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REPLY TO PARDO: UNSAFE LEGAL KNOWLEDGE?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 May 2011

Mark McBride
Mark McBride*
Affiliation:
Oxford Universitymarkmcbride1978@gmail.com
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Extract

Michael Pardo recently intriguingly argues that “the goal or aim of legal proof is knowledge (or something approximating knowledge) rather than less epistemically demanding goals.” Pardo continues, “[L]egal verdicts require more than truth and justification. . .. [T]ruth and justification also need to be connected in an appropriate way.” I do not want to contest (directly) this central claim of Pardo's. My aim here is principally to show some difficulties for the account of (legal) knowledge with which Pardo evidently operates, on which safety is a necessary condition. Highlighting these difficulties, however, puts pressure on Pardo's central claim.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 67 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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