempted understanding of its dynamics (seeWalters 2004). It is also an exampleof the kind of complicated federalism, with vertical checks,balances and thresholds, that has emerged in a 21stcentury America closely divided upon whether and how to usegovernment policy to address various social and economicproblems.

Information

Type
SYMPOSIUM
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , July 2005 , pp. 367 - 370
Copyright
© 2005 The American Political Science Association

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