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Demarcating Contextualism and Contrastivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2021

Jon Bebb
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that there is a significant but often overlooked metaphysical distinction to be made between contextualism and contrastivism. The orthodox view is that contrastivism is merely a form of contextualism. This is a mistake. The contextualist view is incompatible with certain naturalist claims about the metaphysical nature of concepts within whichever domain is being investigated, while the contrastivist view is compatible with these claims. So, choosing one view over the other will involve choosing to affirm or deny a significant metaphysical claim. As such, a demarcation ought to be put in place between contextualism and contrastivism.

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Research Article
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Philosophy , Volume 97 , Issue 1 , January 2022 , pp. 23 - 49
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Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2021

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