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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 August 2016
With the exception perhaps of extra premium, there is, it seems to me, noactuarial point in which the practice of assurance offices is so empiricalas that of the allowance to be given for the surrender of a policy. Theusual custom, so far as I am aware, is to find the value of the policy(generally by the table of mortality and interest used in calculating thereserve) and from that value to deduct a certain proportion, handing overthe remainder to the policyholder. The amount of this deduction is purelyarbitrary, and were it not for the equalizing effects of competition, wouldshow very startling diversities; since, even with this counteracting effect,the differences in practice can hardly help striking anyone who has examinedthe amounts given as surrender value by the various offices interested inlarge reassurance cases which from any reason do not follow the rule of theparent company. In fact, making any return whatever under discontinuedpolicies is the result of that struggle for existence called competition;and like all things growing from this root, the practice has been mouldedmuch more by the pressure of circumstances than by theoreticalconsiderations. Consequent on this method of growth we find extraordinaryand indefensible anomalies imperatively calling for rectification. Furtherit seems to me, looking at the matter as a purely practical question and notone of actuarial fitness at all, there is no point more needful ofexamination. As things are at present, nobody can say positively whether asits proportion of the value the assurance office retains too little or toomuch. If the former, the sooner a practice resulting in loss is reformed,the better.
page 385 note *
If ω–x be taken as 1, these formulæ become respectively For
the increasing assurance, , and for the
annuity,
.
page 390 note * Mr. Jellicoe, in a paper is the Assurance Magazine, volume viii, page 310, considers the cheaper price of annuities than assurances to be caused by Government competition in the former. No doubt this has something to do with it, but I am disposed to think the principal reason is that annuity transactions are a large and district branch of business, on which no bonuses are paid to bondholders. “With-profit” policyholders are content to pay more than is absolutely required for the risk, in consideration of the bonuses received; and as profit policies form the great bulk of assurance business, the non-profit class does not receive the same attention. Were profit policies done away with, I think the rates for non-profit assurances would from the effects of competition very soon approximate to those for annuities.