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Some Simple Tests of Rational Voting and AgendaSetting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2014

Sean Corcoran ,
Thomas Romer  and
Howard Rosenthal
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Abstract

This article analyzes election data that permit simple tests of rationalvoting and agenda setting. The voting test pertains to aggregate electionresults. The prediction is that when voters have single-peaked preferences,there will be more opposition to the second of two budget proposals that arevoted on simultaneously. Unlike the standard binary choice setting, not allvoters have weakly undominated voting strategies, but the game among thevoters can be solved simply by iterative application of weak dominance. Theagenda-setting prediction tested is that agenda setters should make oneproposal rather than two when given the option. The data come from Oregonschool district financial elections from 1980–83, years in which the rulesfor these elections were abruptly changed.

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Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , May 2015 , pp. 155 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2014 

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Footnotes

Sean Corcoran is Associate Professor of Education Economics,Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development, NewYork University, New York, NY 10012, USA (sean.corcoran@nyu.edu). Thomas Romer is Professor ofPolitics and Public Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School and theDepartment of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA (romer@princeton.edu). HowardRosenthal is Professor of Politics, Wilf Family Department ofPolitics, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA (hr31@nyu.edu). We thank Alexander Ruderfor extensive and effective research assistance. We also thank seminarparticipants at Columbia University for comments on an earlier draft.Thanks are also in order to the referees and the editor. The datacollection for this study was supported by the Russell SageFoundation.

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Corcoran et al Dataset

Dataset

http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/25893
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