Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
In support of the Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) safety case for a geological disposal facility (GDF) in the UK, there is a regulatory requirement to consider the likelihood and consequences of nuclear criticality. Waste packages are designed to ensure that criticality is not possibleduring the transport and operational phases of a GDF and for a significant period post-closure. However, over longer post-closure timescales, conditions in the GDF will evolve.
For waste packages containing spent fuel, it can be shown that, under certain conditions, package flooding couldresult in a type of criticality event referred to as 'quasi-steady-state' (QSS). Although unlikely, this defines a 'what-if' scenario for understanding the potential consequences of post-closure criticality. This paper provides an overview of a methodology to understand QSS criticality andits application to a spent fuel waste package.
The power of such a hypothetical criticality event is typically estimated to be a few kilowatts: comparable with international studies of similar systems and the decay heat for which waste packages are designed. This work has built confidencein the methodology and supports RWM's demonstration that post-closure criticality is not a significant concern.