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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 June 2025
One profound yet relatively understudied contribution to tafsīr (Qur’an commentary) is that of Ibn ʿArafah al-Warġammī (d. 803/1401), a leading Mālikī scholar of eighth/fourteenth-century Ḥafṣid Tunisia. Although no separate commentary by Ibn ʿArafah has come down to us, his commentary on the Qur’an is accessible through the lecture notes that were compiled by his students. This article will examine one significant aspect of Ibn ʿArafah’s Qur’anic discourse that is barely acknowledged—his understanding of the relationship between the Qur’an and logic, and his use of logic in Qur’anic interpretation. It suggests that Ibn ʿArafah conceived of logic as embedded in the fabric of the Qur’an and felt a sense of urgency in using logic as an instrument for tafsīr. It also shows that the application of logic to Qur’anic interpretation is dominant in Ibn ʿArafah’s commentary to an extent that is not found in earlier works of tafsīr. Through identifying the different ways in which he intertwined the science of logic with tafsīr, this article will highlight Ibn ʿArafah’s role in the logical hermeneutics of the Qur’an and expand our understanding of how logic was used as an instrument for other sciences—in particular, for the interpretation of the Qur’an.
1 Author’s note: All translations herein are mine except where stated otherwise. The translations of the Qur’an are based on A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, two vols (London, 1955); and M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, The Qurʼan: A New Translation (New York, 2005), though I modify them occasionally.
2 He attempted this through providing Qur’anic verses that he interpreted as containing syllogisms. See A. Kleinknecht, ‘Al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm: Eine Ableitung der Logik aus dem Koran’, in Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, (eds.) S. M. Stern, A. Hourani, and V. Brown (Oxford, 1972), pp. 159–187; M. E. Marmura, ‘Ghazali’s attitude to the secular sciences and logic’, in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, (ed.) G. F. Hourani (Albany, 1975), pp. 100–111; M. Whittingham, Al-Ghazālī and the Qurʼān: One Book, Many Meanings (London, 2007), pp. 81–101; A. Wohlman, Al-Ghazali, Averroes and the Interpretation of the Qur’an: Common Sense and Philosophy in Islam, (trans.) D. Burrell (London, 2009), pp. 22–35.
3 There are explicit references to al-Ġazālī in some of Rāzī’s logical treatments of the Qur’an in his magnum opus, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb. See, for instance, Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb (at-Tafsīr al-kabīr), 32 vols (Beirut, 1981), xiii, p. 82. See, more generally, M. Lagarde, Index du Grand Commentaire de Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (Leiden, 1996), pp. 50–51, which provides a handy list of references to the ‘Principes logiques’ in Rāzī’s tafsīr.
4 Naǧm ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūfī, al-Išārāt al-Ilāhiyyah ilā al-mabāḥiṯ al-uṣūliyyah, (ed.) Ḥasan Quṭb, three vols (Cairo, 2002); Naǧm ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-ǧaḏal fī ʿilm al-ǧadal, (ed.) W. Heinrichs (Wiesbaden, 1987). See also A. Shihadeh, ‘Three apologetic stances in al-Ṭūfī: theological cognitivism, noncognitivism, and a proof of prophecy from scriptural contradiction’, Journal of Qur’anic Studies 8.2 (2006), pp. 1–23.
5 In this context, mention should be made of the research that considered the logical aspects of the Qur’an. For instance, R. W. Gwyne, Logic, Rhetoric, and Legal Reasoning in the Qur’ān (London, 2004), looked at different types of logical arguments in the Qur’an; G. Gobillot, ‘La démonstration de l’existence de Dieu comme élément sacré d’un texte’, in Al-Kitāb: la sacralité du texte dans le monde de l’islam, (eds.) D. De Smet, G. de Callataÿ, and J. M. F. Van Reeth (Brussels, 2004), pp. 103–142, explored the Qur’an’s use of the enthymeme; and J. Jomier, ‘L’Évidence de l’Islam’, in L’Orient chrétien dans l’empire musulman: hommage au professeur Gérard Troupeau, (ed.) G. Gobillot (Versailles, 2005), pp. 23–36, analysed how the Qur’an uses the syllogistic to prove its divine nature. I must also mention A. Q. Ahmed, ‘The logic of God’s knowledge’, in Tradition and Reception in Arabic Literature: Essays Dedicated to Andras Hamori, (eds.) M. Larkin and J. Sharlet (Wiesbaden, 2019), pp. 153–160, which is of much relevance to the present article. See also ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Farāhī, Ḥuǧaǧ al-Qurʾān al-ḥikmah al-bāziġah wa-l-ḥuǧǧah al-bāliġah (Azamgarh, 2009); J. van Ess, ‘The logical structure of Islamic theology’, in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, (ed.) G. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 21–50; C. Schöck, Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik: Zum Verhältnis von arabischer und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz, und Schlusslehre (Leiden, 2006); K. Blankinship, ‘The early creed’, in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, (ed.) T. Winter (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 33–54, at p. 34; U. Mårtensson, ‘“The persuasive proof”: a study of Aristotle’s politics and rhetoric in the Qurʾān and al-Ṭabarī’s commentary’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 34 (2008), pp. 363–420.
6 On the relation between reason and revelation in Islamic thought, see N. Heer, ‘The priority of reason in the interpretation of scripture: Ibn Taymīyah and the Mutakallimūn’, in Literary Heritage of Classical Islam: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of James A. Bellamy, (ed.) M. Mir (in collaboration with J. E. Fossum) (Princeton, 1993), pp. 181–195; W. B. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians (Oxford, 1993); F. Griffel, ‘Al-Ghazālī at his most rationalist: the universal rule for allegorically interpreting revelation (al-Qānūn al-Kullī fī t-Taʾwīl)’, in Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazālī. Papers Collected on His 900th Anniversary, Vol. 1, (ed.) G. Tamer (Leiden, 2015), pp. 89–120; C. Sharif El-Tobgui, Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation: A Study of Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l-naql (Leiden, 2015).
7 Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī ad-Dāwūdī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, (eds.) a committee of scholars, two vols (Beirut, 1983), ii, p. 237.
8 Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭāhir Ibn ʿĀšūr, at-Taḥrīr wa-t-tanwīr, 30 vols (Tunis, 1984), i, p. 7.
9 As for the Arabic literature, different aspects of Ibn ʿArafah’s commentary have been studied. These include comparing his tafsīr with previous works; the linguistic aspects of his tafsīr; and his criticism of previous tafsīr authorities. See, respectively, Saʿīd Sālim Saʿīd Fāndī, ‘At-Tafsīr bayna al-Bayḍāwī wa-bn ʿArafah’ (unpublished PhD dissertation, Ǧāmiʿat az-Zaytūnah, 1995); Ḥasan ʿAbd Allāh Bustānī, ‘Ad-Dirāsāt an-naḥwiyyah fī tafsīr Ibn ʿArafah’ (unpublished master’s dissertation, al-Ǧāmiʿah al-Mustanṣiriyyah, 2001); Nizār Ḥammādī, Itḥāf ahl al-maʿrifah bi-l-istidrākāt at-tafsīriyyah li-l-imām Ibn ʿArafah ʿalā Kaššāf az-Zamaḫšarī wa-Muḥarrar Ibn ʿAṭiyyah wa-tafsīr al-Faḫr ar-Rāzī (Kuwait, 2015).
10 An exception is Wasīlah Balʿīd b. Ḥamdah, ‘Muḥammad b. ʿArafah wa-manhaǧuh fī at-tafsīr’, Maǧallat Ǧāmiʿat az-Zaytūnah 2 (1993), pp. 79–119, at pp. 97–99. However, the discussion is brief (fewer than three pages).
11 On the usage of logic as an exegetical tool outside the tafsīr tradition, see R. M. Siddals, ‘Logic and Christology in Cyril of Alexandria’, Journal of Theological Studies 38.2 (1987), pp. 341–367; H. van Loon, The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria (Leiden, 2009), pp. 61–122; R. Somos, Logic and Argumentation in Origen (Münster, 2015); M. Randall James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (Leiden, 2021), pp. 27–72; M. Martijn, ‘If, then, therefore? Neoplatonic exegetical logic between the categorical and the hypothetical’, History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 24.1 (2021), pp. 3–43; F. A. J. de Haas, ‘Deduction and common notions in Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics A 1–2ʹ, History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 24.1 (2021), pp. 71–102.
12 This has bearings on the approach that reads the Qur’an as a philosophical text. See, on this theme, S. Akhtar, The Quran and the Secular Mind: A Philosophy of Islam (London, 2007); J. Janssens, ‘Al-Kindi: the founder of philosophical exegesis of the Qur’an’, Journal of Qur’anic Studies 9.2 (2007), pp. 1–22; M. Rustom, The Triumph of Mercy: Philosophy and Scripture in Mullā Ṣadrā (Albany, 2012); O. Leaman, The Qurʼan: A Philosophical Guide (London, 2016); M. Campanini, Philosophical Perspectives on Modern Qur’anic Exegesis: Key Paradigms and Concepts (Sheffield, 2016); J. Janssens, ‘Philosophical commentaries’, in The Oxford Handbook of Qur’anic Studies, (eds.) M. Shah and M. Abdel Haleem (Oxford, 2020), pp. 780–793; Y. Çelik, Critical Hermeneutics: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives in Turkey on the Understanding and Interpretation of the Qur’an (Leiden, 2023).
13 On the biography of Ibn ʿArafah, from which I benefited for this section, see Muḥammad al-Fāḍil Ibn ʿĀšūr, at-Tafsīr wa-riǧāluh (Cairo, 1970), pp. 102–107; Muḥammad Maḥfūẓ, Tarāǧim al-muʾallifīn at-Tūnisiyyīn, five vols (Beirut, 1982–1986), iii, pp. 363–371; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Ibn ʿArafah, al-Muḫtaṣar al-kalāmī, (ed.) Nizār Ḥammādī (Kuwait, 2014), pp. 22–65; H. R. Idris, ‘Ibn ʿArafa’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, (eds.) P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W. P. Heinrichs, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3082 (accessed 1 August 2022); Mohammad Fadel, ‘Ibn ʿArafa al-Warghammī’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, (eds.) K. Fleet, G. Krämer, D. Matringe, J. Nawas, and E. Rowson, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_30702 (accessed 1 August 2022). His work on logic is published in Saʿd Ġurāb (ed.), Risālatān fī al-manṭiq (Tunis, n.d.).
14 Šams ad-Dīn Abū al-Ḫayr Muḥammad Ibn al-Ǧazarī, Ġāyat an-nihāyah fī ṭabaqāt al-qurrāʾ, (eds.) G. Bergsträsser and O. Pretzl, two vols (Cairo, 1932–1933), ii, p. 243.
15 See Aḥmad Bābā at-Tunbaktī, Nayl al-ibtihāǧ bi-taṭrīz ad-Dībāǧ, (ed.) ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Harrāmah (Tripoli, 2000), pp. 487–488.
16 On al-Basīlī, see Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, Fahrast ar-Raṣṣāʿ, (ed.) Muḥammad al-ʿInnābī (Tunis, n.d.), pp. 175–177.
17 Al-Ubbī, Tafsīr al-Imām Ibn ʿArafah Abī ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ʿArafah al-Warġammī bi-riwāyat tilmīḏih Abī ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ḫalafah b. ʿUmar al-Waštānī al-Ubbī, (eds.) Ḥasan al-Mannāʿī, Ǧalāl ad-Dīn ʿAllūš, Muḥammad Ḥawālah, and Hišām az-Zār, five vols (Beirut, 2015).
18 Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Basīlī at-Tūnisī, at-Taqyīd al-kabīr fī tafsīr Kitāb Allāh al-maǧīd, (ed.) ʿAbd Allāh b. Muṭlaq aṭ-Ṭuwālah, two vols (no publisher location, 1992).
19 Al-ʿĀliyah Šaʿrāwī, Tafsīr Ibn ʿArafah bi-riwāyat al-Basīlī: dirāsah wa-taḥqīq li-Sūrat al-Aʿrāf (unpublished master’s dissertation, Ǧāmiʿat al-Ǧazāʾir, 2006).
20 Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Basīlī at-Tūnisī, Nukat wa-tanbīhāt fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-maǧīd, published with Ibn Ġāzī al-ʿUṯmānī al-Miknāsī, Takmilat an-Nukat, (ed.) Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭabarānī, three vols (Casablanca, 2008).
21 For example, B2, ii, p. 422, lines 9–11; p. 423, lines 1–3 [Text 30] indicates lines 9–11 of p. 422 and lines 1–3 of p. 423, both of which are taken from vol. 2 of B2. The number within square brackets indicates the order of the Arabic passage in the appendix.
22 This is the majority opinion; see ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, xxiv, pp. 98–99 (under Q. 25:50–52).
23 Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Azharī, Tahḏīb al-luġah, (eds.) Aḥmad ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm al-Baradūnī et al., 17 vols (Cairo, 1964), xii, pp. 161–163; al-Muṣṭafawī, at-Taḥqīq fī kalimāt al-Qurʾān al-karīm, 14 vols (Beirut, 2009), vi, pp. 280–284.
24 See, on this point, ʿUbayd Allāh b. Faḍl Allāh al-Ḫabīṣī, at-Taḏhīb Šarḥ ʿalā Tahḏīb al-manṭiq wa-l-kalām (Cairo, 1936), p. 366; Quṭb ad-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah fī šarḥ ar-Risālah aš-Šamsiyyah ([Cairo], 1311 [1893]), pp. 102–103.
25 Saʿd Ġurāb (ed.), Risālatān fī al-manṭiq, p. 67.
26 See al-Ḫabīṣī, at-Taḏhīb, pp. 212–213; Ibrāhīm al-Bāǧūrī, Ḥāšiyah ʿalā matn as-sullam fī ʿilm al-manṭiq (Cairo, 1308 [1890]), p. 62.
27 Ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, xiii, p. 82 (under Q. 6:91).
28 Ibid.
29 On contradiction, see Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, pp. 86–89; al-Bāǧūrī, Ḥāšiyah ʿalā matn as-sullam fī ʿilm al-manṭiq, p. 81.
30 For the first example, see, for instance, Ibn Ǧarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān, (ed.) ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin at-Turkī, 26 vols (Riyadh, 2003), xvii, pp. 468–469 (under Q. 25:50); Ǧār Allāh Maḥmūd b. ʿUmar az-Zamaḫšarī, al-Kaššāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq at-tanzīl wa-ʿuyūn al-aqāwīl fī wuǧūh at-taʾwīl, (ed.) Ḫalīl Šīḥā (Beirut, 2009), p. 749 (under Q. 25:50); ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, xxiv, pp. 98–99 (under Q. 25:50–52). For the second example, see aṭ-Ṭabarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān, xxii, pp. 229–231 (under Q. 55:39–42); az-Zamaḫšarī, al-Kaššāf, p. 1072 (under Q. 55:41–43); ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, xxix, pp. 120–122 (under Q. 55:41–42). For the final example, see aṭ-Ṭabarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān, ix, pp. 393–401 (under Q. 6:91); az-Zamaḫšarī, al-Kaššāf, p. 336 (under Q. 6:91); ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, xiii, pp. 76–84 (under Q. 6:91).
31 Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt maʿa šarḥ Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, p. 374; Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Manṭiq al-Mulaḫḫaṣ, (eds.) Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalekī and Ādīne Aṣġarīnežād (Tehran, 2002), pp. 248–249.
32 Az-Zamaḫšarī, al-Kaššāf, p. 351 (under Q. 6:148).
33 Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt maʿa šarḥ Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, (ed.) Sulaymān Dunyā (Beirut, 1992), pp. 224–225; ar-Rāzī, Manṭiq al-Mulaḫḫaṣ, pp. 124–125.
34 Az-Zamaḫšarī, al-Kaššāf, p. 440 (under Q. 9:66).
35 Ibn Wāṣil al-Ḥamawī, Commentary on the Jumal on Logic by Khūnajī, (ed.) K. El-Rouayheb (Leiden, 2022), p. 153. See also on this topic, Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, p. 102.
36 Az-Zamaḫšarī, al-Kaššāf, p. 440 (under Q. 9:66), provides two readings. The one that Ibn ʿArafah depends upon can be summarised thus: ‘If We may forgive some of you by virtue of repenting, We will punish others for insisting on their hypocrisy.’
37 I borrow this term from M. R. Baumer, ‘Sketch for a modal interpretation of Descartes’ Cogito’, Philosophy Research Archives 11 (1985), pp. 635–655, at p. 635, who fittingly defines logical exegesis as follows: ‘a two-stage operation or process, consisting of (1) formal interpretation of the content of a text within some logical system and (2) evaluation of the content of the text in terms of this formalization.’
38 Az-Zamaḫšarī, al-Kaššāf, p. 287 (under Q. 5:31).
39 On this idea, see Sībawayh, al-Kitāb, (ed.) ʿAbd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, five vols (Cairo, 1988), i, p. 99; Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī, Šarḥ Kitāb Sībawayh, (ed.) Aḥmad Ḥasan Mahdalī and ʿAlī Sayyid ʿAlī, five vols (Beirut, 2008), i, pp. 407–408.
40 Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ, (eds.) ʿIrfān al-ʿAšā Ḥassūnah et al., 11 vols (Beirut, 2010), iv, p. 235 (under Q. 5:27–38); as-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ad-Durr al-maṣūn fī ʿulūm al-Kitāb al-maknūn, (ed.) Aḥmad al-Ḫarrāṭ, 11 vols (Damascus, 1986), iv, pp. 245–247.
41 See, on this logical point, ar-Rāzī, Manṭiq al-Mulaḫḫaṣ, p. 321; Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, pp. 125–126.
42 For the Chrysippean indemonstrables, see S. Bobzien, ‘Logic’, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, (ed.) B. Inwood (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 85–123, at pp. 104–121.
43 See an indication to this question in Ibn ʿĀšūr, at-Taḥrīr wa-t-tanwīr, xx, p. 52 (under Q. 27:89). See also ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Muḥammad al-Ḫaṭīb, Saʿd ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Maṣlūḥ, and Raǧab Ḥasan al-ʿAllūš, al-Mawsūʿah al-Qurʾāniyyah: at-Tafṣīl fī iʿrāb āyāt at-tanzīl, 16 vols (Kuwait, 2015), x, p. 48.
44 The custom of many logical manuals is to mention the categorical proposition first, as it is more rudimentary than the hypothetical and it forms the basis of the hypothetical. In other words, the question is which type can be reduced to which; hence, the categorical is primary. See, for example, Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, p. 62.
45 Except if there is a subtle nuance from a rhetorical (balāġī) perspective.
46 Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm wa-s-sabʿ al-maṯānī, 30 vols (Beirut, n.d.) [an imprint of the edition of Idārat aṭ-Ṭibāʿah al-Munīriyyah], xiii, p. 43 (under Q. 12:85).
47 Abū Muḥammad Ibn ʿAṭiyyah, al-Muḥarrar al-waǧīz fī tafsīr al-Kitāb al-ʿazīz (Tafsīr Ibn ʿAṭiyyah), (eds.) A group of researchers, 10 vols (Doha, 2015), iii, p. 227 (under Q. 4:79–81); Muḥammad al-Qurṭubī, al-Ǧāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān, (eds.) ʿAbd al-Muḥsin at-Turkī et al., 24 vols (Beirut, 2006), vi, p. 468 (under Q. 4:79); al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī, v, pp. 89–91 (under Q. 4:79); Ibn ʿĀšūr, at-Taḥrīr wa-t-tanwīr, v, p. 131 (under Q. 4:78–79).
48 Naǧm ad-Dīn ʿUmar b. ʿAlī al-Qazwīnī al-Kātibī, ar-Risālah aš-Šamsiyyah fī al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah. Given as lemmata in al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī, al-Qawāʿid al-ǧaliyyah fī šarḥ ar-Risālah aš-Šamsiyyah, (ed.) Fāris Tabrīziyān (Qum, 1412 [1991]), pp. 252–253. The translation is from T. Street, ‘Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) and the early reception of Kātibī’s Shamsīya: notes towards a study of the dynamics of post-Avicennan logical commentary’, Oriens 44.3–4 (2016), pp. 267–300, at p. 283.
49 For extended discussions, see Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, pp. 65–70; al-Ḫabīṣī, at-Taḏhīb, pp. 245–251.
50 See az-Zamaḫšarī, al-Kaššāf, p. 195 (under Q. 3:135); Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ, iii, p. 348 (under Q. 3:133–141); as-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ad-Durr al-maṣūn fī ʿulūm al-Kitāb al-maknūn, iii, p. 396.
51 Ibn ʿAṭiyyah, al-Muḥarrar al-waǧīz, ii, p. 610 (under Q. 3:135–136).
52 On contraposition and the difference of opinion between the ancients and the later scholars concerning its nature, see ar-Rāzī, Manṭiq al-Mulaḫḫaṣ, pp. 200–203; Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, pp. 98–102; al-Ḥillī, al-Qawāʿid al-ǧaliyyah, p. 315.
53 Ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, xvi, p. 197 (under Q. 9:106).
54 Importantly, Niẓām ad-Dīn al-Ḥasan an-Naysābūrī, Tafsīr Ġarāʾib al-Qurʾān wa-raġāʾib al-furqān, (ed.) Zakariyyā ʿUmayrāt, six vols (Beirut, 1996), iii, p. 528 (under Q. 9:100–110), who was writing shortly after Ibn ʿArafah recorded that it was said—in response to those who entertained two options only—that the disjunctive hypothetical proposition is possibly anti-joining (wa-uǧība bi-annahū yaǧūzu an takūna l-munfaṣilatu māniʿata l-ǧamʿi faqaṭ).
55 See Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, p. 64; Saʿd Ġurāb (ed.), Risālatān fī al-manṭiq, p. 69.
56 See the various opinions in Makkī b. Abī Ṭālib al-Qaysī, al-Hidāyah ilā bulūġ an-nihāyah, (eds.) Zārah Ṣāliḥ et al., 13 vols (Sharjah, 2008), x, pp. 6691–6692 (under Q. 43:63); Ibn ʿAṭiyyah, al-Muḥarrar al-waǧīz, viii, pp. 646–647 (under Q. 43:63–68); al-Qurṭubī, al-Ǧāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān, xix, pp. 73–74 (under Q. 43:63–64); al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī, xxv, p. 96 (under Q. 43:63).
57 For the lemmata of al-Ǧumal and a commentary, see Ibn Wāṣil al-Ḥamawī, Commentary on the Jumal on Logic by Khūnajī, p. 96.
58 R. Wisnovsky, ‘Avicennism and exegetical practice in the early commentaries on the Ishārāt’, Oriens 41.3–4 (2013), pp. 349–378, at p. 376.
59 Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh, (ed.) Ṭāhā Ǧābir al-ʿAlwānī, six vols (Beirut, 1992), iii, p. 297.
60 Ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, iii, p. 247 (under Q. 2:106).
61 See, for example, Ibn Ṭumlūs (Alhagiag Bin Thalmus d. 620/1223), Compendium on Logic: al-Muḫtaṣar fī al-manṭiq, (ed.) F. Ben Ahmed (Leiden, 2019), pp. 208–211.
62 It is noticed here that Ibn ʿArafah implies that Ḏū al-Qarnayn represents Alexander the Great. See, on this point, B. M. Wheeler, Moses in the Quran and Islamic Exegesis (London, 2002), pp. 16–17.
63 See Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, pp. 89–90; al-Ḫabīṣī, at-Taḏhīb, p. 235.
64 Note that this is al-Basīlī’s interpretation as included in the footnote by the editor of al-Ubbī’s work.
65 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, Ǧāmiʿ al-bayān, xix, pp. 129–130 (under Q. 33:50); Ibn ʿAṭiyyah, al-Muḥarrar al-waǧīz, viii, pp. 31–32 (under Q. 33:50); al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī, xxii, pp. 53–54 (under Q. 33:50); Ibn ʿĀšūr, at-Taḥrīr wa-t-tanwīr, xxii, pp. 62–64 (under Q. 33:50).
66 Ibn ʿĀšūr, at-Taḥrīr wa-t-tanwīr, xxii, p. 64.
67 See, on this point, Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, pp. 67–68.
68 Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ, ix, p. 568 (under Q. 52:1–28); as-Samīn al-Ḥalabī, ad-Durr al-maṣūn fī ʿulūm al-Kitāb al-maknūn, x, pp. 64–65.
69 Makkī b. Abī Ṭālib al-Qaysī, Muškil iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, (ed.) Ḥātim Ṣāliḥ aḍ-Ḍāmin (Beirut, 1984), p. 690.
70 For a detailed discussion of this point, see Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār, Ḥāšiyah ʿalā Šarḥ at-Tahḏīb ([Cairo], 1318 [1900]), pp. 155–161. Invoking the notion that ‘the negative proposition does not require the existence of the subject’ in the service of tafsīr is found in some commentaries after Ibn ʿArafah in elucidating other verses of the Qur’an. See, for example, Burhān ad-Dīn al-Biqāʿī, Naẓm ad-durar fī tanāsub al-āyāt wa-s-suwar, 22 vols (Cairo, n.d.), xii, p. 348; Muḥammad al-Amīn b. Muḥammad al-Muḫtār aš-Šinqīṭī, Aḍwāʾ al-bayān fī īḍāḥ al-Qurʾān bi-l-Qurʾān, (ed.) Bakr b. ʿAbd Allāh Abū Zayd, seven vols (Beirut, 2019), iii, pp. 89–90.
71 Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ, ii, p. 205 (under Q. 2:183–188).
72 Ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, xiii, p. 227 (under Q. 6:142–144).
73 On the conditions of productivity for the second-figure, see ar-Rāzī, Manṭiq al-Mulaḫḫaṣ, pp. 259–261; Quṭb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah, p. 105.
74 Al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī, viii, p. 39 (under Q. 6:142).
75 For al-Ālūsī, see B. M. Nafi, ‘Abu al-Thanaʾ al-Alusi: an Alim, Ottoman mufti, and exegete of the Qurʾan’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34.3 (2002), pp. 465–494; Muḥsin ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, al-Imām al-Ālūsī wa-manhaǧuh fī at-tafsīr (Amman, 2015). On Ibn ʿĀšūr’s commentary, see B. M. Nafi, ‘Ṭāhir ibn ʿĀshūr: the career and thought of a modern reformist ʿālim, with special reference to his work of tafsīr’, Journal of Qur’anic Studies 7.1 (2005), pp. 1– 32; G. F. Haddad, ‘Tropology and inimitability: Ibn ʿĀshūr’s theory of tafsīr in the ten prolegomena to al-Taḥrīr wa’l-tanwīr’, Journal of Qur’anic Studies 21.1 (2019), pp. 50–111.
76 See al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī, xxii, p. 83 (under Q. 33:56).
77 Ar-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, xv, p. 149 (under Q. 8:20–23).
78 Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ, v, p. 301 (under Q. 8:15–38).
79 One might, however, posit that al-Ālūsī’s commentary on this verse is not based on Ibn ʿArafah at all, but is rather owing to other works, such as the epistle of the Ottoman scholar Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (d. 1205/1791), on which see Ahmed, ‘Logic of God’s knowledge’.
80 Al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī, ix, pp. 189–190 (under Q. 8:23).
81 For instance, al-Ālūsī refers, in this discussion, to the grammarian Ibn Hišām (d. 761/1360) and what he says on this matter in his important work on Arabic grammar, al-Muġnī. See Ǧamāl ad-Dīn Ibn Hišām al-Anṣārī, Muġnī al-labīb ʿan kutub al-aʿārīb, (eds.) Māzin al-Mubārak, Muḥammad ʿAlī Ḥamd Allāh, and Saʿīd al-Afġānī, two vols (Damascus, 1964), i, p. 288.
82 Al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-maʿānī, x, p. 132 (under Q. 9:66).
83 See their treatments in ʿIzz ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd as-Salām, Fawāʾid fī muškil al-Qurʾān, (ed.) Sayyid Riḍwān ʿAlī an-Nadwī (Jeddah, 1982), p. 129; Ibn Ḥaǧar al-Haytamī, al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīṯiyyah (Beirut, n.d.), p. 256.
84 Ibn ʿĀšūr, at-Taḥrīr wa-t-tanwīr, ix, pp. 306–311 (under Q. 8:20–23).
85 Ibn ʿĀšūr, at-Taḥrīr wa-t-tanwīr, x, pp. 252–253 (under Q. 9:66).
86 This is a debated issue. For some relevant works, see K. El-Rouayheb, ‘Sunni Muslim scholars on the status of logic, 1500-1800ʹ, Islamic Law and Society 11.2 (2004), pp. 213–232; M. Ali, ‘A statistical portrait of the resistance to logic by Sunni Muslim scholars based on the works of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (849-909/1448-1505)’, Islamic Law and Society 15.2 (2008), pp. 250–267.
87 Comparatively, one may point to Clement of Alexandria, on which E. Osborn, The Emergence of Christian Theology (Cambridge, 1993), p. 252, writes: ‘Logic and exegesis are mutually dependent for Clement; without a base in scripture, logic remains in the realm of opinion, and without the resources of logic, scripture can be twisted to mean anything.’ He also says: ‘Logical demonstration, as Clement understands it, ends as a method of biblical interpretation. Aristotle’s logic becomes Clement’s hermeneutic. Whereas rhetoric and dialectic, by themselves, lead to opinion, faith leads to true knowledge which expounds revelation with the precision of Greek logic’ (p. 255). See also S.-P. Bergjan, ‘Logic and theology in Clement of Alexandria: the purpose of the 8th book of the Stromata’, Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum/Journal of Ancient Christianity 12.3 (2008), pp. 396–413; M. Havrda, The So-Called Eighth Stromateus by Clement of Alexandria: Early Christian Reception of Greek Scientific Methodology (Leiden, 2017). For other attempts, see J. Marenbon, Boethius (New York, 2003), pp. 66–95; G. R. Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 140–163.