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Adaptational Functional Ascriptions in Evolutionary Biology: A Critique of Schaffner's Views

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

William A. Rottschaefer
William A. Rottschaefer*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lewis and Clark College
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Lewis and Clark College, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Road, Portland, OR 97219-7899.
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Abstract

Kenneth Schaffner has argued that evolutionary theory, strictly understood, cannot support the functional ascriptions used in adaptational functional explanations. Although the causal ascription clause in these ascriptions is supported, the goal-ascription clause cannot be, since it imports anthropocentric features deriving from a vulgar understanding of evolutionary theory. I argue that an etiological interpretation of selectional explanations sanctions both the causal and goal-ascription clauses of functional ascriptions and provides a way to understand teleological explanation within evolutionary biology.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , December 1997 , pp. 698 - 713
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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