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The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2016

Ariel Zylberman
Ariel Zylberman*
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University
*
Email: arielzylberman@gmail.com
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Abstract

The two standard interpretations of Kant’s view of the relationship between external freedom and public law make one of the terms a means for the production of the other: either public law is justified as a means to external freedom, or external freedom is justified as a means for producing a system of public law. This article defends an alternative, constitutive interpretation: public law is justified because it is partly constitutive of external freedom. The constitutive view requires conceiving of external freedom in a novel, second-personal way, that is, as an irreducibly relational norm.

Keywords

Kantexternal freedompublic lawsecond person

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Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 101 - 126
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2016 

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