Hostname: page-component-6bb9c88b65-6vlrh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-07-25T09:29:18.677Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Hazards or Hassles The Effect of Sanctions on Leader Survival*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2015

Amanda A. Licht
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Recent empirical work scrutinizes the ability of economic sanctions to destabilize targeted leaders. Limitations in data and modeling choices, however, may have inflated estimates of sanctions’ efficacy. I propose a unified theoretical model, incorporating the possibility that leaders targeted with threats and imposed sanctions differ in baseline risks from those who are not. I combine this hazards approach with an empirical strategy to account for differences in ex ante risks and improved data on leader failure. This approach uncovers a considerably more modest effect. Sanctions rarely destabilize their targets.

Information

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , January 2017 , pp. 143 - 161
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

*

Amanda A. Licht, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, PO Box 6000 (aalicht@gmail.com). The author’s sincere thanks to many people who read or provided comments as this paper developed from a dissertation chapter to a conference paper to a stand alone article, especially Brian Lai, Sara Mitchell, Fred Boehmke, Jong Hee Park, Alex Quiroz Flores, Mike Ward, Susan Allen, Ben Fordham, Katja Kleinberg, and Dave Clark. The author also thanks Cameron Thies and the anonymous reviewers. Any remaining errors, of course, are my own. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.25

References

Allen, Susan H. 2008. ‘The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(6):916–944.Google Scholar
Baldwin, David. 1985. Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Jones, Bradford S.. 2004. Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolph M., and Morrow, James D.. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio. 1998. Politics and Uncertainty: Theory, Models and Applications. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Conrad, Courtenay R., and Ritter, Emily H.. 2013. ‘Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law’. The Journal of Politics 75(2):397–409.Google Scholar
Drezner, Daniel W. 1999. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. ‘The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion’. International Organization 57(3):643–659.Google Scholar
EAST Investigators. 1997. ‘Angioplasty or Surgery for Multivessel Coronary Artery Disease: Comparison of Eligible Registry and Randomized Patients in the EAST Trial and Influence of Treatment Selection on Outcomes’. The American Journal of Cardiology 79(11):1453–1459.Google Scholar
Escriba-Folch, Abel, and Wright, Joseph. 2010. ‘Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers’. International Studies Quarterly 54(2):335–359.Google Scholar
Galtung, Johan. 1967. ‘On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia’. World Politics 19(3):378–416.Google Scholar
Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, Glenn, and Bremer, Stuart. 2004. ‘The MID 3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description’. Conflict Management and Peace Science 21(1):133–154.Google Scholar
Gibler, Douglas M. 2009. International Military Alliances, 1648–2008. CQ Press.Google Scholar
Goemans, Hein, Gleditsch, Kristian, and Chiozza, Giacomo. 2009. ‘Archigos, Version 2.9 Codebook’. Available at http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/Archigos.2.9-August.pdf.Google Scholar
Ho, Daniel E., Imai, Kosuke, King, Gary, and Stuart, Elizabeth A.. 2011. ‘MatchIt: Nonparametric Preprocessing for Parametric Causal Inference’. Journal of Statistical Software 42(8):1–28.Google Scholar
Hufbauer, Gary C., Schott, Jeffrey J., and Elliott, Kimberly A.. 2009. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Peterson Institutes Press.Google Scholar
Iqbal, Zaryab, and Zorn, Christopher. 2008. ‘The Political Consequences of Assassination’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(3):385–400.Google Scholar
Kaempfer, William H., and Lowenberg, Anton D.. 1988. ‘The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach’. The American Economic Review 78(4):786–793.Google Scholar
Kaempfer, William, and Lowenberg, Anton D.. 2000. ‘A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions’. In Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury (eds), Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice, 158–186. New York, NY: Martin’s Press.Google Scholar
Kaempfer, William H., Lowenberg, Anton D., and Mertens, William. 2004. ‘International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator’. Economics & Politics 16(1):29–51.Google Scholar
Kam, Cindy, and Franzese, Robert. 2009. Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Keele, Luke. 2010. ‘Proportionally Difficult: Testing for Nonproportional Hazards in Cox Models’. Political Analysis 18(2):189–205.Google Scholar
King, Gary, Alt, James E., Burns, Nancy E., and Laver, Michael. 1990. ‘A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies’. American Journal of Political Science 34(3):846–871.Google Scholar
Lai, Brian. 2003. ‘Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-Cold War Period, 1991–1996’. Journal of Peace Research 40(1):103–128.Google Scholar
Leeds, Brett A., Mattes, Michaela, and Vogel, Jeremy S.. 2009. ‘Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments’. American Journal of Political Science 53(2):461–476.Google Scholar
Licht, Amanda. 2010. ‘Coming Into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(1):58–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Licht, Amanda A. 2011. ‘Change Comes with Time: Substantive Interpretation of Nonproportional Hazards in Event History Analysis’. Political Analysis 19(2):227–243.Google Scholar
Licht, Amanda A. 2014. ‘Regular Turnover Details, 1960–2004’. Binghamton, NY; https://sites.google.com/site/amandalichtphd/research/regular-turnover-details.Google Scholar
Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. ‘Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders’. American Journal of Political Science 49(3):564–576.Google Scholar
McGillivray, Fiona, Smith, Alistair. 2000. ‘Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments’. International Organization 54(4):809–824.Google Scholar
McGillivray, Fiona, and Stam, Allan C.. 2004. ‘Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(2):154–172.Google Scholar
Morgan, T. C., and Schwebach, Valerie L.. 1995. ‘Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Foreign Policy’. International Interactions 21(3):247–263.Google Scholar
Nooruddin, Irfan. 2002. ‘Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy’. International Interactions 28(1):59–75.Google Scholar
Pape, Robert A. 1997. ‘Why Economic Sanctinos Do Not Work’. International Security 22(2):90–136.Google Scholar
Peksen, Dursun, and Drury, A. C.. 2010. ‘Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy’. International Interactions 36(3):240–264.Google Scholar
Powell, Jonathan M., and Thyne, Clayton L.. 2005. ‘Global Instances of Coups from 1950–2010: A New Dataset’. Journal of Peace Research 48(2):249–259.Google Scholar
Raftery, Adrian E. 1999. ‘Bayes Factors and BIC’. Sociological Methods & Research 27(3):411–427.Google Scholar
Schmoor, Claudia, Caputo, Angelika, and Schumacher, Martin. 2008. ‘Evidence from Nonrandomized Studies: A Case Study on the Estimation of Causal Effects’. American Journal of Epidemiology 167(9):1120–1129.Google Scholar
Smith, Alastair. 1995. ‘The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions’. International Interactions 21(3):229–245.Google Scholar
Therneau, Terry M., and Grambsch, Patricia M.. 2000. Modeling Survival Data: Extending the Cox Model. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar
Wolford, Scott. 2007. ‘The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict’. American Journal of Political Science 51(4):772–788.Google Scholar
Wolford, Scott. 2012. ‘Incumbents, Successors, and Crisis Bargaining: Leadership Turnover as a Commitment Problem’. Journal of Peace Research 49(4):517–530.Google Scholar
Wood, Reed. 2008. ‘“A Hand Upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976–2001’. International Studies Quarterly 52(3):189–513.Google Scholar
Wright, Joseph. 2008. ‘To Invest or Insure? How Authoritarian Time Horizons Impact Foreign Aid Effectiveness’. Comparative Political Studies 41(7):971–1000.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Licht Dataset

Dataset

http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PVMZB1
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Licht supplementary material

Hazards or Hassles RnR Appendix

Download Licht supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 2.6 MB
Supplementary material: PDF

Licht Supplementary Material 2

Data bibliography

Download Licht Supplementary Material 2(PDF)
PDF 12.9 KB