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Feminism, Underdetermination, and Values in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Kristen Intemann
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Abstract

Several feminist philosophers of science have tried to open up the possibility that feminist ethical or political commitments could play a positive role in good science by appealing to the Duhem-Quine thesis and underdetermination of theories by observation. I examine several different interpretations of the claim that feminist values could play a legitimate role in theory justification and show that none of them follow from a logical gap between theory and observation. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach for defending the possibility that feminist political commitments could play a legitimate role in science.

Information

Type
Gender and Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 1001 - 1012
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

This paper was originally developed at the NEH Summer Institute on Science and Values at the University of Pittsburgh. Special thanks to Sandra Mitchell, co-director of that institute, for all of her comments, criticisms, and suggestions. I would also like to thank Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Jean Roberts, and Andrea Woody for their comments on earlier drafts.

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