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Learning from Debate: Institutions andInformation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2015

Eric S. Dickson ,
Catherine Hafer  and
Dimitri Landa
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Abstract

We present a model and a laboratory experiment on the informativeness ofdebate, varying both informational and institutional variables. Theinformational variable we focus on is a novel factor affecting the extent towhich audience members can learn from exposure to unpersuasive arguments.The more easily a listener can learn from an argument she findsunpersuasive, the greater the risk that the speaker will alienate thislistener when she fails to persuade her. We find a strong interactionbetween speakers’ responsiveness to that risk and the institutions ofdebate. When listeners can learn from unpersuasive arguments, many speakersare discouraged from attempting persuasion, irrespective of the debate ruleswe consider. In contrast, when listeners cannot learn from unpersuasivearguments, debate rules affect speakers’ willingness to engage inpersuasion.

Information

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 449 - 472
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2015 

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Footnotes

*

Eric S. Dickson (eric.dickson@nyu.edu), Catherine Hafer (catherine.hafer@nyu.edu), and DimitriLanda (dimitri.landa@nyu.edu) areAssociate Professors in the Department of Politics, New YorkUniversity, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012. The authorsbenefitted from comments from Sandy Gordon, Rebecca Morton, seminarparticipants at the UC Berkeley, Paris School of Economics, Universityof Virginia, and Vanderbilt University, and audiences and discussantsat the meetings of APSA, MPSA, The Public Choice Society, and SAET. Wethank Dominik Duell and Marlene Guraieb for excellent researchassistance. To view supplementary material for this article, pleasevisit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.6

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