Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation ofWeapons of Mass Destruction. By Derek D. Smith. NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 197p. $75.00 cloth, $24.99paper.

By the early 1990s, scholars and policymakers alike began voicingreservations about the ability of deterrence strategies to counternuclear, chemical and biological arsenals as these weaponsproliferated into the hands of state and nonstate actors. Someobservers doubted if it was technically feasible to create credibledeterrent commitments given the possibility that there might be nosignificant targets in the opposing camp to hold at risk, thatpotential opponents were irrational or suicidal, or that it might beimpossible to identify the culprits who launched the attack itself(e.g., the origins of an epidemic might never be identified). Othersdoubted the strategic wisdom of relying on deterrence, given thatthe costs of policy failure were potentially catastrophic. And, asthe September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated, overwhelmingmilitary superiority cannot deter or defend against terrorist cellsthat are willing to sacrifice themselves to achieve theirobjectives. Because of the inherent limitations of deterrence, manysuggested that preventive war and preemption were the best way todeal with rogue states and terrorist organizations that wereacquiring weapons of mass destruction.