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On linking cognitive mechanisms to game play: A critique of Morikawa, Hanley, and Orbell

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Peter Stone
Peter Stone*
Affiliation:
Political Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6044 stone68@stanford.edu
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Abstract

Tomonori Morikawa, James E. Hanley, and John Orbell have argued that natural selection leads populations who play Hawk-Dove, a game-theoretic stylization of confrontation, to develop the capacity for various “orders of recognition.” Such an argument requires a model linking game play to the presence or absence of various cognitive mechanisms. Morikawa and colleagues present such a model but, I argue, leave it incomplete, unable to sustain the conclusions they wish to defend. The development of a more fully specified model would significantly assist future studies of cognitive structures related to game play.

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Type
Critique and Reply
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , September 2003 , pp. 33 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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