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THINKING ABOUT SOCIAL NORMS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 May 2022

Ken Binmore
Ken Binmore*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, Bristol University, Bristol, United Kingdom
*
*Corresponding author. Email: k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk
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Abstract

This article argues that it is a waste of time seeking to treat populists as examples of homo economicus when seeking to persuade them that the conspiracy theories to which they subscribe are big lies. But it does not follow that homo economicus is worthless in this context. He has a role in explaining the evolution of the social norms whose violation is the root cause of the rise of populist movements. Such an approach requires a willingness to entertain both proximate and ultimate explanations of human behaviour simultaneously.

Keywords

proximateultimatehomo economicussocial normconventionreciprocityfolk theoremA13B00B52C70

Information

Type
Special Issue Articles: The Political Economy of Populism
Information
National Institute Economic Review , Volume 259: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULISM , Winter 2022 , pp. 20 - 30
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of National Institute Economic Review

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